JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — The decision of the Commissioner, Consolidation, Orissa dated 11th June, 2001 in Consolidation Revision Case No.1763 of 1998, Annexure-2, is assailed in this Writ application. 2. The said Revision Case was filed under Section 36 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmenta¬tion of Land Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) by the present petitioners inter alia challenging the order dated 9th November, 1998 passed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Jagatsinghpur in Appeal Case No.37 of 1997. The said appeal arose out of an order passed by the Consolidation Officer, Jagatsingh¬pur in Remand Revision Case No.687 of 1998. 3. The property in dispute appertains to Land Register Plot No.1184, Khata No.632 corresponding to Current Settlement Plot No.1268, Khata No.43, and Revision Settlement (1985) Plot No.714, Khata No.32 of Mouza-Mohira, P.S. and District-Jagat¬singhpur. The petitioners claim title over the said property by virtue of a registered sale deed executed by one Purushottam Rath on 1.2.1969. According to them, the disputed lands were “Bahel” lands and Balaram Acharya, the father of the present petitioners, and one Parikshita Acharya were the “Baheldars”. Purushottam, the vendor of the petitioners, was allegedly a Sthitiban tenant under the Baheldars. According to the petitioners, after vesting of the Bahel with the State in the year 1963, in consonance with the Tenants Ledger submitted by the Baheldars, Purushottam was ac¬cepted as the Sthitiban tenant under the State. He possessed the lands peacefully and sold the same to the petitioners in the year 1969 by a registered sale deed. But then in the record-of-rights published in the year 1983, the suit lands were recorded in favour of Laxman Acharya, present opposite party No.3. The peti¬tioners challenged such recording before the Commissioner, Land Records and Settlement, by filing a Revision, but during pendency of the Revision Case, the Mouza in which the disputed lands situ¬ated came within the fold of the Consolidation Act and the Revi¬sion Case therefore abated. Thereafter the petitioners filed Objection Case before the Assistant Consolidation Officer under Section 9(3) of the Act which was registered as Objection Case No.1663/98. The Assistant Consolidation Officer dismissed the aforesaid Objection Case. Being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was registered as Appeal Case No.124/98. The Assistant Consolidation Officer dismissed the aforesaid Objection Case. Being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was registered as Appeal Case No.124/98. The said Appeal was allowed and the disputed lands were directed to be recorded in the names of the petitioners. Hereafter, Laxman Acharya, present opposite party No.3 challenged the appellate order before the Consolidation Commissioner in Revision Case No.687 of 1992. The Commissioner allowed the said Revision and remanded the Objection Case to the Consolidation Officer, Jagatsinghpur with a direction to dispose of the same afresh on the basis of the decree stated to have been passed by the Civil Court. The present petitioners chal¬lenged the said order of remand passed by the Commissioner before this Court in OJC No.9432 of 1992. The said writ application was disposed of with an observation that the Consolidation Officer while disposing of the Objection Case de novo would also take into consideration the entry made in the Tenants Ledger main¬tained in the Tahsil. According to the petitioners, their vendor Purushottam Rath was inducted as a tenant by the Baheldars. He was possessing the disputed lands as a tenant before vesting and after vesting the Baheldars submitted the Tenants Ledger indicat¬ing his name as a tenant. It is further asserted that Purushottam was deemed to be a tenant under the State in consonance with the provisions of Section 8 (1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and by virtue of the registered sale deed the petitioners have acquired valid right, title and interest over the lands. The Consolidation Officer, Jagatsinghpur had considered all these aspects as per the direction of this Court as well as the obser¬vations of the Revisional authority and finally disposed of the Objection Case with direction to record the disputed lands in favour of the petitioners with Sthitiban status. Opposite party No.3 preferred an appeal before the Deputy Director, Consolidation against the order of the Consolidation Officer which was registered as Appeal Case No.37 of 1997. The appellate authority, however, after a thread-bare analysis of all the documents, reversed the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed to record the disputed lands in favour of opposite party No.3 with Sthitiban status. The said order was based on the decree passed by the Civil Court as well as the record-of-rights of 1983 Settlement. The appellate authority, however, after a thread-bare analysis of all the documents, reversed the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed to record the disputed lands in favour of opposite party No.3 with Sthitiban status. The said order was based on the decree passed by the Civil Court as well as the record-of-rights of 1983 Settlement. The petitioners challenged the said order before the Commissioner and the latter by the impugned order Annexure-1 dismissed the Revision Case and con¬firmed the findings arrived at by the Deputy Director in Appeal Case No.37 of 1997. 4. To appreciate the dispute which has a chequered career, the necessary facts bereft of unnecessary details may be noted as follows :- Admittedly one Nilakantha Acharya was the original owner and Baheldar in respect of the disputed lands. Said Nilakantha Acharya was the father of Balaram Acharya and Parikshita Acharya. It appears from the decision passed by the Civil Court that on 19.12.1924 both Balaram and Parikshita had taken some loan from Baman Acharya, grandfather of the present opposite party No.3. For securing the said loan, the disputed property was mortgaged through a registered deed of mortgage. Aforesaid Balaram and Parikshit having failed to repay the loan, Baman Acharya filed a suit, being Mortgage Suit No.575 of 1929. The said suit was decreed in favour of Baman Acharya on 30.11.1930, vide Annexure B/3. Thereafter Baman Acharya had preferred an appeal being dis¬satisfied with the rate of interest decreed. The said Appeal was registered as Munsif Appeal No.442 of 1930 before the then Addi¬tional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack. On 1.3.1932 the said Appeal was disposed of and the following decree was passed, vide Annex¬ure-C/3 :- “That the appeal be and the same is hereby allowed for interest at the stipulated rate from the date after the expiry of the stipulated period of time, i.e. from 19th February, 1926 till date of suit and thereafter at 6 p.c.p.a till realization, and for costs of both Courts with future interest at 6 p.c.p.a. till realization. No interest is allowed at the stipulated rate up to the period of grace as it is rather high. The defendants must pay the decretal amount within four months from the date of decree and in default the respondents’ right to redeem will be lost and appellant will recover possession of the mortgaged property.” 5. Against the said appellate judgment and decree of the Addl. The defendants must pay the decretal amount within four months from the date of decree and in default the respondents’ right to redeem will be lost and appellant will recover possession of the mortgaged property.” 5. Against the said appellate judgment and decree of the Addl. Subordinate Judge, Balaram and Parikshita preferred Second Appeal before the Patna High Court which was registered as S.A. No.48 of 1932. The said Appeal was disposed of on consent, vide Annexure-D/3. The Patna High Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, but then the rate of inter¬est was reduced to “25% per annum instead of Rs.3/2 p.c.p.m. or Rs.37/8 p.c.p.a.” In spite of the above confirming judgment and decree passed by the Patna High Court, the decretal dues were not paid. Consequently, a proceeding for foreclosure was drawn on the basis of an application filed by the mortgage/decree-holder on 26.2.1936, vide Annexure-E/3 and E/3-1. The mortgage decree was thereafter put to execution, vide Execution Case No.267 of 1936 and actual delivery of possession of the mortgaged property through process of Court was handed over to the grandfather of present opposite party No.3 on 11.6.1936. From the date of deliv¬ery of possession, the grandfather of opposite party No.3, it is asserted, was in continuous and peaceful possession of the dis¬puted property and he exercised his right of ownership thereon. 6. The other side of the story as per the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Balaram had inducted Purushottam, the vendor of the petitioners as a tenant in respect of the disputed property and had executed a “Hata Patta” (Lease) in evidence thereof. Purushottam from the date of such induction was possess¬ing the disputed lands as a tenant. The lands in question being of Bahel character, the same vested with the State, but then such vest¬ing did not affect the right of Purushottam who was a tenant. Later on Purushottam was accepted as a tenant under the State, as would be evident from the 1931 record-of-rights. Purushottam after being accepted as a Sthitiban tenant, paid rent to the State and became the absolute owner of the disputed lands. While matter stood thus, for meeting certain contingencies, Purushottam exe¬cuted a registered sale deed in favour of the petitioners in the year 1969 and the petitioners became the owners thereof. Purushottam after being accepted as a Sthitiban tenant, paid rent to the State and became the absolute owner of the disputed lands. While matter stood thus, for meeting certain contingencies, Purushottam exe¬cuted a registered sale deed in favour of the petitioners in the year 1969 and the petitioners became the owners thereof. It is further submitted that taking into consideration the fact that the ex-Baheldar Balaram had mentioned the name of Purushottam in the Tenants Ledger, and in view of the 1931 record-of-rights, the Consolidation Officer directed to record the disputed lands in favour of the petitioners who had acquired valid right, title and interest in consonance with the registered sale deed executed in favour of Purushottam. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Tenants Ledger being a public document, an inference that the vendor of the petitioners, namely, Purushottam was a tenant in respect of the disputed lands prior to vesting and was in possession thereof may be drawn. Such right cannot be extin¬guished by vesting and, added to that, after the vesting Puru¬shottam was accepted as a tenant under the State. Thus, whatever right opposite party No.3’s grandfather had was obliviated after the Bahel in which the disputed lands situated vested in the State. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that taking into consideration the Tenants Ledger, the 1931 re¬cord-of-rights and other documents like rent receipts, etc. the disputed lands are to be recorded in the names of the peti¬tioners. The Commissioner, it is submitted, lost sight of the Tenants Ledger and other documents and acted illegally and with material irregularity in dismissing the Revision Case and it is a fit case where this Court may quash the order of the Commission¬er. 7. In reply, learned counsel for opposite party No.3 submitted that in order to frustrate the decree passed in the Mortgage Suit and during pendency and continuance of the litiga¬tion in Civil Court, Balaram had clandestinely executed a “Hata Patta” in favour of Purushottam who happened to be the brother-in-law of Balaram with an avowed oblique motive of frus¬trating the decree to be passed by civil Court. 8. Taking advantage of that Hata Patta and the entry made in the Tenants Ledger, Purushottam managed to get the disputed lands recorded in his favour in the 1931 record-of-rights. 8. Taking advantage of that Hata Patta and the entry made in the Tenants Ledger, Purushottam managed to get the disputed lands recorded in his favour in the 1931 record-of-rights. According to learned counsel for opposite party No.3, the aforesaid Hata Patta if any was a created document and even otherwise that came to light only during pendency of the litigation and was therefore hit by the principles of lis pendens. By virtue of that Hata Patta no right was conferred on Purushottam and, in fact, Puru¬shottam was never in possession of the disputed lands. At the other hand, right from 11th June, 1936 when possession was handed over to the grandfather of opposite party No.3 through Court, he was in possession thereof. 9. In support of aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the opposite party No.3 relied upon a judgment passed in a complaint case on 22.12.1941 by the S.D.M., Sadar, Cuttack, vide Annexure-F/3. The said complaint case, as it appears, was initi¬ated on the basis of a complaint filed by Purushottam alleging that in consonance with Hata Patta executed by Balarm he was in possession of the disputed lands but the grandfather of opposite party No.3, namely, Baman Acharya had cut and removed paddy grown on the said land by him. The said complaint case ended in acquit¬tal. In the said judgment the learned Magistrate observed that complainant Purushottam claimed possession of the disputed land on the basis of a Hata Patta. But though it was asserted by him that the said Hata Patta was a registered document, it was stated that the same had been lost. The certified copy of the said Hata Patta was also not filed before the Magistrate. On the basis of the materi¬als on record the Magistrate held that Purushottam was never in possession and, in fact, the grand- father of the petitioners, accused Baman, was in cultivating possession of the disputed lands. 10. It is further submitted that after vesting of the disputed lands, the grandfather of the petitioners filed an application under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act for settlement of the lands in his favour. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No.1885/65. On 20.5.1970 the A.S.O. directed to record the lands in the name of the grandfather of opposite party No.3. The said order was passed after considering a Civil Court decree and other documents. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No.1885/65. On 20.5.1970 the A.S.O. directed to record the lands in the name of the grandfather of opposite party No.3. The said order was passed after considering a Civil Court decree and other documents. In 1983 Hal Settlement, the disputed lands also stood recorded in the name of the present opposite party No.3. While matter stood thus, the Mouza in which the disputed lands situate came within the fold of the Consoli¬dation Act by virtue of a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act and the disputed land was recorded in the name of oppo¬site party No.3 in the Land Register. The petitioners thereafter preferred Objection Case which ultimately ended in the impugned decision of the Consolidation Commissioner, vide Annexure-1. 11. Though the parties in support of their respective cases relied upon several documents, most of which have been annexed to the Writ application and the counter-affidavit, the stock argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that by virtue of a Hata Patta executed by the Baheldar, Puru¬shottam had acquired tenancy right in respect of the disputed lands. The said right was fortified by submission of Tenants Ledger by the Baheldar after the vesting. He was therefore deemed to be a tenant under the State and by virtue of the registered sale deed the petitioners have acquired valid right, title and interest in respect of the disputed lands. It is further asserted that whatever title had been acquired by opposite party No.3’s ancestor, that was lost after vesting of the lands with the State, specially in view of the fact that the lands were vested free from all encumbrances. This aspect of the case was not kept in mind by the Consolidation Commissioner. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties patiently. Perused the materials meticulously and considered the submissions diligently. The facts narrated above would clearly reveal that the dispute with regard to the lands in question started as long back as in the year 1924 when both Balaram and Parikshit took some loan from Baman, grandfather of opposite party No.3, and had mortgaged the aforesaid lands by executing registered mortgage deed. A Mortgage Suit was filed in the year 1930. According to the petitioners, Balaram had executed a Hata Patta and had in¬ducted Purushottam as a tenant in respect of the disputed lands. A Mortgage Suit was filed in the year 1930. According to the petitioners, Balaram had executed a Hata Patta and had in¬ducted Purushottam as a tenant in respect of the disputed lands. Though it is stated that the said Hata Patta was a registered document, neither the same or a certified copy thereof was ever produced and the plea taken was that the same had been lost. Thus, the date on which such a Hata Patta was executed remains in dark. Onus with regard to creation of tenancy and the date on which that was created lies heavily on the petitioners who claim that their vendor had been inducted as a tenant. The petitioners have totally failed to discharge the said onus. Further, though litigations admittedly commenced since 1929 with Mortgage Suit No.575/1929 was filed in the Court of the Munsif, Cuttack to which both Balaram and Purushottam were parties, at no point of time they breathed a word with regard to execution of any Hata Patta or creation of tenancy right in favour of purushottam. This throws a suspicion as to the story advanced by Purushottam at a later stage. Even otherwise if a Hata Patta was created during pendency of litigation, the same would be hit by the principles of lis pendens and would not confer any right on Purushottam or the petitioners. Purushottam also could not claim any right in respect of the disputed lands on the basis of an invalid docu¬ment. The only other trump-card utilized by the petitioners with regard to Purushottam’s title is the Tenants Ledger. But as per law after vesting the Baheldar was required to submit a list of tenants on the basis of which Tenants Ledger was to be prepared. Law is also well settled that an entry in Tenants Ledger ipso facto does not create any title under Section 34 of the Evidence Act. It is only a corroborative evidence. It is often noticed that being influenced by extraneous reasons, several fictitious entries are made in the Tenants Ledger but the said entries cannot be treated as conclusive. 13. In the present case there is great dispute as to genu¬ineness of the entry made in the Tenants Ledger. The entry with regard to the disputed land casts grave doubt as to genuineness thereof. 13. In the present case there is great dispute as to genu¬ineness of the entry made in the Tenants Ledger. The entry with regard to the disputed land casts grave doubt as to genuineness thereof. In such circumstances the Zamabandi filed by the ex-Baheldar cannot be accepted to be the sole basis for determining the genuineness of the Tenants Ledger. If the entry in the Zamaban¬di would be the basis of determination of tenancy right, an intermediary who had actually not granted a list for extraneous reasons could insert names in the Tenants Ledger. This view of mine is fortified by the observations made by this Court earlier in the decision reported in the case of Shakuntala Devi v. State of Orissa, 43 (1977) CLT 156. 14. Admittedly Purushottam was the brother-in-law of Bala¬ram. The estate vested with the State in 1963. By the said date Balaram had lost the property, vide decree passed in the afore¬said Mortgage Suit passed by the Munsif, which was confirmed by the Patna High Court. Possession of the property was also handed over to the grandfather of opposite party No.3 on 11.6.1936, which was much prior to the date of vesting. There are enough materials on record apart from the writ of delivery of possession issued by the Civil Court from which it is revealed that the grandfather of opposite party No.3 was in possession of the disputed lands after he was put in possession in consonance with the foreclosure decree. The final decree for foreclosure decree passed in Mortgage Suit No.575/1929 reads as follows :- “That the defendant and all persons claiming through or under him be debarred from all rights to redeem the mortgaged property set out and described in the schedule hereunto annexed and shall put the plaintiff in possession of the said property.” 15. Thus the vendor of the petitioner, Purushottam, who claimed his right through Balaram, a party to the aforesaid Mortgage Suit was estopped from putting forth his title over the disputed lands. The fact that the grandfather of oppo¬site party No.3 continued in possession after physical delivery of possession of the disputed lands was made in his favour at 9 A.M. on 11.6.1936 is fortified from the order passed by the S.D.M., Sadar, Cuttack dated 22.12.1941 in the criminal case initiated by Purushottam for an offence allegedly committed under Section 379 IPC. The fact that the grandfather of oppo¬site party No.3 continued in possession after physical delivery of possession of the disputed lands was made in his favour at 9 A.M. on 11.6.1936 is fortified from the order passed by the S.D.M., Sadar, Cuttack dated 22.12.1941 in the criminal case initiated by Purushottam for an offence allegedly committed under Section 379 IPC. That apart, in consonance with the order passed by the O.E.A. authority, after vesting the record-of-rights was prepared in favour of the grandfather of opposite party No.3 and by virtue of that opposite party No.3 became the absolute owner of the disputed lands. 16. The above analysis clearly reveals that both the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Commissioner of Consolidation have properly appreciated the facts and the materials available on record in extenso. They had posed right questions and arrived at correct conclusion that opposite No.3 is the absolute owner of the disputed lands and the same should be settled in his favour. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order Annexure-2. 17. In view of the discussions made above, I find no reason to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner, vide Annex¬ure-2 and dismiss this Writ application. Parties to bear their respective costs. Application dismissed.