Judgment D. D. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Mr. S. K. Kakodkar, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M. S. Sonak and Mr. P. S. Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S. G. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by mr. V. P. Thali and Ms. G. Pednekar, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, mr. S. G. Dessai, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Dessai, the leaned Counsel for respondent No. 2 and Mr. A. F. Diniz, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3. ( 2 ) THE writ petition is directed against the order dated 28. 2. 2005 passed by the Honourable Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly, declaring the petitioner disqualified as a member of the House in accordance with clause 2 of para 2 of the Xth Schedule of the constitution of India as well under Article 191 (2) of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel placed before us the following facts and circumstances which have resulted in the Speaker passing the impugned order : on 1st June, 2002, the petitioner was elected as Member of the Goa Legislative Assembly from velim Constituency as an independent candidate. The petitioner extended support to the coalition ministry headed by shri Manohar Parrikar (the then Chief Minister ). The petitioner was a Minister in the said cabinet. The respondent No. 1 filed a petition before the Honourable Speaker under Clause (6) of the Tenth Schedule for disqualification of the petitioner under Clause 2 of Para 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of india alleging that the petitioner became a Member of Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) for short ). ( 4 ) ON 1st February, 2005, respondent No. 1 filed disqualification petition No. 2/05. The speaker issued publication of notice in the newspaper without making any efforts whatsoever to serve the petitioner personally. On 2nd February, 2005, an advertisement in the newspaper was published whereby the petitioner was asked to take notice that the disqualification petition was filed against him before the Honourable Speaker. The said notice also asked the petitioner to show cause why the interim relief of injunction prayed for in the disqualification petition be not granted against the petitioner. It was also stated in the said public notice that the matter was fixed for hearing on 2. 2. The said notice also asked the petitioner to show cause why the interim relief of injunction prayed for in the disqualification petition be not granted against the petitioner. It was also stated in the said public notice that the matter was fixed for hearing on 2. 2. 2005 at 10 a. m. before the Honourable Speaker in his chamber at Porvorim Legislative Assembly. It was also mentioned in the said notice that in case the petitioner remains absent for hearing in person and through his Advocate, duly authorised, the matter would be heard and determined in the absence of the petitioner, as per the text of the notice which was issued by the secretary, Goa Legislative assembly dated 1. 2. 2005 published in the local daily herald on 2. 2. 2005. ( 5 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel further contended that the petitioners Advocate appeared before the Speaker on 2. 2. 2005 at 10 a. m. and requested for time and the hearing of the petition was postponed till 12. 00 noon on the same day. The Advocate for the petitioner again at 12. 00 noon requested the Speaker to grant time. However, the request was rejected by the Speaker. No arguments were heard at 12. 00 noon on 2. 2. 2005 by the Speaker on the interim relief nor the date or the time was fixed for communication of the orders on interim relief and, therefore, the petitioner was not aware of passing of any interim relief by the speaker on the disqualification petition filed by respondent No. l and in the absence of any interim order, the petitioner was entitled to participate in the proceedings of the house. However, when the Assembly Session was going on, the petitioner was participating in the proceedings of the Assembly Session, the Speaker through police and Marshal physically removed the petitioner from the House by allegedly invoking Rule 289 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Busi- ness of the Goa Legislative Assembly, 1992 (hereinafter, referred to as the "goa Rules" ). It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the Honourable speaker allegedly issued interim order restraining the petitioner from taking part in the proceedings till the next date of hearing i. e. 4. 2. 2005 and if at all there was such an order, the same was never communicated to the petitioner. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the Honourable speaker allegedly issued interim order restraining the petitioner from taking part in the proceedings till the next date of hearing i. e. 4. 2. 2005 and if at all there was such an order, the same was never communicated to the petitioner. In view of the conflicting reports in the press, the petitioner applied for certified copy of the interim order on 7. 2. 2005 and it is only thereafter the certified copy of the said order was given to the petitioner. Non-communication of interim order to the petitioner was clearly to deny and deprive the petitioner from approaching the High court against such an illegal order. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the order dated 28. 2. 2005 which is impugned in the present petition was passed by the speaker in total violation of the principles of natural justice, which is also mala fide being irrational and suffers from total perversity and, therefore, it cannot be sustained in law for the following reasons : mr. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel has submitted that respondent No. 1 filed the disqualification petition with mala fide intention on account of political development that took place in goa at the relevant time. The alleged cause of action for disqualification of the petitioner, as per respondent no. 1, arose in October, 2002. The petition was filed on 1. 2. 2005 on the eve of assembly Session which was called by the governor of Goa on 2. 2. 2005 to consider the "vote of confidence" of Shri Manohar Parrikar led BJP coalition Government in Goa. The manner in which the petition was processed by the Speaker and the alleged interim order was passed by the Speaker on 2. 2. 2005 without giving even breathing time to the petitioner to putforth his defence and the happenings during the assembly proceedings on 2. 2. 2005, has caused bona fide apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that he would not get free and fair justice from the honourable Speaker Shri Vishwas Satarkar. ( 6 ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further contended that some time on 29th January, 2005 four BJP MLAS resigned from BJP Legislature Party. BJP had a strength of 17 Members in the Legislative assembly after the election results of June, 2002. ( 6 ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further contended that some time on 29th January, 2005 four BJP MLAS resigned from BJP Legislature Party. BJP had a strength of 17 Members in the Legislative assembly after the election results of June, 2002. Subsequently, its strength was increased to 21. When the Government was formed by BJP in June, 2002, the petitioner who was elected as an independent, extended support to the BJP Government and was also a Minister in the said cabinet. On 29. 1. 2005, the petitioner resigned as Minister and also withdrew the support to the BJP led coalition Government. Along with the petitioner, other Minister Shri Ramkrishna Dhavlikar also resigned as Minister and he along with his party i. e. Mahrashtrawadi Gomantak party also withdrew the support to the said coalition Government headed by Mr. Manohar Parrikar. As a result of these developments, the BJP Government in the State of Goa was reduced to minority. Indian National Congress (INC)) staked its claim before the Governor of Goa to form the Government. The petitioner extended support to the inc for formation of the Government. In this backdrop of the facts, the Governor summoned the assembly Session on 2nd February, 2002 at 2. 30 p. m. for Manohar Parrikar government to seek a vote of confidence in the House. This decision was announced by the Governor on 1. 2. 2005. The Notice was published in the local news paper whereby the petitioner was informed that the disqualification petition was field against him and he was called upon to appear before the speaker for hearing on disqualification petition at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005. The public notice did not indicate that any attempt was made to serve the copy of disqualification petition personally on the petitioner. It was specifically urged at the time of hearing that the service by publication in the news paper of the disqualification petition was not a valid service, since there was no attempt made to servethe petitioner personally. The Speaker, however, refused to grant time as prayed at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and only adjourned the matter till 12. 00 noon on the same day, di- reeting the petitioner to file reply within such a short time. The petitioner appeared through the Lawyer at 12. The Speaker, however, refused to grant time as prayed at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and only adjourned the matter till 12. 00 noon on the same day, di- reeting the petitioner to file reply within such a short time. The petitioner appeared through the Lawyer at 12. 00 noon and filed an application for grant of time by giving reason why the reply could not be prepared within such a short time. At 12. 00 noon on 2. 2. 2005, the matter was argued only as regards the prayer of the petitioner for time and on the point as to why the prayer of interim relief should not be considered without giving opportunity to the petitioner to file reply. The learned Counsel for the petitioner could not argue anything on interim relief for want of instructions from the petitioner. ( 7 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel has submitted that the Speaker rejected the application filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner for grant of time and reserved the order on interim injunction without hearing the petitioner on merits of the case. At the Assembly Session at 2. 30 pm. , during the recess time, the Honourable speaker invited the petitioner to his Chamber. However, the petitioner apprehended some untoward incident since the voting was to take place after recess on no confidence motion. Avoided to go to the Chamber of the honourable Speaker after recess time of Assembly Session on 2. 2. 2005. The Honourable Speaker directed to remove the petitioner from the House by exercising power under rule 289 of the Rules of Business. The petitioner was then removed from the House by force by Marshal. The intention of the speaker was quite evident that the petitioner somehow should not be permitted to participate n the Assembly Session, particularly because the petitioner had already withdrew his support to the Parrikar led coalition Government and the session was convened at the time when the INC claimed to have strength of 18 Members in 36 Members house, including the support of the petitioner. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the learned Senior counsel that the Office of the Speaker is an august office and in our system of Parliamentary democracy, the Speaker has to rise above party affiliation. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the learned Senior counsel that the Office of the Speaker is an august office and in our system of Parliamentary democracy, the Speaker has to rise above party affiliation. Unfortunately, the honourable Speaker Shri Satarkar in utter violation of this reach tradition of the Chair of the Speaker demonstrated the partisan attitude to serve the purpose of political party. The filing of the disqualification petition and taking cognizance by the Speaker at the relevant time was merely to save the BJP Government and the manner in which the proceedings of disqualification petition were processed by the Speaker without giving any time whatsoever to the petitioner to file reply and passing of the interim order in a hurry, there was a strong apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that he would not get free and fair and unbiased decision in the disqualification petition filed by respondent No. 1 and, therefore wanted the Speaker to disassociate with those proceedings of disqualification by referring them to the Privilege committee of the House. It is contended that no attempts were made by the Speaker to serve the petitioner on 1. 2. 2005 and the rejection of the request of grant of time made by the Lawyer of the petitioner at 10 a. m. and 12. 00 noon on 2. 2. 2005 by the Speaker, and passing of the alleged interim relief in total haste clearly demonstrate that the order impugned is mala fide, perverse and also violative of principles of natural justice. ( 9 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel further contended that apart from the above referred facts, there are other circumstances which further demonstrate that the conduct of the Speaker was biased and, therefore, the order impugned is mala fide and perverse. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the disqualification petition filed by respondent No. 1 was not in conformity with Rule 6 of the Disqualification rules which requires that every petition and annexures shall be signed by the person filing such petition and must be verified in the manner laid down in the Code of civil Procedure. It is submitted that the disqualification petition was not verified as per rule 6 of the Rules. Similarly, Rule 7 (2) provides that the Speaker shall dismiss such petition which is not in conformity with the requirement of Rule 6. It is submitted that the disqualification petition was not verified as per rule 6 of the Rules. Similarly, Rule 7 (2) provides that the Speaker shall dismiss such petition which is not in conformity with the requirement of Rule 6. However, in the instant case though the disqualification peti- tion was not in conformity with the requirement of rule 6, the Speaker for collateral consideration did not exercise the power under rule 7 (2) and did not dismissed the disqualification petition. Mr. Kakodkar, the learned senior Counsel further contended that Rule 6 (5) provides that every petition shall be accompanied by copies of documentary evidence on which the petitioner relies. In the instant case, the respondent No. 1 filed the disqualification petition on 1. 2. 2005 and the documents at serial Nos. 1 to 3 mentioned in the list of documents were produced before the Speaker at the time of hearing fixed at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and the document at serial No. 4 was produced at 12. 00 noon on 2. 2. 2005. It is, therefore, evident that the respondent No. 1 did not file any document along with the Disqualification petition on 1. 2. 2005 and, therefore, the disqualification petition ought to have been dismissed as per the mandate of Rule 7 (2) of the Rules. ( 10 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner is elected as an Independent MLA from Velim constituency during the elections held in may, 2002 and continues to be an independent MLA till this date and has never become a Member of the BJP legislature party. The petitioner is never been enrolled himself as primary or other member of the BJP. It is contended that Rule 3 of the Member of the goa Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rule, 1986 ("disqualification rules for short) provides that the leader of each legislature party (other than a legislature party consisting of only one member) shall, within thirty days after the first sitting of the House, furnish information to the Speaker in the form of statement containing the names of the member of the Legislature Party together with particulars in form-I. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 provides that whenever any change takes place in such information furnished, information should be furnished to the Speaker in respect of such change within 30 days thereafter. Rule 4 provides for information to be furnished by member in Form III and Rule 5 provides that the secretary of the Legislature shall maintain in form IV based on information under Rules 3 and 4. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner continues to be an independent MLA and has furnished the necessary information under Rule 4 of the Disqualification Rules. The BJP in its information under rule 3 has never given any information to the Speaker about its increase in strength on account of the alleged joining of the petitioner as Member of the BJP. It is contended that after October, 2002 Ghri atanasio Monserrate, MLA belonging to united Goan Democratic Party (UGDP) and shri Pandurang Madkaikar, MLA belonging to the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) joined the BJP which is rightly reflected in the bulletin issued by the Secretary (Legislature) after recording the above changes. In January, 2005, Shri Francisco Pacheco, mla belonging to the UGDP (Secular) joined the BJP. Bulletin was issued incorporating the above change as required under the rules. It is further contended by the learned senior Counsel that during the Assemblysessions held after October, 2002, BJP had issued whip to its legislators. Not once, the petitioner was issued whip by the BJP or his signature was obtained on the whip. In the bulletin issued by the Secretary as required under the Rules on 21. 12. 2004, the petitioner is shown as an independent MLA. It is, therefore, contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that there is no substance in the allegations made by respondent No. 1 in the disqualification petition that the petitioner has become the member of BJP or has joined the BJP, supporting the coalition Government headed by BJP as an independent MLA and, therefore, the membership books were handed over to him by the bjp Office to be handed over the same to their Velim representative Shri Valentino rebello and, therefore, the petitioner did not feel anything wrong in handing over the said membership books to Mr. Valentinho Rebello. Similarly, Mr. Valentinho Rebello had handed over to the petitioner some books along with cash of Rs. Valentinho Rebello. Similarly, Mr. Valentinho Rebello had handed over to the petitioner some books along with cash of Rs. 500/- for handing over the same in BJP Office at Panaji which also the peti- tioner did not consider anything wrong in doing so, particularly when the petitioner was supporting the coalition Government headed by BJP, as the independent MLA. The learned senior Counsel further contended that the disqualification petition filed by the respondent No. 1 on 1. 2. 2005 does not comply with the Rule 6 (4), 6 (5) and 6 (6) of the Disqualification Rules. The Speaker did not dismiss the disqualification petition by exercising the powers under Rule 7 (2) since respondent No. 1 did not comply with the requirement of Rule 6. The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 1 has alleged in the petition that the petitioner has joined BJP in October, 2002. There is no date on which the petitioner had joined bjp in October, 2002. The manner and method is not mentioned in the Disqualification petition. There is no allegation made in the petition that the petitioner was enrolled as primary member of the BJP. The copies of all the documents relied upon by the respondent No. 1 were not annexed with the disqualification petition. The petitioners advocate was given copy of the petition at 10. 00 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005. Copies of three listed documents were produced before the Speaker at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and copy of the fourth document was produced by respondent No. 1 at 12 noon son 2. 2. 2005 before the Speaker. The originals of such documents were not filed on record by respondent No. 1. Copies of the photos annexed with the petition are the photographs taken at the alleged BJP convention held in September, 2003. Negatives of all those photographs were not produced before the Speaker. The copy of the register issuing member ship book, signature of the petitioner acknowledging receipt of membership, similarly copy of the register of collection of membership book, the petitioners signature in token of return of membership book of Velim Constituency though not disputed by the petitioner, however, no enrolment form of any members out of 700 members allegedly enrolled by the petitioner was produced before the Speaker by respondent No. 1. Of the alleged enrolment form of the petitioner for membership of the BJP dated 16. Of the alleged enrolment form of the petitioner for membership of the BJP dated 16. 11. 2002, only xerox copy was accompanied with the application filed by respondent No. 1 on 15. 11. 2002. No reference was made to this documents (enrollment form dated 16. 11. 2002) nor was it annexed with the disqualification petition. The petitioner opposed the production of all the documents by application dated 16. 2. 2005 by specifically denying the signature thereon. The alleged enrollment form dated 16. 11. 2002 related to the period 2003-2008 and, therefore, could not have been used for enrolling the member on 16. 11. 2002. There are no allegations in the disqualification petition that the petitioner had paid the membership fee of rs. 5/- or issued receipt therefor. The petitioner since not knowing Marathi could not have submitted the enrollment form in marathi. The membership form dated 16. 11. 2002 alleged to have been filled in by the petitioner is in Marathi. ( 11 ) ASSUMING without admitting that the purported enrollment form only expresses desire to become the member, the filing of such form does not make the applicant a member. The membership of a private association can never be a matter of right. Some certificate or membership is necessary to show and establish that the particular person is admitted as a member of the organisation. Admittedly, the original of the alleged enrollment form is not available in the record of proceedings which was in the custody of the Speaker. That after passing of the impugned order of disqualification, the then speaker resigned and carried away the record of the proceedings and returned it to the speakers Office only on 2. 3. 2005. This was clearly intended to show that there was original available and may have been misplaced to avoid presumption of forgery by respondent No. 1. The inspection of the original documents, including the document dated 16. 11. 2002 was given to the petitioner and mention of it in the Roznama dated 19. 2. 2005 is completely false and is also evident from the fact that there is no original of the document dated 16. 11. 2002 in the record of the Speaker. The Affidavit of satish Dhond, General Secretary of BJP pro- duced on 19. 2. 2005 was objected to by the petitioner as false. The said affidavit is also not verified according to law. 11. 2002 in the record of the Speaker. The Affidavit of satish Dhond, General Secretary of BJP pro- duced on 19. 2. 2005 was objected to by the petitioner as false. The said affidavit is also not verified according to law. ( 12 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 had stated before the speaker that he would not lead any evidence (see Roznama dated 16. 2. 2005 as well as the impugned order) and could not have been permitted by the Speaker to substitute the affidavit evidence to achieve the same object indirectly. No opportunity was offered to the petitioner by the Speaker to cross-examine mr. Satish Dhond. As far as copy of the BJP electoral Roll of Velim Constituency is concerned, there is no reference to this document in the disqualification proceedings. It is a computer print out, and does not show who computed the chart and on what date. It is clearly a manipulated computer product and was produced only after the Speaker asked for it. ( 13 ) VALENTINHO Rebello for whom the alleged membership books were collected by the petitioner was himself enrolled as a member on 19. 11. 2002; whereas the petitioner alleged to have been made member of BJP on 16. 11. 2002. The allegations made by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner cannot be taken as authentic or genuine. Even otherwise, the alleged enrollment form is the document made by the BJP over which the petitioner had no control. The petitioner knows nothing about the news paper, which is based on the alleged enrollment form dated 16. 11. 2002 and the petitioner has denied having signed the said enrollment form, the original thereof is also not on record, such a fabricated document should not have been relied upon by the Speaker as an admissible evidence to hold that the petitioner has incurred disqualification. Gomant shakti is not a news paper and it is an in- house magazine of BJP for private circulation among the members and the contents thereof in Marathi could not be known to the petitioner to contradict since the petitioner does not know Marathi. ( 14 ) MR. Kakodkar, the leaned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has advanced the following legal contentions in order to demonstrate that the impugned order passed by the honourable Speaker is not sustainable in law. ( 14 ) MR. Kakodkar, the leaned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has advanced the following legal contentions in order to demonstrate that the impugned order passed by the honourable Speaker is not sustainable in law. It is contended that the purport and requirement of Paragraph 2 (l) (a) of the Tenth schedule is completely different and distinct than that of the requirement of Paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule and therefore, the approach of the Court to interpret paragraph 2 (2) must be different from the approach to interpret paragraph 2 (1) (a) of Tenth Schedule. Paragraph 2 (1) applies to a member of a political party voluntarily giving up his membership of such political party and thereby incurs disqualification. Whereas paragraph 2 (2) requires the elected member of the House otherwise than a candidate set up by the political party, if joins, any political party after such election, incurs disqualification under this clause. It is, therefore, contended that they are two clauses distinct and separate. The members of political party are elected on the party manifesto. Whereas, the person contesting the election as an independent, has no manifesto for governance. He is elected purely on the promises given by him to the constituency to use his office to voice grievances of the the constituency in the Legislative Assembly. Mr. Kakodkar, the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the judgments based on paragraph 2 (1 ) (a) of Tenth Schedule have no relevance and cannot, therefore, be construed to be the guidelines to interpret paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule. ( 15 ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the important point to be borne in mind in construing the expression "join" in Paragraph 2 (2) is that the Member of Legislative Party is not denied the freedom of association guaranteed by article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. There is no prohibition on the members of the legislative assembly to associate with each other or attend political conventions. The court will have to reconcile the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (c) and the provisions of paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule. There is no prohibition on the members of the legislative assembly to associate with each other or attend political conventions. The court will have to reconcile the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (c) and the provisions of paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule. ( 16 ) IT is contended by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the coalition government being the order of the day, the freedom to associate with members of other political party must be greater than the one when there was two parties rule. The members of a political party or the independents supporting a coalition Government are committed to support the programmes and policies of the rival political party in majority in the legislature leading the coalition government. Indeed, if they are prohibited from doing so, there will be no democratic Government in the country, particularly when no single party is getting the majority to form the Government. It is vehemently contended that while interpreting and construing the expression "join" used in Paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule, the Court should take into consideration the above referred contemporary political scenario. In the backdrop of the above referred facts, the expression "join" cannot be interpreted loosely or in an elastic manner, but it must be rigorously limited as applicable to exceptional cases where the conduct clearly demonstrates that such independent elected member of the House has joined any political party after such election. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that as far as Courts are concerned, the safe rule is to limit to cases where it is a proven fact that the independent MLA is enrolled as a member of the political party or expressly admits that he has joined the political party. In coalition culture, mere fact of associating with the members of the political party to which the support is extended by the independent MLA itself does not attract disqualification under Clause 2 (2) of the tenth Schedule. It is submitted that so far as decision of this Court in the case of (Narsingrao Gurunath Patil and others v. Arun gujarathi, Speaker and Ors.)1,2003 (1) Bom. It is submitted that so far as decision of this Court in the case of (Narsingrao Gurunath Patil and others v. Arun gujarathi, Speaker and Ors.)1,2003 (1) Bom. C. R. 363 is rendered by this Court in view of the contingencies mentioned in Clause 2 (l) (a) of the Tenth Schedule and, therefore, the criteria and the requirement for incurring disqualification under Clause 2 (2) being different and distinct, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench of this Court in the said Judgment cannot be ipso facto made applicable in the present case where the disqualification alleged to have been incurred by the petitioner under Clause 2 (2) of the tenth Schedule. ( 17 ) IT is contended that the Apex Court in the case of (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and ors.)2, (1992 Supp. (2) S. C. C. 651) considered the scheme and interpretation of Clause 2 (1 ) (a) of Tenth Schedule and, therefore, merely because in paragraph 13 of its Judgment though it is observed that the same yardstick is applicable to the person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election, in that sense, it does not reflect that the said observations were made by the Apex court after taking into consideration the scheme and requirement of the provisions of paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule. ( 18 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel contended that the provisions of tenth Schedule needs to be construed strictly and rigorously complied with and the Rules framed thereunder must also be complied with by the Speaker while dealing with the reference under paragraph 6 of Tenth Schedule. In order to substantiate his contention, reliance is placed on the Judgment of the apex Court in the case (Sadashiv H. Patil v. Vithal D. Tcke and ors.), 2000 (8) S. C. C. 82. It is further contended by the learned Senior counsel that since the Rules of Procedure are evolved by the Speaker in view of Clause 8 of Tenth Schedule, he is required to follow those Rules to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution and non-adoption of procedure by the Speaker prescribed under the rules cannot be sidelined as mere procedure or no consequence. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Mayawativ. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Mayawativ. Makandeya Chand and others), 1998 (7) S. C. C. 517. ( 19 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel further contended that the Speaker acts as a Tribunal while considering the disqualification and, therefore, the Indian Evidence Act is applicable to the proceedings of disqualification. It is submitted that the speaker was only entitled to consider and rely only on the evidence placed before respondent No. 1 in the form of petition or other documents which were admissible as well as substantial and cogent. It is contended that the Honourable Speaker, in the impugned order itself has observed that he has, in fact, followed certain provisions of the Evidence act, such as section 73 white-comparing fee-disputed signature of the petitioner. It is, therefore, contended that the Honourable speaker having accepted the fact that the provisions of the Evidence Act were applicable, ought not to have permitted respondent no. 1 to place on record the documents No. 1 to 4 without filing the original thereof on record. In other words, after the documents which are filed in the form of xerox copies of the originals or otherwise, without filing the originals thereof, the Speaker should not have or ought not to have considered those documents and should not have relied upon those documents since the said documentary evidence was completely inadmissible in law and, therefore, the order impugned suffers from inherent infirmity and, therefore, has resulted into absurdity and irrationality. ( 20 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel, without admitting has submitted that though it is presumed for the sake of argument that the Tribunals are entitled to act on any material which is logically prohibited even though it is not evidence in the court of law even then while assessing the evidence, the Tribunal must consider before accepting the same as to whether such evidence is logically prohibitive and is cogent. However, relying on such evidence, the Tribunal cannot deviate from the rules of natural justice and fair play and an opportunity must have to be given to the other side to putforth his defence. The learned Senior counsel submitted that the Tribunal examined the evidence in a perverse manner and drew the conclusions which, on the face of it, are erroneous. The learned Senior counsel submitted that the Tribunal examined the evidence in a perverse manner and drew the conclusions which, on the face of it, are erroneous. This would, obviously is a patent perversity in appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal and rendering the conclusion based on such perverse appreciation of evidence, is not only absurd but totally perverse. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed by the learned Senior counsel on the case of (Haji Zainullah Khan v. Nagar Mahapalika), 1994 (5) S. C. C. 667. Mr. Kakodkar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the instant case, in view of the sequence of events, the manner in which the speaker initiated the proceedings of disqualification against the petitioner, the time of entertaining the disqualification petition in regard to the cause of action which had taken place long time ago and not giving even a breathing time to the petitioner to file reply before passing the interim order which was virtually in the nature of final order, the petitioner had expressed his apprehension that he would not get the fair and unbiased justice at the hands of the Speaker Vishwas satarkar and, therefore, in such a situation, in view of Rule 7 (4) of the Disqualification Rules, the Honourable Speaker should have referred the disqualification to the Privilege Committee. However, by avoiding to take recourse provided under Rule 7 (4) of the Rules, the Honourable Speaker retained the disqualification petition before himself and proceeded to pass orders, which clearly demonstrates the oblique motive to prevent the petitioner from participating in the vote of confidence which the Parrikar Government was to obtain on the Floor of the House on 2. 2. 2005 and, therefore, the final order dated 28. 2. 2005 suffers from biased and is also mala fide. It is contended that it was the duty of the speaker, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to refer the disqualification petition filed by the respondent No. 1 to the privilege Committee of the House. In order to avoid the allegations of bias and mala fides, in fact it was not necessary for the petitioner to ask the Speaker to refer the petition to the privilege Committee, but the Honourable speaker ought to have suo motu referred the petition to the Privilege Committee in the interest of justice and fair play. In order to avoid the allegations of bias and mala fides, in fact it was not necessary for the petitioner to ask the Speaker to refer the petition to the privilege Committee, but the Honourable speaker ought to have suo motu referred the petition to the Privilege Committee in the interest of justice and fair play. Reliance in this regard is placed on the Judgment of the Apex court in the case of (Dr. Wilfred A. de Souza and others v. Shri Thomazinho Cardozo and others), 1999 (1) Bom. C. R. 594. ( 21 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel has vehemently argued that the breach of Disqualification Rules 3 and 4 would not only mean the breach of procedure, but it also violates the constitutional mandate in the sense that these are the rules which are meant to implement the mandate of the Constitution incorporated in Clause 2 of Tenth Schedule and, therefore, the impugned order which is passed by the Speaker ignoring these aspects and relying only on inadmissible, uncorroborated documentary evidence submitted by respondent No. 1 clearly renders the said order not only mala fide, but is also perverse. It is vehemently contended by Mr. Kakodkar, the learned senior Counsel that the conclusion as to mala fides must necessarily be drawn as an inference from the facts and the conduct cannot be accounted as a normal reaction to a situation and there is no necessity to prove the mala fides by factual evidence. Similarly, where the admitted circumstances and record demonstrate contrary, in such situation merely denial of bias by the respondent no. 1 is of no avail. It is contended that the circumstances in which the disqualification proceedings were pressed by the Speaker and passing of the interim order and not granting even a breathing time to file reply to the petitioner, are the circumstances which demonstrate the bias conduct of the Speaker, which has resulted in passing the impugned order of disqualification of the petitioner. ( 22 ) IN so far as the concept of perversity is concerned, it is contended by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and ors. (supra), it is clear that the reasonable person must direct himself properly in law. ( 22 ) IN so far as the concept of perversity is concerned, it is contended by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and ors. (supra), it is clear that the reasonable person must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from matters which are irrelevant. If he does not obey these rules, he may truly be acting unreasonably and the conclusions recorded in such a situation undoubtedly would be perverse and such a conclusion cannot be sustained in law. It is further contended that in case of Mayawati (supra), srinivasan, J. has referred to a passage in de Smith which states that unreasonableness is acting in bad faith. The Judgment in the case of (Tata Cellular v. Union of India), 1994 (6) S. C. C. 651 also made reference to a passage in (Union of India and anr. v. G. Ganayuthan)8, 1997 (7) S. C. C. 463, which, inter alia, states that the findings arrived at not bonafide are unreasonable. ( 23 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel has argued that the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand, what it means is that no material can be relied upon to establish contested facts which are not spoken of by the persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. It is further contended that even if it is presumed for the sake of argument that even if all technicalities of the evidence Act are not strictly applicable, however, it is a perversity if the Tribunal acts on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify basing its conclusion on the copies of the documents when the originals are not produced and proved. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workman and ors.), A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 330. ( 24 ) MR. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workman and ors.), A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 330. ( 24 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, however, when the signature is strongly disputed by the party who alleged to have signed the document, the normal course is to send such document to the Handwriting Expert rather than the Judge doing the job of the handwriting expert. Mr. Kakodkar, the learned Senior Counsel fur- ther contended that the observation of the speaker in the Roznamadated 19. 2. 2005 that he gave the inspection of the alleged enrollment form dated 16. 11. 2002 (original), cannot be accepted as correct. There is no entry in the Roznama that the original of the xerox form was produced or received by the speaker. It is also contended that the affidavit filed by the Secretary (Legislature) dated 29 /11 /05 also confirms that there was nothing in the roznama nor the original membership form dated 16. 11. 2002 was placed on record of the Speaker. It is, therefore, contended that in the absence of the original, placing reliance on the mere xerox copy by the Speaker arid passing the order of disqualification on that basis is an order which is totally perverse. ( 25 ) MR. Kakodkar, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that the decision of the Speaker or the order of disqualification passed by the Honourable speaker can only be challenged on the ground of violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the Judgments of the Supreme court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and ors, (supra) and in the case of (Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singhv. Chairman, bihar Legislative Council and ors.), 2004 (8) s. C. C. 747. Mr. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the Judgments of the Supreme court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and ors, (supra) and in the case of (Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singhv. Chairman, bihar Legislative Council and ors.), 2004 (8) s. C. C. 747. Mr. Kakodkar, therefore, contended that the impugned order is passed by the Speaker in total violation of principles of natural justice with the oblique motive, based on extraneous circumstances and, therefore, the same is irrational and perverse. Hence, the same cannot be sustained in law. ( 26 ) MR. Anay, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that though the Courts have a power of judicial review they would not normally interfere with the order passed by the Speaker in view of the mandate of Clause 7 of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It is contended that the power of judicial review of the order of disqualification passed by the Speaker and the extent thereof is considered by the Supreme court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and ors, (supra ). It is submitted hat the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan clearly demonstrates that the judicial review is available under articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution only when the Speakers order contains infirmity based on violation of constitutional mandate, non-compliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. It is further contended that the Supreme Court in Kihoto hollohan s case has expressed that the limited scope of the interference available to courts is not to be seen as an infringement on the courts power of judicial review, but is a acknowledgment by the Courts of Parliamentary traditions which result from an evolution of the institution of parliamentary democracy and high position of primacy of the speaker. It is submitted that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of kihoto Hollohan in respect of power of judicial review of the Court and extent thereof has been followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of (Ravi Naik v. Union of India), 19943 (2) S. C. C. 641 and Mayavati (supra) and by this High Court in Arun Gujaratis case. Mr. Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the petitioner can invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 only on the ground of violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with the rules of natural justice, and perversity. It is contended that the petitioner has utterly failed to make out any case on these points and, therefore, the petition is devoid of substance. ( 27 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the contention of the petitioner that there is sharp distinction between paragraph 2 (1) (a) and paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule, which operates in two different situations inasmuch as the former applies to a member of a house "belonging to any political party" voluntarily giving up his membership of such political party, while the later applies to an independent member of the House if he "joins" any political party after his election cannot be accepted, inter alia, because the object of Tenth schedule is to ensure political stability and curb the political defection. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme. The provisions of Xth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by the political party is so elected on the basis of the programme ofthat political party. It is submitted that the Supreme court has consistently observed that the provisions of paragraph 2 (1) (a) of Tenth schedule proceeds on the premise that the political propriety and morality demand that if after the election an elected member changes his affiliation and leaves the political parry which had set him up as a candidate, then he should give up his membership of the legislature and go back to the electorate to seek a fresh mandate. It is contended that it is no doubt true that the elected representatives have right to freedom of speech, right to dissent and freedom of conscience. However, the Supreme Court in Kihoto hollohans case has expressed that these rights and freedoms are not absolute and concluded that the anti-defection law recognizes the need to stop unprincipled defection. It is contended that it is no doubt true that the elected representatives have right to freedom of speech, right to dissent and freedom of conscience. However, the Supreme Court in Kihoto hollohans case has expressed that these rights and freedoms are not absolute and concluded that the anti-defection law recognizes the need to stop unprincipled defection. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan has specifically held that the same yardstick is to be applied to a person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after election. Mr Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has, therefore, contended that the contention canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the law laid down by the Apex Court in Kihoto hollohans case and Narsingrao Gurunath patil and ors. (supra) case applies only to the disqualification incurred in paragraph 2 (1) (a) and is not applicable to paragraph 2 (2) of tenth Schedule of the Constitution, is misconceived. It is contended that the language used in paragraph 2 (l) (a) and Paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule clearly demonstrates that both these provisions have been evolved to curb the vice of defection and breach of electoral mandate. ( 28 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ravi Naiks case does not lay down that the logic applied to a case under paragraph 2 (l) (a) of the Tenth Schedule, is different from the one to be applied in a case under paragraph 2 (2 ). Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the argument of the petitioner as regards the speakers order being in violation of constitutional mandate is that the petitioners status was shown as an independent in the bulletin Part II dated 21. 12. 2004. It is contended that this bulletin was published on the basis of Form III submitted under Rule 4 of Goa Assembly rules, which are framed under Clause 8 of the Tenth Schedule. It is contended that the rules of 1986 are the rules framed by the speaker to regulate the procedure to be followed by him for exercising power conferred on him under Clause 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule. It is contended that the rules of 1986 are the rules framed by the speaker to regulate the procedure to be followed by him for exercising power conferred on him under Clause 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule. The said rules are, therefore, subordinate legislation, procedural in nature and cannot be equated to or given the constitutional status of the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule. The violation of the said Rules, therefore, would only amount to an irregularity in procedure, which is immune from judicial review in view of paragraph 6 (2) of the Tenth Schedule in view of the law laid down by the Supreme court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan and followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of (Dr. Luis Proto Barbosa v. Union of India and others), 1990 (Supp.) Bom. C. R. (P. B.)56 : 1991 (2) Mh. L. J. 873 : 1992 S (2) s. C. C. 644, Raui Naik (supra), Mayawati (supra), and narsingrao G. Patil and others (supra ). Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the contention canvassed by the petitioner in this regard, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court is devoid of substance. ( 29 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that even if the speaker had to proceed under Rule 7 (4), the privilege Committee was headed at the relevant time by the Deputy Speaker, who was also a Member of BJP and the majority member of the said Committee were also Members of BJP and, therefore, the allegations of bias would also apply even against the said committee. It is pertinent to note that even by referring the petition to the Privilege Committee by the speaker for preliminary inquiry and for submitting report to the Speaker, it is only the Speaker under Rule 7 (6) of the said Rules is required to proceed to determine the question as soon as, may be, after receipt of the report from the said Committee. It is, therefore, not understood as to how the allegations of bias could be circumvented or overcome even if the Speaker would have referred the disqualification petition to the said Committee under Rule 7 (4) of the Rules. ( 30 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the decision in the case of Dr. It is, therefore, not understood as to how the allegations of bias could be circumvented or overcome even if the Speaker would have referred the disqualification petition to the said Committee under Rule 7 (4) of the Rules. ( 30 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the decision in the case of Dr. Wilfred Dsouza (supra) was given in the facts of that case and is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there was no confidence motion moved against the Speaker which was to be taken up on 29. 7. 98 before which on 28. 7. 98 itself the Speaker had passed the ex parte ad interim order restraining 10 MLAs from voting, there by defeating the said no confidence motion moved against him and which was to be taken on the next date. It is further contended that it was specifically submitted before the Speaker that the issues of bias and mala fides be decided first as preliminary issues. In the present case, there was no such request made by the petitioner before the Speaker and, therefore, the decision of this Court in case of Dr. Wilfred Dsouza (supra) does not help the petitioner. ( 31 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel further contended that under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is the only Authority envisaged for deciding the disqualification petition and, therefore, the doctrine of necessity is clearly attracted in such cases. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the Judgment in the case of (Election Commission of India v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy), 1996 (4) S. C. C. 104. It is submitted that whenever the proceedings in the form of petition for disqualification of the Member of the House is brought before the Speaker, the Speaker is expected to act quickly on the basis of the evidence placed before him in order to comply with the mandate of the Constitution enumerated in paragraph 2 of the Tenth schedule. It is submitted that whenever the proceedings in the form of petition for disqualification of the Member of the House is brought before the Speaker, the Speaker is expected to act quickly on the basis of the evidence placed before him in order to comply with the mandate of the Constitution enumerated in paragraph 2 of the Tenth schedule. It is contended that if the Member of the House incurs disqualification under any of the contingencies contained in Clause 2 of the Tenth Schedule, in that case, such member loses his right to be a Member of the House and, therefor, the Speaker under clause 6 of Tenth Schedule has to act quickly in view of the doctrine of necessity in order to comply with the mandate of Clause (2) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. It is, therefore, contended that the provisions of the Disqualification Rules and the powers exercised by the Speaker are perfectly consistent with the scheme of the Tenth Schedule and there is no othef^motive which can be attributed to the conduct of the Speaker only because the Speaker has acted while conducting the proceedings, efficiently. It is submitted that the respondent No. 1 filed the disqualification petition before the Speaker on 1. 2. 2005 at about 5. 30 p. m. which was accompanied by the affidavit of Rajendra ganu and list of documents. The Speaker tried to personally serve the notice of the petition on the petitioner. On 2. 2. 2005, notice of the disqualification petition was published in the news papers whereby the petitioner was informed that the disqualification petition was filed against him before the speaker and the matter was fixed for hearing on 2. 2. 2005 at 10 a. m. before the Speaker for consideration of ad interim relief of injunction against the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to remain present for the hearing in person and/or through his Advocate. It is submitted by Mr. Aney the learned Senior counsel that attempt to serve the petitioner personally was made by the Speakers Office at 7. 30 a. m. at "casa Monserrate" at Taleigao. The Serving Officer was informed that the petitioner was not available at the said place and had gone to Velim for getting ready for the Assembly. It is further contended that the Serving Officer went to Velim at the petitioners residence to serve the notice of the petition. 30 a. m. at "casa Monserrate" at Taleigao. The Serving Officer was informed that the petitioner was not available at the said place and had gone to Velim for getting ready for the Assembly. It is further contended that the Serving Officer went to Velim at the petitioners residence to serve the notice of the petition. However, the petitioner was not available at his residence and the petitioners wife refused to accept the said notice. It is contended that though the aforesaid facts were denied by the petitioner, mere denial by the petitioner could not change the record of the proceedings of the Speaker. On the other hand, it is evident that the attempt of personal service was made by the Speakers office. Though there is no requirement under the disqualification Rules that personal service is required to be effected on the person against whom such petition is filed, it is contended that in any event, after reading the public notice, the petitioner was given opportunity to appear before the Speaker at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005. Mr. Aney, the learned senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the argument of the petitioner that there was mala fide and bias on the part of the Speaker for not serving the notice personally to him, is completely misconceived. It is submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that the allegation of the petitioner that no such attempt of personal service was made by him is correct, even then there is no bar in the Tenth Schedule or Rules, prohibiting the Speaker from passing ex parte order if the circumstances so require. ( 32 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel further contended that on 2. 2. 2005 at 10 a. m. , the petitioner filed an application for adjournment of time by 15 days. The copy of the petition and the list of documents along with the documents at serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 which were mentioned in the said list, were given to the petitioner. The inspection of original documents at serial Nos. 1,2, and 3 was also given to the petitioner at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and it is only thereafter, in view of the urgency in the matter and in order to give opportunity to the petitioner, the hearing on interim relief was adjourned to 12 noon on 2. 2. 2005. 1,2, and 3 was also given to the petitioner at 10 a. m. on 2. 2. 2005 and it is only thereafter, in view of the urgency in the matter and in order to give opportunity to the petitioner, the hearing on interim relief was adjourned to 12 noon on 2. 2. 2005. It is contended that at 12 noon, copy of the document at serial No. 4 of the list of documents was also given to the petitioner. Inspection of original of the document was also given to the petitioner. The petitioner again filed an application for adjournment which was rejected by the Speaker. The speaker at 1/2 noon considered the arguments of the Advocates for the parties on interim relief and the parties were informed that the order would be communicated to them. Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the allegation of the petitioner that no arguments were heard on interim relief is contrary to the record. Another contention of the petitioner that the principles of natural justice were violated because he was not given the copies of the documents, is also without any basis and contrary to the record. It is submitted that the sequence of events referred to hereinabove clearly demonstrate that the speaker in view of the urgency of the situation and as per the doctrine of necessity though acted quickly, but after following the proper procedure and in bona fide manner, after complying with the principles of natural justice. ( 33 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that on 2. 2. 2005 at 2. 30 p. m. the proceedings of the Assembly started and the motion of confidence was moved by Mr. Parrikar in the Assembly house, which was debated. The petitioner was present in the House. There was recess at about 4. 00 p. m. The Speaker at about 4. 40 p. m. called both the parties in his Chamber. Respondent No. 1 was present in person. The petitioner remained absent. Order was pronounced on interim relief, restraining the petitioner from voting or participating in the house proceedings till the next date of hearing and the matter was fixed on 4. 2. 2005. It is submitted that when the House assembled after recess, the Speaker conveyed the interim order to the petitioner through the secretary. The petitioner remained absent. Order was pronounced on interim relief, restraining the petitioner from voting or participating in the house proceedings till the next date of hearing and the matter was fixed on 4. 2. 2005. It is submitted that when the House assembled after recess, the Speaker conveyed the interim order to the petitioner through the secretary. However, the petitioner did not leave the House, and, therefore, the petitioner had to be taken out of the House by the speaker by invoking powers under section 289 of the Rules. Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that the interim order was not only passed after hearing both sides, but was also conveyed through the Secretary. Thus, the argument of the petitioner about mala fides and bias on the part of the Speaker cannot be accepted. It is contended that the mis-behaviour of the petitioner in the House after the recess on 2. 2. 2005 resulted in his removal was obviously associable to the Speaker's attempt to implement his interim order and the petitioner's refusal to abide by it. ( 34 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that there are no direct or personal allegations of mala fides against the honourable Speaker. The allegations of mala fides are easy to make but difficult to prove and hence requires very high degree of standard of proof. The mala fides must be proved by factual evidence and cannot be inferred from insinuations, conjectures or surmises. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of (Pralapsing v. State of Punjab), A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 72 and the case of (E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil nadu), 1974 (4) S. C. C. 3. The allegations of facts are required to be proved by the petitioner herein by leading cogent evidence. Inspite of giving ample opportunities by the honourable Speaker in that regard, the petitioner not only did not examine himself, but failed to lead any evidence on his behalf. In fact, it is evident from the Roznama on record of the Speaker that the petitioner had filed an application dated 16. 2. 2005 that he did not want to lead any oral evidence. In fact, it is evident from the Roznama on record of the Speaker that the petitioner had filed an application dated 16. 2. 2005 that he did not want to lead any oral evidence. It is, therefore, contended that the allegations of the petitioner regarding mala fides, bias on the part of the Speaker are baseless and that the Speaker has acted judicially in discharge of his constitutional obligation which is clear from the impugned order. ( 35 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended that on 4. 2. 05, the reply was filed by the petitioner to the application for disqualification. In that reply, the petitioner neither specifically raised any objection of bias or mala fides nor demanded that this issue be decided first as an preliminary issue. The petitioner has also not made any request in his reply to the Speaker that the petition be referred to the Privilege Committee under rule 7 (4) of the Disqualification Rules. It is submitted that the petitioner has in the course of hearing before the speaker admitted his signatures on the documents at serial Nos. 1 and 2 of the List of documents as well as the fact that he had participated in the Sixth State BJP Conference held in the last week of September, 2003 and addressed from the podium and seconded a political resolution. The petitioner also did not dispute the affidavit of Shri Ganu filed in support of the petition. The petitioner merely denied the fact of becoming member of BJP. However, did not annex any affidavit of Valentino Rebello nor did he request for issuing summons for examining said Rebello, so as to establish his contention that he was only acting on behalf of Mr. Rebello, as Postman in collecting 40 membership books on 16. 11. 2002 from the BJP Office and returned 28 of them duly filled by the newly enrolled primary members. Mr. Aney, the learned senior Counsel has contended that the petitioner himself, for the first time, applied for certified copy of the interim order on 7. 2. 2005 and has not given any explanation or reason as to why he could not apply for the certified copy of the interim order immediately on 2. 2. 05 or at least on the next date. 2. 2005 and has not given any explanation or reason as to why he could not apply for the certified copy of the interim order immediately on 2. 2. 05 or at least on the next date. It is, therefore, contended that it is the petitioner who himself is responsible for not taking any action to obtain the certified copy of the interim order and for his own action, the speaker cannot be said to be responsible, nor can it be said that the interim order was not served by the Speaker on the petitioner with mala fide intention. It is contended that on 11. 2. 05, respondent No. 1 filed his rejoinder. The petitioner filed an application stating that he wanted to file sur-rejoinder. It is contended that the parties were given all the opportunities to produce the pleadings, documents etc. on 14. 2. 05 by the Speaker. The matter was fixed for hearing/evidence, if any, on 14. 2. 05. It is contended that respondent no. 1 in his rejoinder filed before the Speaker has stated that respondent No. 1 relied upon the membership form signed by the petitioner to demonstrate that the petitioner has joined bjp and also craved leave to produce the same in the course of hearing of the disqualification proceedings. It is contended that on 14. 2. 05, the petitioner filed sur-rejoinder and, therefore, respondent No. 1 made an application for adjournment wherein it is stated that respondent No. 1 desired to rely upon and produce some more documents in support of his petition which included the primary membership form signed by the petitioner in the said application for adjournment. This application was objected to by the petitioner. ( 36 ) IT is contended that the petitioner nowhere has mentioned in the said application as to why he was objecting to the production of the membership form. It is contended that the parties were specifically asked as to whether they wanted to lead evidence. The advocate for the petitioner was requested to produce his witnesses, if any, on the next date. The matter was fixed for hearing/evidence at 12 noon on 15. 2. 05. It is, therefore, contended that there is nothing objectionable in production of the document by the respondent No. 1. It is contended by Mr. The advocate for the petitioner was requested to produce his witnesses, if any, on the next date. The matter was fixed for hearing/evidence at 12 noon on 15. 2. 05. It is, therefore, contended that there is nothing objectionable in production of the document by the respondent No. 1. It is contended by Mr. Aney that the contention of the petitioner that the documents were produced by respondent No. 1 not because they wished to do so, but because the Speaker insisted and that shows his mala fide intention and bias. It is submitted that the Speaker's request for the documents was only an attempt to discover the whole truth and completely in keeping with his role as a judicial and fact finding authority. It is submitted that on 15. 02. 05, respondent No. 1 filed an application to produce additional documents, namely the primary membership form signed by the petitioner on 16. 11. 02 enrolling himself as primary member of the BJP and Form No. 1 and Form No. III, both dated 23. 10. 02 for showing that the petitioner joined BJP. The matter was fixed for reply on the said application on 15. 02. 05. However, atthe request of both the parties, the petition was fixed for final hearing on 16. 02. 05 at 12 noon. On 16. 02. 05, the respondent No. 1 filed his reply to the application of the petitioner dated 15. 2. 05 objecting to the production of the said document of primary membership form on the ground that the Disqualification Rules do not permit production of document after filing of the petition as well as the signature on the said form is not of the petitioner and it is a forgery committed by respondent No. 1. Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel contended that in the reply dated 16. 2. 2005 filed by the petitioner has not given any reason as to why he did not oppose production of the said document and also did not ask for any opportunity to meet the document. Respondent No. 1 filed his reply to the application filed by the petitioner. On 16. 2. 05, the petitioner filed an application stating that he 'did not want to lead any oral evidence in view of the statement made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that they did not want to lead any oral evidence. On 16. 2. Respondent No. 1 filed his reply to the application filed by the petitioner. On 16. 2. 05, the petitioner filed an application stating that he 'did not want to lead any oral evidence in view of the statement made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that they did not want to lead any oral evidence. On 16. 2. 05, at the end of the hearing the Advocate for the respondent no. 1 offered inspection of the original membership enrollment form alleged to have been signed by the petitioner, to which the Advocate for the petitioner did not agree and filed the application dated 16/02/05 objecting such inspection at the belated stage. ( 37 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has contended that in the rejoinder dated 11. 2. 2005, respondent No. 1 has stated that he wanted to rely upon the membership enrollment form and was also granted leave to produce the same in the course of hearing. In the sur-rejoinder before the Speaker, the petitioner did not specifically state that the document (Membership enrollment form) was a false or fabricated document. It is submitted that in the application for adjournment filed by respondent No. 1 dated 14. 2. 05 before the Speaker, it was stated therein that respondent No. 1 was desirous to rely upon and produce some more document in support of his petition which included the Membership Form signed by the petitioner. It was also stated by respondent No. 1 that he would require some time to produce the said document as respondent No. 1 was trying to locate the original of the same. On 15. 2. 2005, respondent No. 1 produced the membership form vide his application dated 15. 2. 05. It is contended that the reply filed by the petition to the application of respondent No. 1 for production of the said document indicates that the original document was very much produced on record of the proceedings and the petitioner has nowhere mentioned that the document produced was a Photostat copy or that the original document was not produced, except that the petitioner has denied his signature on the document. It is contended that on 16. 2. 05, the inspection of the original of the said document was offered to the petitioner. However, the petitioner objected to such inspection which is evident from the roznama dated 16. 2. 05. It is contended that on 16. 2. 05, the inspection of the original of the said document was offered to the petitioner. However, the petitioner objected to such inspection which is evident from the roznama dated 16. 2. 05. It is submitted by mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner at no point of time during the proceedings before the Speaker, stated that the said document produced is not the original document, but his only case was that the signature appearing thereon is not of his. The Speaker in the impugned order has stated that the petitioner did not even make the application for impounding the document produced by the respondent No. 1. It is submitted that in view of the above referred facts, it is clear that the original of membership form signed by the petitioner on 16. 11. 2002 was produced before the Speaker. The petitioner, at no point of time disputed the fact that such original was produced and the only objection of the petitioner was that the same was produced at the belated stage and secondly, it was not signed by the petitioner. The argument of the petitioner that the original of the document was not produced on record is, therefore, contrary to the record itself and cannot be accepted. ( 38 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel further contended that notices were issued to the parties by the Speaker asking them to personally remain present for examination on 17. 02. 2005 at 5. 00 p. m. (which was later on adjourned to 18. 2. 2005 at 4. 00 p. m. by the Advocate for the petitioner and thereafter to 19. 2. 2005 at 12. 00 noon) as regards the BJP Membership Form alleged to have been signed by the petitioner. On 19. 2. 05, the Speaker examined the parties in person with regard to the alleged signature of the petitioner on the Membership Enrollment form. The Speaker also gave inspection of all the three documents, including the document dated 16. 11. 02 i. e. the Primary Membership Form of BJP. During the Course of examination by the Speaker, respondent No. 1 produced an affidavit of Satish Dhond dated 17. 2. 2005, wherein it is stated that he had enrolled the petitioner as Member of BJP on 16. 11. 02 and the membership form of the petitioner was filled in by Mr. 02 i. e. the Primary Membership Form of BJP. During the Course of examination by the Speaker, respondent No. 1 produced an affidavit of Satish Dhond dated 17. 2. 2005, wherein it is stated that he had enrolled the petitioner as Member of BJP on 16. 11. 02 and the membership form of the petitioner was filled in by Mr. Dhond after which the petitioner signed the said document before him. The petitioner, by application dated 19. 2. 05 objected to the filing of the affidavit of Mr. Dhond only on the ground that it is produced at a belated stage. ( 39 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has further stated that the contents of the said affidavit of Mr. Dhond were neither controverted by filing any affidavit by the petitioner nor did he request for summoning Mr. Dhond for cross-examination, except the application dated 19. 2. 2005 objecting to the production of the. said affidavit of Mr. Dhorvd at the belated stage and merely denied in the said application that the said affidavit of mr. Dhond is false. On 22. 2. 05, the Speaker inquired from respondent No. 1 as to whether he had any corroborative or contemporaneous document in support of his plea that the petitioner has joined the BJP independent of the plea and the allegations that the petitioner had signed the primary membership form since the petitioner was denying the said membership form document and had submitted in the reply that adverse inference be drawn against the respondent No. 1 for suppressing the membership roll and, therefore, the membership roll of Velim Constituency was produced by respondent No. 1 during the course of hearing. The production of the said document was also objected to by the petitioner by filing an application dated 22. 2. 05. In the said membership roll, name of Valentino Rebello as a member of BJP from booth No. 2 is mentioned. Similarly, under serial No. 1 at page 277 of the said roll, the name of the petitioner is enrolled as member of BJP from Booth No. 25. This enrollment of the petitioner shows that his membership form number is 21989'. It also shows that the said membership form is from Book No. 880 and the date of membership is 16. 11. 02. Mr. This enrollment of the petitioner shows that his membership form number is 21989'. It also shows that the said membership form is from Book No. 880 and the date of membership is 16. 11. 02. Mr. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel has contended that it is not possible to fabricate such a document within a period of half an hour or so showing the names of so many persons as members of BJP along with their other details. The petitioner has never raised a case about the impossibility of enrolling hundreds of members in a short interval. The petitioner did not lead any evidence nor examined or cross-examined any witnesses or the deponent to prove that the Membership enrollment Form was fabricated or that the membership List was bogus. The Speaker was acting in judicial capacity and was justified in permitting the additional documents. ( 40 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel contended that in view of the above referred facts and circumstances, the allegations of the petitioner regarding mala fides and bias on the part of the Speaker are baseless and that the Speaker acted judicially while discharging his constitutional obligation. ( 41 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in any case, unless the conduct of the Speaker is found to be so abhorrent or perverse that any person of reasonable prudence would hold it so, this Court may not interfere in the impugned order. The Wednesbury unreasonableness principle is not at all attracted to the impugned decision of the Speaker. The impugned order is plausible and would be a possible view based on facts and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the same. ( 42 ) MR. Aney, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the question of applicability of the Indian Evidence act in respect of the disqualification proceedings before the Speaker has been considered by this Court in a common Judgment dated may 14, 1993 passed in Writ petitions No. 321/1990 and 48/1991. The Division Bench, in paragraph 26 of the said Judgment has held that the Evidence Act is not applicable to Tribunals or to quasi judicial bodies required to decide and adjudicate upon rights. A Tribunal is governed by a statute and the procedures established, if any, and otherwise by what are called rules of natural justice. The Division Bench, in paragraph 26 of the said Judgment has held that the Evidence Act is not applicable to Tribunals or to quasi judicial bodies required to decide and adjudicate upon rights. A Tribunal is governed by a statute and the procedures established, if any, and otherwise by what are called rules of natural justice. The Division Bench of this Court in narsingrao G. Patil and others (supra) has turned down the contention of the petitioner about the applicability of the Evidence Act to the disqualification proceedings before the speaker and further expressed that the degree of proof required under the Evidence Act does not ipso facto apply in the disqualification proceedings before the Speaker as the speaker functions as a Tribunal and not as the Court. The Division Bench in the said case also considered the decision of another division Bench of this Court in the case of ravi Naik (supra) wherein it is held that the evidence Act is not strictly applicable to the tribunals which are required to decide and adjudicate upon the rights and the said view of the Division Bench was affirmed by the supreme Court. The law laid down in these decisions clearly demonstrate that the Evidence Act is not strictly applicable to the proceedings before the Speaker though he functions as Tribunal and, therefore, the contention canvassed by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the documents filed before the Speaker by the respondent No. 1 were not admissible as per the Evidence Act and could not have been relied upon by the Speaker, is not sustainable in law in view of the law laid down in the above referred Judgments. ( 43 ) WE have given our anxious thought to the various contentions canvassed by the respective Senior Counsel for the parties, the judgments of the Apex Court and that of the high Court cited and relied upon by the parties and the documents referred to and relied on including the affidavits, rejoinders and sur-rejoinder filed by the parties. Before we consider the validity of the order of the speaker which is impugned in the writ petition, it will be appropriate, at the outset, to consider the power of judicial review and the extent thereof. It is no doubt true that this issue has been already considered and concluded by the apex Court as well as this High court. Before we consider the validity of the order of the speaker which is impugned in the writ petition, it will be appropriate, at the outset, to consider the power of judicial review and the extent thereof. It is no doubt true that this issue has been already considered and concluded by the apex Court as well as this High court. However, we feel it necessary to refer to those Judgments and the observations made therein. The Apex Court in the case of kihoto Hollohan (supra), in paragraph 111 has observed thus : "111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F) : that the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant (sic ground) for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non- justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power. That Paragraph 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6 (1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity, are concerned. That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6 (2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Article 122 (1) and 212 (1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh case to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words 'be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament" or 'proceedings in the legislature of a State' confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The Speakers/chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. The law laid down by the Apex Court in-the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra), makes it implicitly clear that the power which the speaker exercises while adjudicating upon the issues in the disqualification petition is a judicial power and the Speaker acts as a tribunal. The law laid down by the Apex Court in-the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra), makes it implicitly clear that the power which the speaker exercises while adjudicating upon the issues in the disqualification petition is a judicial power and the Speaker acts as a tribunal. Similarly, the statutory finality embodied in paragraph 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule does not take away the power of judicial review of the order passed by the Honourable speaker under paragraph 6 (1 ). However, this Court can exercise such power of judicial review only in cases of violation of constitutional mandate, as well as principles of natural justice and mala fides and a perversity. It is also evident that the order passed by the Speaker cannot be interfered with only on the ground of procedural irregularities. The law laid down by the Courts clearly demonstrates that the power to decide the dispute in disqualification petition exercised by the Speaker under Paragraph 6 (1) of the tenth Schedule is mainly of judicial complexion and attracts an immunity from the Court except where the order of the Speaker is in violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non compliance with the rules of natural justice and perverse. ( 44 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of Ravi Naik (supra) has made the following observation in paragraph 18 of the Judgment:"the Disqualification Rules have been framed to regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising the power conferred on him under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the constitution. The Disqualification Rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6 as construed by this Court in kihoto Hollahan case. Moreover, the field of judicial review in respect of the order passed by the Speaker under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 as construed by this Court in kihoto Hollohan case is confined to breaches of the constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. We are unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sen that the violation of the Disqualification Rules amounts to violation of constitutional mandates. By doing so we would be elevating the rules to the status of the provisions of the Constitution which is impermissible. We are unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sen that the violation of the Disqualification Rules amounts to violation of constitutional mandates. By doing so we would be elevating the rules to the status of the provisions of the Constitution which is impermissible. Since the Disqualification rules have been framed by the Speaker in exercise of the power conferred under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule they have a status subordinate to the Constitution and cannot be equated with the provisions of the constitution. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as constitutional mandates and any violation of the Disqualification Rules does not afford a ground for judicial reviews of the order of the Speaker in view of the finality clause contained in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule as construed by this court in Kihoto Hollohan case. " ( 45 ) THE law laid down by the Supreme court in Ravi Naik's case once again makes it clear that the power of judicial review of this Court in respect of the order passed by the Speaker is restricted only to the breaches of the constitutional mandates, mala fides, noncompliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. The Disqualification Rules framed by the Speaker under Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule are procedural in nature. Any violation thereof is a procedural irregularity and does not afford a ground for judicial review. ( 46 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, bihar Legislative Council and others, (2004)8 s. C. C. 747, after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court, particularly the observations made by the Apex court in paragraph 111 in case of Kihoto hollohan (supra), has observed in paragraph 8. 1, thus :"this authoritativepronouncement clearly lays down that the decision of the Chairman or the speaker of the House can be challenged on very limited grounds, namely, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity and farther a mere irregularity in procedure can have no bearing on the decision. "the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. "the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh (supra) has followed and reiterated the same principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kihoto hollohan and and observed that the power of judicial review and the extent thereof enjoyed by this Court in respect of the order passed by the Speaker in the disqualifica- tion proceedings in exercise of power under paragraph 6 ( 1) of the Tenth Schedule, is limited and indulgence is permissible only on the ground of breach of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. In our view, in the backdrop of the above referred decisions of the Apex Court, the power of judicial review and its extent stands concluded by the law laid down by the Apex Court in these decisions, which makes it implicitly clear that such power can only be exercised in case of violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, noncompliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. ( 47 ) IN the instant case, the Speaker in exercise of power conferred on him under Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule to the constitution of India, read with Section 14-A of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (Central Act 20 of 1963) has framed the Rules, namely the Members of the Goa legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule gives power to the Speaker to make Rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule and it is also mentioned in paragraph 8 (1) of the Tenth Schedule that such rules may provides for - (a) the maintenance of registers or other records as to the political parties if any, to which different members of the House belong; (b) the report which the leader of a legislature party in relation to a member of a House shall furnish with regard to any condonation of the nature referred to in clause (b) of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 in respect of such member, the time within which and the authority to whom such report shall be furnished; (c) the reports which a political party shall furnish with regard to admission to such political party of any members of the House and the officer of the House to whom such reports shall be furnished; and (d) the procedure for deciding any question referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 including the procedure for any inquiry which may be made for the purpose of de- ciding such question. The scheme provided in paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule is twofold. It gives power to the Speaker to make rules and it also provides the nature of rules to be framed by the Speaker in order to implement the mandate of Tenth Schedule. Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Disqualification Rules are in relation to the information to be furnished by the leader of the legislature party, the information necessary to be furnished by the Member and the register of information as to members. These rules are, therefore, framed under the provisions of Paragraph 8 (1) of the Tenth Schedule to give effect to the provisions the Tenth Schedule and stand on slightly different footing than the Rules 6 and 7 which are purely procedural in nature. Rule 6 contemplates that no reference of any question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member made in accordance with the provisions of this rule. Rule 6 contemplates that no reference of any question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member made in accordance with the provisions of this rule. Subrules (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Rule 6 deal with the nature of disqualification petition, to whom it should be addressed, the procedure required to be undertaken by the Secretary after receipt of such petition, the documents which are required to be filed along with the petition, etc. Similarly, Rule 7 prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the speaker on receipt of the disqualification petition under Rule 6. It is, therefore, evident that Rules 6 and 7 are purely procedural rules. Whereas, Rules 3, 4 and 5 though part and parcel of the Disqualification Rules, 1986, however have a different object to be achieved than the mere procedure required to be followed by the Speaker in the disqualification proceedings and therefore, though procedural in nature, however have a different complexion. We are quite aware that breach of these rules cannot be a ground for judicial review. However, we are considering this aspect from the different perspective. ( 48 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of mayawativ, Markandeya Chand and ors. (supra), Thomas, J. , in paragraph 24 has observed thus : "we will not say that the rules of procedure are on a par with the constitutional mandate incorporated in the tenth Schedule of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the procedures prescribed in the Disqualification Rules are meant to be followed for the purpose for which they are made. It is by virtue of the authority conferred by the Tenth Schedule that the Disqualification Rules are formulated "for giving effect to the provisions of this Schedule". What would have happened if the Rules had not been formulated as enjoined by Para 8 of the tenth Schedule ? The provisions of the Tenth schedule would remain ineffective. So the rules cannot be read in isolation from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, instead, they must read as part of it. Of course mere violation of a rule is not enough to constitute violation of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. The provisions of the Tenth schedule would remain ineffective. So the rules cannot be read in isolation from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, instead, they must read as part of it. Of course mere violation of a rule is not enough to constitute violation of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. When a certain procedure is required by the Rules to be adopted for giving effect to the provisions of the Constitution, the nonadoption of the procedure cannot be sidelined altogether as a mere procedure and of no consequence. Compliance or non-compliance with the rules of procedure would very much help the authorities to decide whether there was violation of the constitutional provision envisaged in the Tenth Schedule. In the instant case, we are faced with altogether a different situation such as what is the effect if the Disqualification Rules are compiled with as per the procedure prescribed therein and whether the information furnished as per the procedure stipulated in such rules and is available on record, is of no consequence or it has some relevance with the issue of disqualification proceedings. There is no dispute that though these rules are framed to give effect to the constitutional mandate of the Tenth Schedule and, therefore, they do not enjoy the status at par with the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, any breach thereof is no ground for judicial review. However, if they are complied with and if the information which is required to be furnished as per the procedure prescribed under such Rules, particularly Rules 3,4 and 5 of the Disqualification Rules is furnished, such information, in our view, at least, prima fade, be presumed to be true till such presumption is rebutted. Looking to the object for which these Rules are framed by the speaker, its importance cannot be casually ignored or brushed aside. We are also aware that mere entries or information furnished under the Rules do not conclusively decide whether the Member of the House has incurred disqualification, when there is other cogent evidence to show otherwise. However, these entries made in the record as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules, in our view, at least can be treated to have prima facie presumptive value till the contrary is proved. However, these entries made in the record as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules, in our view, at least can be treated to have prima facie presumptive value till the contrary is proved. In the instant case, the petitioner afterbeing elected as an independent MLA from velim Constituency May, 2002 and after becoming the member of the House, furnished the information as required under Rule 4 by submitting the prescribed form wherein he is shown to be an independent MLA. In the event of change of the status of the Members, the Secretary (Legislature) has to issue bulletins periodically under the relevant Disqualification Rules showing the current status of the Members of the House. The bulletin supersedes all other earlier bulletins and, therefore, the latest bulletin will be the most authentic which demonstrates the current status of the Members of the House. In the instant case, the Secretary (Legislature) issued the bulletin dated 21. 12. 2004 wherein the petitioner is shown as an independent mla. Similarly, in case of increase or decrease in the strength of the legislature party, leader of the legislature party, under the Rules, is required to inform about such change. However, no such information was furnished at any point of time by the leader of the BJP legislature party. If the petitioner has joined the BJP in October, 2002, after his election as an independent MLA, in that case, the strength of the BJP legislature party must have gone up by one Member and, therefore, they were required to communicate this change in the strength under the Rules. However, no information in this regard was ever furnished by the leader of the BJP legislature party. We are once again reiterating that the breach of procedure prescribed under the rules being mere procedural irregularity and not legal infirmity, is not the ground for judicial review of the order of the Speaker. However, no information in this regard was ever furnished by the leader of the BJP legislature party. We are once again reiterating that the breach of procedure prescribed under the rules being mere procedural irregularity and not legal infirmity, is not the ground for judicial review of the order of the Speaker. However, when the procedure prescribed under the Rules is complied with and the information furnished is available on record, in such situation the said information or the entry made therein if ignored and brushed aside , without justification or legitimate reasons, at least at the time of passing of the interim order in a disqualification petition by the speaker, this aspect, coupled with the attending facts and circumstances in a given case can provide legitimate foundation to hold that the interim order is passed by the speaker for extraneous considerations unless the other evidence available before the speaker is substantial, cogent and is sufficient, prima facie, to hold that the Member of the House has incurred disqualification. ( 49 ) THE contention of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that the purported requirement of Clause 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth schedule is completely different and distinct than the requirement of paragraph 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule and the decisions of the supreme Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and the case of Narsingrao G. Patil (supra) are in respect of paragraph 2 (l) (a) of the Tenth Schedule, and, therefore, do not have any bearing in respect the controversy in issue which pertains to disqualification, if any, incurred by the petitioner under Clause 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule is concerned, following are our reasons for not accepting this proposition. ( 50 ) IN order to appreciate this contention, we need to consider the mandate of the constitution under the Tenth Schedule and the object it has to achieve. The mandate is that the Member of the House, if has incurred the disqualification, must be disqualified to be continued to be the Member of the House and in order to achieve this mandate, the contingencies are provided in Clauses 2 (1) (a) and 2 (2) of the Tenth Schedule to show as to when the Member of the House can said to have incurred the disqualification. It is no doubt true that the evidence necessary to prove that the Member of the house has voluntarily given up his membership of a political party who has incurred disqualification contemplated under Clause 2 (l) (a) is different than in case of a Member who is elected otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party has joined any political party. Similarly, the nature of proof required in these two clauses is different. However, the objective to be achieved by the scheme of both these clauses is one and the same that is to disqualify such Member who has incurred disqualification as per the contingencies mentioned in these respective clauses. The observations made in paragraph 13 by the Apex Court in case of Kihoto hollohan (supra) read thus : "these provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme. A person who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. The provisions of Paragraph 2 (1) (a) proceed on the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if such a person, after the election, changes his affiliation and leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his membership of the legislature and to go back before the electorate. The same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as an independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election. In view of the above referred observations of the Apex Court and the findings recorded by us on the basis thereof referred to herein above, the contention of Mr. Kakodkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the law laid down by the Judgments of the Apex court and this Court is in respect of Clause 2 (1) (a) of the Tenth Schedule has no application in so far as Clause 2 (2) of the Tenth schedule is concerned, is misconceived and cannot be accepted.