Judgment Dinesh Maheshwari, J.-This is a tenants second appeal arising from a suit for eviction and arrears of rent being Civil Suit No. 27/1975, which was decreed by the Munsif , Sri Ganganagar for arrears of rent and for eviction on the ground of default and material alteration by the Judgment and decree dated 06.09.1980 which was affirmed by the Additional District Judge, Sri Ganganagar while dismissing Civil Appeal No. 36/1980 filed by the defendant-tenant on 18.08.1983. .2. This second appeal against the aforesaid Judgment and decree dated 18.08.1983 was admitted by this Court after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties on the following substantial questions of law:- .(1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Additional District Judge was not right in decreeing the suit on the ground of default? .(2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Additional District Judge was not right in holding that the tenant-defendant (appellant) has taken benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No.17 of 1950) in the earlier suit between the parties? .(3) (a) Whether the defendant has made any material alteration in the premises in suit after taking them on rent by means of the document Exhibit 12? .(b) If the answer to this question is in the affirmative whether these material alterations were done with the consent of Banarsidas? .(c) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the decree for ejectment on the ground of material alterations in the premises as envisaged under Section 13(1)(c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. 17 of 1950) cannot be sustained? .(4) Whether the learned Additional District Judge was not right in refusing to admit the additional evidence as prayed by the defendant in his application under Order 41 Rule, 27 CPC? 3. While Questions No. 1, 2 and 4 relate to the ground of default and cognate aspects thereto; whereas Questions No. 3 (a), (b) and (c) relate to the ground of material alteration. The questions involved in this case require consideration as to whether the decree for ejectment on these two grounds of default and material alteration, or any of them, could be sustained? The questions involved in this case require consideration as to whether the decree for ejectment on these two grounds of default and material alteration, or any of them, could be sustained? It may be clarified that the appellant-tenant Daulat Ram has since expired and is now represented by his heirs and the proceedings in the present appeal were directed to be carried in respect of Rajendra Prasad son of the tenant - Daulat Ram by the order dated 15.09.1997. 4. The proceedings between the parties have passed through different phases and stages having their peculiar relevance to the two grounds of eviction aforesaid and, therefore, it shall be appropriate to deal with the two grounds separately. 5. The present suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiffs-respondents as heirs of the original landlord late Shri Banarsidas on 31.01.1975 in the Court of Munsif , Sri Ganganagar seeking eviction of the defendant-tenant Daulat Ram from the suit property on the ground of tenant having committed default in payment of rent from 012.1973 to 312.1974 and so also on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiffs No. 1 to 5 of starting their business. Another ground of eviction was put forward that premises were let out to the defendant for commercial purposes but he was using the premises from the year 1973 for residential purposes and, therefore, had not been using the premises for the purpose for which they were let out. The plaintiffs also claimed a decree for arrears of rent and water charges for 23 mouths. 6. It is not in dispute that premises in question are a part of property known as Ahata No. 2 situated at Industrial Area, Sri Ganganagar. A portion on the north eastern side of this Ahata No. 2 was let out by Banarsidas to the defendant - Daulat Ram on 01.09.1959 at a rent of Rs. 125/-per month with further stipulation of payment of Rs. 4/-per month as water charges by the tenant. 7. It was alleged by the plaintiffs in the plaint that premises in question were taken on rent for one year only and after 31.08.1960, the defendants was continuing in possession as statutory tenant. 125/-per month with further stipulation of payment of Rs. 4/-per month as water charges by the tenant. 7. It was alleged by the plaintiffs in the plaint that premises in question were taken on rent for one year only and after 31.08.1960, the defendants was continuing in possession as statutory tenant. It was further alleged that after 312.1968, the tenant did not make payment of the rent and water charges and the landlord Banarsidas had bona fide and reasonable requirement for his business and for these two grounds, Banarsidas filed earlier Civil Suit No. 135/1970 on 28.04.1970 before the Munsif, Sri Ganganagar. 8. The plaintiffs averred that defendant taking advantage of the provisions of law, made a payment of Rs. 2,289/-to Banarsidas on 21.07.1970 and in this way saved himself from eviction because of default in payment of rent. The defendant - tenant also raised an objection in the said suit that the Ahata in question was given on rent for industrial purposes and the tenancy was yearly one and the notice served by Banarsidas under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid. According to the plaintiffs, there was no substance in such an objection, yet the Counsel for Banarsidas keeping in view this objection withdrew the suit with permission to file fresh on 01.09.1971. After withdrawal of the said suit, the defendant paid the rent till 31.01.1973 to late Shri Banarsidas but from 01.02.1973 till the death of Banarsidas (the date of death being 28.09.1973), the rent was not paid to Shri Banarsidas nor after his death the rent was paid to the plaintiffs and hence the rent from 01.02.1973 to 312.1974 of 23 months of Rs. 2,875/-and water charges of Rs. 92/-, total 2,967/-were due which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. On the basis of these averments, the ground of eviction was stated in the manner that by not making payment of said amount of rent and water charges, the defendant has violated the agreement and so also the law and was, therefore, liable for eviction. 9. 92/-, total 2,967/-were due which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. On the basis of these averments, the ground of eviction was stated in the manner that by not making payment of said amount of rent and water charges, the defendant has violated the agreement and so also the law and was, therefore, liable for eviction. 9. It is relevant to point out at this stage that as the present suit was filed on 31.01.1975 in terms of the then existing provisions of law, as contained in Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in a suit for eviction on the ground of default, it was required of a tenant on the first date of hearing or, on or before such other date as the Court may on an application fix, not exceeding two months, to deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord an amount for the period for which he may have made default upto the previous month of payment at the rate of rent calculated on the basis of last paid rent with interest at the rate of 6% per annum and thereafter to continue to deposit the rent month by month by 15th of each succeeding month. Sub-section (5) envisaged that if in any such suit, there be any dispute to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court would determine the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant within 15 days from the date of such order in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (4). 10. Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 13 of the Act at the relevant time read as under:- “(3) For the purpose of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) a tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of any rent due from him, if he has remitted such amount to the landlord by postal money order at his ordinary address. .(4) Ina suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that Sub-section, the tenant shall, on the first day of hearing or on or before such date as the Court may, on an application made to it, fix in this behalf , or within such time, not exceeding two months, as may be extended by the Court, deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. .(5) If in any suit referred to in Sub-section (4), there is any dispute to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant, within fifteen days from the date of such order, in accordance with the provisions of Section (4). .(6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. .(7) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in Clause (a), of Sub-section (1) shall be passed by the Court but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefit under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation, if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.” 11. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefit under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation, if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.” 11. On the first date of hearing in the present suit, i.e., 10.03.1975, the defendant appeared through Counsel and submitted an application stating that for the landlord not accepting the rent despite offers and despite sending by money orders, the defendant has started making payment of the rent of Rs. 125/-per month and Rs. 4/-water charges, total Rs. 129/-per month by way of application in the Court of Munsif and the rent till 31.01.1975 was deposited in that Court and in these circumstances, only the amount of Rs. 129/-for the month of February, 1975 was due which the defendant wanted to pay that very day. He also pointed out that he was required to deposit the rent in the Court for the last two years incurring substantial expenditure and it was prayed that the amount of Rs. 129/-of February, 1975 be permitted to be paid to the plaintiffs under receipt and they be further directed to receive monthly amount of Rs. 129/-in the first week of every succeeding month. 12. The learned trial Court passed only the following order on this application on 10.03.1975 : Þodhy oknh gkftj&izfroknh ds odhy Jh js[kkjke gkftj&odhy izfroknh us ,d nj[okLr ds lkFk ekg Qjojh] 1975 dk fdjk;k isk fd;k & odhy oknh ysus dks rS;kj ugha vr% fdjk;k ekg Qjojh] 1975 dk gLc tkCrk tek vnkyr djk;k tkosA odhy izfroknh us tckc nkok ds fy;s le; pkgk & vr% fnukad 1&4&1975 dks isk gksAß 13. Therefore, only this much was directed that rent of the month of February, 1975 be deposited in the Court. On the next dated i.e., 01.04.1975, written statement was filed and on this very date, the defendant filed yet another application stating that the rent of the month of February, 1975 was deposited in the Court after refusal by the plaintiffs and they were refusing to accept the rent of the month of March, 1975 also and, therefore, it appears that every month, the defendant would be required to deposit the rent for which every time, the order would be required from the Court which would lead to serious inconvenience. On this application, the Court passed the following order:- Þodqyk; QjhdSu gkftj izfroknh dh rjQ ls fdjk;k tek djokus dh fuLor nj[okLr isk gqbZ & fjiksVZ lfjLrk eqykfgtk dh xbZ & Qjojh] 1975 dk fdjk;k tek gks pqdk gS vc ekpZ] 1975 o vkbZUnk ds fdjk;k tek djkus dh fuLor gqDe ds fy;s ;g nj[okLr isk gqbZ gS vr% fdjk;k gj ekg izfroknh oknh }kjk u ysus ij vnkyr esa gLc tkCrk tek djok;Aßs 14. In the written statement filed on 01.04.1975, the defendant admitted the agreement of payment of Rs. 125/-per month and Rs. 4/-per month as water charges but denied the liability of payment of house tax. It was also denied that Ahata in question was taken on rent only for one year. Regarding the previous suit, it was pleaded that of course the suit was filed on the ground of bona fide necessity but the suit was entirely baseless and not maintainable in law and, therefore, the suit was withdrawn by Banarsidas but condition precedent for filing of the present suit of payment of costs was not fulfilled and, therefore, the present suit was not maintainable. The defendant averred that Banarsidas continued to accept rent for some time after dismissal of the previous suit but thereafter stopped accepting the rent; and the rent was offered and was sent by money orders also but he did not accept the same and under compulsion, the defendant had to start depositing the rent in the Court of Munsif where the rent upto 31.01.1975 was deposited. It was alleged that by not accepting the rent, the landlord has harassed him and he was forced to adopt the proceedings for depositing the rent resulting in wastage of at least one day every month, apart from Rs. 25/-per month expenditure every time. The defendant denied any rent to be due. 15. The defendant also submitted pleadings in the form of better particulars on 212.1976 in terms of the order dated 211.1976 passed by the Court. However, so far the question of default is concerned, the relevant pleadings remained as noticed above. 16. 25/-per month expenditure every time. The defendant denied any rent to be due. 15. The defendant also submitted pleadings in the form of better particulars on 212.1976 in terms of the order dated 211.1976 passed by the Court. However, so far the question of default is concerned, the relevant pleadings remained as noticed above. 16. On the Ground of default, the Court framed issue No. 4 putting a burden on the defendant in the following terms:- Þ¼4½ vk;k izfroknh us tokcnkos ds [k.M&5 esa crk;s vuqlkj fdjk;k 01-02-1973 ds ckn dk oknh dks vksQj fd;k] euhvkMZj ls Hkstk o U;k;ky; esa tek fd;kA vr% og vnk;xh fdjk;s esa fMQkYVj ugha gS \ izfroknhß 17. The learned Munsif on this issue held the defendant to be liable for eviction on the ground of default on the consideration that the burden of proving this issue was upon the defendant because it was his case that he sent money orders after 01.02.1973 to the plaintiffs and upon refusal deposited the rent in the Court; but the defendant has not led any evidence in that respect, whereas Krishan Kumar PW. 1 has deposed that defendant has not paid rent from February, 1973 nor sent money order. Thereafter, the learned Munsif observed that this suit was on the ground of default right from the beginning. The first date of hearing in this suit was 10.03.1975 and on this date, the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of Section 13(4) and (5) of the Act and the application field by him on 10.03.1975 could not be said to be an application under Section 13(5) of the Act. The provisions of Section 13(4) and (5) came to an end on 29.09.1975 and for the pending suits, Section 13-A was inserted in the Act and for obtaining benefit of this Section 13-A, the defendant ought to have moved an application within one month from 29.09.1975. For the suits pending on 29.09.1975, only Section 13-A would apply and on his not making application under Section 13-A he could be evicted on the ground of default. It was also observed that, in the alternative, from the documents Exhibit-5, Exhibit-6, and Exhibit-3, it was clear that defendant had already obtained the benefit of Section 13(4) of the Act previously and, therefore, even if Section 13-A was left aside, yet he was not entitled for the benefit of these provisions again. It was also observed that, in the alternative, from the documents Exhibit-5, Exhibit-6, and Exhibit-3, it was clear that defendant had already obtained the benefit of Section 13(4) of the Act previously and, therefore, even if Section 13-A was left aside, yet he was not entitled for the benefit of these provisions again. But thereafter, it was reiterated that suit was pending on 29.09.1975 and only Section 13-A would apply and for its non-compliance, defendant was liable for eviction on the ground of default. 18. In the appeal filed by the defendant, the learned Appellate Judge after referring to the rival contentions endorsed the findings of the trial Court on more or less identical considerations that the defendant failed to make applications as required by Section 13(4) and (5) of the Act on 10.03.1975 and that he failed to move application within one month of insertion of Section 13-A of the Act and that he had already taken benefit of Section 13(4) of the Act in the previous suit. 19. An additional factor deserves to be noticed that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was moved by the appellant-defendant-tenant seeking to produce 25 receipts of payment of rent for the period in dispute with the submissions that by mistake, these receipts could not be filed earlier but the omission was not intentional and in the interest of justice, the receipts be accepted on record. The tenant wanted to support his case that the rent from 01.02.1973 to 31.01.1975 was regularly deposited in the Court under Section 19-A of the Act. The application was opposed on behalf of the plaintiffs and the learned Appellate Judge rejected this application on two grounds: first, that even if taken on record, the receipts were of no help to the appellant as he was not entitled for the benefit under Section 13(4) of the Act, and secondly, that there was an inordinate delay and gross negligence in not filing these receipts earlier. 20. In the light of the law applicable to the case, the proceedings noticed hereinabove and the evidence, Questions No. 4, 2 and 1 as formulated in this case may be considered in that order. Question No. 4 21. 20. In the light of the law applicable to the case, the proceedings noticed hereinabove and the evidence, Questions No. 4, 2 and 1 as formulated in this case may be considered in that order. Question No. 4 21. So far the application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC is concerned, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that these were receipts of deposit of the rent in the Court and there was no question of the documents being not genuine. There was of course an omission to produce the same before the trial Court but that should not come in the way of accepting this application particularly when the documents would be helpful in arriving at a just conclusion on the question of default as the tenant has regularly deposited the rent in the Court. 22. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant for granting the application and taking the documents on record for the purposes of proof of the case pleaded by the defendant, cannot be accepted. A bare perusal of the application makes it apparent that no cause worth the name has been stated in this application on which the Court could have considered that the defendant could not produce the documents before the trial Court inspite of exercise of due diligence. It is not a case where in the absence of these documents, the Court might find it difficult to pronounce the judgement effectually and completely on the questions raised before it. 23. The documents in question precisely relate to the proof of the case of payment as pleaded by the defendant. Moreover, in this case, as noticed above, issue No. 4 regarding the ground of default was framed by the trial Court in the negative putting the burden of proof upon the defendant. Although framing of such an issue cannot be said to be proper so far as the requirements of procedure are concerned, however, it has not been the case of the defendant that he was put to any prejudice by such framing of the issue. The issue in its terms clearly cast a primary burden upon the defendant to establish the payment in accordance with law of the rent from 01.02.1973 and in that situation, it was rather moreover required of the tenant t