Judgment Ajay Rastogi, J.-By instant writ petition, petitioner has challenged order of dismissal dated 18.07.1977 (Annexure-1), so also order dated 17.04.1995 (Annexure-7) whereby his request for grant of reinstatement in service as a result of acquittal from offence under Sections 161 IPC and 5(1) (d) and Section 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (“PC Act”) vide Judgment dated 07.03.1986 passed by this Court in Cr. Appeal No. 235/77 was declined. 2. Facts, in brief , are that petitioner initially joined service as LDC in erstwhile Rajasthan State Electricity Board (“RSEB”) on 16.03.1964. While being posted in Office of Assistant Engineer (O&M), RSEB, Sikar, on the basis of a complaint filed by one Durga Prasad, petitioner was prosecuted under Section 161, IPC read with Sections5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the PC Act, for taking a bribe of Rs. 20/-. After trial in Spl. Cr. Case No. 59/75, he was convicted by Special Judge (ACD Cases), Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide Judgment dated 25.05.1977 for offences charged (supra), and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 200/- (in default, further one months SI). As a consequence of aforesaid conviction, petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 18.07.1977 (Annexure-1). 3. Against aforesaid conviction, petitioner preferred S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 235/77 before this Court, which was allowed vide Judgment dated 07.03.1986 and he was acquitted from the offences charged (supra), after giving him benefit of doubt; but since the Counsel for petitioner at that stage moved some application that the petitioner was not interested in reinstatement as he has been settled out of Rajasthan in Mumbai, and he would not claim any arrears of salary, so after such statement (supra), this Court also declined to consider him for reinstatement and back wages. An extract of operative part of Judgment -dated 07.03.1986 of this Court in criminal appeal (supra) reads as under: “ Shri Tibrewal has moved an application mentioning that his client is not interested in service as he has gone to Bombay outside Rajasthan and has settled his life there and he would not claim arrears of salary and reinstatement. Even if he would have claimed it, this Judgment would not have entitled him to have such a claim because the acquittal is based merely on benefit of doubt, unless the department after due inquiry exonerates him. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. Even if he would have claimed it, this Judgment would not have entitled him to have such a claim because the acquittal is based merely on benefit of doubt, unless the department after due inquiry exonerates him. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The accused is acquitted of the charges under which he has been convicted and sentenced by the trial Court vide its Judgment dated 25.05.1977, which I hereby set aside. He is on bail and need not surrender, his bail bonds are discharged. However, it is made clear that this Judgment would not entitle him for any reinstatement of benefit of salary etc. not only since he has voluntarily relinquished and waived his right but even otherwise he will not have any right of reinstatement and arrears of salary etc.” 4. Being aggrieved by denial of reinstatement and back-wages under Judgment dated 07.03.1986 (supra), petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. The Apex Court condoned the delay and granted special leave; and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, disposed of the matter vide order dated 11.02.1987 - operative part whereof reads: “ ...We are of the considered opinion that the High Court having recorded an order of acquittal could not have made the direction in the last para of its Judgment that the appellant was being acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt and, therefore, was not entitled to reinstatement and payment of back wages. The question of reinstatement is not for a criminal Court. It is for the State Government to consider whether he should be reinstated at all having regard to the fact that the acquittal of the appellant proceeds on benefit of doubt and to consider the question of grant of such relief upon his reinstatement as regards salary and other service benefits, if any. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.” 5. After the direction (supra) of the Apex Court, petitioner submitted application on 24.03.1987 (Annexure-2) to the authority concerned for taking decision for grant of his reinstatement and back-wages. According to him despite his communication / correspondence from time to time, his request was finally declined by the authority vide order dated 02.03.1988 (Annexure-4), against which he preferred appeal before respondent No. 2, which too was rejected vide letter dated 03.05.1988 (Annexure-5), against which also, petitioner wrote a letter in the form of second appeal to respondent authority on 26.05.1988 for reconsideration. 6. Being dissatisfied with aforesaid rejection, petitioner preferred CWP No. 2768/89 praying for quashing of order of dismissal dated 18.07.1977, so also for reinstatement in service from 18.07.1977 with all consequential benefits and back wages. During pendency of writ petition, respondent No. 2 rejected second appeal dated 26.05.1988 preferred by petitioner vide order dated 03.08.1993 (Annexure-6). However, this Court vide Judgment dated 010.1993 decided CWP No. 2768/89 by directing that order dated 02.03.1988 (Annexure-4) was not in consonance with the decision of Apex Court, and further directed respondents to consider claim of petitioner within three months after considering Judgment of Apex Court, Rules, Regulations and Circulars issued from time to time. In the light of directions (supra), the authority examined his representations but finally declined to grant of reinstatement and back-wages vide order dated 17.04.1995 (Annexure-7). Hence, this writ petition. 7. During pendency of this writ petition, five State Government Cos. have stepped into shoes of erstwhile RSEB, therefore, petitioner moved an application for substitution. This Court allowed this application vide order dated 02.05.2002 for amendment in cause title by way of substitution of Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd (JVVNL) as respondents vice RSEB. 8. Shri Ashok Gaur, Counsel for petitioner urged that the respondents have not applied their mind at all and without taking note of observations of the Apex Court in order dated 11.02.1987, so also the order of this Court dated 010.1993 passed in CWP 2768/89, and despite observations of this Court in Judgment dated 07.03.1986 in Cr. App. No. 235/77 being quashed by the Apex Court, yet the respondents proceeded on the basis of statement allegedly made on behalf of his Counsel when his aforesaid criminal appeal was heard, and ultimately he was again denied of reinstatement and back-wages. According to Shri Gaur, the statement allegedly made on behalf of petitioner by his Counsel in criminal appeal, for rejecting his claim for reinstatement and back-wages, in no manner can be said to be germane especially in the light of observations of the Apex Court, quoted (Supra). 9. Shri Gaur has further urged that once he was acquitted in criminal case, even after giving him benefit of doubt, the dismissal based on conviction did not exist, and as a logical consequence whereof , he is entitled to reinstatement and full back-wages. 9. Shri Gaur has further urged that once he was acquitted in criminal case, even after giving him benefit of doubt, the dismissal based on conviction did not exist, and as a logical consequence whereof , he is entitled to reinstatement and full back-wages. In support of his contention, Shri Gaur drew my attention to a circular issued by respondent RSEB on 24.01.1995 and further contended that acquittal entails reinstatement in service and make him entitled to back wages at least from the date of acquittal in terms of Circular dated 24.01.1995. 10. In support of his contentions, Shri Gaur placed reliance on the decisions of Apex Court in (1) Union of India vs. Jaipal Singh, 2004 (1) SCC 121 , (2) Sulekh Chand vs. Commissioner of Police, 1995 (1) JT SC 23, and (3) Union of India vs. Madhusudan Prasad, 2004 (1) SCC 43 , so also of this Court in (4) Ghasilal Ora vs. JVVNL, 2002 (2) RLR 777 and (5) unreported Judgment in Raghuveer Pd vs. State, CWP No. 3642/88, decided on 01.08.1989. 11. Respondents have filed reply to writ petition. Shri J.K. Singhi, Counsel for respondents contended that it was not a case of clear acquittal of petitioner from offences charged but was after giving him benefit of doubt, as such reinstatement could not have been claimed as a matter of course, because it is for employer to decide independently on the basis of record as to whether in view of the fact that criminal proceedings were initiated, at the behest of department which directly relates to the discharge of duty and particularly in present case, where there was serious charge of corruption imputed against him, acquittal will not entail him to reinstatement with back wages and more so when petitioner has submitted application through his Counsel before this Court in criminal appeal for relinquishment of his claim for reinstatement and back-wages, he is not entitled for any such benefits. Shri Singh further urged that the authority after taking note of material on record has rightly rejected his claim for reinstatement and back-wages vide impugned order (Annexure-7). 12. Shri Singhi also submitted that the authority has taken note of order of Apex Court so also observations made by this Court in CWP No. 2768/89. Shri Singh further urged that the authority after taking note of material on record has rightly rejected his claim for reinstatement and back-wages vide impugned order (Annexure-7). 12. Shri Singhi also submitted that the authority has taken note of order of Apex Court so also observations made by this Court in CWP No. 2768/89. It has further been urged that circular dated 24.01.1995 of which reference has been made by petitioner, cannot be read in isolation as it does not deal with cases where acquittal has been ordered after giving benefit of doubt to offender delinquent, and a general decision as referred to in Circular (supra) cannot be invoked in all cases, inasmuch as in present case, this Court vide order dated 010.1993 in earlier CWP No. 2768/89, had directed to consider entire material on record and not to proceed only on the basis of order alone. That apart, Shri Singhi submitted that once it was petitioners own contention that he would not claim any reinstatement as he was settled out of Rajasthan in Mumbai, as such no error has been committed by respondents in passing impugned order (Annexure-7). Shri Singhi, in support of his contentions, relied upon decisions in (1) Champaklal vs. J. B. Jhala 1980 (2) SLR (Guj) (DB) 724, (2) Javed Soukat vs. State of Bihar, 2000 (8) SLR (Patna) 367 (3) Union of India vs. Shribiharilal Sidhana 1997 (2) SLR (SC) 523. 13. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused material on record so also decisions cited at the bar. 14. It is common case among the parties that petitioner was involved in a case of criminal charge of corruption for which he was prosecuted for offence under Section 161, IPC read with Section 5 (1) (d) of PC Act and was initially convicted by criminal Court vide Judgment dated 25.05.1997 but in Cr. Appeal No. 235/77 this Court acquitted him from aforesaid offence after giving him benefit of doubt vide Judgment dated 07.03.1986. The respondent authority has considered and decided representation of petitioner inter alia assigning following reasons: - .(1) that petitioner made his admission in writing in application moved before appellate Court that he has already settled in Mumbai and, therefore, did not want to claim arrears of salary and reinstatement. The respondent authority has considered and decided representation of petitioner inter alia assigning following reasons: - .(1) that petitioner made his admission in writing in application moved before appellate Court that he has already settled in Mumbai and, therefore, did not want to claim arrears of salary and reinstatement. .(2) that he was gainfully employed elsewhere during intervening period and settled in Mumbai; and .(3) that he was acquitted ofcriminal charge of corruption after giving him benefit of doubt by appellate Court; 15. For aforesaid reasons, the authority rejected petitioners representation holding that he is not entitled to grant of reinstatement with back wages. 16. From a bare reading of the order dated 17.04.1995 (Annexure-7) it appears that only fact being considered by the authority, which throughout remained predominant in its mind was an application submitted on behalf of petitioner before criminal appellate Court where he declined to his reinstatement and back wages as he was settled elsewhere; and taking note of this statement cum application (supra), the authority finally rejected to consider for his reinstatement with back wages as it was a case of acquittal after giving him benefit of doubt. 17. No doubt, it was open for respondents even after acquittal, to initiate disciplinary action after serving upon him charge-sheet under RSEB CCA Regulations, 1962, if at all considered it to be a case of misconduct. But as a matter of fact no disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated, and ultimate fact remained that petitioner stood acquitted of criminal charge levelled against him vide Judgment dated 07.03.1986 of this Court, which attained finality. That apart, once the Apex Court has set aside direction given by this Court e.g., “ petitioner would not be entitled to any reinstatement with back wages”, mere statement made by Counsel before this Court in criminal appeal, particularly when petitioner has specifically came out with a case that he never submitted any such application at any stage while his appeal was decided by this Court on 07.03.1986, which is a matter of dispute, which cannot be resolved but ultimate fact still remained that it was for the authority to consider independently after taking note of the service rules and regulations, circulars so also decision of the Apex Court. Strange enough, the authority remained predominant throughout while deciding his representation that he once stated that he was not requiring reinstatement and back wages being settled out of Rajasthan. In my opinion, very premises, on which the authority has proceeded in examining the issue in totality is wholly misconceived and misplaced. 18. It was obligatory for the authority to examine facts of the case, in which offence was committed; Judgment of Apex Court, Scheme of Rules and Regulations so also Circulars, and the fact that despite his acquittal after giving him benefit of doubt, the department did not consider it proper to initiate disciplinary action against him; and after taking into consideration in totality of matter the decision was to be taken as to whether the act of petitioner at all involved moral turpitude or his retention was in the interest of the department, if he is taken back in service, or whether there is any legal impediment in reinstating him in service. But all such relevant consideration were wholly misplaced while examining representation of petitioner by the authority while taking impugned decision. 19 In such circumstances, at best, it could be one of its considerations but the impugned order in no manner could be rested finally being based on its face value as referred to by this Court in its Judgment in criminal appeal (supra). Other considerations have been noticed by the authority keeping in mind that ultimate fact of criminal appeal of petitioner being allowed by this Court while acquitting him from offences charged of corruption. Be that as it may, in view of Judgment of this Court in criminal appeal (Supra), petitioner can in no manner be said to be a person who was convicted or under clouds of committing criminal offence. 20. However, ultimate fact remained that once findings recorded by this Court while deciding criminal appeal has been set aside by Apex Court, consequence whereof have to be noticed by competent authority. 21. Now I advert to the Judgment s cited by Counsel for petitioner. In Union of India vs. Jaipal Singh (Supra), employee was reinstated on acquittal in appeal but denied back wages holding that the employee will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for denying him actual payment of back wages, that period be counted as period of service without any break. In Union of India vs. Jaipal Singh (Supra), employee was reinstated on acquittal in appeal but denied back wages holding that the employee will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for denying him actual payment of back wages, that period be counted as period of service without any break. Even while examining the claim for back wages, the Apex Court observed that if prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or the department, itself , perhaps different considerations, may arise. In present case, the prosecution was at the behest of respondent department and so considerations which were taken by Apex Court while deciding issue, will not be applicable to the facts situation of present case. 22. In Union of India vs. Madhusudan Prasad (Supra), delinquent was dismissed from service without any inquiry and no show cause notice was issued to him prior to dismissal from service, and the appellate authority held the order of dismissal to be in violation of principles of natural justice and as a consequence, the delinquent was reinstated in service, but back wages were denied to him, which came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances, it has no application to present fact situation in the facts situation of present case. 23. In Sulekh Chand vs. Commissioner of Police (Supra), it was observed by Apex Court in Para 2, “ once the acquittal was on merits the necessary consequence would be that the delinquent is entitled to reinstatement as if there is no blot on his service and the need for the departmental enquiry is obviated. It is settled law that though the delinquent official may get an acquittal on technical grounds, the authorities are entitled to conduct departmental enquiry on the self same allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action.” 24. As it was a case of acquittal on merits, the Apex Court finally observed that the authority can conduct departmental enquiry on the self same allegation but in present case, acquittal was after giving him benefit of doubt and no departmental inquiry was initiated. Hence, the decision in Sulekhchands case (Supra) does not render any help to petitioner. .25. Shri Gour further placed reliance on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Ghasilal Ors. vs. JVVNL (Supra). Hence, the decision in Sulekhchands case (Supra) does not render any help to petitioner. .25. Shri Gour further placed reliance on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Ghasilal Ors. vs. JVVNL (Supra). It was a case where appellant was initially convicted under Sectiion 302/149, IPC but later on his conviction was converted under Section 323, IPC and he was given benefit under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In that case, question arose as to whether benefit of probation will at all be sufficient for not to reinstate him in service and to deny back wages. The Division Bench of this Court, after examining the controversy finally held that disqualification attached on account of such conviction stood removed according to Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and that apart, this Court observed that it was at the most a case of misconduct not involving moral turpitude, and every offence is certainly contrary to the accepted moral values of society but it cannot be said that every offence involves moral turpitude. This Court observed as under: - .“It is nobodys case that in the case at hand the offence under Section 323, IPC for which the petitioner has been ultimately convicted, involved moral turpitude. After his conviction for offence under Section 323, IPC the petitioner was granted benefit of probation and was released under the provisions of the Act. The appellant, therefore stood removed of the disqualification attached on account of such conviction according to Section 12 of the Act. Such conviction is not a disqualification for the purpose of seeking an employment in future, of course, after the removal of such disqualification under Section 12 of the Act, the conduct of the petitioner which had led to his conviction cannot be said to have been obliterated.” 26. In these facts, the decision in Ghasilal Oras case (Supra) will be of no assistance to present petitioner. .27. As regards Judgment s relied upon by Counsel for respondents, in Union of India vs. Shri Biharilal Sidhana (Supra), the Apex Court held that acquittal in criminal case does not give him an automatic right to be reinstated in service, and all relevant considerations were to be taken note of by the authority while passing impugned decision. .27. As regards Judgment s relied upon by Counsel for respondents, in Union of India vs. Shri Biharilal Sidhana (Supra), the Apex Court held that acquittal in criminal case does not give him an automatic right to be reinstated in service, and all relevant considerations were to be taken note of by the authority while passing impugned decision. Ratio decendi laid down by the Apex Court applies to the present fact situation, but in the case (Supra), where the delinquent was working purely on temporary basis, inasmuch as while working as Cash Clerk, committed misappropriation of the funds on more than one occasion but in criminal case, he was acquitted and reinstatement was denied to him for the reason that he was a temporary employee, who was otherwise having no right to hold the post. However, it was emphasized by the Apex Court that it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. But since it was a case where the delinquent was only a temporary Government servant, the Apex Court, held, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conduct the enquiry or to continue in service a Government servant accused of defalcation of public money. While in present case, acquittal is from criminal charge after giving him benefit of doubt but the petitioner was .substantive employee of the respondents, and in ordinary course in the absence of holding departmental inquiry in view of acquittal may be based on benefit of doubt, the reinstatement ordinarily could not have been denied. 28. In Javed Shoukat vs. State of Bihar (Supra) was of a case where initially petitioner was charged of criminal offence, from which he was acquitted in criminal proceedings but simultaneously disciplinary proceedings for self same charge were initiated wherein after being held guilty of misconduct, he was denied reinstatement, which is not the fact situation of present case. 29. 28. In Javed Shoukat vs. State of Bihar (Supra) was of a case where initially petitioner was charged of criminal offence, from which he was acquitted in criminal proceedings but simultaneously disciplinary proceedings for self same charge were initiated wherein after being held guilty of misconduct, he was denied reinstatement, which is not the fact situation of present case. 29. In the case at hand, other relevant considerations have been completely misplaced and have not been taken note of by the authority while examining claim of petitioner for reinstatement and back wages in the light of Orders of Apex Court in SLP against Judgment of this Court in criminal appeal (supra), so also of this Court in earlier CWP No. 2768/89, in my opinion, rejection of his claim based on his act of relinquishment in the light of statement made by his Counsel in criminal appeal, which too stood set aside under the aforesaid order of Apex Court, cannot be said to be a fair consideration. 30. In the light of what has been discussed above, it is clear that representation of petitioner was neither considered objectively nor on the grounds, which were germane to the controversy raised by petitioner and in fact, his representation in the circumstances has not visited fair consideration. Any how, petitioner has suffered a long mental agony in litigation since 1977 and I have been informed that during pendency of writ petition, he has already crossed his age of superannuation in January, 1999, and that apart, earlier there was only scheme of contributory provident fund, but now pension scheme has been incorporated for employees of respondents, JVVNL (erstwhile RSEB) from November, 1988. If the petitioner would have been in service, he would have retired at the age of superannuation in January, 1999 with an option for grant of pension. Further more, present petition is second inning of ordeal litigation of legal gimmicks. Hence, I do not consider it necessary to remand back the matter for consideration afresh by competent authority. And, to meet the ends of justice, I mould the relief by invoking writ jurisdiction. 6.31. Consequently, this writ petition is partly allowed. Further more, present petition is second inning of ordeal litigation of legal gimmicks. Hence, I do not consider it necessary to remand back the matter for consideration afresh by competent authority. And, to meet the ends of justice, I mould the relief by invoking writ jurisdiction. 6.31. Consequently, this writ petition is partly allowed. The respondents are directed to compute retiral and pensionary benefits in favour of petitioner on the basis of actual service rendered from the date of his appointment till dismissal from service (18.07.1977) after considering his case for grant of pensionary benefits under the pension scheme; and such computed pension shall be payable to him from the date, he actually attained age of superannuation (January, 1999) as if he would have been in service; and if at all service rendered by him falls short of qualifying service for pension purpose, the respondents shall pass appropriate orders so as to get pension alongwith other retiral benefits as if he had served for a period sufficient with a view to entitle him to get the pension. 7.32. Arrears of pension which have fallen due and payable after attaining the age of superannuation in the light of aforesaid direction, shall be paid to petitioner within three months. No order as to costs.