JUDGMENT Pius C. Kuriakose, J. 1. Defendants in a suit for declaration and injunction are the appellants in R.S.A. No. 1003 of 2004 and the original respondent in the R.S.A. is the plaintiff in the suit. Respondents 2, 3, and 4 in R.S.A. No. 1003 of 2004 are parties who have been impleaded subsequent to the filing of the Second Appeal on the basis of I.A. Nos. 1925, 1981 and 1963 of 2004. The Trial Court decreed the suit in part. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Court. The District Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in full. R.S.A. 1003 of 2004 is directed against the judgment and decree of the District Court. Additional respondents 2 to 4 in this appeal support the appellants. Even though the Courts below have narrated the rival pleadings very elaborately, I am also referring to the pleadings in brief. The parties will be referred to by their status and ranks before the Trial Court. 2. According to the plaintiff he is a member of Sree Narayana Dharma Samajam, a society registered under T.C. Act 12 of 1955 which functions at Ayyappankavu within the limits of Kochi Corporation. The defendants in the suit are the President and Secretary of the said society (hereinafter referred to as 'the Samajam'). The affairs of the Samajam are being conducted on the basis of Ext. A 1 byelaws. The Samajam has 561 members. Under Cl.20(f) of Ext. A 1 members shall be given 7 days clear notice on ordinary general body meetings. The defendants published a notice on 25.3.1999 to the effect that a general body of the Samajam will be convened at 10 A.M. on 4.4.1999. The plaintiff received the notice only on 1.4.1999. Many other members received this notice later still. The action of the defendants is in gross violation of Cl.20(f) of the byelaws. Important items such as admitting new members into the Samajam, purchase of a new bus for the Samajam school and appointment of a Manager for the school were on the agenda. To 115 members notices were sent by post. Those members are yet to receive the notices. The intention of the defendants was to prevent members who are opposed to them from participating in the meeting so that they can take decisions unilaterally. To 115 members notices were sent by post. Those members are yet to receive the notices. The intention of the defendants was to prevent members who are opposed to them from participating in the meeting so that they can take decisions unilaterally. Realising the above intention, the plaintiff and 81 members submitted on 2.4.1999 itself a memorandum seeking postponement of the meeting scheduled for 4.5.1999. The defendants did not agree even to consider the memorandum. Hence the suit for injunction restraining the conduct of the meeting and for a declaration that in the event of the meeting being held the decisions to be taken are invalid and for a further declaration that in future also meetings shall not be held in violation of Cl.20(f) of the byelaws. 3. Defendants contended that the plaintiff is no longer a member of the Samajam since he indulged in activities which were contrary to the interest of the Samajam. The Working Committee of the Samajam on 22.4.1999 suspended him from the primary membership of the Samajam and therefore he is not a member of the Samajam. Plaintiff had previously filed a suit O.S.No.690 of 1999 and sought for injunction. The Court rejected the said suit. He is not entitled to question the decisions of the General Body of the Samajam since he is no longer a member of the Samajam. Plaintiff's averment that he received the notice only on 1.4.1999 is not true. Plaintiff is a person who participated in the meeting. The decisions taken in the meeting are not liable to be invalidated on the only reason that a few persons did not have seven days' notice in the matter of the meeting. The decisions taken by the General Body on 4.4.1999 are decisions which are liable to be implemented and many of those decisions have already been implemented. 4. The suit was amended on the basis of the application filed by the plaintiff. Going by the amended plaint, additional relief for cancellation of those members who have been given new memberships on the basis of the resolution adopted in the meeting of the General Body on 4.4.1999 was also incorporated as an additional relief. In the additional written statement filed to the plaint after amendment, it was contended that under Cl.5 of the Bylaws, the Working Committee of the Samajam has the power to enrol new members. In the additional written statement filed to the plaint after amendment, it was contended that under Cl.5 of the Bylaws, the Working Committee of the Samajam has the power to enrol new members. The said power is over and above the decision taken by the general body on 4.4.1999. Separate suits have been filed by many new members enrolled subsequent to 4.4.1999 before the Sub Court and they have obtained interim orders in their favour. These new members have already participated in three Annual General Body meetings and in many other General body meetings. In any event, continuance of the present suit without impleading those new members will not be legal. The suit has virtually become infructuous. Sathyapalan and Balasubramanyan, original defendants 1 and 2 are no longer President and Secretary respectively. (Editor's Note:Para.5 to 19 omitted being narration of facts) 20. As already indicated it was on the question of law relating to the necessity or otherwise of a publication under 0.1 R.8 of the C.P.C. regarding the suit is subsequently amended that counsel on both sides addressed most of their arguments. I have considered all the arguments and gone through the various judicial precedents cited at the Bar particularly Dilawar Hussain v. Subhan Khan, AIR 1931 Oudh. 375 (supra), Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, 1990 (1) SCC 266 (supra), Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. T. N. Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642 (supra), Board of Trustees v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458 (supra), Narayanan Nambuthiri v. Kurichithanam Educational Society, 1957 KLT 932 (supra), Noble v. Peter P. Ponnan, 1999 (2) KLT SN 25 (supra), Corporation of Trivandrum v. Narayana Pillai, 1968 KLT 285 (supra), The Victoria Edward Hall v. Samraj, 2001 (3) MLJ 39 (supra) and Sukumaran v. K. O. A. Devaswom, 1989 (1) KLT 341 (supra). 21. The plaint in this case prior to its amendment was suit filed against two individuals by name K. N. Balasubramanyan and K. V. Sathyapalan who were of course described as President and Secretary respectively of the Society. Subsequent to the amendment the defendants came to be substituted as the Society represented by its officer bearers K. N. Balasubramanyan and K. V. Sathyapalan. Subsequent to the amendment the defendants came to be substituted as the Society represented by its officer bearers K. N. Balasubramanyan and K. V. Sathyapalan. The averments in the original plaint are that the society has a membership strength of 561 and the society exists for the welfare of the general public and that the defendants in the suit are acting in violation of the byelaws of the Society. The further averments are that it has not been possible for the plaintiff to array all the members of the Society as parties to the suit and the plaintiff ought to be given permission under O.1 R.8 to file the suit without arraying all the members of the society. In other words, the society was not originally a party to the suit instead two functionaries of the society alone were made defendants in the suit and the plaintiff wanted the decree to be obtained by him to bind the society which has got a membership strength of 561 persons. As far as that plaint prior to amendment is concerned permission of the Court under O.1 R.8 was perhaps necessary. At least the plaintiff thought that permission was necessary and that was why I. A. No. 2515/99 was filed seeking permission under O.1 R.8. The question now is whether the amended suit in which S. N. D. Samajam, the society is the only defendant is bad for want of leave from Court under O.1 R.8 C.P.C. O.1 R.8 of the Code is extracted hereunder: One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest: -- (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,-- (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested; (b) the Court may direct that one or more of such person may, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. (2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-r.(1), at the plaintiff's expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-r.(1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. (4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-r.(1), and no such suit shall be withdrawn under sub-r.(3), of R. 1 or O.23, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under R.3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiff's expense, notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified in sub-r.(2). (5) Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. Explanation.-- For the purpose of determining whether the person who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued or defend the suit, as the case may be. 22. The question which arose in Sukumaran's case (supra) decided by K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, J. was whether it was necessary to have notice of the institution of a suit filed against a society registered under Act 12 of 1955 given either to the members of the Managing Committee or to the members leave alone by public advertisement within the meaning of O.1 R.8 sub-r.(2) so as to say that the suit was properly instituted. The learned Judge after referring to the various provisions of Act 12 of 1955 and to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom. 516 and that of the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, 1955 (3) All. ER 518 held that a society registered under Act 12 of 1955 is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued and therefore represents the cause of the members who constituted it and accordingly held that a judgment or decree passed by a Court in a suit or other civil proceeding where the society is on the party array will bind the society and in such suits provisions of O.1 R.8 have no relevance. Kalyan Singh's case (supra) and Tamil Nadu Housing Board's case (supra) were not cases where the parties did have a claim that they were legal entities and therefore it was not necessary to have recourse to the procedure envisaged under O.1 R.8 C.P.C. The Kurichithanam Educational Society which was the respondent in Nambuthiri's case (supra) was obviously not a Society registered under any statute but was only an unregistered association of persons which never had a claim that it was a legal entity by itself. In the case decided by the Madras High Court in Noble v. Peter P. Ponnan (supra) also the position was admitted that the Church or the Society which was one of the parties was an unincorporated and unregistered body. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees (supra) was relied on by Mr. Achan for canvassing the proposition that merely by registration a society will not become an incorporated body and thereby acquire a legal personality. Board of Trustees case (supra) was decided on an entirely different factual and legal situation. The applicability or otherwise of the procedure envisaged by O.1 R.8 in the context of a registered Society did not come up for consideration even remotely in that decision. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was examining whether a State statute by name Tibia Club Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The applicability or otherwise of the procedure envisaged by O.1 R.8 in the context of a registered Society did not come up for consideration even remotely in that decision. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was examining whether a State statute by name Tibia Club Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. For the said purpose the Supreme Court was examining the dimensions of the expression 'Corporation' employed in Entry 32 of II list which was the State List and Entry 44 and 43 of the Central List which was the First List in the Constitution. It was in that context the Supreme Court held that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 will not become an incorporated Society or a corporation by virtue of such registration. The applicability of the procedure envisaged by O.1 R.8 C.P.C. never came up for consideration before the Supreme Court at all in the above decision. Even though both Mr. Krishnankutty Achan and Mr. Babu Karukapadath addressed me very persuasively regarding the necessity for reconsidering the judgment of K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, J. in Sukumaran's case (supra), I am not convinced on their submissions that the above judgment requires to be reconsidered. The very purpose behind the Act 12 of 55 was to introduce provisions for improving the legal condition of literary, scientific and charitable societies then existing in the Travancore - Cochin areas of the Kerala State. Under S.3 of the statute any 7 or more persons associated for any literary, scientific or charitable purpose or for any such purpose as is described in S.32 of the Act may by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association and filing the same with the Registrar, form themselves into a Society under this Act. Under S.8 of the statute the properties of the society shall be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings civil and criminal shall be described as the property of the governing body of the society by their proper title. Under S.8 of the statute the properties of the society shall be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings civil and criminal shall be described as the property of the governing body of the society by their proper title. S.9 of the statute is very important and the same reads as follows: "Suits by and against societies: -- Every society may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman, or Principal, Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim for demand against the society, to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal, Secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body, some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant." S.10 is also equally important and reads thus: "Suits not to abate: -- No suit or proceedings by or against a society in any Civil Court shall abate or discontinue by reason of the person by or against whom such suit or proceedings shall have been brought or continued dying or ceasing to fill the character in the name whereof he shall have sued, or been sued but the same suit or proceeding shall be continued in the name of or against the successors of such person." S.11 is also important and the same is as follows: "Enforcement of decree against society: -- If a decree is against the person or officer named on behalf of the society such decree shall not be executed against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the . society." S.25 confers certain powers on the District Court regarding the removal of the governing body of the society, framing of a scheme for amendment of the society and for dissolving, of the society. A survey of various provisions of Act 12 of 1955 will reveal very clearly that when it comes to suing or being sued against the society is given a certain legal personality distinct from and in substitution of all its members. A survey of various provisions of Act 12 of 1955 will reveal very clearly that when it comes to suing or being sued against the society is given a certain legal personality distinct from and in substitution of all its members. Provisions of O.1 R.8 have been incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure as an exception to the general rule that all suits and legal proceedings shall have the junction of all interested parties, in situations where due to the numerical strength of the interested persons it is difficult to array all the interested persons as parties. In other words, provisions of O.1 R.8 of the C.P.C. apply when there are numerous interested persons having community of interest in the subject matter of the case, it is impractical to implead all of them and therefore seeks the leave of the Court and file the suit as a representative suit so that the decree to be passed will bind not only those who are actually made parties but also the entire community of interested persons who will be free to enter appearance in response to the publication which the Court mandates under O.1 R.8(2). 23. I will now refer to a judgment delivered by Nandana Menon, J. in Ezhumattoor N. S. S. Karayogam v. L. Janaki Amma, AIR 1957 TC 259. One of the issues which arose for consideration in that case was whether the office bearers of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were entitled to represent the society in legal proceedings. In the said decision the learned Judge quoted with approval the following commentaries of Chitaley on O.1 R.8 of the C.P.C. : "Bodies of persons may be registered under the Company's Act and may be authorised under law to sue and be sued through one of their members or officers. But in the case of unincorporated associations like clubs etc., the Secretary or other officers of the club cannot sue or be sued except by obtaining permission under this rule even though he or they may have been authorised by a resolution of the association to sue or to defend a suit. But in the case of unincorporated associations like clubs etc., the Secretary or other officers of the club cannot sue or be sued except by obtaining permission under this rule even though he or they may have been authorised by a resolution of the association to sue or to defend a suit. Under S.6 of the Societies Registration Act of 1860 a Society registered under the Act can sue or be sued in the name of the President, Secretary or other proper officer of company." and went on to hold: "So a Society like the present plaintiff can be validly represented in a suit filed against it by its office bearers." In other words, the learned Judge also was of the view that societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 could sue and be sued even without recourse to the proceedings under O.1 R.8. 24. The argument of Mr. Krishnankutty Achan is that the appellant Society is an unincorporated Society and therefore merely because the same has obtained registration under Act 12 of 1955 it is not entitled to exemption from the mandates of O.1 R.8. I cannot agree with the above argument. Having regard to the ratio that emerges from the various judgments cited before me, the legislative objectives underlying Act 12 of 1955 as well as O.1 R.8 of the C.P.C. and my own analysis of O.1 R.8, I am inclined to agree with the views expressed by K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, J. in Sukumaran's case (supra). Therefore, I answer the substantial question of law No. 1 formulated in this case against the appellants and in favour of the respondent and hold that the suit as amended subsequently is not bad for want of leave or publication under O.1 R.8 C.P.C. (Editor's Note: Paras.25 to 30 omitted being narration of facts) 31. The result of the above discussion is that all the second appeals fail. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court will stand confirmed. The appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.