Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 1898 (RAJ)

Bhopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2005-07-26

GOVIND MATHUR

body2005
Judgment Govind Mathur, J.-By this petition for writ a challenge is given by the petitioner to the order dated 27.03.2000 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment of withholding of five grade increment with cumulative effect upon the petitioner and also the order dated 23.07.2005 passed by the appellate authority i.e., the Dy. Inspector General of Police affirming the order dated 27.03.2000 passed by the disciplinary authority. 2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present writ petition are that a memorandum under rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1958) was served upon the petitioner alleging therein that the petitioner alongwith one Sh. Prem Singh and six other Constables on 19.08.1993 entered into a conspiracy and extorted a sum of Rs. 7,000/-, a watch, silver chain and keys of shop from one Sh. Mahendra Kumar Jain. An allegation that on being arrested in criminal case for offence under Sections 395, 420 and 120 IPC, the petitioner was arrested on 111.1993 and remained in police custody up to 012.1993 and thereafter he was sent in judicial custody. 3. The petitioner denied the charges and submitted a reply under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The disciplinary authority being dissatisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner appointed an inquiry officer to inquire into the allegations levelled against the petitioner. The inquiry officer after holding an inquiry in accordance with the Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 submitted the inquiry report to the disciplinary authority. The inquiry officer after considering the evidence available on record held that the petitioner Bhopal Singh, Constable No. 200 was not with Sh. Prem Singh, Driver who left police station at 8 pm under report No. 659 and 663. The inquiry officer also found that the petitioner Bhopal Singh left the police station alongwith Sub-Inspector Bansidhar as per report No. 664 at 1.15 am. On basis of this finding the inquiry officer held that the petitioner was not at spot of alleged incident in village, Surajgaon. 4. The disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding given by the inquiry officer directed the petitioner to submit explanation to the findings arrived by him in disagreeing with the inquiry officer. 5. On basis of this finding the inquiry officer held that the petitioner was not at spot of alleged incident in village, Surajgaon. 4. The disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding given by the inquiry officer directed the petitioner to submit explanation to the findings arrived by him in disagreeing with the inquiry officer. 5. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the inquiry report on the count that in Roznamcha there was no mention of movement of the petitioner at 8 PM under the report No. 659, therefore, the petitioner was deemed to be at Surajgaon at 4 pm and he returned to police station thereafter. The petitioner failed to submit any explanation to the notice of show cause dated 211.1997. 6. The disciplinary authority by an order dated 27.03.2000 imposed a punishment of stoppage of five grade increments upon the petitioner holding the petitioner guilty for the charges leveled against him. The disciplinary authority by the order dated 27.03.2000 gave a finding that the act of the petitioner is a serious misconduct, which effects image of police force adversely. .7. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 27.03.2000 preferred an appeal before the appellate authority i.e., the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Udaipur and the appellate authority in his turn rejected the appeal by order dated 23.07.2001.Challenge is given by this petition to the orders passed by the appellate authority and the disciplinary authority on the following grounds: 1. Thefinding given by the disciplinary authority is not supported by reasons; therefore, there is total non-application of mind on the part of disciplinary authority. 2. The disciplinary authority merely on the count that the name of the petitioner is not shown in the Roznamcha under report No. 659 with regard to arrival at police station with SHO presumed that the petitioner was not at the police station at 8 pm and participated in Criminal Act at Surajgaon, is having no foundation. 3. Theorder of the appellate authority is bad in the eye of law being in violation of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958. The order passed by appellate authority deserves to be quashed being a non-speaking and unreasoned order. .8. A reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the respondents in general defending the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. .9. The order passed by appellate authority deserves to be quashed being a non-speaking and unreasoned order. .8. A reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the respondents in general defending the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. .9. I have heard the Counsel for the parties. 10. The first contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the disciplinary authority is not a speaking and reasoned order and the findings given by the disciplinary authority are not supported by the reasons appears to be a correct. From perusal of the order dated 27.03.2000 it is apparent that the disciplinary authority made general remarks and on basis of those remarks held the petitioner guilty for the definite charges. It is well settled that for definite charges of misconduct the disciplinary authority is required to give definite findings substantiated by the reasons. In the present case the disciplinary authority has merely stated that the act of the delinquent employee is a serious misconduct and it effects the image of police force adversely. The relevant portion of the order of the disciplinary authority reads as under: “nks"kh deZpkjhx.kksxhu tqeZ gSa }kjk fd;k x;k d`R; ,d laA tks iqqfyl Nfo dks /kwfey dj nsus dk fd;k gSA ,d vuqkkfLkr foHkkx ds vUnj bl izdkj dh cqjkbZ dks u"V ikuk esSa mi;Dr le>rk gw Lrqrks"kiza ij yxk;s x;s vkjksiks rFkk nks"kh deZpkjh }kjk izr tokc dks lan ugha ekurs gqos gj nksuksa dks izekf .kr ekurk gaw ijUrq mudh lsok vof /k ,oa ekuoh; nf"Vdks.k rFkk lq/kjus dk volj iznku djrs e flag dkfu gq, ujeh dk :[k viukrs gq, gj nksuksa deZpkfj;kas loZ Jh izsg dkfu- 361 ,oa Hkksiky fla200 dks i`Fkd 5&5 okf "kZZd osru o`f} Hkkoh izHkko ls cUn djus ds n.M lsnf .Mr djrk gwaA” 11. From reading of the finding given by the disciplinary authority it is apparent that the same is not at all supported by any reason with sufficient evidence. Non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority while imposing a major punishment upon the petitioner is apparent. Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 puts a statutory obligation upon the disciplinary authority to record finding against each charge. In the present case no specific finding against the charges levelled is given by the disciplinary authority. Non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority while imposing a major punishment upon the petitioner is apparent. Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 puts a statutory obligation upon the disciplinary authority to record finding against each charge. In the present case no specific finding against the charges levelled is given by the disciplinary authority. Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 provides that it is only after good and sufficient reasons that penalty specified in it can be imposed. It should appear from the order-imposing penalty that the disciplinary authority has applied its mind by recording good and sufficient reasons before imposing it. In the instant case reason whatsoever given by the disciplinary authority is not sufficient and good as required to impose a major penalty. 12. The second contention of Counsel for the petitioner is that the disciplinary authority disagreed with the inquiry officer on the count that in the Raznamcha the arrival of the petitioner was not shown at 8 pm with Station House Officer of the Police Station concerned under Report No. 659 and only on this count treated the petitioner guilty. It is contended by Counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary authority was required to give finding on charge leveled and not to the fact as to whether the petitioner with SHO arrived at police station or not at 8 pm. According to the Counsel even if it is assumed that the petitioner did not arrive at police station at 8 pm, even then it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to prove presence and participation of the petitioner in the incident said to have taken place at Surajgaon. In reply it is contended by the learned Counsel for respondents that sufficient evidence is available on record to show presence and participation of the petitioner in the incident concerned at Surajgaon. I have thoroughly examined the order passed by the disciplinary authority. This order nowhere maintains any evidence produced by the prosecution, its discussion and appreciation of the same is too far to refer. The disciplinary authority in fact has not at all considered the evidence produced even by the prosecution; as such, the finding given by him is perverse. 13. I have thoroughly examined the order passed by the disciplinary authority. This order nowhere maintains any evidence produced by the prosecution, its discussion and appreciation of the same is too far to refer. The disciplinary authority in fact has not at all considered the evidence produced even by the prosecution; as such, the finding given by him is perverse. 13. The next contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the appellate authority failed to decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958. Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958 prescribes a procedure to consider an appeal submitted by a delinquent employee being aggrieved by an order of disciplinary authority imposing punishment as prescribed under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958. Relevant portion of rule 30 i.e., Sub-rule 2 of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958 reads as under: “(2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14, the appellate authority shall consider: - .(a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. .(b) Whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established; .(c) Whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making an order, and .(d) Whether the penalty imposed in excessive, adequate or inadequate and after giving a personal hearing to the government servant to explain his case, if he desires so, and after consultation with the commission if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass orders. .(i) Setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or .(ii) Remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.” 14. According to Rule 30 the appellate authority is required to satisfy himself while considering an appeal with regard to adhering to the procedure prescribed under the Rules of 1958 or holding inquiry for imposing a major punishment. It further prescribes that the appellate authority is required to satisfy itself as to whether the facts established afford sufficiency justification for making an order and whether the penalty imposed is excessive adequate or inadequate. 15. It further prescribes that the appellate authority is required to satisfy itself as to whether the facts established afford sufficiency justification for making an order and whether the penalty imposed is excessive adequate or inadequate. 15. I have perused the order passed by the appellate authority. The appellate authority at inception reproduced the charges leveled against the petitioner and then reproduced the appeal submitted by the petitioner and thereafter in most casual manner just reproduced the provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules. 1958. The appellate authority has not considered the appeal in accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958. 16. In view of it, the order passed by the appellate authority is not an order in accordance with the Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958; the same therefore deserves to be quashed. I have also perused the order passed by the reviewing authority. However, as the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority are bad in the eye of law, therefore, the order passed by reviewing authority also deserves to be quashed. 17. In view of whatever discussed above this writ petition deserves acceptance and therefore the same is allowed. The order impugned dated 27.03.2000 (Annexure-4) passed by the disciplinary authority, the order dated 23.07.2001 (Annexure-5) passed by the appellate authority and the order-dated 04.04.2002 (Annexure-7) passed by the reviewing authority are hereby quashed. 18. No order as to costs.