JUDGMENT K.C. Sood, J. (Oral): This Court on 27l" December, 2004 passed consent decree in a Second Appeal filed by the applicant-appellant. The order reads: "Caveat No. 71 of 2003 Infructuous. RSA No. 168/2003 Parties have amicably settled the dispute. Respondent Kuldip Kumar Sood and his son Amit Sood undertake to part with the land, 1.5 mtrs. in width and 50 mtrs. in length as shown in map mark X alongwith the affidavit denoted by A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, on payment of Rs. 3 lacs. It is agreed to between the parties that sale shall be executed within two weeks form today and amount of Rs.3 lacs shall be paid to the respondent Kuldip Kumar Sood and Amt Sood before the Sub Registrar, Dharamshala. In case the appellant do not take steps for the registration of this sale with prior notice of date to the respondent within two weeks form today, the appeal of the appellant shall stand dismissed, automatically, without any further reference to the Court case the amount is paid and sale is registered in accordance with the order of this Court, the appeal shall be deemed to have been disposed of accordingly. CMPs No. 274 of 2003 and 917 of 2004 In view of the disposal of the main appeal, these application do not survive. The same are disposed of. Copy dasti." 2. It will be noticed that the parties had agreed: (a) the sale deed shall be executed within two weeks from the date of the passing of the decree on payment of Rs. Three lacs to respondents Kuldip Kumar Sood and Amit Sood before the Sub Registrar, Dharamshala. (b) In case the appellant do not take steps for the registration of this sale, with prior notice of date, to the respondent within two weeks from the date of the decree, the appeal of the appellant would stand dismissed, automatically, without any further reference to the Court. 3. The applicant-appellant did not take any steps to get the sale deed registered in terms of the decree dated 27th December, 2004, noticed above. On 2nd April, 2005, almost after four months, the present application under Section 148 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on the affidavit of Mr. H.C. Guaba, a Senior Deputy manger, Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Limited, Chandigarh for the enlargement of the time to get the sale deed executed. 4. On 2nd April, 2005, almost after four months, the present application under Section 148 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on the affidavit of Mr. H.C. Guaba, a Senior Deputy manger, Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Limited, Chandigarh for the enlargement of the time to get the sale deed executed. 4. Pie reasons given in the application are to say least vague and without any foundation. What the applicant states is that certified copy of the orders was sent by the counsel to Chandigarh, but the same was received after considerable delay and there was confusion as the negotiations with the respondent No.1 were going on for 78 square meters of land though in the affidavit which has been filed by the applicant in respect of 75 square meters and therefore, the appellant-applicant could not take steps for the execution of the sale deed as decreed on 27th December, 2004. 5. It is noticed that the copy was applied by the applicant-appellant on the same date as is apparent from the copy of the order dated 27^ December, 2004 (Annexure-B).The copy was supplied to the appellant-applicant next day i.e. 28th December, 2004. The applicant-appellant is enigmatically silent as to when the case was processed in the department of the applicant and what precisely was the confusion. It may be worthwhile to notice that this order was passed in the presence of the learned counsel for the applicant-appellant and copy was permitted to be given dasti, as prayed for by the learned counsel for the appellant and there is no question of any confusion. I find no plausible reasons or sufficient cause to allow this application. 6. In addition, it may be noticed that Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1999 and Section 148 was substituted to read: "148. Enlargement of time: Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any Act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, [not exceeding thirty days in total,] even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired". 7. Enlargement of time: Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any Act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, [not exceeding thirty days in total,] even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired". 7. A reading of Section 148, above shows that where a time is fixed by the Court, the same can, in its discretion, be enlarged, but not exceeding thirty days in total. In this case the decree was passed on 27th January, 2005, now excluding the time in obtaining the copy of the order, the maximum period allowable under Section 148 of the Code expired or 9th February, 2005, whereas this application was filed on April 2, 2005. The application; therefore, is not maintainable even if Section 148 of the Code is assumed to be applicable in this case. 8. This apart, a preemptive decree was passed on that date to the effect that if the amount of Rs. Three lacs were not deposited by the applicant-appellant within two weeks form the date of the decree, the appeal of the applicant-appellant would automatically stands dismissed without any further reference to the Court. On the passing of this order, the decree became final and this Court cannot even under the inherent powers of this court, under Section 151 CPC, can vary the terms of the judgment and decree as observed by the Apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Darshan Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 318. The following observations in that judgment are apposite: The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the same becomes final subject to any further avenues of remedies provided in respect of the same and the very court or the tribunal cannot and, on mere change of view, is not entitled to very the terms of the judgments, decree and orders earlier passed except by means of review, if statutorily provided specifically therefore and subject to the conditions or limitations provided therein". 9. Learned counsel for the applicant relying on Smt. Periyakal and others vs. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 submits that the court has the necessary jurisdiction to enlarge time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant relying on Smt. Periyakal and others vs. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 submits that the court has the necessary jurisdiction to enlarge time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ratio of this case is not applicable in the facts of this case. 10. There is no merit in this application. 11. Dismissed. -