Judgment 1. These appeals are directed against the common order dated 110.2004 passed by learned Single Judge in various writ petitions. Since, common facts and issue are involved in these appeals, we heard and dispose of all these appeals by this common Judgment . 2. The petitioners-appellants are carrying on the business of Catering at various Stations on the Jaipur Division of North Western Railway. They are providing catering service to traveling passengers. In the writ petition, the petitioners-appellants have challenged the New Catering Policy, 2000, specially Para 15.4 of the new policy which deals with the license fee. For ready reference that reads as under:- “15.4 License Fee: License fee will be 12% (or any other percentage commission on sales notified from time to time) of estimated annual sales turn over for both general and reserved categories. In the case of static units, there will be no separate charges towards rent for building/land, vendors fee and conservancy charges etc. except electricity and water charges based on actual consumption.” 3. The case of the petitioners-appellants is that license fee should be fixed as it was before policy. Now under the New Policy, licence fee is being charged on the sales turnover. The case of petitioners is that charging of fees on the basis of sales turnover is infact nothing but charging of tax similar to sales tax. The notice of demand has also been challenged on the basis that license fee is charged with retrospective effect which is illegal. 4. Learned Single Judge after considering all these aspects has taken the view that New Policy is in order and license fee charged as per Para 15.4 of the new policy is in the nature of fees and not the tax and there is nothing wrong in charging of license fee in the manner referred in Para 15.4 of the New Policy. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants mainly emphasized on the ground that the system adopted for charging the license fees is nothing but similar to sales tax as it has been charged on the basis of sales turnover and under this New Policy, the authorities have no power to charge tax. He also submits that as the notices were issued for recovery of the past sales i.e., from 2000 onwards when the policy was framed, the new policy is illegal as policy cannot be given effect retrospectively. 6. He also submits that as the notices were issued for recovery of the past sales i.e., from 2000 onwards when the policy was framed, the new policy is illegal as policy cannot be given effect retrospectively. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents i.e., U.O.I. and Divisional Railway Manager have placed reliance on the decision of learned Single Judge. 7. The short controversy for our consideration in these appeals is whether the fees charged under Para 15.4 of the New Policy is in the nature of tax? For that, we have to see the difference between the tax and fees. 8. Their Lordships have considered this aspect in the case of Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar & Ors. vs. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 966 . In Para 18 of the Judgment , their Lordships have observed as under:- “A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. If with a view to provide a specific service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in the nature of a fee and not in the nature of a tax. It is true that ordinarily a fee is uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients. But absence of uniformity is not a criterion on which alone it can be said that it is of the nature of a tax. A fee being a levy in consideration of rendering service of a particular type, correlation between the expenditure incurred by the Government and the levy must undoubtedly exist, but a levy will not be regarded as a tax merely because of the absence of uniformity in its incidence, or because of compulsion in the collection thereof , nor because some of the contributories do not obtain the same degree of service as others may.” 9. Fees is basically against rendering of service and in tax the element of service is missing, but under the tax, compulsion is always there and even in the case of fee if some compulsion is there, the character of fees does not cease. 10. Again this issue has been considered by their Lordships in the case of Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors., 1981 (4) SCC 391 . In Para 25 of the Judgment , their Lordships have made distinction between fees and tax. In Para 25, their Lordships have observed as under:- “Fees” are the amounts paid for a privilege, and are not an obligation, but the payment is voluntary. Fees are distinguished from taxes in that the chief purpose of a tax is to raise funds for the support of the Government or for a public purpose, while a fee may be charged for the privilege or benefit conferred, or service rendered or to meet the expenses connected therewith. Thus, fees are nothing but payment for some special privilege granted on service rendered. Taxes and taxation are, therefore, distinguishable from various other contributions, charges or burdens paid or imposed for particular purposes and under particular powers or functions of the Government. It is now increasingly realised that merely because the collections for the services rendered or grant of a privilege or licence, are taken to the consolidated fund of the State and are not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself decisive.” 11. Fees is paid for privileges and facilities while the tax is charged for support of the Government for a public purpose. 12. In Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners Association & Ors. vs. Hyderabed Municipal Corporation, Hyderabed & Anr., 1999 (2) SCC 274 their Lordships have gone to the extent that though normally for the purpose of fee, element of quid pro quo should be there but even in absence of quid pro quo, the nature of fee sometimes does not change. In Para 9 of the Judgment their Lordships have observed as under:- “It is, by now, well settled that a licence fee may be either regulatory or compensatory. In Para 9 of the Judgment their Lordships have observed as under:- “It is, by now, well settled that a licence fee may be either regulatory or compensatory. When a fee is charged for rendering specific services, a certain element of quid pro quo must be there between the service rendered and the fee charged so that the licence fee is commensurate with the cost of rendering the service although exact arithmetical equivalence is not expected. However, this is not the only kind of fee which can be charged. Licence fees can also be regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given require to be regulated or controlled. The fee which is charged for regulation for such activity would be validly classifiable as a fee and not a tax although no service is rendered. An element of quid pro quo for the levy of such fees is not required although such fees cannot be excessive.” 13. Mr. Bapna, learned Counsel for the appellants emphasized on the fact that the method of charging the fees based on sales turnover, if that is the method, then it amounts to charging of sales tax and ceases from the nature of fees. 14. This aspect has also been considered by their Lordships in the case of the Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. The State of Orissa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 459 . In Para 22 of the Judgment , their Lordships have observed as under:- “Therefore, in our opinion, the mere fact that the levy imposed by the impugned Act has adopted the method of determining the rate of the levy by reference to the minerals produced by the mines would not by itself make the levy a duty of excise. The method thus adopted may be relevant in considering the character of the impost but its effect must be weighed alongwith and in the light of the other relevant circumstances. In this connection it is always necessary to bear in mind that where an impugned statute passed by a State Legislature is relatable to an Entry in List II it is not permissible to challenge its vires only on the ground that the method adopted by it for the recovery of the impost can be and is generally adopted in levying a duty of excise. Thus, considered the conclusion is inevitable that the cess levied by the impugned Act is neither a tax nor a duty of excise but is a fee.” 15. Their Lordships have taken the view that method of determining the rate of levy by reference to production or turnover, that could not by itself make the levy as duty or tax. 16. In the case in hand, in Para 15.4 of the New Policy though the method has been adopted to calculate the fees on the basis of sales turnover, in our view that does not make any difference and does not change the nature of license fees which has been charged. 17. In view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships and the facts of the case in hand i.e., under the New Policy, license fee is being charged on the sales turnover of the persons carrying on the business of catering, that does not make any difference and does not change this fees into tax. 18. Mr. Bapna has also argued that demand notices are issued in 2003 for recovery of the amount from 01.07.1999 to 312.2003, thus the policy has been made effective retrospectively. .19. We see no substance in this argument of Mr. Bapna. When Policy decision was taken in 2000 and made effective from 01.07.1999 and in 2003 only demand notices have been issued for recovery of the arrears, by issue of demand notices in 2003 for the arrears, it cannot be said that policy has been made effective retrospectively. 20. In absence of that, we see no substance in these appeals. 21. All the appeals stand dismissed.