Judgment :- Ramachandran, J. Ext.P1 order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench dated 14-01-2002 is subjected to challenge by the applicant, who is the petitioner herein. Nevertheless, it has not been possible for us to give a finality to the issue. We think, further examination of the claims has to be made with reference to the grievances of the petitioner vis-à -vis his counter parts, who had opportunity to get the benefits because of the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal in certain other cases. The facts could be stated as herein below. 2. In short, the applicant was claiming identical benefit that was conferred by Ext.P3 in favour of two employees (Sunil and Sivaraman) of an antedate of regularisation. Persons, who got engaged as casual labourers before the attainment of 18 years of age, could not have claimed such period for the purpose of regularisation. But a position had come to be accepted against this general principle in view of the order passed in O.A.No .1908/1992 by the Tribunal. Because of the directions passed in the above O.A., the applicants there got the benefit of such service and consequential seniority. Pointing, out that this relief should have been conferred on them as well, Sri. Sunil and Sri. Sivaraman, referred to earlier, had filed O.A.NO.1155 of 1998 and by Ext.P4 judgment, the Tribunal had required the Department to look into their claims in the light of the order in O.A.No.1098/1992. 3. Ext.P3 came to be passed in the aforesaid circumstances conferring such benefits on them. The resultant position was that Sri. S.N. Sunil, by virtue of this added service, became senior to the petitioner. The petitioner had his date of birth as 14-10-1965 and he had entered service on 19-07-1982; he was to attain 18 years of age on 14-10-1983. But, he was regularized in service only on 08-07-1994, because of the restriction of non-inclusion of service before attainment of majority. If Sri. Sunil had been permitted to remain as such he would have been a junior to him. But, the march that had been secured by Sri. Sunil because of the order dated 14-07-1999, according to the petitioner, him a rightful cause of action. 4. The petitioner had thereupon filed O.A. No.837 of 1999 as the Department was not taking notice of the claims. But, the march that had been secured by Sri. Sunil because of the order dated 14-07-1999, according to the petitioner, him a rightful cause of action. 4. The petitioner had thereupon filed O.A. No.837 of 1999 as the Department was not taking notice of the claims. However, the Tribunal had rejected the application holding that the application is hit by limitation. According to the Department, the decision in O.A. No.1098/1992, which had been followed in the said case as also in some other cases, should have been claimed at appropriate time and delay was not explained. The applicant had thereupon filed O.P.No.22295 of 1999. This Court, although dismissed the Original Petition, had reserved his right to raise the issue before the Department. However, the Department had rejected the claims of the petitioner once again which led to the filing of the Original Application. Since the claim was rejected, the present Original petition had been filed. 5. Sri. T.C. Govinndaswamy, counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that two different yardsticks had been adopted as between the employees and this Court has to intervene in the matter. According to him, the stand of the Department and the Tribunal, that there was delay, cannot be accepted, since the cause of action had arisen only because of Ext.P5 order dated 14-07-1999. Within months thereof, the applicant had filed an application for claiming the reliefs. He points out that in O.A.No.1155/1998, leading to Ext.P4, he had not been made as party, and the Department had a duty to inform him of a proposal, which would have adversely affected his seniority. 6. If this alone was the submission, it would have been possible to accept the contention of Sri. Govindaswamy viz., that there was no delay. The petitioner had approached the Department in time. But, there is a further difficulty which has surfaced. We see that while passing Ext.P1 the Tribunal had also gone into the intrinsic merit of the contentions that had been raised. On a previous occasion, although in O.A.No.1098/1992 it had been declared by the Tribunal that for the purpose of regularisation, service rendered before the attainment of 108 years of age could have been taken into consideration and the decision followed in other cases, when the same issue has come before the Tribunal, it appears that it was felt, the proposition did not appear to be based on any rule or prescription. In other words, in the case at hand, Tribunal has held that an error committed, did not authorize them to continue to commit errors. 7. When the matter is placed before the Tribunal, it was proper and justified on the part of the Tribunal to examine the sustainability of the claim and we cannot find fault with the Tribunal, when the issue is attempted to be critically examined. Adverting to the relevant portion of the order, which had been highlighted by the applicants in the earlier proceedings, the Tribunal held that to their mind and opinion, there was nothing in the orders which went to show that in the matter of relaxation and for counting of service, the service before the attainment of 18 years could have been taken into consideration or for any purpose. If this was the emerging legal position, the Tribunal was of the view that the claim of the applicant was not sustainable. 8. We also concur with the view, to the extent that only in case there is definite orders forthcoming from the Administration, it would have been possible for a relaxation to be made in favour of any group of employees, and if this is overlooked, perhaps it is an instance where the order is vitiated. If that be the case, the decision in O.A. No.1098/92 is to be deemed as one arrived at per incuriam. 9. We can see the heartburn of the petitioner/applicant and the justifiability that because of the orders passed behind his back, persons who were his juniors have become to be reckoned as seniors solely arising out of the advantage that had been obtained by them because of the orders of the Tribunal, and implemented by the Department by passing consequential orders. However, there can be only one yardstick and that has to be applied with reference to the rules in respect of all who are similarly situated. We are fortified in our above conclusion, by drawing sustenance from the observations of the Supreme Court made in Management of M/s. Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Ajit singh (2005 (2) Supreme 26). Sri. Ajit Singh had been appointed as a Legal Assistant by the management. His services were dispensed with pursuant to a decision to abolish the post. The termination was subject matter of an industrial dispute. The employee had been ordered to be reinstated. Sri. Ajit Singh had been appointed as a Legal Assistant by the management. His services were dispensed with pursuant to a decision to abolish the post. The termination was subject matter of an industrial dispute. The employee had been ordered to be reinstated. The writ petition filed had been dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court with certain observations. The employer did not challenge the judgment, but the employee filed an appeal. A Division Bench had thereupon restored the order of the Labour Court. Civil Appeals came to be filed before the Supreme Court in the above circumstance. 10. A question had arisen as to whether the judgment of the single Judge, wherein it had been held that the employee was a workman had attained finality, as it was not challenged by an appeal by the management, and whether therefore it would operate as res judiciata against the management. Relying on the decision in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004 (3) SCC 1], which held as following: “The principle of res judicata is a procedural provision. A jurisdictional question if wrongly decided would not attract the principle of res judicata. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, the same becomes a nullity. When an order is a nullity, it cannot be supported by invoking the procedural principles like estoppel, waiver or res judicata….� the court held that: “It would, therefore, be not correct to contend that the decision of the Learned Single Judge attained finality and thus, the principle of res judicata shall be attracted in the instant case.� The Labour court had in the cited case decided about jurisdiction, and if that question was rightly decided, it led to a situation that the dispute referred was not as industrial dispute as it did not concern a workman. But, the decision nevertheless had to be made in view of the reference. The attempt of the court was to see that rightful claims of the parties were not lost in procedural pitfalls. 11. It is settled position that the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to suggest the Administration to depart from policy decisions in force. The Tribunal has also not held that fundamental rights of the claimants had been violated by the procedure being followed. 11. It is settled position that the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to suggest the Administration to depart from policy decisions in force. The Tribunal has also not held that fundamental rights of the claimants had been violated by the procedure being followed. See also Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1990) 2 SCC 707], as quoted by a Division Bench of this Court in Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep v. Naderkoya and others [2005 (1) KLJ 454]. If such errors are committed in the application of the rules, the Court has a duty to use its discretion to set right the position. Necessarily an approach should be to arrive at the correct application of legal principles. An error committed could be rectified, on the facts of this case. 12. Although we are not granting the relief to the petitioner, we hold that the rejection of the application on the ground of delay was not permissible or justifiable. However, the real question is as to whether service before the attainment of 18 years of age could be reckoned for the purpose of regularisation. This is to be governed by rules. We hold that notwithstanding the directions, that had been passed by the Tribunal in O.A.No.1098/1992, and claims which were decided on the authority of the said decision, it will be permissible for the Administrative to evaluate the circumstances de novo, and after notice to the parties concerned, make appropriate adjustments. If the Administration is satisfied that there were no departmental orders or rules, which authorized such service to be considered for regularisation, such benefits are not to be given to any individual overlooking others. Notwithstanding the conferment of such benefit, it will be within the rights of the Department to got into the matter once again, but only after intimating the persons affected, about the proposal to interfere with the settled seniority position. The principle should be borne in mind that person should not be discriminated and the applicant should not be put to a disadvantageous position vis-à -vis any of his colleagues. Such exercises, as stated above, are to be completed within a period of six months from today. The Writ Petition is disposed of with the above direction.