Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal filed by the Revenue (Commissioner of Income-tax) under Section 260a of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against an order dated September 25, 2001, passed in the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in I. T. A. No. 627/ind of 1996. This appeal was admitted for final hearing on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that expenditure made on account of royalty payment was allowable as revenue expenditure ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing expenditure of Rs. 10,39,045 treated by the Assessing Officer as unreasonable and not deductible as per the provisions of Section 40a (2) and Section 35a of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? ( 2. ) NONE for the appellant. Heard Shri G. M. Chafekar, learned senior counsel with Shri D. S. Kale, learned Counsel, for the assessee. ( 3. ) THE issue in question arises out of the assessment year 1993-94. We feel it appropriate at the outset, to quote verbatim the manner in which the issue involved in this appeal was decided by the Tribunal : Para. 2. At the outset, the learned Authorised Representative submitted that the first three grounds are covered in favour of the assessee by the orders of this Tribunal in the case of the assessee in I. T. A. Nos. 975 and 976/ind of 1994 for the assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91. On the other hand, the learned Departmental Representative had no serious objections but preferred to rely on the orders of the Assessing Officer. Para. 3. We have gone through the orders of the Tribunal in I. T. A. Nos. 975 and 976/ind of 1994 and find that the issues raised in the first three grounds are squarely covered in favour of the assessee. Following our earlier orders, we set aside the issues raised in these grounds against the Revenue. " A mere perusal of the aforesaid 2 paras of the impugned order under appeal would indicate the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the issue and eventually decided the same in favour of the assessee. Following our earlier orders, we set aside the issues raised in these grounds against the Revenue. " A mere perusal of the aforesaid 2 paras of the impugned order under appeal would indicate the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the issue and eventually decided the same in favour of the assessee. Indeed, neither is there a reference to narration of facts, nor discussion nor finding much less categorical finding and nor any reasoning. What is present in the impugned order is only the "conclusion". It may be good for the parties to appeal because they are more concerned with the eventual conclusion but not much concerned as to how that conclusion was reached. At least the winning side is least concerned with even reasoning if the issue is decided in it favour. It is the losing party who is more concerned with non-assigning of the reasoning which led to the decision against them. ( 4. ) WE feel most appropriate to quote the subtle observations of the Supreme Court made from time to time consistently reminding the courts in the country of the need to assign the reasons by any quasi-judicial, judicial as also by administrative authorities in support of their conclusions. These observations came to be made in one of the recent decisions by their Lordships in the case of D. P. S. Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain, AIR 2005 SCW 95 . The learned judge A. Pasayat speaking for the Bench held : Para. 18. It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative order Lord Denning M. R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 1 All ER 1148 observed "the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974] ICR 120, it was observed : failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974] ICR 120, it was observed : failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise of power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The inscrutable face of a sphink is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. ( 5. ) IN this present case, we are at a loss to know the facts of the case, the issue raised, issue decided in earlier years and the year in question, what was the reasoning of the Tribunal in the earlier year cases which according to the learned Members went in favour of the assessee. It is neither mentioned, nor quoted, nor enclosed by way of annexure so that we may read the same for deciding the appeal. In the absence of any of these things on record, we are unable to know as to whether at all, the Tribunal decided the issue and if so, what was that issue which the Tribunal eventually decided, and whether the earlier year so-called decision contained any reasoning or not. Mere mentioning in the order by quoting a number of cases is of no consequence because it does not serve anybodys purpose. ( 6. ) IN substance, we as an appellate court cannot countenance such casual approach in deciding the appeal by the Tribunal as a last court of appeal on the facts and hence, set it aside by remanding the case to the Tribunal for its fresh decision on the merits in accordance with law. ( 7. ( 6. ) IN substance, we as an appellate court cannot countenance such casual approach in deciding the appeal by the Tribunal as a last court of appeal on the facts and hence, set it aside by remanding the case to the Tribunal for its fresh decision on the merits in accordance with law. ( 7. ) THOUGH, the issue was argued by learned Counsel for the assessee on the merits contending that once issue is covered by the decision of this Court and other should be decided in favour of the assessee, we do not wish to do so. What the Tribunal should have done in accordance with law. We do not wish to do except to set aside the order impugned in so far as it relates to the issue in question are concerned and then again call upon the Tribunal to properly decide the issue in accordance with law and keeping in view the observations made supra. ( 8. ) ACCORDINGLY, and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated September 25, 2001, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in I. T. A. No. 627/ind of 1996 for the assessment year 1993-94 is set aside to the extent it deals with the questions involved in appeal and was decided in paras. 2 and 3 of the impugned order quoted supra. The Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal afresh only on the two questions involved in appeal on which this appeal was admitted for hearing. Needless to observe, the Tribunal will decide the appeal after narrating the full relevant facts necessary for the disposal of two questions, legal issues governing the questions and then assign their reasoning with reference to any case law on the subject having its application to the question. Let this be done within three months. Parties to appear before the Tribunal on February 28, 2005, to enable the Tribunal to decide the appeal as directed. Record of the case be sent back (if requisitioned ). ( 9. ) NO costs. ( 10. ) C. C. within a week.