S.K.Krishnan, J.: This habeas corpus petition has been filed by the petitioner, who has been detained by the first respondent under Sec.3(i)(ii) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974), (in short, COFEPOSA Act), to quash the detention order in G.O.No.S.R.1/538-3/2005 dated 13.6.2005 and for a direction to the respondents to produce the body of the petitioner/detenu before this Court. 2. The case of the petitioner/detenu is as follows: (a) The petitioner is doing a transport business by lending lorries for hire. He was served with summons by the officials of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (in short, D.R.I.) with a direction to appear before them on 22.5.2005 and 23.5.2005. According to the D.R.I. Officials, the petitioner committed an offence punishable under Sec.135(1)(a) and (c) of the Customs Act by smuggling Red Sander logs, a prohibited item for export under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2004-2009, in export consignment covered under Shipping Bill No.2065890, dated 17.5.2005 filed in the name of M/s.Ascending Impex, No.9, Park Street, Perambur, Chennai and declared to contain "Natural Slate Stone" in the Container No.FSCU-7872956 on truck No.TSH-5429. (b) Based on the above allegation, the petitioner was arrested on 23.5.2005. A statement was recorded from the petitioner by the D.R.I. Officials and they have also prepared a seizure mahazar. (c) Thereafter, the sponsoring authority sent a proposal to the detaining authority for passing an order of detention against the petitioner. On receipt of relevant documents and connected materials from the sponsoring authority, the first respondent/detaining authority passed a detention order, dated 13.6.2005. (d) Aggrieved by the detention order, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under the Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner/detenu has filed this petition for the above said relief. 3. Though the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner/detenu attacked the detention order on various grounds, he laid stress mainly on the following grounds: (a) He contended that when the detaining authority, for passing the detention order mainly relied on the Shipping Bill No.2065890, dated 17.5.2005, which was filed by M/s. Ascending Impex, in the grounds of detention at para.Nos.(i) and (xxxi) in pages 1 and 9 respectively, a copy of the said Bill has not been furnished to the detenu. (b) It is emphasized that the sponsoring authority also failed to place a copy of the Shipping Bill before the detaining authority while passing the detention order. 4. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that the details of the container, which was intercepted by the D.R.I.Officials and the details of export thereof, have all been set out in the detention mahazar dated 22.5.2005, which was drawn in the presence of independent witnesses, Customs officials and the officials of Chennai Container Terminal Limited. On 23.5.2005 also, a seizure mahazar was prepared in the presence of independent witnesses, representatives of the Customs Agent, Container Freight Station, Customs Officials and Forest Officials. The said mahazars, which had been placed before the detaining authority, were furnished to the petitioner/detenu. In such circumstances, the non-placement and non-supply of the Shipping Bill do not in any way prejudice the detenu and do not take away the conscious involvement of the detenu in the smuggling of prohibited goods. It is further submitted that a copy of the Shipping Bill had also been supplied to the detenu as requested by him in his representation dated 25.7.2005. Emphasising the above stated facts, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the order of detention is not violative of either Constitutional provisions or the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. 5. Before considering rival contentions, it is pertinent to see what the Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India says: "22(5). Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases: When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act, which reads as follows: "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons: (1) The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any Officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from_ (i) smuggling goods, or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii) xxxxxxx (iv) xxxxxxx (v) xxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxx (3) For the purposes of Clause (5) of Art.22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.“ 6. A combined reading of the provisions of the said Article and the Act would make it clear that the detenu shall be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention is passed, within five days or fifteen days in some exceptional cases, from the date of detention. 7. In the light of the above, it is more appropriate to analyse the settled position of law in this regard. In the reported decision in Smt.Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1983, the Apex Court observed as follows: ”Now it is obvious that when Clause (5) of Art.22 and Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject of course to Clause (6) of Art.22 in order to constitute compliance with Clause (5) of Art.22 and Sec.(3), Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause (5) of Art.22, read with Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to Clause (6) of Art.22 copies of documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of Clause (5) of Art.22, read with Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void. In Yunnam Manbabu Singh v. State of Manipur, A.I.R. 1983 S.C.300, the Supreme Court held that non-furnishing of copies of statements i.e., statement containing admission to detenu would make the detention invalid. 8. The non-furnishing of copies of the documents particularly Shipping Bill sought for by the petitioner/detenu, in our view, is a clear violation of the said mandatory provisions. In Yunnam Manbabu Singh v. State of Manipur, A.I.R. 1983 S.C.300, the Supreme Court held that non-furnishing of copies of statements i.e., statement containing admission to detenu would make the detention invalid. 8. The non-furnishing of copies of the documents particularly Shipping Bill sought for by the petitioner/detenu, in our view, is a clear violation of the said mandatory provisions. On a perusal of the typed set filed by the petitioner, we can see that the copies of the Shipping Bills were furnished to the petitioner by the Additional Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai only on 9.8.2005. In other words, the copies of the documents to be furnished within five days or fifteen days in exceptional cases from the date of detention, were furnished to the petitioner only after two months, for which there is no acceptable reasons from the authorities concerned. 9. When the provisions of the said Article and Act were not complied with in a strict sense and spirit, what was laid down by the Apex Court in Smt.Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1983, cited and extracted supra, is squarely applicable to the case on hand. In this view of the matter, unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenu along with the grounds in the language known to him, the supply of grounds and other documents simpliciter, would give him not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a representation to the detaining authority. In such circumstances, we are unable to accept the stand of the Additional Public Prosecutor. 10. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the requirement of Clause (5) of Art.22, read with Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu is illegal and void. Accordingly, the order of detention dated 13.6.2005 is set aside and habeas corpus petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to set the petitioner/detenu at liberty forthwith unless his custody is required in any other case.