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2005 DIGILAW 1820 (MAD)

Marimuthu & Others v. Elango & Others

2005-11-30

S.ASHOK KUMAR

body2005
Judgment :- Legal heirs of the 5th defendant, are the appellants. Suit filed for specific performance. 2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows: The suit property belonged to the defendants 1 to 4. Defendants 1 to 4 executed a sale agreement dated 5.7.1989 for consideration of Rs.30,000 in favour of the plaintiff for which an advance amount of Rs.10,000 was paid to the defendants 1 to 4 and the balance amount would be paid within two months and settled the sale agreement. On 28.8.1989, defendants 1 to 4 sent a notice to the plaintiff for the payment of the balance amount of Rs.20,000 on or before 5.9.1989 for which the plaintiff sent a reply on 31.8.1989 to the effect that he was ready to settle the sale agreement and the defendants 1 to 4 were asked to come to the Sub Registrar Office, Kurinchipadi on 2.9.1989 and to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the entire amount on the sale agreement. On 2.9.1989 defendants 1 to 4 gave a telegram to the plaintiff that they have cancelled the sale agreement. During the pendency of the suit, the 5th defendant-Gnanambal purchased the suit property on 29.11.1989. Hence, as per the sale agreement the defendants had to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after adjusting the loan amount on mortgage deed. 3. In the written statement filed by the 5th defendant, it is stated as follows: "She was unaware about the execution of sale agreement dated 5.2.1989. This defendant purchased the suit property on a sale agreement from the defendants 1 to 4 for a consideration of a sum of Rs.22,000 and paid an advance amount of Rs.5,000 on 25.9.1989 and the balance amount of Rs.17,000 would be paid within three months. From the date of sale agreement, this defendant was in possession and made cultivation. In fact, on 26.10.1989 plaintiff was attempting to encroach upon the suit land. This defendant has paid the entire amount on 29.11.1989 and got the sale deed in her favour. Hence, the suit may be dismissed." 4. Trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the second appeal. 5. On 12.12.1994, the second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. This defendant has paid the entire amount on 29.11.1989 and got the sale deed in her favour. Hence, the suit may be dismissed." 4. Trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the second appeal. 5. On 12.12.1994, the second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Courts below are in coming to the conclusion that the favour of the 5th defendant is hit by the principles of lis pendens when the sale has taken place prior to the filing of the suit? 2. Whether the sale in favour of the 5 defendant is protected by the principles of Specific Relief Act? 3. Whether the Courts below are right holding that the agreement in favour of plaintiff is true and valid? 6. Heard both sides. 7. During the pendency of appeal, 5th defendant-Gnanambal died. Her legal heirs were added as appellants 2 to 11 before the late Court. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relying on the judgment reported in Peary v. Gauri, A.I.R. 1978 All. 318, and contended that in this case also there is no findings as to when the suit has been filed. 9. The relevant portion in Ram Peary v. Gauri, AIR. 1978 All. 318, runs as follows: "The subsequent transferee, even though has obtained the transfer without notice of the original contract, cannot set up against the plaintiff-contractor any right; for it defeat the rule of lis pendens which founded upon public policy." 10. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents relying on the judgment report a Mohammed Ali v. Abdulla, AIR 1973 h 131, and contending that there is finding grading the filing of the suit and hence, the suit is hit by lis pendens. The relevant portion runs as follows: "Brief Note: - (A) The principle of lisp dens embodied in Sec.52 being a principle of public policy, no amount of good faith or bona fides vests on the transferee any title or interest adverse to the decree holder." Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 runs as follows: ­ "During the pendency in any Court having authority .... suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immov­able property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, ex­cept under the authority of the Court and no such terms as it may impose. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceedings shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.” 11. The important question to be answered is whether the 5th defendant-Gnanambal is a bonafide purchaser and whether she purchased the property pending the suit. On a perusal of the material records, it would disclose that the suit was filed on 25.9.1989 with an agreement petition to amend the suit immediately the same day, around 3.00 p.m. Ex.B-1 agreement of sale has been executed in favour of-the 5th defendant. Thereafter on 29.11.1989, Ex.B-2 sale deed has been executed in favour the 5th defendant. It is rightly contended by the trial Judge that since after institution of the suit only the defendant purchased the property, the suit was hit by lis pendens. In para.23 of the judgment of the trial Court, there is a finding regarding the institution of the suit as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and hence, the decision reported in Ram Peary v. Gauri, A.I.R 1978 All.318, is not applicable to the present case on hand. 12. From the judgments cited above, it is clear that in a case in which the property has been purchased during the pendency of the lis, even the question whether the purchaser acted bona fidely or not does not arise. 12. From the judgments cited above, it is clear that in a case in which the property has been purchased during the pendency of the lis, even the question whether the purchaser acted bona fidely or not does not arise. Transfer of property is prohibited during the pendency of the suit as a matter of public policy and therefore the purchaser is estopped from claiming that she is bona fide purchaser. Accordingly the substantial questions, of law are answered against the appellants. 13. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.252 of 1989 and the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.237 of 1991. Appeal dismissed.