Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. The State of Haryana has filed this petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated July 31, 2003 (annexure P.7) passed by the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Haryana (respondent No. 2). 2. M/s. Ganesh Packaging Industries Pvt. Ltd., Faridabad (hereinafter described as "the assessee") was registered as a dealer under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (for short, "the State Act") and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short, "the Central Act"). On the basis of assessment made for the years 1973-74 to 1978-79 under the State Act and the Central Act, the Assessing Authority created liability of Rs. 2,39,013 against the assessee. Due to its failure to satisfy the demand, the assessees land bearing Khasra No. 65/17 (8 kanals), 65/18 (7 kanals), killa No. 323, Khatoni No. 477, situated in Mewla Maharajpur, Faridabad was attached by Collector-cum-Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Faridabad vide his order dated August 17, 1985 passed under Section 72 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (for short, "the 1887 Act"). Intimation of the attachment was duly sent to Sub-Registrar/Tehsildar, Faridabad, but the property could not be sold for almost 9 years due to lack of permission from Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana. The required permission was given by the competent authority on February 28, 1994. But, even thereafter, the property was not sold. 3. Respondent No. 1, M/s. M.H. Textiles Pvt. Ltd., Faridabad, purchased the factory and other properties of the assessee by registered sale deed dated August 11, 1994. Soon thereafter, respondent No. 1 deposited a sum of Rs. 2,39,013 which was outstanding against the assessee. 4. In the meanwhile, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Faridabad initiated proceedings against the assessee under Section 9(2) of the Central Act read with Sections 25(5), 47 and 59 of the State Act for levy of interest and penalty and vide order dated October 26, 1994 (annexure P.3), he created demand of Rs. 6,82,247. This was followed by an order dated December 20, 1997 vide which Assistant Collector 1st Grade-cum-Excise and Taxation Officer, Faridabad directed attachment of the property which had been purchased by the petitioner on August 11, 1994. The petitioner challenged the order of attachment by filing an appeal, which was allowed by District Collector, Faridabad vide his order dated December 23, 1997. The petitioner challenged the order of attachment by filing an appeal, which was allowed by District Collector, Faridabad vide his order dated December 23, 1997. The operative part of that order reads as under : "I agree with the observation and suggestions of the learned counsel of the appellant that the ruling cited by him is covered the present matter. No other contentions were raised by the respondent in this matter. Hence the notice dated October 20, 1997 issued by the respondent against the present appellant is divided as the same has no merit. After considering the record of this case and the arguments of both sides in this matter, I am of the considered view that respondent has no right to attach the property after making the payment of the principal amount by the appellant. I therefore, accept the appeal of the appellant and set aside the order dated October 20, 1997 issued by the respondent against the appellant. The file is consigned to record room after taking due process." 5. Feeling aggrieved by the order of District Collector, Faridabad, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority filed an appeal before Commissioner, Gurgaon Division, Gurgaon (hereinafter referred to as "the Commissioner") which was dismissed on October 5, 2001. The Commissioner nullified the levy of interest for want of jurisdiction by observing that there is no provision under the Central Act for levy of interest after the payment of the principal amount. He further held that the appeal was barred by limitation. Excise and Taxation Officer, Faridabad did not challenge order dated October 5, 2001 by filing an appeal or revision. Instead, he filed an application under Section 15 of the 1887 Act for review of that order. Vide his order dated September 6, 2002 (annexure P.6), the Commissioner allowed the review application and directed that the appeal be listed for re-hearing. The operative part of the review order reads as under: "After hearing both the sides and perusing the relevant rules and citations, it is revealed that some such facts have been placed before me which has changed the complexion of my previous order dated October 5, 2001. In these circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice to review my previous order. As such, after condoning the delay in filing the present review petition, I order that both the parties should be again heard at length. In these circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice to review my previous order. As such, after condoning the delay in filing the present review petition, I order that both the parties should be again heard at length. Let file be put up on October 18, 2002 for arguments." 6. Respondent No. 1 challenged the last mentioned order by filing a revision under Section 16 of the 1887 Act, which was allowed by respondent No. 2 by making the following observations : "The order dated September 6, 2002 of the Commissioner, allowing the request for review of his own order dated October 5, 2001 is based on the fact that the respondent could not mention any law earlier under which interest could have been charged and was now presenting this provision of the law, under which interest can be charged. However, the respondent has not explained in his review petition before the Commissioner as to why he did not bring this fact to his notice during the earlier proceedings when the notification to this effect had been issued on April 1, 2000. The counsel for the respondent was repeatedly asked as to why he did not bring this notification to the notice of the Commissioner during the arguments before him in respect of his order dated October 5, 2001. However, he could not give any satisfactory reply and in fact maintained that the Commissioner did not hear any arguments on merit and heard the case only on the issue of delay. However, this statement is completely belied by the order of the Commissioner which at page 2 of the order, mentions the detailed arguments put forward by the present respondent before him wherein he has not raised the issue of the notification dated April 1, 2000 at all. The counsel for the respondent has, therefore, made a false statement before this Court by maintaining that the Commissioner while giving his decision vide his order dated October 5, 2001, heard the case only on the issue of delay and not on merits. The Commissioner has clearly stated in his conclusion in his order dated October 5, 2001 that there is no substantive provision in the Central Sales Tax Act which empowers the department to levy interest nor the appellant has been able to show that such a provision exists in the State Act. The Commissioner has clearly stated in his conclusion in his order dated October 5, 2001 that there is no substantive provision in the Central Sales Tax Act which empowers the department to levy interest nor the appellant has been able to show that such a provision exists in the State Act. The appellant has also not been able to satisfy this Court about the delay in filing the present appeal which is of more than one year. This clearly shows that the Commissioner had not dismissed the appeal only on the ground of delay. He had dismissed the appeal primarily because there was no substantive provisions for levying interest, and only secondly because of delay. It is, therefore, very clear that the respondent himself was not aware of the notification when the Commissioner passed his order dated October 5, 2001 as he did not raise this issue before the Commissioner either in writing or at the time of arguments. Therefore, he had applied for review of the Commissioners order on the basis of a false statement in order to cover up his own ignorance during the earlier proceedings before the Commissioner. The request for review was therefore vitiated because of misrepresentation. On these grounds, therefore, I accept the appeal, set aside the order dated September 6, 2002 of the Commissioner, Gurgaon Division and uphold his earlier order dated October 5, 2001." 7. We have heard Shri Jaswant Singh, learned Senior Deputy Advocate-General and perused the record. In our opinion, the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. A bare reading of orders dated December 23, 1997, October 5, 2001 and September 6, 2002 passed by the District Collector, Faridabad and the Commissioner, respectively shows that the Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority had challenged order dated December 23, 1997 after a time-gap of more than one year and 5 months and no tangible explanation was offered for this delay. The Commissioner noted that copy of order dated December 23, 1997 was supplied to the Assessing Authority on November 10, 1998 and the appeal was filed on July 6, 1999 and that no explanation had been offered for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. The Commissioner noted that copy of order dated December 23, 1997 was supplied to the Assessing Authority on November 10, 1998 and the appeal was filed on July 6, 1999 and that no explanation had been offered for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. He accordingly held that the appeal was barred by time. He also considered the merits of the case and held that no interest or penalty could be charged from respondent No. 1 because it had deposited the principal amount. After about one year, the Commissioner reviewed order dated October 5, 2001 and listed the appeal for fresh hearing, albeit without going into the question of maintainability of the review application and without assigning any tangible reason. Respondent No. 2 entertained the revision petition filed by respondent No. 1 and held that the Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction to review order dated October 5, 2001 and that there was no legal justification to overlook the fact that the appeal filed by the Assessing Authority against order dated December 23, 1997 was barred by time. 8. The learned Senior Deputy Advocate-General could not show as to how the appeal filed on July 6, 1999 against order dated December 23, 1997 could be treated as within limitation. He also failed to refer to any provision under which order dated October 5, 2001 passed by the Commissioner could be reviewed and that the same suffered from any error apparent. Therefore, we do not find any justification to interfere with an otherwise well-reasoned order passed by respondent No. 2 vide which he quashed order dated September 6, 2002. 9. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.