Judgment D. D. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Shri Daga, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mrs. Dangre, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent. ( 2 ) THE petition is directed against the order dated 6-9-2004 passed by the respondent No. 2 under section 3 (2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous persons Act, 1981 as well as order dated 25-10-2004 passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby order dated 6-9-2004 came to be confirmed. ( 3 ) SHRI Daga learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the respondent No. 2 Detaining Authority while formulating grounds of detention has on two in camera statement of witnesses a and b. In para (7) of the detention order dated 6-9-2004, it is stated that copies of the documents placed before the Detaining Authority were enclosed with the charge-sheet, which the detenu may verify and acknowledge the same and in camera statements start from ground 5. 1 to ground 5. 2. 2 of the grounds of detention. It was contended that the said copies of the two in camera statements upon which reliance is placed by the respondent No. 2 Detaining Authority are not supplied to the detenu along with charge- sheet. It was submitted that because of non-supply of documents, i. e. in camera statements, which were relied upon by the respondent No. 2 and which form an integral part of the grounds of detention, the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making effective representation against the order of detention and, therefore, right of effective representation guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of the petitioner is violated, consequently the order of detention is bad in law. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the following judgments of this Court: 1) (Smt. Subhangi Tukaram Sawant v. Shri R. H. Mendonca and others), 2001 (Supp.) Bom. C. R. (F. B.)526 : 2001 All. M. R. (Cri) 68. 2) (Smt. Gobibai V. Ghanavat v. State of Maharashtra and others), 2003 bom. C. R. (Cri.) 851 : 2003 All. M. R. (Cri.) 406. 3) (Shri Vijay Ramchandra Angre v. Shri S. M. Shangari and others), 2003 B. C. I. 808 : 2004 All. M. R. (Cri.)1974. C. R. (F. B.)526 : 2001 All. M. R. (Cri) 68. 2) (Smt. Gobibai V. Ghanavat v. State of Maharashtra and others), 2003 bom. C. R. (Cri.) 851 : 2003 All. M. R. (Cri.) 406. 3) (Shri Vijay Ramchandra Angre v. Shri S. M. Shangari and others), 2003 B. C. I. 808 : 2004 All. M. R. (Cri.)1974. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel Shri Daga further contended that detenu has a right to have copies of the documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority while formulating the grounds of detention. The words effective representation appearing in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution must be construed to provide real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to put up his defence in his representation. If the words effective representation are interpreted in an artificial or fanciful manner, then it would defeat the very object of not only article 22 (5), but also Article 21 of the Constitution. It is manifest that when the Detaining Authority applies its mind to the documents and material, which form the basis of detention, then there could be no difficulty in supplying the same to the detenu. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in (Kamla kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra and another), A. I. R 1981 S. C. 814. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel Shri Daga further argued that the impugned detention order is based on two crimes, i. e. Crime No. 127/2004 for the offence under section 302 read with section 149 of Indian Penal Code and Crime No. 335/2004 for the offence under sections 384, 294 and 506 of Indian penal code. It was submitted that so far as first Crime No. 127/2004 is concerned, petitioner was directed to be released on bail in the matter on 14-6-2004. The state has not challenged the said order. So far as second crime is concerned, same is registered at the instance of one Raju Jahajpure on 20-8-2004. The petitioner though presently in custody is not arrested in the said crime. However, on 24-8-2004, complainant Raju has sworn an affidavit that he has not lodged the aforesaid report. It was submitted that Crime No. 127/2004 registered against the petitioner is against an individual and does not constitute disturbance to public order and same is related to law and order. However, on 24-8-2004, complainant Raju has sworn an affidavit that he has not lodged the aforesaid report. It was submitted that Crime No. 127/2004 registered against the petitioner is against an individual and does not constitute disturbance to public order and same is related to law and order. It was contended that as per section 2 (b-i) of the Act, dangerous person is defined and solitary involvement of the petitioner in the crime referred to here in above cannot bring him in the category of dangerous person and, therefore, detention order cannot be passed on the basis of solitary crime. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment in (Pradip Bhikaji Satam v. S. M. Shangari and others), 2002 Bom. C. R. (Cri.) 602 : 2002 Cri. L. J. 1975. ( 6 ) IT was submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that petitioner has created regime of terror in Lakadganj area of Nagpur city and no person in that area was ready to come forward to give evidence against the petitioner because of threats to their lives. It was contended that petitioner has been supplied the gist of in camera statements in the grounds of detention mentioned in the order itself and as such, no prejudice has been caused to him for non-supply of copies of the said statements and his right to make effective representation has not been adversely affected. In order to substantiate the contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the judgments of the Apex Court in (The State of Bombay v. Atma ram Shridhar Vaidya), A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 157, (Lawrence Joachim Joseph dsouzav. The State of Bombay), A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 531 and (State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi), 1984 (1) S. C. C. 596. ( 7 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor Mrs. Dangre contended that petitioner was continuously engaged in commission of violent and desperate acts such as wrongfully restraining and injuring a public servant with a sharp weapon, committing criminal trespass and outraging modesty of women, threatening to kill people, and committing acts endangering life or personal liberty of others. The petitioner has created a regime of terror in the minds of people residing in the area of Lakadganj and Kalamna of city of Nagpur. The petitioner has created a regime of terror in the minds of people residing in the area of Lakadganj and Kalamna of city of Nagpur. Four offences have been registered against the petitioner and out them, i. e. Crime nos. 127/2004 and 335/2004 have been considered for the purpose of the passing the order of detention. Similarly, two in camera statements have been taken into consideration. It was submitted that activities of the petitioner were affecting public order and not law and order. ( 8 ) WE have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties as well as judgments relied on and cited by them in support of their contentions. In the instant case, the first contention canvassed by Shri daga. learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that copies of the in camera statements recorded by the police Authorities of witnesses a and b are not supplied to the petitioner and, therefore, impugned order of detention is violative of article 22 (5) of the Constitution and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has not disputed that copies of the in camera statements of the witnesses recorded by the police authorities were not supplied to the petitioner. However, all material particulars of the grounds in this regard are disclosed in ground No. 5. 1 and its sub-grounds as well as ground No 5. 2 and its sub-grounds and, therefore, requirement of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is fulfilled and, therefore, order of detention is not violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It is also contended by the learned additional Public Prosecutor that under Article 22 (6) of the Constitution, the detaining Authority is permitted to withhold facts, which not considers not desirable to be disclosed in the public interest and, therefore, State is justified in claiming privilege in respect of documents, i. e. in camera statements, otherwise whole purpose of preventive detention would be rendered futile. ( 9 ) SO far as above referred contention canvassed by Shri Daga, learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, issue in this regard is no more res integra and is already concluded by the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. ( 9 ) SO far as above referred contention canvassed by Shri Daga, learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, issue in this regard is no more res integra and is already concluded by the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. The Apex Court in para (6) of the judgment in the case of Kamla kanhaiyalal Khushalani (cited supra) has observed as follows :"thus, we are of the opinion that in view of what has been laid down in maneka Gandhis case (supra) and in a number of other cases following the aforesaid decision, the law of preventive detention has now to satisfy two fold test (1) that the protection and the guarantee afforded under Article 22 (5) is complied with and (2) that the procedure is just and reasonable. In this view of the matter, unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenu along with the grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter would give him not a real, but merely an illusory opportunity to make a representation to the detaining Authority. "in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred judgment, it is evident that in order to satisfy the requirement of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, the Detaining Authority is under obligation to supply all the material and documents, which are relied by it to make order of detention, to the detenu along with grounds mentioned in the order of detention. It is, therefore, evident that any deviation from this procedure by the Detaining Authority would result in violation of right of detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and on this count, order of detention would be vitiated. ( 10 ) IN the instant case, admittedly the Detaining Authority did not supply copies of the in camera statements of witnessess a and b recorded by the police Authorities to the petitioner though recitals in the said in camera statements were relied on to reach the subjective satisfaction that the activities carried out by the petitioner are extremely prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and on the basis thereof, passed the impugned order of detention against the petitioner. It is, therefore, evident that procedure adopted by the detaining Authority is inconsistent with the procedure required to be followed by the Detaining Authority is inconsistent with the procedure required to be followed by the Detaining Authority in view of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution as interpreted by the Apex Court in the above referred judgment and therefore, impugned order is violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and cannot be sustained in law. ( 11 ) IN the decision of this Court in the case of Smt Subhangi Tukaram sawant (cited supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the order of detention was held to be violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution only on the ground that copies of in camera statements supplied to the detenu did not contain verification made by the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police. It is, therefore, evident that detenu is entitled to receive not only copies of in camera statements of such witnesses, which are relied on by the detaining Authority for issuing order of detention, but also verification made by the Police Authority in regard to truthfulness of the statements made by the witnesses. The view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt Subhangi Tukaram Sawant (cited supra) was considered and followed in the subsequent decisions of this Court in the case of Smt. Gobibai v. Ghanavat (cited supra) and in the case of Shri Vijay Ramchandra Angre (cited supra ). ( 12 ) IN view of above referred decisions of the Apex Court and this Court and law laid down therein, the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained in law being violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. ( 13 ) SO far as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay (cited supra) cited by the respondents is concerned, the Apex Court has considered the rights of the detenu under Article 22 of the Constitution and in para (7) concluded thus:"in our opinion, much of the controversy is based on a somewhat loose appreciation of the meaning of the words used in the discussion. We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by Article 22 (5 ). We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by Article 22 (5 ). The first part of article 22, Clause (5) gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be. " The second right given to such person is of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. " It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the Detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds, therefore, must be in existence when the order is made. By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categories of prejudicial acts the suspected activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the "grounds" and they must be supplied. No part of such "grounds" can be held back nor can any more "grounds" be added thereto. What must be supplied are the "grounds on which the order has been made" and nothing less. The second right of being afforded the "earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order" is not confined too only a physical opportunity by supplying paper and pen only. In order that a representation can be made the person detained must first have knowledge of the grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they were satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order. It is therefore, clear that if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges contained in the grounds, the information conveyed to the detained person must be sufficient to attain that object. Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Of course if the detenu is told about the details of facts besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better position to deal with the same. It is significant that the clause does not say that the "grounds" as well as details of facts on which they are based must be furnished or furnished at one time. " ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, the Apex Court has also considered right given to the detaining Authority under Article 22 (6) of the Constitution and in para (11) of the above referred judgment observed thus:"it was argued that under Article 22 (6) the authorities are permitted to withhold facts which they consider not desirable to be disclosed in the public interest. It was argued that, therefore, all other facts must be disclosed. In our opinion, that is not the necessary conclusion from the wording of Article 22 (6 ). It gives a right to the Detaining Authority not to disclosed such facts, but from that it does not follow that what is not stated or considered to be withheld on that ground must be disclosed and if not disclosed, there is a bench of a fundamental right. A wide latitude is left to the authorities in the matter of disclosure. They are given a special privilege in respect of facts which are considered not desirable to be disclosed in public interest. As regards the rest, their duty is to disclose facts so as to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention. " ( 15 ) THE Apex Court in the case of Lawrence Joachim Joseph Dsouza (cited supra) considered and relied the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay (cited supra) as well as State of Punjab (cited supra ). It is no doubt true that tenor of the observations made by the Apex Court in all these decisions demonstrates that the Detaining Authority is under constitutional obligation to furnish reasonably definite grounds as well as adequate particulars to detenu. It is no doubt true that tenor of the observations made by the Apex Court in all these decisions demonstrates that the Detaining Authority is under constitutional obligation to furnish reasonably definite grounds as well as adequate particulars to detenu. However, right of the detenu to be furnished particulars is subject to limitation under Article 22 (6) of the Constitution whereby disclosure of facts considered to be against the public interest can be withheld by the Detaining Authority. However, the Apex Court in the case of Kamla kanhaiyalal Khushalani (cited supra) while considering scheme of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution has gone a step ahead and held that material and documents relied on in the order of detention are required to be supplied to the detenu along with grounds of detention and supply of grounds simpliciter would give detenu not a real, but merely an illusory opportunity to make representation to the Detaining Authority. It is therefore, evident that contentions canvassed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this regard are misconceived and devoid of substance and cannot be accepted. ( 16 ) SINCE the impugned order of detention is vitiated on the ground of violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, there is no need for us to consider and adjudicate other grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the present petition on which order of detention is challenged. ( 17 ) BEFORE we part with this judgment, we want to express our anxiety and concern about the attitude of the Detaining Authorities in ignoring the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in regard to scheme and procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Failure on the part of Detaining Authority to follow the procedure under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution as interpreted by the Apex Court and this Court invariably results in quashing of order of detention. We are really disturbed, as to why simple procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is not followed by the Detaining Authority in many matters. The present case is a glanng example where Detaining Authority has ignored the settled procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, which has resulted in giving benefit to the detenu and frustrated the whole object of law of preventive detention. The present case is a glanng example where Detaining Authority has ignored the settled procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, which has resulted in giving benefit to the detenu and frustrated the whole object of law of preventive detention. We strongly deprecate such attitude of the Detaining Authority and expect that the Principal Secretary, Department of Home of State of maharashtra shall issue appropriate guidelines to all the Detaining authorities in the State entrusted with the power of detention under the Preventive Detention Acts, to scrupulously follow the procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution as settled by the decisions of the Apex Court and this court subject to safeguards provided to the Detaining Authorities under Article 22 (6) of the Constitution. We also expect the Principal Secretary, Home department to take appropriate action against the Detaining authority, who without adequate reasons, fails to follow the constitutional procedure contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to send copy of this judgment to the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, State of Maharashtra forthwith. ( 18 ) IN the result, petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 6-9-2004 passed by the respondent No. 2 as well as impugned order dated 25-10-2004 passed by the respondent No. 1 are quashed and set aside. Detenu Ashok alias Bawaji alias Champalal Yadav is directed to be released forthwith from his detention unless required in any other case. ( 19 ) THE Rule is made absolute in the above terms. Petition allowed.