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2005 DIGILAW 1800 (MAD)

Pandian v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police

2005-11-24

A.R.RAMALINGAM, P.K.MISRA

body2005
Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. 1. Heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the Accused No. 1, who has been convicted under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The co-accused, the wife of Accused No. 1, has been acquitted by the Trial Court. 3. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is as follows: One Regina, widow of the deceased is the Informant. The appellant, deceased and one Swaminathan are three brothers. Swaminathan’s son Rajalingam had given a puppy belonging to the accused to one Vattai son of Muthusamy. On 2.4.1996, the date of occurrence, the appellant scolded Rajalingam as the latter had given the puppy belonging to the accused to one Vattai. At that time, the deceased intervened and stated that there was no necessity to start a quarrel for the handing over of a puppy. The appellant a nd his wife scolded the deceased and the deceased also scolded the two accused persona in return. The co-accused Muthulakshmi caught hold of the deceased and the appellant stabbed the deceased with a knife. When the appellant was again trying to assault the deceased, the deceased assaulted the appellant and his wife with a stone. The informant has also assaulted both the appellant and his wife with a stick. The deceased was shifted to a nearby room, but he died within a short time. 4. Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty against the charges levelled against them. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and produced 22 documents and 9 Material Objects. Relying upon the evidence of the informant P.W.1, as corroborated by other witnesses and the medical evidence, the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302, IPC, but acquitted the co-accused. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the evidence of P.W.1 should not have been accepted as she is an interested witness and there are various discrepancies in her evidence. 6. We have carefully gone through the evidence of P.W.1 and other relevant materials, such as F.I.R and post-mortem report. We do not find any adequate reason to discard the evidence of P.W.1 as well as other materials on record and, therefore, the culpability of the appellant cannot be disbelieved. 7. 6. We have carefully gone through the evidence of P.W.1 and other relevant materials, such as F.I.R and post-mortem report. We do not find any adequate reason to discard the evidence of P.W.1 as well as other materials on record and, therefore, the culpability of the appellant cannot be disbelieved. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that even assuming that the appellant had assaulted the deceased, the materials on record indicate that the occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel and only one knife blow was given by the appellant without any premeditation and, therefore, the appellant should not have been convicted under Section 302, IPC, but should have been convicted under Section 304, I.P.C. by applying Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State on the other hand has submitted that in view of the materials on record, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the appellant had intention to cause death and, therefore, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. is justified. 9. Section 299, I.P.C. defines what is culpable homicide. Section 300, I.P.C. provides that except in the cases excepted, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the necessary mens rea , that is to say, the requisite intention or knowledge as envisaged in four clauses contained in Section 300, I.P.C. Section 300, I.P.C. contains five enumerated exceptions,. Exception 4, which is relevant for the present purpose, is extracted hereunder: “Exception 4.— Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.— It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.” 10. In the present case, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is obvious that the occurrence arose out of a sudden fight in course of a sudden quarrel without any premeditation. 11. It is contended by the Additional Public Prosecutor that the quarrel itself had been initiated by the appellant himself. However, even assuming that he appellant had initiated the quarrel, as apparent from the Explanation, to attract Exception 4 it is immaterial as to who started the quarrel. 11. It is contended by the Additional Public Prosecutor that the quarrel itself had been initiated by the appellant himself. However, even assuming that he appellant had initiated the quarrel, as apparent from the Explanation, to attract Exception 4 it is immaterial as to who started the quarrel. The fact that there was a sudden quarrel between the deceased and the accused is amply borne out by the evidence of P.W.1 as well as the F.I.R. The evidence also clearly indicates that in course of such hot exchange of words, the appellant had suddenly attacked the deceased. It cannot be said that there was any premeditation. 12. In such view of the matter, in our opinion, Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. is applicable. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. is liable to be altered to one under Section 304 by applying Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. In the facts and circumstances, we feel that the sentence should be reduced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and the conviction is altered to one under Section 304, I.P.C. and the sentence is reduced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment.