Judgment :- This second appeal has come after remand by the Supreme Court. The defendants are the appellants. The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for declaration, possession, mandatory injunction and costs. The suit property is the northern east-west wall in the A-Schedule property and the two feet space on the northern side of the said wall. 2. The plaintiff claimed that the B-Schedule property is his exclusive property. The A­-Schedule property was purchased by him with the wall and about four years back, when the plaintiff and his family members were away from the property, the defendants had stealth­ily put up hookstones on the northern side of the east-west wall of the plaintiff and have put up asbestos thalvaram sloping towards north. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to the two feet north-south space that has been left by his predecessors-in-title for tile purpose of maintaining the northern side of the AB wall. The defendants have no right to put up any construction much less to put up hookstones in AB wall before the suit was filed. 3. The defendants/appellants resisted the suit stating that the North-East wall is a common wall belonging to the plaintiff's vendor and it is incorrect to state that the defendants had put up hookstones only about four years ago. Hookstones have been in existence from the time of construction 'of the suit-wall and a roofing has been put up about 30 years ago. The roof was a thatched one and defendants have prescribed right over the suit wall and it is not the exclusive wall of the plaintiff. That portion to tile north of the wall has been let out to various persons and even assuming without admitting the same, the defendants were permitted to put up hookstones by the plaintiff's predecessors-in-title and the hookstones were permanent in character and, therefore, the plaintiff's prayer for tile relief of mandatory 711 injunction cannot be grant ed, since it is barred by time. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. Defendants 2 to 4 preferred the first appeal. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. Defendants 2 to 4 preferred the first appeal. The appellate Court found that the suit wall is the plaintiff's property entirely, but he is not entitled to any space on the northern side of the suit wall and the hookstones are not constructions of permanent character and the licence can be revoked and, therefore, the decree of the judgment of the Lower Court was partly modified. 5. Against that, the appellants preferred the present second appeal. On 11.8.1998, the second appeal was partly allowed, the mandatory injunction granted by the lower appellate Court was set aside and the plaintiff was held entitled to be compensated by payment of Rs.15,000. The mandatory injunction was restricted to the removal of three hookstones to the eastern side of the construction. 6. Against that the respondents herein preferred S.L.P. The Supreme Court granted leave and allowed C.A.No.43 of 2000, since the Substantial question of law was not taken note of and it was decided as if it were as first appeal. Tile matter was remanded to this Court and, therefore, the second appeal was heard on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the lower appellate Court is right in holding that Sec.60 of the Easement Act will not apply to the case when construc­tion with hookstones of permanent char­acter had been put up on the suit wall?" 7. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the cross-objection filed by the respondent is not maintainable since the finding regarding tile two feet space has become final; the appellate Court as well as the trial Court failed to see that the Suit wall was a common wall; the relief of mandatory injunction cannot be granted because tile plaintiff came to Court with a delay and the licence granted to the defendants to put up the hooks was an irrevo­cable licence. 8. No substantial question of law was framed by the respondents in the cross-objection, when it was filed. 9. At the time of arguments, learned counsel for the appellants raised the following substantial question of law oil the second appeal: "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for mandatory injunction in view of the delay and acquiescence?" 10. 8. No substantial question of law was framed by the respondents in the cross-objection, when it was filed. 9. At the time of arguments, learned counsel for the appellants raised the following substantial question of law oil the second appeal: "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for mandatory injunction in view of the delay and acquiescence?" 10. Now, the learned Counsel for the cross objector, raised the following substantial questions of law: "Whether the lower appellate Court is right in giving findings with regard to two feet space beyond the northern wall, without adverting to the specific finding of the trial Court?" 11. Learned counsel for the first respondent submits that so far as acquiescence is concerned, no opportunity was given to him to prove that there is no acquiescence. The plea of acquiescence was raised only in the additional written statement filed pending the first appeal. Learned counsel also submitted that when the first respondent is entitled to maintain his wall, he should be atleast permitted to whitewash the wall and repair the wall, if needed. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that the manner in which the appellate Court had calculated the dimension of the property is totally contrary to the materials placed before and that the trial Court had rightly come to the conclusion that the two feet space belongs to the first respondent. 13. The judgments relied on, by the appellants are: Krishnan Pillai v. Kilasathammal, A.I.R.1928 Mad. 810; Dwarka v. Gourishankar, A.I.R.1943 Nag.77; Fazal Haq v. Data Ram, A.I.R. 1975 All.373; Faqir Chand v. Lila Ram, A.I.R. 1994 Del.161; Khair Mohd. Khan v. Mt. Jannat, AIR.1940 Lah.359; Nasirul-Zaman Khan v. Azim-Ullah, I.L.R. 28 All. 741. 14. The plaintiffs' property lies south of the AB wall. The offending hookstones were put up on the other side facing the defendants' property in the passage to the north of the wall. Ex.A- 1, the sale deed under which the plaintiff has purchased the property from one Arokiyasamy Mudaliar oil 14.6.1972, shows that the plaintiff has absolute right to the northern wall. In the said document, it is shown that one Lakshmiammal owns her property south of the suit property. Lakshrniammal is the wife of the plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and Ii is wife purchased all the property from the same Arokiyasamy Mudaliar. In the said document, it is shown that one Lakshmiammal owns her property south of the suit property. Lakshrniammal is the wife of the plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and Ii is wife purchased all the property from the same Arokiyasamy Mudaliar. According to the appellate Court, there is no evidence to show that' the AB wall is the common wall for the defendants. The defendants purchased the property under Ex.B-2. In Ex.B-2, schedule property shows that it lies to North of Saminatha Pillai's house. The said Saminatha Pillai is the father of the plaintiffs' vendor. In Ex.B-2, there is no mention 'about the common wall. In view of the factual findings with regard to the Suit wall we must confirm the findings that the Suit wall belongs to the plaintiffs. 15. The hookstones were inserted in the wall according to the petitioner, even in the time of Arokiyasarny MUdaliar, vendor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued notice under Ex.A,5 oil 24-10-1979 stating that the defendants encroached in the B-schedule property in tile year 1974-1975, when they were not in the house. Tile, defendants inserted the hookstones in the AB wall. Tile case of the plaintiff is that they Put up the hookstones only in the year 1975 and 'there was Panchayat and the defendants had agreed to remove the hookstones. Barring the plaintiff, no other witness was examined. 16. According to Ex. C-1, the Advocate Commissioner's report, the hookstones were put up not more than 10 years ago. The defendants have produced extract from the property assessment register in respect of the house adjacent to the AB wall and the Municipality assessed the tax even from the year 1967-68. On receipt of Ex.A-5 notice, the first defendant sent reply under Ex.A-6. In Ex.A-6, the first defendant has stated that he 'has got permission for Arokiyasamy Mudaliar to insert hookstones over the wall 26 years ago. In Ex.A6, it is stated that nearly 40 years ago, Arokiyasamy Mudaliar had given permission to put up the hookstones. 17. The appellate Court found that as per Ex.A9, the registered partition deed executed among' one Mustafa and others dated 19.10.1900; it is admitted by the plaintiff along with plaintiff's wife that the property belongs to the said Mustafa. There is no wall mentioned in Ex.A9. Ex.B- 1 and Ex.B-4 are the ancient title deeds of the plaintiff's predecessors. 17. The appellate Court found that as per Ex.A9, the registered partition deed executed among' one Mustafa and others dated 19.10.1900; it is admitted by the plaintiff along with plaintiff's wife that the property belongs to the said Mustafa. There is no wall mentioned in Ex.A9. Ex.B- 1 and Ex.B-4 are the ancient title deeds of the plaintiff's predecessors. In those documents also, the AB wall was not mentioned. These are of the year 1933-34. The plaintiff has given evidence that there was a partition between Arokiyasamy Mudaliar, is vendor and his brother. But this was also not produced by the plaintiff to show that he has got two feet beyond the AB wall. He has also admitted in the evidence that there is no mention about the common wall in the partition suit. 18. The plaintiff must prove that when AB wall was constructed, the extent of two feet beyond the AB wall, belongs to him. Ex.A-3 is the town Survey plan which shows that the entire survey No.433 measures 47' on the eastern side from north to south. The appellate Court held that it, is not open to the plaintiff to take advantage of town survey plan to prove his entitlement. The plaintiff's vendor Arokiyasamy Mudaliar while selling the property has fixed the AB wall as the northern boundary and shown the property to the south of the wall to the extent of 22' or 23'. If there was enjoyment of the property further to the north of the AB wall, definitely it would have been mentioned. The plaintiff is entitled only to what he purchased under Ex.A-1 and not what is described as Survey No.443 in the town survey plan. Even with regard to that, the appellate Court had held that the Surveyor had not fixed the dimensions properly, but drawn an imaginary line from the Survey No.444 and that there is no encroachment. When there is neither oral nor documentary evidence to show that the plaintiff's vendor was in enjoyment of two feet open space, the finding that the plaintiff has no space beyond the north of AB wall is factually correct. 19. Now, we come to the question of -mandatory injunction. According to the defendants, they have prescribed title by adverse possession to the suit B-Schedule property. 19. Now, we come to the question of -mandatory injunction. According to the defendants, they have prescribed title by adverse possession to the suit B-Schedule property. To show that the hookstones have been in existence merely from 1967-68, the defendants filed Ex.13-3 to show that the property tax has been assessed in respect of Door Nos.33-A to 33-C. The description of the property given in Ex.C-1 reads as follows: "On the back portion of the defendant's property there are three residential rooms present facing northwards and bearing Door Nos.33-A to 33-C. The defendants have filed Ex.3, the extract issued by the Municipality that the above said three door numbers were assessed to property tax. The extracts were issued from the year 1967-68. The first-defendant executed a mortgage in favour of Co-operative Bank and he described the property contained one house bearing Door.No.32". Thereafter the appellate Court held that since even as per the defendants own admission the hookstones were put up by them by virtue of permission given by Arokiasamy Mudaliar, it is only under licence and since the insertion of hookstones is not a construction of permanent character, the licence can be revoked and therefore, granted the relief of mandatory in­junction. Both the Courts also felt that since asbestos roofs were not manufactured 30 years ago, the, hooks could not have, been in exist­ence since then. 20. It is true that the plea of acquiescence was raised only in the appellate Court. However, the fact remains that the plaintiff's case that the defendants had stealthily put up the hook­ stories four years prior to the suit was not proved. In these circumstances, we are left with the ' defendant's case. For 26 years, the hookstones have been there by virtue of per­ mission given by Arokiasarny Mudaliar. (It is not necessary in this case to decide whether the hookstones are construction of permanent nature and whether the licence granted by Arokiasamy Mudaliar is, irrevocable or whether the defendants prescribed to the title of the suit wall since the defendants rely on Ex.A-6, from which, it is seen that the defendants have put up the hookstones with the permission of Arokiasamy Mudaliar, question of prescription of title by adverse possession does not arise.) However for grant of mandatory injunction, the time of delay is crucial. The case that it was put up four years ago, has not been proved. The case that it was put up four years ago, has not been proved. The Commissioner has fixed the date of insertion of the hooks at about 10 years. So the plain­ tiff obviously had stood. by for several years without taking, steps to seek the removal of the hookstones. 21. In Nasir-ul-Zaman Khan v. Azim-Ullah, I.L.R.28, All. 741, it was held that kachcha thatched houses were of permanent character within the meaning of Sec.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The fact that the thatches have been renewed from time to time, does not make the construction of a temporary character. In Krishnan Pillai v. Kilasathammal, A.I.R.1928 Mad.810, it was held that the land was used by both parties for passage, only the defendants owned properties on either side o a lane, put up a sort of a platform, it was held that it was not a proper case for issuing mandatory injunction. This case is somewhat similar to the present case, In that case, the plaintiff asserted what he claimed to be his legal right. Even assuming that there was a legal right when it is a question of relative convenience or inconvenience and the extent of damage to the one party or the other, the learned Judge was persuaded to hold that the manner in which the plaintiff has been enjoying or using the property has not been in the slightest degree interfered with or inconvenienced. In that case, the shed was put up 10 or 12 years ago. The plaintiff lay quiet till 1921, when the suit was instituted. Learned Judge observed that: “I do not propose to put it on any ground of acquiescence, nor on any ground of estoppel. I do not think there are facts in this case on which the one or the other can be found in favour of the defendant. Yet there is undoubtedly this laches on the part of the plaintiff. In all matters of equitable relief the court is entitled to take the laches of the party seeking relief into consideration in granting or refusing it. Yet there is undoubtedly this laches on the part of the plaintiff. In all matters of equitable relief the court is entitled to take the laches of the party seeking relief into consideration in granting or refusing it. I have not the shadow of a doubt in my mind that English Courts of equity having before them such a case as this, in which the plaintiff has been sleeping over his rights for 10 or 12 years, would undoubtedly have refused the remedy by way of mandatory injunction." Learned Judge also held on that ground alone, the plaintiff is disentitled to the relief of mandatory' injunction. Learned Judge observed that there is not evidence with regard to what may be regarded as any special source of inconvenience or discomfort caused to the plaintiff barring "sentimental satisfaction that the plaintiff has won in the case and spited the defendant, insisting upon the demolition of the structure Wilt wrongfully by the defendant". In Mathuri v. Bhola Nath, A.I.R. 1934, All. 517, it was held that licence was irrevocable. In Khair Mohd Khan v. Mt. Jannat, AIR,1940 Lah.359, the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court held that the encroachment made by the joint owner on land reserved for common purposes does not constitute a continuing wrong. It is complete ouster and it is a wrong, complete at the time when construc­tion is put up. In Dwarka v. Gourishankar, AIR 1943, Nagpur 77, a hut was considered as permanent structure. In Faqir Chand v. Lila Ram, AIR.1994 Delhi 161, it was held that the construction of the tin-shed in the com­mon passage amounted to complete ouster of the right of common use. The injury was complete when the tin-shed was constructed and limitation was three years for filing the suit for seeking the relief pf mandatory injunction. 22. The decision in Krishnan Pillai v. Kilasathammal, A.I.R.1928 Mad.810, squarely applies to the present case. The case of the defendants is that 26 years ago the hookstones were put up, the plaintiff's case that they were put up four years ago is clearly false. Prohibitory injunction or mandatory in­ junction is purely an equitable relief and plain­ tiff P who, has putforth a false case would not be entitled to the relief of mandatory injunc­tion. In the Commissioners' report, it was clearly stated that the hookstones were in existence for 10 years. Prohibitory injunction or mandatory in­ junction is purely an equitable relief and plain­ tiff P who, has putforth a false case would not be entitled to the relief of mandatory injunc­tion. In the Commissioners' report, it was clearly stated that the hookstones were in existence for 10 years. The defendants' evidence remains unchallenged. The plaintiff has obviously not suffered any inconvenience because of the existence of the hookstones, since the other side of the wall is not visible to him. On the other hand, when the defendants-had put up portions and the roof of the said portions rests on hookstones, the defendants will definitely be prejudiced if a decree for mandatory in unction is granted asking them to remove the hookstones. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that if the hookstones are not directed to be removed then at least he may be permitted periodically to enter the two feet passage and whitewash and repair the wall. 24. Learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that it cannot be done because these portions are occupied by people and respondent cannot whitewash the wall without entering that area. 25. The question of relative convenience or, inconvenience, as observed by the decision in Krishnan Pillai v. Kilasathammal, A.I.R.1928 Mad.810, must be in favour of the appellants. The existence of the hooks does not in any way impair enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff, because hooks are on the other side of the plaintiff's wall, facing the vacant space. On the other hand, the appellants have used the hooks to raise roof over those portions, for which property tax has been assessed, fight from 1968. Therefore, the first respondent, who had been sleeping over his rights for atleast 10 years, as per the Commissioner's report and longer as per the defendant's case, must be refused the remedy of mandatory injunction. This is so, especially since his case that it happened four years ago, has been demonstrated to be false. Even if we take the plaintiffs' case to be true, which it is not, the plaintiff has kept quiet atleast for those four years. The equitable relief cannot be granted because of laches. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellant had already deposited a sum of Rs.15,000 as directed by this Court, before the order of remand by the Supreme Court. The equitable relief cannot be granted because of laches. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellant had already deposited a sum of Rs.15,000 as directed by this Court, before the order of remand by the Supreme Court. The appellants' case that they are permitted by Arokiasamy Mudaliar to put up the roof, must be accepted, since there is no evi­dence to the contrary. It is true that they also pleaded adverse possession, but their earliest stand regarding the hooks shows that they are permitted by Arokiasamy Mudaliar and that destroys the plea of adverse possession. 27. In these circumstances, it really cannot be said that there was illegality on the part of the appellants in putting up the hooks. However, by their act, the plaintiff is deprived of his right to whitewash or otherwise maintain the northern side of the wall that belongs to him. For this, he is entitled to some compensation and the compensation already deposited by the ap­pellants, shall be treated as compensation for their act of depriving the plaintiff of his right to whitewash his own wall on the northern side. The hook stones must be treated as a construc­tion of permanent character, in view of the use to which they have been put. 28. In Nasir-ul-Zaman Khan v. Azim-Ullah, I.L.R.28, All. 741, it was held that even Kachcha thatched houses were held to be a construction of permanent character and the fact that they have removed from time to time, does not make them temporary. Similarly, merely because the hookstones can be pulled out, if necessary, will not make it temporary, since the roof of the residential portions rest on the hooks. 29. Therefore, the first question regarding the character of hookstones, whether temporary or permanent is answered in favour of the appellants. 30. The second question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction is also answered in favour of the appellants. 31. Thirdly, the substantial question of law raised by the cross-objector with regard to two feet space is answered against the cross-objector. It is a finding of fact. 32. 30. The second question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction is also answered in favour of the appellants. 31. Thirdly, the substantial question of law raised by the cross-objector with regard to two feet space is answered against the cross-objector. It is a finding of fact. 32. To sum up: (a) the plaintiff/cross-objector is entitled to AB wall; (b) the plaintiff/cross objector is not entitled to the two feet space beyond AB wall; (c) the plaintiff/cross-objector is not entitled to mandatory injunction in respect of hooks; (d) the defendants/appellants, shall pay a sum of Rs.15,000 as compensation for depriving the right of enjoyment of the plaintiff with regard to AB wall. This compensation has already been deposited and the plaintiff/cross-objector may withdraw it;(e) To ensure the interest of justice, the defendants are restrained from expanding the roofing or load more weight on the hooks than there is on date, thereby putting greater strain on the wall that belongs to the plaintiff and there shall be an injunction restraining the defendants from extending the residential portions by extending the roof over the three hooks, which are now left open. They shall remain open; (f) The appellants/defendants shall maintain the northern side of the wall by regularly whitewashing the same and they shall not in any way impair the strength of the wall. 33. The second appeal is partly allowed, and disposed of and the cross objection is dismissed. No costs.