JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. - This petition under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code1) is directed against the order dated 11.1.2005, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, whereby charge under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has been ordered to be framed against the petitioners/accused (hereafter referred to as the accused persons). 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition are that according to the prosecution, complainant Surbhi Mahant was married to accused Tarun Mahant on 19.1.2001. Her parents had given dowry at the time of her marriage as per their capacity. However, after some days of the marriage at the instance of accused Ram Krishan Mahant and Bimla Mahant, accused Tarun Mahant started beating and torturing the complainant who tolerated the torture and beatings believing that with the passage of time the situation would improve. However, the excesses of the accused persons went on increasing. On 21.2.2002 the complainant gave birth to a daughter. Even thereafter the torturing of the complainant continued on the ground of bringing less dowry and the accused persons insisted that she should ask her parents to purchase a Car for them. On 8.8.2002 getting fed up with the tortuous and cruel behaviour of the accused persons, the complainant attempted to commit suicide. On 2nd and 9th of March, 2003 she was again beaten up by accused Tarun Mahant, therefore, she left for her parents house. The matter was thereafter reported to the police and investigation followed. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was presented against the accused persons. On 11.1.2005 the impugned order directing framing of the charge against the accused persons came into being. Aggrieved by the order, this petition has been preferred by them. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused persons and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State and have also gone through the records. 4. On 11.1.2005 the impugned order directing framing of the charge against the accused persons came into being. Aggrieved by the order, this petition has been preferred by them. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused persons and the learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State and have also gone through the records. 4. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the accused persons that framing of the charge against the accused persons was opposed for the accused at the stage of the framing of the charge but the trial Court in its order had not referred to any of the grounds in opposition and proceeded to frame the charge in the absence of any material on record to show reasons to proceed against them. It was also contended that the complainant had been making false allegations against the accused persons as is evident from her statement placed on record that earlier because of some mistake she had taken some poisonous substance and is now imputing that she attempted to commit suicide because of the alleged torture. Similarly, as per the FIR she was allegedly beaten on 2nd and 9th of March, 2003 whereas her MLC dated 12.3.2003 in this regard is not co-relating any injury with the time of her allegedly having sustained such injuries. It was also contended that it is simply an ego clash. Therefore, the impugned order and consequential proceedings deserve to be quashed. 5. To substantiate his submissions, the learned Counsel has relied on Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, AIR 1988 SC 709. 6. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Advocate General contended that it is a mis-statement of facts that the framing of charge was ever opposed for the accused. On the contrary, at the relevant time the existence of prima facie case was conceded for the accused persons. It. was further contended that as per the material on record, a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons to put them to trial and there is no illegality or material irregularity in framing the charge against them, therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference. 7. It. was further contended that as per the material on record, a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons to put them to trial and there is no illegality or material irregularity in framing the charge against them, therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference. 7. It may be pointed out at the very outset that it is clear on a combined reading of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code that the Court at the time of consideration of the charge has to satisfy itself on the basis of the material on record whether there are grounds to proceed against the accused or not. If on appreciation of the material on record the Court comes to the conclusion that the accusations against the accused are frivolous and no prima facie case is made out against the accused, he is to be discharged. However, if the material placed on record prima facie supports the accusation, the Court has to frame; charge against the accused and it need not give detailed reasons for framing the charge whereas it has to record its reasons to support the conclusion that the accused is liable to be discharged. While appreciating the material on record, the standard of test will not be the same as applied to the evidence oh record at the final hearing. 8. In Balkrishan Sharma v. State of H.P., 2002 Cri.LJ. 4364 this Court while dealing with the subject, held as under :- "5. It may be pointed out at the very outset that when after considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 of the Code and making such examination, if any, of the accused, as the trial Court thinks fit, if it is of the opinion that the said material prima facie discloses that the accused has committed an offence which it is competent to try, then it shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. When the Court forms such an opinion, it is not supposed to give reasons in detail for arriving at the prima facie conclusion that the accused has committed the offence and there are « grounds to proceed against him and to charge him for the commission of such offence. When the Court forms such an opinion, it is not supposed to give reasons in detail for arriving at the prima facie conclusion that the accused has committed the offence and there are « grounds to proceed against him and to charge him for the commission of such offence. However, if the Court, after perusal of the aforesaid material, finds that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charge must be considered to be groundless, that is to say, that there is no ground for framing a charge against the accused and he should, therefore, be discharged. However, the Court is expected to record its reasons for so doing, it may however, be pointed out that the Court though is not required to record detailed reasons for framing a charge against the accused, but, the record it has relied upon, to arrive at the prima facie conclusion that there are grounds to proceed against the accused, must disclose that in fact there are reasons to proceed against the accused for the commission of the offence for which he has been ordered to be charged." 9. In State of H.P. v. Des Raj (2003 (1) Current L.J. 290, this Court reiterated the aforesaid view while holding as under: "5. It may be pointed out at the very outset that Sections 227 , and 228 of the Code make it manifest that the Court has to apply its mind to the material on record to be satisfied whether there are grounds to proceed against the accused or not? In case the Court, on appreciation of the material on record, comes to the conclusion that the allegations against the accused are frivolous and the material placed before the Court does not show a prima facie case to proceed, the accused has to be discharged. However, if there is sufficient material to proceed against the accused, the Court has to frame a charge against the accused. The test to determine whether there are grounds to proceed or not, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would be determined on the basis of the material placed, before that Court by the prosecution. The test to determine whether there are grounds to proceed or not, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would be determined on the basis of the material placed, before that Court by the prosecution. While perusing the material with a view to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused or not, the standard of test will not be the same as is finally applied before finding the accused guilty or otherwise. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon the material on record leading to forming a presumptive opinion as, to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused, may justify the framing of charge. Therefore, only the broad probabilities of the case, the deciding effect of the evidence and infirmities, if any, emanating from the records, are to be taken into account to arrive at the conclusion. No roaving inquiry into the alleged facts and weighing the material on record as if the conclusion is to be recorded, after recording of the evidence are required. In case the judge arrives at the conclusion that the allegations are frivolous and there is no material prima facie supporting the allegations constituting the offence, the accused has to be discharged but if the material on record probables the allegations and even if creates grave suspicion, a charge will have to be framed against the accused." 10. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Shyam Dutt v. Ravi Dutt and others, Latest HLJ 2004 (HP) 1201 and Vinod Kumar and others v. State of H.P., 2005 (1) S.L.J. 547. 11. The aforesaid view is in conformity with the view taken by the Apex Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018; Supdt. and Ramembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52); Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996(9) SCC 766 and Om Wati and another v. State through Delhi Administration and others, 2001(4) SCC 333. 12. and Ramembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52); Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996(9) SCC 766 and Om Wati and another v. State through Delhi Administration and others, 2001(4) SCC 333. 12. In Madhavraos case supra, relied upon for the accused, the Apex Court in fact was not concerned with the scope of interference by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction with the orders regarding framing of charge but in fact the Honble Court was dealing with the scope of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding quashing of the prosecution of the accused and it was held as under:- "7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroversial allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is, expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose in likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 13. The above observations of the Honble Supreme Court apparently are not in conflict with the aforesaid decisions. The crux of the matter is that a criminal prosecution can be quashed if there are special features in the case justifying a confusion that chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue. 14. In substance, what can be said on a combined reading is that if a prima facie case is made out against the accused on the basis of the material placed before the Court, the charge is bound to be framed, but if there is no prima facie case, the accused is liable to be discharged. 15. 14. In substance, what can be said on a combined reading is that if a prima facie case is made out against the accused on the basis of the material placed before the Court, the charge is bound to be framed, but if there is no prima facie case, the accused is liable to be discharged. 15. The submissions, thus, made for the accused persons are required to be examined in view of the aforesaid settled position in law. 16. The contention for the accused persons that the charge was opposed before the trial Court but the trial Court did not consider the ground of opposition in the impugned order, is liable to be rejected. A perusal of the zimini order dated 11.1.2005 reveals that on that day none was present for the State whereas all the accused persons were present with their counsel. The charge was conceded for the accused; meaning thereby that framing of the charge was not opposed at all. Thus the existence of prima facie case affording ground to proceed against the accused was conceded for the accused persons. Any observations about a factual aspect in the order relating to the day-today proceedings before the Court carries conclusive presumption of correctness, therefore, the contents of the aforesaid zimini order belies the submission raised for the accused. 17. No doubt, there is a statement of the complainant on the file wherein she had stated that because of mistake she took some poisonous substance and she had no quarrel with any one and no one was liable for her act. However, in her statement under Section 161 of the Code she has explained that such a statement was made by her because of "Lok Laj" and at the instance of the relatives whereas in fact she had taken poison deliberately because of the cruelty met out to her by the accused persons. The fact that on 8.8.2002 she had consumed organo phosphorous, is prima facie evident from the MLC dated 8.8.2002. The complainant had given birth to a daughter before such statement was made. In such a situation the version of the complainant, a Hindu woman, that she had made such a statement earlier because of "Lok Laj" and at the instance of the relatives, cannot be discredited at this stage. 18. The complainant had given birth to a daughter before such statement was made. In such a situation the version of the complainant, a Hindu woman, that she had made such a statement earlier because of "Lok Laj" and at the instance of the relatives, cannot be discredited at this stage. 18. It is true that as per the contents of the FIR the complainant had claimed that she was beaten by her husband on 2nd and 9th of March, 2003. The record reveals that she was medically examined on 12.3.2003 at 9-10 p.m. with the alleged history of having been beaten on 2nd of March. At the time of such medical examination three injuries of the duration of 7 to 10 days having been caused with blunt weapon were found on her person. It cannot, therefore, be held at this stage that such injuries were not the result of her alleged beating on 2nd of March, 2003. 19. The mere production of the dowry articles before the police during the investigation by the accused persons does not in any way show that they are innocent. 20. The contents of the FIR lodged by the complainant, her supplementary statement under Section 161 of the code, the aforesaid MLCs, and the statements of Nirmala Mahant, Rakesh Kumar Mahanant and Pooja, disclose the ground to proceed against the accused persons for the commission of offences punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 21. Thus, in view, of the legal and factual aspects of the matter as discussed hereinabove, the impugned order does not call for any interference either in exercise of the revisional powers or the inherent powers of this Court. 22. As a result, this petition is dismissed. 23. The parties, through their learned Counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on 18.7.2005