AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) IN 1995 the respondent authority allotted a commercial plot for the purpose of encouraging the growth in the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Area Plot was numbered as 3-B measuring 2000 sq. mtrs. whereunder the petitioner wanted to establish a Trade Facilities Centre. The plot No. 3-B was carved out from plot No. 3 having total area of 4000 sq. mtrs. While the construction designs of the proposed structure on the plot was being scrutinized as per the bye-laws of the authority, it transpired to them that additional area of 2000 sq. mtrs. would better serve architectural viability of the said plot in terms of availability of floor area and building design, hence the petitioner decided to avail the additional area of 2000 sq. mtrs. of commercial land which was lying adjacent to the plot allotted to the petitioner. Petitioner made approaches to the respondent authority. After various discussions on 1st September, 1997 the authority allotted the plot No. 3-A to the petitioner on the requisite terms and conditions as mentioned therein. The petitioner company deposited 20% of the premium amounting to Rs. 9. 5 lacs on 13th September, 1997. Petitioner requested the respondent authority to allow payment of further premium in 10 (ten) instalments with interest 18% on the balance amount of premium. On 17th November, 1997 the allotment was cancelled by the respondents and the premium of Rs. 9. 5 lacs which was deposited by the petitioner was refunded. The writ petition was filed. Interim order was passed. Ultimately order dated 17th November, 1997 was quashed with a direction upon the respondent authority to pass appropriate orders only after giving appropriate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Consequently petitioner approached the respondent authority and re-deposited a sum of Rs. 9. 5 lacs as per 20% of the premium on 31st March, 1998 and proposed to deposit the balance in 6 (six) months. The respondent rejected the representation. Further made a request of review which was turned down. The ground of rejection of the claim is that there was no advertisement for the purpose of allotment of commercial plot which according to the petitioner is baseless because of the reason that in spite of best effort the authority did not succeed attracting intending buyers for the commercial plots and upon being unsuccessful they have considered the petitioners application. The ground of rejection of the claim is that there was no advertisement for the purpose of allotment of commercial plot which according to the petitioner is baseless because of the reason that in spite of best effort the authority did not succeed attracting intending buyers for the commercial plots and upon being unsuccessful they have considered the petitioners application. Since no contract was concluded, question of consideration of cause under review is yet open and When the same was not adhered, the petitioner invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court to quash the orders dated 2nd December, 1998 and 20th January, 1999 being annexures 11 and 13 respectively and get an order for acceptance of the balance amount and allotment of the land in question. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the respondent authority, the petitioner has not come with clean hands. The petitioner wanted to get more time to pay the instalments which was against policy decision of the NOIDA authority. On 22nd January,1997 Board of Greater NOIDA authority framed rules for allotment of commercial land and the authority is strictly following such guidelines. The petitioner opted to acquire 1000 sq. mtrs. of the commercial land in May,1995 and June, 1995 and amended his proposal and demanded 2000 sq. mtrs. The said land was allotted to him after two years but the petitioner did not execute the work at the site nor raised any construction over the said allotted land but further demanded additional land. The intention of the petitioner is malafide. He wants to get allotment of the land without complete payment and complying the conditions. The writ petition is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed with costs. Time and again representations were heard and opportunities were afforded to the petitioner to make submissions. It is to be remembered that as per rules framed by the respondent authority in a meeting held on 22nd January, 1997 allotment of the land of the Greater NOIDA can only be made after due advertisement published in the newspapers and all applications were considered. Factually the petitioner has got the allotment directly on his applicatioa without following the proper procedure as aforesaid. The order of the allotment is rightly cancelled. ( 3 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner added that an order of the authority cannot be construed in the light of the explanations subsequently given. Factually the petitioner has got the allotment directly on his applicatioa without following the proper procedure as aforesaid. The order of the allotment is rightly cancelled. ( 3 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner added that an order of the authority cannot be construed in the light of the explanations subsequently given. There should not be any vagueness in considering the cause. Legality of the order passed by the statutory authority must be judged on the face thereof as the reason contained therein cannot be supplemented by an affidavit. Apparently we do not find any cause which can grossly affect the merit. ( 4 ) THEREFORE, we called upon the judgments on the merit. He cited three judgements which are reported in AIR1995 SC 1 , JT1994 (6 )SC 292 , 1994 (4 )SCALE297 , 1994 Supp (3 )SCC494 , [1994 ]supp3 SCR770 , 1995 (1 )UJ59 (SC ), (1995 )1 UPLBEC126 (Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain), AIR1998 SC 1400 , 1998 (2 )ARBLR1 (SC ), 1998 (2 )BLJR819 , 1998 (1 )CTC443 , JT1998 (2)SC 149 , (1998 )III MLJ54 (SC ), (1998 )120 PLR802 , RLW1998 (2 )SC 183 , 1998 (2)SCALE58 , (1998 )3 SCC471 , [1998 ]1 SCR456 (Tarsem Singh v. Sukhminder Singh) and (Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Union of India and Anr. ). ( 5 ) IN the first judgement i. e. (supra) we find the Supreme Court held that there is no legal basis for holding that a vested right is obtained by such type of petitioner in respect of the respective allotment. The public authority has a right to identify the allottee. The allotment is selection process. It is not the allotment itself. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment at the price prevailing on the date of drawal of lots. The price or rates prevailing on the date of such communication of allotment is applicable unless provided in the scheme. ( 6 ) FROM (supra) we find that an agreement would be void if both the parties to the agreement were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. It was also held therein that bilateral transaction by two or more parties if not in writing cannot be deviated from the definition of the contract. ( 6 ) FROM (supra) we find that an agreement would be void if both the parties to the agreement were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. It was also held therein that bilateral transaction by two or more parties if not in writing cannot be deviated from the definition of the contract. contract is a bilateral transaction between two or more parties. Every contract has to pass through several stages beginning with the stage of negotiation during which the parties discuss the proposals and the counter-proposals as also the consideration resulting finally in the acceptance of the proposals. The proposal when accepted gives rise to an agreement. Mutual consent which should also be a free consent, as defined under sections 13 and 14 of the Contract Act, is the sine qua non of a valid agreement. One of the essential elements which go to constitute a free consent is that a thing is understood in the same sense by a party as is understood by the other party. ( 7 ) THE next citation is reported in (, 2000 (3 )CTC546 , JT2000 (7 )SC 256 , 2000 (5 )MPHT321 , 2000 (5 )SCALE59 , (2000 )6 SCC113 , [2000 ]supp1 SCR447 , (2000 )3 UPLBEC2047 (supra ). There we find that when a development authority announces a scheme for allotment of plots, the brochure issued by it for public information is an invitation to offer. Several members of the public may make applications for availing benefit of the scheme. Such applications are offers. Some of the offers having been accepted, subject to rules of priority or preference laid down by the Authority, result in a contract between the applicant and the authority. The legal relationship governing the performance and consequences flowing from breach would be worked out under the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act except to the extent governed by the law applicable to the Authority floating the scheme. ( 8 ) ON the other hand respondent contended that once the order is cancelled upon giving the reason the course of action is complete. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent cited (Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrul and Ors.) and explained that there cannot be any concluded contract between government and highest bidder. ( 8 ) ON the other hand respondent contended that once the order is cancelled upon giving the reason the course of action is complete. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent cited (Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrul and Ors.) and explained that there cannot be any concluded contract between government and highest bidder. There is no confirmation of the acceptance of the highest bid This type of transaction is mere acceptance on condition. In further from (Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The international Airport Authority of India and Ors.) we find that when the government is dealing with the public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc. , must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. We have also drawn our attention towards (Mahabir Auto Stores and Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. ). It was also held that State or its instrumentality engaged in commercial transactions, its actions must be reasonable fair and just even when no formal contract is entered into. In (Ram and Shyam Company v. State of haryana and Ors.) it was decided that an owner of private property need not auction it nor is he bound to dispose it of at a current market price. Factors such as personal attachment, or affinity, kinship,empathy, religious sentiment or limiting the choice to whom he may be willing to sell, may permit him to sell the property at a song and without demur. A welfare State as the owner of the public property has no such freedom while disposing of the public property. Factors such as personal attachment, or affinity, kinship,empathy, religious sentiment or limiting the choice to whom he may be willing to sell, may permit him to sell the property at a song and without demur. A welfare State as the owner of the public property has no such freedom while disposing of the public property. Disposal of the public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficent activities by the availability of larger funds. From (Harbans Lal v. Jaqmohan Saran) we get that writ in the nature of the certioran may be issued only if the order of the inferior tribunal or subordinate court suffers from error of jurisdiction, or from a breach of the principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. There is no sanction enabling the High Court to reappraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by an. inferior court or subordinate court. When a High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to us, private negotiation in respect of allotment of the public land by the public authorities even in case of non-availability of candidates as per advertisement, is not permissible in law. It can, at best, be construed as individual action of the local authority. There should be transparency in; dealing with the public by the public authorities. Such private negotiation, as contended by the petitioner, cannot give any right to the petitioner. In absence of any right, the writ court behaves restraintly. However, even in absence of any express right, in two occasions the writ court interferes i. e. promissory estoppal or legitimate expectation. Promissory estoppal stands on a better footing than legitimate expectation But since there is no promise on the part of the petitioner, the question of promissory estoppal cannot find place hereunder. Hence the only remaining question is whether any legitimate expectation finds place herein or not. Legitimacy of expectation depends upon a very important point i. e. element of right. Promissory estoppal stands on a better footing than legitimate expectation But since there is no promise on the part of the petitioner, the question of promissory estoppal cannot find place hereunder. Hence the only remaining question is whether any legitimate expectation finds place herein or not. Legitimacy of expectation depends upon a very important point i. e. element of right. Any illegality cannot give rise to legitimate expectation. Factually the petitioners case is that as because private negotiation was continued due to failure of getting effective offer by the advertisement and a portion of the money was deposited, petitioner accrued certain rights of expectation. But as soon as the authority refunded the sum and repeatedly considered the representations under the order/s of the court and by way of review in connection thereto, the writ court cannot compel them to give hope for further expectation. We have to consider the decision making process but not the decision. We do not find any cogent reason to draw an inference that consideration of representation was wrongful. Even thereafter if the petitioner wanted to say that he accrued certain rights it has to be evidentially proved in a civil proceeding The writ court is not made for the same. We have to stop somewhere. We cannot indulge litigants to proceed for litigation before the writ court perpetually. Therefore, we cannot pass any order in favour of the petitioner. Thus, in totality the writ petition cannot be sustained. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the writ petition is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated if any deposit is lying with the government it can be refunded to the petitioner within a period of a fortnight from the date of communication of this order. However, no order is passed as to costs. . .