RAJIV SHARMA, J. Both the writ petitions have similar facts, hence they are being decided by a common judgment. 2. In Writ Petition No. 2407 of 1998 (S/s), the petitioner has challenged the show-cause notice dated 14- 2-1998 whereby the petitioner was required to show-cause why his services be not terminated. He further prays for a direction to allow the petitioner to discharge his duties of teaching, in a congenial atmosphere without any hindrance and victimization and further to pay his due salary alongwith admissible allowances etc. and continue to pay the same regularly in future every month. 3. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions, the petitioners services were terminated and he filed Writ Petition No. 1971 of 1999 (S/s), challenge the termination order dated 10-4-1999 issued by the Secretary and further for a direction to reinstate with all consequential benefits, including back wages, treating him to be on duty throughout. 4. It has been stated that Madarsa Dar-ul Moballeghin (hereafter referred to as the madarsa) situated at Pata Nala, Lucknow, is an old reputed institution existing since about sixty years established by the Anjuman Hidayatul Muslameen Pata Nala, Lucknow and controlled as well as managed by the Majlise-lntizamiya (Committee of Management) of the said Anjuman Hidayatul Muslameen. The said anjuman is a registered body, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 with its registration No. 40/1935-36, the aforesaid Madarsa established and managed by the Anjuman are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as the said bodies are discharging public duties. 5. The Institutions received financial assistance in the form of donations from the public within the country as well as abroad, the nature of public duties are such which are avowed Constitutional functions of our Welfare-state. 6. It has been stated that bye-laws deals with the aims and objects of the Anjuman and Bye-laws-2 (ha) as also Bye-law No. 18 provide for the establishment and control of institutions in furtherance of which the said Dar-ul-Moballeghin exists. Bye-laws No. 8 provides for the creation of a Majlis-e-Intezamiya (Committee of Management) to fulfill the aims and objects of the anjuman and Bye-laws No. 9 deals with the size of the Majlis-e- lntezamiya as well as the number and designation of the office bearers. Bye-laws No. 8 provides for the creation of a Majlis-e-Intezamiya (Committee of Management) to fulfill the aims and objects of the anjuman and Bye-laws No. 9 deals with the size of the Majlis-e- lntezamiya as well as the number and designation of the office bearers. Bye-laws No. 26 empowers the Motmad (Secretary), subject to the approval of the Saheb-e-Sadr, to appoint/terminate the employees. 7. It has further been urged that in spite of the aforesaid bye- laws having been registered as for back in the year 1935-36, the rules and regulations with regards the service conditions of employees of the Anjuman and the subordinate institutions ( such as Dar-ul-Moballeghin) in pursuance of Bye-laws No. 29 have not been framed till date even after lapse of so many years and the employees are the victims of exploitation, ad hocism, arbitrariness and whimsical, authoritarian, cruel actions of the authorities, who are unmindful of the lack of jurisdiction and devoid of the proverbial milk of human kindness. It has further been submitted that the petitioner was paid Rs. 400/- per month and always received his due increments in time but inspite of his satisfactory service for more than 12 years he was drawing Rs. 1,485/- per month as salary and Rs. 80/- per month toward tiffin. 8. It is pertinent to mention here that in order to avoid an untoward situation of confrontation, the petitioner as per the advice of some mediating members of the anjuman submitted his application for leave initially for one week from 21-2-1998 to 27-2-1998. 9. On 28-2-1998, a meeting of the Majlis-e-lntezamiya (Committee of Management) of the said anjuman was held which was presided by Haji Abdul Hafiz Member, a sub-committee with an ostensible aim to sort out the rift-basically a clash of egos-between the petitioner and the Mohtamim was constituted consisting of two members-Hafiz Wajid Hussain and Haji Rafi Ahmad Siddiqui. As per the advice tendered by one of the member of the sub-committee, the petitioner submitted his subsequent leave applications, and inquired again and again as to what was his fault and why he was being penalized for no reason in spite of having rendered about 12 years of continuous, sincere and dilligent service which were always highly appreciated by all concerned. It is pertinent to mention that the said sub-committee is a pocket committee under the influence and control of Maulana Abdul Aleem Farooqui, Mohatmim, which unfortunately is highly prejudicial to the interests, career, livelihood, reputation etc. of the petitioner. 10. It has further been stated that the Mohatamim also did not indicate any reason before the sub- committee and on 26-4-1998 in one such meeting held at around 10. 00 a. m. at Sunni College, Mr. Maulana Farooqui, opposite-party No. 2 stated before a number of other members that the petitioner was not at all at fault but Maulana Farooqui, who is also the Mohtamim was not willing to let the petitioner, continue as teacher and in case the Majlis-e- lntezamiya (Committee of Management) of the said anjuman allows the petitioner to continue then he would resign from the post of Mohtamim. The petitioner attempted to resume his duties but he was not allowed to do so. 11. It has been alleged that neither the petitioner has been suspended nor terminated from service yet he has not been paid his salary since 31-1-1998 nor even for the period from 1-2-1998 till 20-2-1998 during which he was regularly teaching before he was forcibly prevented by the opposite-party No. 1 from performing his duties compelling him to submit leave applications up to 26- 4-1998 and thereafter beyond 26-4-1998 the petitioner was not allowed to attend the Madarsa premises. The petitioner has again and again requested the opposite-party No. 1 to permit the petitioner to perform his teaching duties but all in vain. 12. By means of Government Order dated 22-8-1987, the State of U. P. has formulated Uttar Pradesh Ashaskiya Arabi Tatha Pharsee Madarson Ki Manyata Niyamavali. The said Scheme stipulates amongst other service conditions for the teachers working in non- Government (Private) Madarsas. Rule 33 provides that in case disciplinary proceedings against any employee are contemplated, the employee shall be given a specific charge and the delinquent employee shall be afforded ample opportunity to present his defence within three weeks of serving the charge-sheet. Rule 34 also makes it essential that before termination a legal procedure must be adopted, whereas in the petitioners case there was gross violation of Clauses 33 and 34 of the said Niyamawali. 13. Rule 34 also makes it essential that before termination a legal procedure must be adopted, whereas in the petitioners case there was gross violation of Clauses 33 and 34 of the said Niyamawali. 13. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the Counsel for the opposite-parties that the Institution/madarsa in which the petitioners are working is neither the State nor the instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the writ petitions are not maintainable. He further submits that the Institution is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the Institution is not receiving any aid from the Government and the same is also not recognized. The petitioner also does not hold any examination nor give any certificate on the basis of imparting primary education of Arabic. It was further submitted that the petitioner himself was student and had obtained primary knowledge of Arabic and had volunteered for imparting primary knowledge of Arabic to the students for which he was paid remuneration out of the donation/subscriptions received by the Institution. There was no relationship of employer and employee. 14. In support of the above submissions, learned Counsel for the opposite-parties has relied upon a judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 , wherein the Honble Apex Court has laid down the tests for determination as to when a Corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency to the Government: " (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with Government character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor. . . whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State- conferred or State- protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (3) It may also be a relevant factor. . . whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State- conferred or State- protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Government functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. " 15. The aforesaid tests laid down by the Apex Court have been followed in a number of cases. In Mrs. Asha Khosa v. Chairman, Army Public School, Writ Petition No. 1415 of 1996, decided on 17-2-1997, a preliminary objection was raised that the Army Welfare Education Society was registered under the Societies Registration Act. The funds of the aforesaid society were generated by private contributions of service personnel, donations and investments. The society does not receive any funds from the Government. Another source of funds are the tuition fees, library fees and examination fees from the students. Therefore, the Government has no control over the affairs of the society and army schools, run by it like the Army School, Gorakhpur. The Government does not provide any finding for the schools of the society and they are privately funded. Hence the Army Welfare Society and the Army School, Gorakhpur are not State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Overruling the aforesaid tests, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court has held that the writ petition is not maintainable as the Army Welfare Education Society is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Against the said judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, a special appeal was filed before the Honble Apex Court which was dismissed. A similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in V. K. Walia v. Chairman, Army School, Mathura Cantt. reported in 2004 (1) LBESR 145 (All.) : (2003) 3 UPLBEC 2827 (DB), wherein this Honble Court has held that a writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and these schools are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. reported in 2004 (1) LBESR 145 (All.) : (2003) 3 UPLBEC 2827 (DB), wherein this Honble Court has held that a writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and these schools are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. In Chander Mohan Khanna v. National Council of Educational Research and Training & Ors. , reported in AIR 1992 SC 76 , the Apex Court has observed as under: "article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression "state". A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of the fact that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, Corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as "state" under Article 12. " 16. A Division Bench of this Court in Anand Kumar Gupta v. Rajghat Education Centre, 2003 (1) ESC 216 : (2003) 1 UPLBEC 336 (DB), has also held - "the language of Article 226 is not doubt very wise. It states that a writ can be issued `to any person or authority and ``for enforcement if rights, conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. However, the aforesaid language in Article 226 cannot be interpreted and understood literally. If we take the language literally it will follow that a writ can be issued to any private person or to settle even private disputes. If we interpret the words `for any other purpose literally it will mean that a writ can be issued for any purpose whatsoever, e. g. , for deciding private disputes, for grant of divorce, succession certificate etc. Similarly, if we interpret the words, `to any person literally it will mean that a writ can even be issued to private persons. However, this would not be the correct meaning in view of various decision of the Supreme Court and of other Courts vide Smt. Biran Devi v. Sechu Lal, 2001 (4) AWC 2659 ; Gagendra Kumar Sharma v. General Manager v. Bajpur Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. , 2000 (1) LBESR 465 (All) : 1999 (3) UPLBEC 2452 ; Carisbad Co. v. Jagtiani, AIR 1952 Cal. 315, etc. v. Jagtiani, AIR 1952 Cal. 315, etc. The correct interpretation of the aforesaid words in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that a writ can ordinarily be issued to a person to whom writs were traditionally issued by British Courts on well established principles. Similarly, the words, "for any other purpose" have to be interpreted in the narrower sense to mean that a writ can be issued for the purpose for which writs were traditionally issued by the British Courts on well established principles vide Workmen of Pepsico v. Labour Commissioner, 2000 (3) ESC 1593 (All. ). The British Courts did not ordinarily issued writs to private persons except a writ of habeas corpus. No doubt the power of Indian High Courts to issue writs under Article 226 are wider than those of the British Courts vide Dwarika Nath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81 , but they are not so wide as to permit Judges to do anything they like in writ jurisdiction. There are well-settled principles governing the exercise of power under Article 226 as laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court and these principles have laid down several limitations to the exercise of such power. For instance, one of such limitations is that ordinarily a writ will not be issued to a private body except a writ of habeas corpus. " 17. The decision in General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC 639 , the question was whether the Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills was State under Article 12 of the Constitution and hence amenable to writ jurisdiction. The mill was a co-operative society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the State had no control at all in the functioning of the mill much less a deep and pervasive one. Hence it was held that Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills was not State under Article 12 of the Constitution. 18. The mill was a co-operative society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the State had no control at all in the functioning of the mill much less a deep and pervasive one. Hence it was held that Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills was not State under Article 12 of the Constitution. 18. On the other hand learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed a decision of learned Single Judge passed in Smt. Sharma v. Union of India, 1995 (1) LBESR 164 (All), and in Abu Zaid v. Principal, Madarsa- Tul-Islah Sarai Mir, 1998 (2) LBESR 865 (All), in which this Honble Court has held that the Army School run by the Army Welfare Education Society is State under Article 12 of the Constitution in the case of Abu Zaid v. Principal, Madarsa-Tul-Islah Sarai Mir, Azamgarh, the learned Single Judge has held that a writ petition lies even against a private educational institution since the educational institution is discharging a public duty of imparting education which has been held to be a fundamental right by the Supreme Court. 19. The judgments Smt. Rajni Sharma v. Union of India and Abu Zaid v. Principal Madarsa-Tul-Islah, Sarai Mir, relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have already been overruled by this Court in Special Appeal No. 172 of 2004, decided on 16th August, 2004. 20. After hearing the rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the pleadings and in view of the laws laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove, it would be abundantly clear that the institution of the opposite party neither any financial assistance is provided by the Government nor there is any pervasive control in day-to- day functioning of the Institute. It is further evident that it does not enjoy monopoly status which is conferred State or State- protected and is only a private institution. Thus, the institution of the opposite parties cannot be termed as a state or any other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 21. In view of the above discussions, the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. .