JUDGMENT M. M. DAS, J. — This Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-wife against the confirming judgment. The appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law : “The appellant-wife having obtained decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the husband-respondent was not entitled to any decree for dissolution without establishing that he made attempts to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against him, but could not do so because of the conduct of the wife and there being no such finding by any of the Courts below, the decree is not sustainable in law.” 2. In order to appreciate the respective case of the parties, it is necessary to narrate the facts of the case which are as follows: The appellant-wife had married the husband-respondent ac¬cording to the Hindu Customs and Rites in the year, 1976. Being ill-treated by the husband and having discovered that the husband has developed illicit relationship with one B. Varalaxmi, when she objected to such action of the husband, the husband having deserted the wife without any reasonable cause by withdrawing himself from the conjugal society of the wife, she filed O.S. No.8 of 1987 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Parlakhemundi under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. By order dated 12.9.1988 passed in the said suit, the husband was directed to pay the maintenance at the rate of Rs.75/- per month to the wife with effect from October, 1988 apart from the litigation expenses of Rs.150/-. Original Suit No.8 of 1987 was decreed in favour of the wife granting relief of restitution of conjugal rights on contest on 19.1.1990, directing the husband to join the appellant-wife. It appears from the record that the husband having taken no steps to comply with the direction given in the above decree, the wife filed Execution Case No.9 of 1991 to execute the said decree for restitution of conjugal rights. It appears from the record that the husband having taken no steps to comply with the direction given in the above decree, the wife filed Execution Case No.9 of 1991 to execute the said decree for restitution of conjugal rights. It, however appears, that before the said decree was executed, the husband after lapse of more than a year from the date of decree for restitution of conjugal rights, filed Title Suit No.12 of 1991 praying for a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of divorce under Section 13(1-A) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, on the ground that even after lapse one year there has been no reunion between the parties pursuant to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. After filing of the suit, the husband on filing a memo before the Executing Court, to drop the execution proceeding as not main¬tainable, the Executing Court dismissed the said execution pro¬ceeding by its order dated 22.7.1992 against which the wife pre¬ferred Civil Revision No.62 of 1992 before the learned District Judge, Berhampur. The said civil revision was ultimately dismissed as infructuous on the ground that the suit for dissolution of marriage and divorce i.e. T.S. No.12 of 1991 having been decreed in favour of the husband, the said revision has become infructu¬ous. 3. The husband-respondent’s case in the plaint, inter alia, was that the appellant is his legally married wife. The marriage was consummated between them and they begot one son, namely, Dilleswara Kundingi in 1980 and one daughter, namely, Mukta Manjari Kundingi in 1982. The wife who was the respondent in the suit withdrew herself from the conjugal society of the husband in the year 1984 without any cause or reason as she suffered from Psychiatric disorder and became physically and mentally cruel towards the husband, abused him in filthy language, assaulted him etc. and drove him out from the Municipal quarters in the Municipal Colony near Shree Krishna Talkies in 1984 and she deserted him without any fault on the part of the husband. Thus, there was no conjugal life or cohabitation between the parties since 1984. The further case of the husband is that the appellant-wife filed OS No.8 of 1987 for restitution of conjugal rights, to harass the husband which was decreed on 9.1.1990. Thus, there was no conjugal life or cohabitation between the parties since 1984. The further case of the husband is that the appellant-wife filed OS No.8 of 1987 for restitution of conjugal rights, to harass the husband which was decreed on 9.1.1990. But since there was no reunion for more than one year from the date of passing of the decree, he is entitled to a decree for divorce by dissolving the marriage between the parties. 4. The appellant-wife in her written statement while denying the allegations made in the plaint stated that when the parties were residing in Municipal Colony together, the husband developed illicit relationship with one B. Varalaxmi. She having objected to the same was ill-treated by the husband and as a matter of fact, was assaulted by him. But the husband thereafter deserted the company of the appellant-wife and started residing in a rented house continuing his illicit relationship with the said B.Varalaxmi. Though conciliation between the parties was attempted by the wife, by intervention of Bhadraloks, the husband avoided the same and continued ill-treating her. After O.S. No.8 of 1987 filed by the wife was decreed for restitution of conjugal rights on 9.1.1990, the husband in order to avoid the said decree left his service and joined a different School in the district of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh. It is the further case of the appellant-wife in the written statement that on coming to know all these facts, she went to Srikakulam and came to learn that her husband was living with the said B. Varalaxmi in Chikidigam village. She also lodged an F.I.R. in the local Police Station there, returned to Parlakhemundi and filed an execution proceed¬ing to execute the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. She, therefore, stated in the written statement that under Sec¬tion 23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the husband is precluded from taking advantage of his own wrong and hence even though the prescribed period of one year lapsed after the decree for resti¬tution of conjugal rights, without any reunion/restitution, the husband is not entitled to a decree for divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 5. On the above pleadings, the trial Court framed three issues which are as follows : (1) Whether the respondent violated the decree in O.S. 8/87 and deserted the petitioner ? 5. On the above pleadings, the trial Court framed three issues which are as follows : (1) Whether the respondent violated the decree in O.S. 8/87 and deserted the petitioner ? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief as claimed in the suit ? (3) To what relief, the petitioner is entitled to ? 6. After hearing the suit, the trial Court came to the finding that the husband is not guilty of any “serious miscon¬duct” disentitling him to seek dissolution of marriage to which he is legally entitled to under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act and decreed the suit by dissolving the marriage between the parties. Being aggrieved, the appellant-wife filed Title Appeal No.26 of 1994 which was ultimately decided by the judgment dated 12.1.1996 by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gajapati, Parlakhemundi upholding the finding of the trial Court and dismissing the appeal. Hence, this Second Appeal. 7. This second appeal was admitted by the Court on the substantial question of law as stated earlier. In course of hearing of the appeal, it appeared to me that a further question of law also arises for decision in its appeal, i.e., whether in the event the decree passed by the Courts below is confirmed in the Second Appeal, the appellant-wife should be granted permanent alimony and maintenance as provided under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act’). 8. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court has not framed any specific issue with regard to the allegation made by the appellant that the hus¬band-respondent (plaintiff) committed misconduct in taking any care to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights for which he is not entitled to a decree for dissolution of mar¬riage and divorce and as such, the Courts below could not have decreed the suit filed by the husband by coming to an erroneous conclusion that no action of the husband-respondent shows that he committed a “wrong” within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act so as to deny him the relief for dissolution of marriage. 9. It appears that for coming to the above conclusion, the learned trial Court applied the ratio of the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar -v- Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2218 . 9. It appears that for coming to the above conclusion, the learned trial Court applied the ratio of the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar -v- Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2218 . It further appears from the judgment of the lower appellate Court that the above finding of the learned trial Court was confirmed by the lower appellate Court by taking a similar view. 10. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the uncontroverted testimony of the appellant-wife given in her evidence before the learned trial Court has been discarded by the trial Court solely on the ground that no other witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellant-wife though her testimony remained unshaken in the cross-examination. He, therefore, con¬tends that if the evidence of the appellant-wife would have been accepted being not controverted, the Courts below would have found that the husband-respondent is precluded from obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1) (A) (ii) in view of the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. 11. Miss Panda, learned counsel for the respondent-husband, on the other hand, strongly relied upon the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar (supra) and submitted that the appellant-wife has utterly failed to prove her allegations of adultery against the husband beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, no action on the part of the husband will constitute a ‘wrong’ within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act. Miss Panda, therefore, submit¬ted that both the Courts below have rightly decreed the suit of the husband-respondent. 12. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant vehement¬ly argued that the learned Courts below have misinterpreted the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharmendra Kumar (supra) and in the said decision, the Supreme Court nowhere lays down as to what are the circumstances which may be considered to be a ‘wrong’ but it only states that Section 13(1-A) is subject to Section 23(1)(a) of the Act and it has been held in the said decision that mere disinclination to agree to an offer for re-union is not considered ‘wrong’ within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act but it should be something more than that. He has further relied upon the decision in the case of Hira Chand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, AIR 2001 SC 1285 and submitted that the Supreme Court in the above decision taking note of the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar (supra), specifically held that the word “wrong” occurring in Section 23(1)(a) of the Act is a relative term which is to be interpreted taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. 13. In order to appreciate the rival contentions made before this Court as to whether the Courts below have acted erroneously in discarding the evidence of the appellant-wife solely on the ground that no other witnesses were examined by her to corroborate her statement, it was felt necessary to refer to the deposition of the appellant-wife given before the trial Court. From the same, I find that a lawyer’s notice was issued to the father of the wife alleging that she suffered from madness to which a reply was also given denying the said allegation. The appellant-wife has stated that the husband left the Municipal colony with one Varalaxmi without informing her. She also stated that when the husband after some time returned to Paralakhemundi, she personally went and called him to come to the house but he refused to do so even though thereafter the wife and other gen¬tlemen of the locality also made an attempt for reunion. She has further stated that on compelling circumstances, she filed the suit for restitution of conjugal rights, which was ultimately decreed, in her favour but to avoid the direction given in the said decree, the husband left Paralakhemundi and went to Srikaku¬lam along with the said Varalaxmi. She even followed him to the place at Srikakulam where he was living with the said lady Vara¬laxmi and on the advice of the Mandal Development Officer, the respondent-husband took the appellant-wife along with their chil¬dren to village Killoi but at night both the husband and said Varalaxmi left the place without informing them for which she lodged an information at the local Police Station and thereafter came back and filed the execution proceeding. In the cross-exami¬nation, nothing has been elicited from the wife which can lead to falsify the statement given by her in Examination-in-Chief. In the cross-exami¬nation, nothing has been elicited from the wife which can lead to falsify the statement given by her in Examination-in-Chief. This aspect of the matter has been lost sight of by both the Courts below who have mechanically discarded the evidence of the appel¬lant solely on the ground that no other witnesses were examined by her in support of her case. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that this is a case where the question of non-consideration of material evidence on record arises. It appears from the record that by order dated 12.9.1988 in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights bearing O.S. No.8 of 1987 filed by the wife, the learned trial Court granted interim maintenance and directed the husband to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.75/- per month with effect from October, 1988 along with litigation expenses of Rs.150/-. The said amount has not been paid by the respondent-husband. It further transpires that by order dated 24.11.1999 passed in Misc. Case No.348 of 1998 arising out of the Second Appeal, this Court directed that the respondent-husband shall pay an interim maintenance of Rs.500/- per month to the appellant and Rs.500/- per month to her daughter from December, 1998 and fur¬ther directed that all the arrear maintenance should be paid by the husband within a period of three months from that date. Out of the amount of arrear maintenance, only an amount of Rs.2500/- was paid by the husband as would be seen from the order dated 29.9.2000 of this Court and a further sum of Rs.1000/- was paid on 14.11.2000. The husband-respondent, however, having not paid any further maintenance, by order dated 31.1.2001 this Court directed that if by the time of hearing of the Second Appeal, the direction for payment of maintenance, as directed, is not com¬plied with, the respondent will be set ex parte. However, it appears, subsequently the respondent paid a further sum of Rs.31,000/- as per the Xerox copy of the draft attached to the affidavit filed by him on 8.9.2002 stating that the entire arrear maintenance has been paid by him. But thereafter from August, 2002, no further amount has been paid to the appellant towards interim maintenance, as directed. 14. However, it appears, subsequently the respondent paid a further sum of Rs.31,000/- as per the Xerox copy of the draft attached to the affidavit filed by him on 8.9.2002 stating that the entire arrear maintenance has been paid by him. But thereafter from August, 2002, no further amount has been paid to the appellant towards interim maintenance, as directed. 14. In the case of Hirachand Srinibas Managaonkar (supra), the Supreme Court while considering a similar question held in paragraphs-15 and 16 as follows : “15...........The husband was expected to act as a dutiful husband towards the wife and the wife was to act as a devoted wife towards the husband. If this concept of both the spouses making sincere contribution for the purpose of successful cohabi¬tation after a judicial separation is ordered then it can reason¬ably be said that in the facts and circumstances of the case the husband in refusing to pay maintenance to the wife failed to act as a husband. Thereby he committed a ‘wrong’ within the meaning of S.23 of the Act. Therefore, the High Court was justified in declining to allow the prayer of the husband for dissolution of the marriage by divorce under S.13 (1-A) of the Act. 16. In this connection it is also necessary to clear an impression regarding the position that once a cause of action for getting a decree of divorce under S. 13 (1-A) of the Act arises the right to get a divorce crystallizes and the Court has to grant the relief of divorce sought by the applicant.This impression is based on a misinterpretation of the provision in S. 13(1-A). All that is provided in the said section is that either party to a marriage may present a petition for dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were par¬ties or that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which both the spouses were parties. The section fairly read, only enables either party to a marriage to file an application for dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on any of the grounds stated therein. The section does not provide that once the applicant makes an appli¬cation alleging fulfilment of one of the conditions specified therein the Court has no alternative but to grant a decree of divorce. xxx xxx xxx It has to be kept in mind that relationship between the spouses is a matter concerning human life. Human life does not run on dotted lines or charted course laid down by statute. It has also to be kept in mind that before granting the prayer of the peti¬tioner to permanently snap the relationship between the parties to the marriage every attempt should be made to maintain the sanctity of the relationship which is of importance not only for the individuals or their children but also for the society. Whether the relief of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce is to be granted or not depends on the facts and circum¬stances of the case. In such a matter it will be too hazardous to lay down a general principle of universal application.” 16. Applying the ratio of the above decision to the facts of the present case and also applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar (supra) wherein the Supreme Court held that in order to be a “wrong” within the meaning of Section 23(1), the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer for reunion, it must be serious misconduct to justify the denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled, the conclusion is inevitable that the learned Courts below went “wrong” in applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Dharmendra Kumar (supra) to the facts of the present case to arrive at a finding that no serious misconduct has been shown to have been committed by the husband so as to deprive him from obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1-A)(ii)of the Act. The unshaken testimony of the appellant-wife as made before the learned trial Court which has been illegally discarded, clearly shows that the action of the respondent-husband to frustrate the steps taken by the appellant-wife for reunion is a “wrong” within the meaning of Section 23(1) of the Act. Coupled with this, applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar (supra), non-payment of maintenance as di¬rected by the Courts below as well as this Court, as stated earlier, also amounts to commission of a “wrong” within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act. 17. The respondent-husband, however, is directed to pay the arrear maintenance till the date of judgment, to the appellant-wife within a period of two months from today and to pay mainte¬nance of Rs.1500/- per month from the month of April, 2005 or in the alternative, to pay a lump sum alimony of Rs.1.5 lakhs if the respondent-husband does not take back the appellant-wife along with her children so as to effect a reunion. In view of the above, however, if the appellant-wife refuses to join the society of the respondent-husband when asked by the husband to live with him, without any just cause, she will not be entitled to any future maintenance from such date of refusal, as directed above. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgments passed by both the Courts below are set aside and the suit bear¬ing T. S. No.12 of 1991, filed by the respondent-husband is, therefore, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the par¬ties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.