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2005 DIGILAW 206 (RAJ)

Prem Narain Gupta v. Union of India

2005-01-24

DINESH MAHESHWARI

body2005
Judgment Rajsh Balia, J.-We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of learned Single Judge dated 4th November, 2004. The petitioner was charged with misconduct of demanding and receiving illegal gratification for release of STD/PCO connections through Shri Mithu Singh from one Suresh Puri. The alleged incident took place on 13th January, 2003 and the petitioner/appellant was suspended vide order dated 25th February, 2003 under the CCA Rules. At the relevant time, there was no time limit fixed for continuation of the suspension order once passed, however, it could be revoked at any time by the authority competent to make the order. On 30th December, 2003 the memorandum of charge sheet was also served on the appellant-petitioner. However, it further appears that the appellant-petitioner is also undergoing trial in respect of the said incident under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 3. By notification dated 23rd December, 2003 Sub-Rules (6) and (7) were inserted in Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. These Rules were published on 1.2004 and were to come in operation after the expiry of 90 days from the date of its publication. The said Rules came into force on 2nd April, 2004 and after the commencement of Rules, on 27th April, 2004 the suspension order was extended by the Disciplinary Authority by 180 days which order is under challenge. 4. The petition had been presented on 9th January, 2004. The suspension order was challenged on the ground that since the suspension order which was in force as on the date of publication of the Amended Rules which had not been extended within 90 days from the expiry of the date of publication, the Disciplinary Authority had no powers to extend the period of suspension as the period of suspension could not have been extended if it has nor been extended before the expiry of 90 days. It was also contended that before extending the period of order dated 7th April, 2004, the matter was not referred to the Review Committee as per the guidelines issued in this regard by the Office Memorandum dated 7th January, 2004 Annexure R/1 which reads as under:- "whereas, a case against Sh. It was also contended that before extending the period of order dated 7th April, 2004, the matter was not referred to the Review Committee as per the guidelines issued in this regard by the Office Memorandum dated 7th January, 2004 Annexure R/1 which reads as under:- "whereas, a case against Sh. P.N. Gupta, JTO O/o SDE (G/E) Jaitaran (under suspension) in respect of a criminal offence is under trial and he is under suspension vide this office No. X-1/INV/PNG/02-03/2 dated 25.02.2003. Now therefore, the undersigned, being the competent, has carefully considered the case of said Sh. P.N. Gupta, JTO O/o SDE (G/E) Jaitaran (under suspension) for a further period of 180 days from the date of issue of this order. The receipt of order should be acknowledged." 5. Thus, the Review Committee extended a period of suspension for further period of 180 days from 29.2004. The said order is not subject-matter of challenge. 6. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition finding that the Rules did not come into operation until 3rd April, 2004 and, therefore, the period within which the order of suspension was required to be reviewed or extended could not commence prior to the commencement of the Amended Rules. The order passed on 27th April, 2004, therefore, cannot be held to be beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Amended Rules. The learned Single Judge was also of the opinion that the petitioner has been charged with the serious misconduct of demanding bribe and criminal case was also registered against the petitioner by the Anti Corruption Bureau, therefore, the order dated 27th April, 2004 by which the suspension of the petitioner was extended during the pendency of the enquiry can be justified and the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for. 7. We are of the opinion that both the reasons adopted by the learned Single Judge do not admit of any exception and does not call for interference. Firstly no effect can be given to the Rules before they come into operation. 7. We are of the opinion that both the reasons adopted by the learned Single Judge do not admit of any exception and does not call for interference. Firstly no effect can be given to the Rules before they come into operation. Merely because vide Annexure 6 in exercise of administrative authority certain guide lines was issued for reviewing the suspension orders which had been made even before the publication of the Rules to which in terms the Rules do not apply and issued instructions to consider the cases of such pending suspension within 90 days from the date of publication would not exclude the authority concerned to consider the case where 90 days has expired prior to the Rules came into force but the consideration of reviewing the continuance of the suspension order took place thereafter. The law can be given effect to only when it came into force and no action prior to that could be invalidated on the ground of law which is still to commence. Apparently, Annexure 6 while referred to the date of publication, within 90 days from which the pending cases were instructed to be reviewed before the authority concerned on the assumption that if within ninety days the cases were not reviewed they will automatically became dead letter on expiry of 90 days failed to take into account the conclusion of invalidating the suspension of such cases before the Rules came into force and became live. 8. It may be pertinent to note that before insertion of Sub-rules (6) and (7) , no duration was prescribed for continuation of the suspension order. However, under Rules 5 and 8 it was envisaged that it should remain until reviewed by the authority competent to do so in Rule 5(b). It was envisaged that the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any such proceedings. Clause (c) of Sub-rule (5) further envisages that any order of suspension made or deemed to have been made, may at any time be revoked by the authority which made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. Clause (c) of Sub-rule (5) further envisages that any order of suspension made or deemed to have been made, may at any time be revoked by the authority which made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. Under the newly inserted Rules also the authority to make an order for extending the period of suspension vest in the same competent authority who can place the delinquent officer under suspension under Section 5 (b) and power to revoke also vest in the same authority, who has power to put delinquent officer under suspension. The order of extension is also required to be made by the same authority, therefore, the authority of the person making extension order dated 27.4.2004 cannot be doubted. 9. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as we have noticed above, the Reviewing Authority has also opined by its letter dated 29.2000 that looking to the nature of charge which is subject matter of the inquiry, the period of suspension is required to be extended. The order dated 27.4.2004 is also in identical terms that the case against the appellant-petitioner in respect of criminal offence is under trial and he is under suspension vide order dated 25th February, 2003 and keeping in view that the case is still under trial it has been decided to put him under suspension for a period of 180 days from the date of issuing of order. Said order has not been challenged. Hence, defect of procedure, if any, in the first instance, must be deemed to have been cured. 10. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the authority exercised by the competent officer is unreasonable or arbitrary as ordinarily, the suspension of a civil servant who is facing charge of grave corruption both under criminal trial and departmental enquiry not only is a matter of keeping the delinquent away from the office so that he may not misuse it for the purpose of effecting the trial but is also a matter of maintaining public interest to safeguard the trust which people have in a fair and just administration. Keeping that in view, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in holding that in the aforesaid circumstances, the extension of period during the pendency of the enquiry was justified and the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for. 11. Keeping that in view, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in holding that in the aforesaid circumstances, the extension of period during the pendency of the enquiry was justified and the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for. 11. As a matter of fact, the facts and circumstances of the present case reveal that it is not a fit case in which extra-ordinary jurisdiction ought to be invoked for the purpose of putting the petition back in seat during the pendency of the enquiry. 12. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.