G. YETHIRAJULU, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the I Metropolitan Sessions judge, Hyderabad dated 11-11-2002 in s. C. No. 489 of 2001. The appellants are a-1 and A-2. They were charged for the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC. They denied the charges and claimed for trial. The prosecution in order to prove the above charges examined P. Ws. 1 to 12 and marked Exs. P-1 to P-13 and m. Os. 1 to 3. No oral evidence was adduced on defence side, but Ex. D-1 -relevant portion of Section 161 Cr. P. C. statement of P. W. 1 was marked. The learned Sessions Judge after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence found both the accused guilty for the offence under section 302 IPC, convicted each of them and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- each, in default of suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The sessions Court directed both the sentences to run concurrently. The appellants being aggrieved by the judgment of the sessions Court preferred this appeal challenging its validity and legality. ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecution leading to the conviction of the appellants is briefly as follows: the deceased Santoshi was married to the son of A-1 by name Narsing Rao about six months prior to the date of occurrence. The offence took place during the intervening night of 18/19-9-2000 at about 3 a. m. A-1 being the mother-in-law and A-2 being the sister-in-law of the deceased used to harass her for bringing additional dowry. During the fateful night both the accused poured kerosene on the deceased and set fire to her at her residence, which resulted in severe burns to the deceased. She was admitted in osmania General Hospital for treatment and two dying declarations covered by Exs. P-5 and P-8 were recorded from the deceased. The deceased while undergoing treatment, succumbed to the burns at about 3. 45 p. m. on 19-9-2000. The police registered a crime for the offence under Section 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC and after conclusion of the investigation laid the charge-sheet. ( 3 ) THE prosecution contended that both the accused are responsible for the death of the deceased. The accused generally denied the offence and did not take any specific defence. 45 p. m. on 19-9-2000. The police registered a crime for the offence under Section 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC and after conclusion of the investigation laid the charge-sheet. ( 3 ) THE prosecution contended that both the accused are responsible for the death of the deceased. The accused generally denied the offence and did not take any specific defence. ( 4 ) THE point for consideration is: whether the prosecution proved the guilt of both the accused beyond reasonable doubt and whether the convictions and the sentences imposed by the Sessions Court against the appellants are liable to be set aside? point: ( 5 ) ACRIMEWAS registered by the concerned police on the basis of a statement given by the deceased at about 7. 45 a. m. on 19-9-2000. The offence took place at about 3 a. m. on 19-9-2000 at the house of the deceased. Ex. P-5 is the statement recorded by the Assistant Sub-lnspector of Kulsumpura p. S. , Hyderabad, on the basis of which a crime was registered. On the same day p. W. 8, the then VI Metropolitan Magistrate, hyderabad recorded the statement of the deceased (Ex. P-8) between 10. 25 a. m. to 10. 40 a. m. In the said statement the deceased stated that A-1 poured kerosene and set fire to her. ( 6 ) IN addition to Exs. P-5 and P-8- statements of the deceased, the prosecution relied on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 12. P. W. 1 is the mother of the deceased who is a native of Nuthujapur. She stated that at the time of marriage they gave 12 tulas of gold, 10 tulas of silver and other household articles worth Rs. 50,000/ -. After the marriage the deceased was sent to Hyderabad to her in- laws house for marital life. The deceased, her husband and A-1 used to reside in one house. A-2 was also staying by the side of the house of A-1. She further stated that sometime after the marriage, her husband fell ill. When she informed the deceased and her husband, they came along with A-2 to their house. Subsequently her husband died. After completion of the ceremonies the deceased informed herthat A-1 and A-2 were harassing to bring Rs. 50,000/- for business purpose. She further stated that sometime after the marriage, her husband fell ill. When she informed the deceased and her husband, they came along with A-2 to their house. Subsequently her husband died. After completion of the ceremonies the deceased informed herthat A-1 and A-2 were harassing to bring Rs. 50,000/- for business purpose. She informed the deceased that she was not in a position to pay that much amount and she would adjust some amount after one month. She was further informed by the deceased that A-1 and A-2 used to abuse in filthy language. The deceased also wrote a letter to her younger daughter about the demand of amount and harassment. Two days later, she received a telephone message that the deceased was admitted in the hospital with burns. Immediately she reached hyderabad and went to the hospital along with police. By the time they reached the hospital, the deceased died due to burns. In the cross-examination she stated that she reached Hyderabad at about 9. 30 a. m. on the next day of the date of offence and reached hospital at about 11 a. m. The police recorded her statement at about 2 p. m. ( 7 ) THE evidence of P. W. 1 is useful only to the extent that the accused used to demand the deceased to bring Rs. 50,000/- and used to abuse her in filthy language. ( 8 ) P. W. 2, the younger brother of the deceased deposed that on 6-4-2000 the marriage of the deceased was performed. After the marriage the deceased went to her in-law s house to lead marital life. A-1, the deceased and her husband used to stay in one house and A-2 used to stay in the adjacent house. About 12 days after the marriage he went to the house of the deceased and remained there for two days. One month thereafter the deceased and her husband visited his house and the deceased did not make any complaint to him. Subsequently, his father fell sick and later died. The deceased, her husband and A-2 came to his house and, after completion of the ceremonies, the deceased before leaving the house informed P. W. 1 about harassment and demand of money by the accused and p. W. 1 replied that she was not having that much money and would try to adjust some amount. The deceased, her husband and A-2 came to his house and, after completion of the ceremonies, the deceased before leaving the house informed P. W. 1 about harassment and demand of money by the accused and p. W. 1 replied that she was not having that much money and would try to adjust some amount. On 19-9-2000 they received a telephone call thatthe deceased was admitted in the hospital. His mother wentto Hyderabad and informed him about the death of the deceased. Three days later he came to hyderabad and the police recorded his statement. ( 9 ) P. W. 3 is a panch to the observation of scene of offence. P. W. 4 is a Professor working in the Department of Plastic Surgery. He was examined to speak about the admission of the deceased at about 4. 30 a. m. on 19-9-2000 in the casualty ward of osmania General Hospital. ( 10 ) P. W. 5, the then Mandal Revenue officer mentioned aboutthe holding of inquest over the dead body of the deceased between 1 p. m. to 2 p. m. on 20-9-2000 and he stated that the panchayatdars opined that the deceased died due to burns. P. Ws. 6 and 9 are the photographers who took the photos of the dead body of the deceased and the scene of offence respectively. P. W. 7, the then Assistant Sub-Inspector, stated that after hearing a telephonic message from Osmania general Hospital, at about 7. 15 a. m. he went to Osmania General Hospital and recorded ex. P-5-statement from the deceased. He gave a requisition to the VI Metropolitan magistrate, Hyderabad for recording the dying declaration of the deceased and after return to the police station at about 10 a. m. he registered the crime and handed over the file to the Sub-inspector of Police for investigation. P. W. 10, the then Inspector of police mentioned about the investigation, observation of the scene of offence, holding of inquest, arrest of the accused etc. P. W. 11, the doctor who conducted post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased opined that the deceased died due to shock consequent to burns. P. W. 12 is the then Assistant commissioner of Police who laid the charge- sheet. None of the above witnesses stated anything about the offence proper. P. Ws. P. W. 11, the doctor who conducted post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased opined that the deceased died due to shock consequent to burns. P. W. 12 is the then Assistant commissioner of Police who laid the charge- sheet. None of the above witnesses stated anything about the offence proper. P. Ws. 1 and 2 had no personal knowledge about the harassment alleged to be caused by the accused to the deceased. The prosecution did not examine any other witnesses from the village of the accused to speak about the alleged harassment. The information said to be given by the deceased to P. Ws. 1 and 2 was regarding the demand of Rs. 50,000/- for business purpose and it was not part of the dowry amount or additional dowry. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 further disclosed that the deceased informed them that A-1 and A-2 used to harass her by abusing in filthy language. P. Ws. 1 and 2 belong to a far- off place from the village of the accused. There is no other evidence to prove that there was harassment of the deceased by A-1 and a-2 demanding any amount towards dowry. ( 11 ) AS per Ex. P-8-Statement of the deceased, both the accused used to quarrel with the deceased everyday. A-1 used to abuse her on the ground that she was not doing household work. The cause mentioned by the deceased for harassment was different from the cause mentioned by P. Ws. 1 and 2. The deceased did not state the above particulars in Ex. P-5-statement. There is no supporting material to show as to what type of harassment the accused used to cause to the deceased and there is a doubt regarding the alleged harassment and the accused are entitled for the benefit of doubt regarding the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian penal Code. ( 12 ) REGARDING the offence proper, the prosecution relied on the dying declarations of the deceased. Ex. P-5-statement of the deceased was recorded by P. W. 7, A. S. I, of police, Kulsumpura P. S. at about 7. 45 a. m. on 19-9-2000 at Osmania General Hospital, hyderabad and it reads as follows: i am residing in the above said address along with my husband and my mother- in-law. Ex. P-5-statement of the deceased was recorded by P. W. 7, A. S. I, of police, Kulsumpura P. S. at about 7. 45 a. m. on 19-9-2000 at Osmania General Hospital, hyderabad and it reads as follows: i am residing in the above said address along with my husband and my mother- in-law. I have married one Narsing about 6 months back at my village Murchpur, karnataka State. On 19-9-2000 at about 03. 00 hours I woke up for urinal. Meanwhile my mother-in-law called me to her room and poured the kerosene on my body and set fire with the assistance of my sister-in-law by name fathu Bai who was present in her room. Later my husband extinguished the fire and shifted me to Osmania General hospital for treatment. ( 13 ) P. W. 8, the then VI Metropolitan magistrate, Hyderabad recorded Ex. P-8- statement from the deceased on 19-9-2000 at about 10. 25 a. m. He received a requisition from P. W. 7 on 19-9-2000 and proceeded to the Osmania General Hospital to record the statement of the deceased. The deceased was in the female burns ward. The duty doctor identified the deceased and certified that she was conscious and coherent and was in a fit condition to give the statement. He also elicited some information by putting preliminary questions to know her state of mind and satisfied that she was in a fit condition to make a declaration. He recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. At the time of recording the dying declaration, the duty doctor and himself were only present. After recording the statement, the doctor certified that the deceased was conscious and coherent throughout recording the statement. The deceased gave the declaration in Urdu and the doctor translated the same into Telugu. ( 14 ) IN Ex. P-8-statement the deceased stated as follows: my marriage was performed about six months back. I went to my in-laws house after my marriage. My mother-in-law, sister-in-law-Fattu used to quarrel with me everyday. My mother-in-law used to abuse me saying that I am not doing household work. Yesterday night at 6 p. m. my mother-in-law and sister-in- law quarreled with me. In the midnight at 1. 30 a. m. my mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and lit fire to me. My sister-in-law beat me with hands. At that time my husband was sleeping in another room. Yesterday night at 6 p. m. my mother-in-law and sister-in- law quarreled with me. In the midnight at 1. 30 a. m. my mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and lit fire to me. My sister-in-law beat me with hands. At that time my husband was sleeping in another room. On hearing my cries, he came running and extinguished the fire. Afterwards my husband brought me to hospital. ( 15 ) THE accused did not dispute the death of tne deceased due to burns. They also did not dispute the date, time and place of offence and the time of the death of the deceased. The learned Senior Counsel sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, representing the appellants submitted that the statement given by the deceased in Ex. P-5 is contradictory to the statement covered by Ex. P-8, therefore, it is not safe to rely on those statements to find the accused guilty of the offences. He pointed out the following discrepancies in the statements of the deceased: (1) The time of offence was mentioned as 3 a. m. in Ex. P-5 whereas mentioned as 1. 30 a. m. in Ex. P-8. (2) In Ex. P-5 the deceased mentioned that A-2 assisted and A-1 poured kerosene and set fire to her. In ex. P-8 she mentioned that A-2 beat her with hands. (3) In Ex. P-5 the deceased mentioned that when she woke up to go to urinal, A-1 called her to her room and poured kerosene and set fire to her. In Ex. P-8 she did not mention about A-1 calling her to her room and simply stated that A-1 poured kerosene and set fire to her. (4) In Ex. P-5 the deceased mentioned that her husband extinguished the fire without mentioning as to where from he came whereas in Ex. P-8 she mentioned that her husband who was sleeping in another room came running on hearing her cries and extinguished the fire. (5) In Ex. P-5 the deceased did not mention as to who took her to the hospital whereas in Ex. P-8 she mentioned that her husband brought her to the hospital. P-8 she mentioned that her husband who was sleeping in another room came running on hearing her cries and extinguished the fire. (5) In Ex. P-5 the deceased did not mention as to who took her to the hospital whereas in Ex. P-8 she mentioned that her husband brought her to the hospital. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that it is not safe to accept the statements of the deceased, which are contradictory to each other and as there is no other evidence in support of the versions given by the deceased, it is not safe to convict the accused for the offences covered by the charges. ( 16 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that the statements of the deceased can be safely accepted as truthful versions on account of the following common features in both the statements: (1) The date of offences is same in both the statements. (2) Though there was variation about the exact time to the commission of offence, the offence took place in the early hours of 19-09-2000. (3) The offence took place in the house of the deceased, and there is no variation in the scene of offence. (4) There was a specific version that a-1 poured kerosene and lit fire to her and it is same in both the statements. (5) In both the statements the deceased stated that her husband extinguished the fire. (6) It was the specific version of the deceased in Ex. P-8 that her husband took her to the hospital and no contradictory version was given in ex. P-5. The learned Public Prosecutor, therefore, submitted that since the version of the deceased is same on all material particulars, the lower Court was right in accepting that the dying declarations are trustworthy and acceptable. ( 17 ) SRI C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior Counsel representing the appellants, reiied on the judgments of the Supreme court in support of his contention regarding the acceptability of the dying declarations to convict the accused. ( 18 ) IN Chinnamma v. State of Kerala the supreme Court considered the aspect regarding the reliability of the dying declarations in murder cases. In the case covered by the above decision, two dying declarations of the deceased were recorded-one by the Head Constable and the other by the Judicial Magistrate of First class. ( 18 ) IN Chinnamma v. State of Kerala the supreme Court considered the aspect regarding the reliability of the dying declarations in murder cases. In the case covered by the above decision, two dying declarations of the deceased were recorded-one by the Head Constable and the other by the Judicial Magistrate of First class. The Supreme Court aftergoing through the contents of both the dying declarations held that the contents of the dying declarations are highly contradictory as to infliction of injury by the appellant. The motive given in two dying declarations are entirely different. The possibility of the deceased being influenced by her parents cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the conviction based on such dying declarations cannot be sustained. 18 (A ). In the case covered by the above decision, the offence took place on 8-7-1989. A Head Constable recorded the dying declaration on 10-7-1989 at about 10. 45 p. m. in the hospital and another dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class on 14-7-1989. In the first dying declaration the deceased stated that on 7-7-1989 when she wanted to go to her mother s house, her husband did not allow her to go. On 8-7-1989 she still wanted to go to her mother s house, so she dressed up when she was attacked on the head by the appellant, and then the appellant took the kerosene oil which was kept in the room and poured it on her chest. She had not noticed the factum of the appellant setting her on fire and when she felt heat, she ran outside the house and fell unconscious. In the first dying declaration the deceased stated that the appellant who is the sister of her husband was annoyed with her because of a property dispute. On 7-7-1989 she wanted to go to her mother s house. Hence, she told her husband that she will be going there, to which her husband had told her not to go. Still she changed her dress to go. At that point of time, the appellant came to the house and asked her where are you going, but she did not reply. On 8-7-1989 at about9a. m. she got dressed up again to go to her mother s house. Still she changed her dress to go. At that point of time, the appellant came to the house and asked her where are you going, but she did not reply. On 8-7-1989 at about9a. m. she got dressed up again to go to her mother s house. Then the appellant came inside the house and standing behind her hit her on the back of her head once and she fell on the floor. The appellant then took the kerosene tin, which was kept in the room and poured it on her chest. When she felt heat on her chest, she got up and ran outside the house and fell unconscious in the courtyard. 18 (b ). In the second dying declaration which was recorded six days after the date of incident, the deceased stated that on 8-7-1989 she took food for piglings from the kitchen of her husband s house and soon as she entered the kitchen, she got a beating on the back of her head by her sister-in- law (appellant ). She fell down and became unconscious. While she was unconscious, the flames started and there is a smell of kerosene. Her sister- in-law beat her previously, therefore, she suspects that her sister-in-law set fire on her body. Her father, mother, two brothers, two sisters and her husband were attending her. There was some talk that the appellant had done some evil magic on her husband, therefore, her husband was not loving his sister after their marriage. 18 (c ). After examining both the dying declarations, the Supreme Court observed that there were certain glaring contradictions in the dying declarations. When the deceased was certain in the first dying declaration that it was the appellant who poured the kerosene on her and set her on fire whereas in the second dying declaration she was not so sure because she says that she is only suspecting the appellant as having set fire on her. The motive given in the two dying declarations are entirely different. These contradictions created grave suspicion in the mind of the Court whether the injury suffered by the deceased was really because of the act of the appellant or was a figment of the imagination of the deceased. The motive given in the two dying declarations are entirely different. These contradictions created grave suspicion in the mind of the Court whether the injury suffered by the deceased was really because of the act of the appellant or was a figment of the imagination of the deceased. As per the evidence of P. W. 11, who treated the deceased at the first instance, the deceased told that she suffered the injury due to accidental burning while preparing food for the piglings. 18 (d ). The Supreme Court by taking into consideration the above circumstances of the case expressed that the above mentioned facts created a doubt in the mind of the Court as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declaration and the possibility of the deceased being influenced by her parents in making the dying declaration cannot be ruled out. ( 19 ) IN State of A. P. v. Shaik Moin the supreme Court held that when there are contradictions in multiple dying declarations, the accused is entitled for the benefit of doubt. 19 (A ). In the case covered by the above decision, the prosecution alleged that the accused poured kerosene on his wife and set her on fire. She was taken to the hospital by the accused and others. The Sub-Inspector on receiving the intimation came to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased. The prosecution also relied on oral dying declarations said to be made to P. W. 5 and another dying declaration made to the Judicial Magistrate on the same day. The trial court while relying upon the dying declaration made to the judicial Magistrate held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On appeal preferred by the accused, the high Court held that it is not safe to rely upon the dying declarations to find the accused guilty of the offence on account of the contradictory versions in the dying declarations. In the first oral dying declaration made to the neighbour who accompanied the deceased to the hospital the deceased told that the accused poured kerosene and set fire to her because of the fact that he had an illicit relationship with another woman. But, this witness never told the police about the statement said to be made by the deceased to him. But, this witness never told the police about the statement said to be made by the deceased to him. He did not mention in 161 Cr. P. C. statement also. The second dying declaration was given to the Sub-Inspector of Police in the presence of mother and other relations and it was not certified by the doctor, therefore, the Court doubted the genuineness of the said statement in view of an entry in the Accident Register maintained by the hospital on the information given by the deceased that she suffered burn injuries due to an accident while cooking. The third dying declaration given to the Magistrate was recorded in the presence of the doctor and the doctor certified that the deceased was in a fit condition to make the statement wherein she had implicated the accused of having caused the injuries to her by pouring kerosene and setting fire to her. The court observed that in the ordinary course this statement would have been sufficient to come to the conclusion that it is the accused who had caused the injuries which led to the death of the deceased, but the correctness of the said statement has to be examined in the background of factual contradictions in the earlier statements and the entry in the Accident Register that she suffered injuries due to an accident while cooking. The Court further observed that the prosecution has not brought on record any material to show how the entry in the Accident Register was made. On the other hand, the doctor in his evidence specifically stated that the entry was made on the information given by the deceased. The Supreme court took into consideration another important factor that the deceased gave her statement before the Magistrate in urdu language, which was later translated into Telugu as understood by the Magistrate. The efficiency of the language of the Magistrate was not such that he could translate the statement of the deceased into Telugu language correctly. The Supreme Court therefore held that there being direct conflict in regard to the role played by the accused, the benefit of doubt should be given to him. The efficiency of the language of the Magistrate was not such that he could translate the statement of the deceased into Telugu language correctly. The Supreme Court therefore held that there being direct conflict in regard to the role played by the accused, the benefit of doubt should be given to him. ( 20 ) IN Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of a. P. 3 the Supreme Court held that when there are material contradictions between two dying declarations pertaining to the context in which the deceased caught fire, it is not safe to rely on the dying declarations to convict the accused for the offence under section 302 IPC. 20 (A ). In the case covered by the above decision, the prosecution alleged that the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased were indisposed to her as she was unable to give birth a child. She was subjected to harassment and threats. They used to scare her by saying that they would throw her in a well or a canal to get clearance for the husband to re-marry. On the morning of the ill- fated day, the husband caught hold of her hair from behind, the mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and asked her husband to set her ablaze. The husband obliged by lighting a matchstick and she caught fire. When she screamed out, the assailants took to their heals. The neighbours who reached the scene extinguished the fire and on the same day the Judicial Magistrate recorded one dying declaration and the S. I. of police recorded another dying declaration in the hospital. In both the dying declarations she attributed to the husband and his mother for the cause of her devastating burns. Except the judicial Magistrate and the S. I. who recorded the dying declarations, all other witnesses deposed that the deceased told him that her clothes were caught fire while cooking milk. Even her father and mother when examined in Court also said like that. In the dying declaration recorded by the S. I. , the deceased stated as follows: today morning i. e. , 9-10-1994 when I was lighting the stove in the kitchen and preparing coffee at about 6. 00 a. m. my mother-in-law and husband came from behind. After entering the kitchen, my husband caught hold of my hair and I was unable to move. 00 a. m. my mother-in-law and husband came from behind. After entering the kitchen, my husband caught hold of my hair and I was unable to move. My mother-in-law narayanamma sprinkled kerosene on my body and clothes. She asked her son to set fire, my husband lit the matchstick and threw it on my clothes. When my clothes caught fire I started shouting with fear. My mother-in-law narayanamma and my husband lakshmi Reddy ran away from there. 20 (b ). In the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate the deceased stated as follows: my mother-in-law s name is narayanamma, my husband s name is dandu Lakshmi Reddy. In the morning at 6. 00 a. m. when I was sweeping, my mother-in-law Narayanamma and my husband Lakshmi Reddy both poured kerosene on me, lit the matchstick and set me to fire. 20 (c ). During the trial, the accused took a stand that the deceased had some mental imbalance and suicide tendency. On earlier occasions she made an attempt to electrocute herself, but it was averted with the intervention of others. 20 (d ). In the light of the above material, the Supreme Court did not concur with the view of the Division Bench of the high Court by observing that the High court side-stepped the crucial evidence of the father and mother of the deceased which diametrically went against the version of the deceased. The Supreme court also took into consideration the version of father and mother that the deceased was not mentally sound. Under the above circumstances, the supreme Court observed that if the court has even a slight doubt of the mental soundness of the author of the statement, it would be unsafe to base conviction on such statement, albeit its inadmissibility under Section 32 of the evidence Act. The Supreme Court therefore gave the benefit of doubt to the accused by holding that the conviction cannot sustain. ( 21 ) THE legal position regarding the conviction of the accused on the basis of the dying declaration is well established, but when there are two contradictory statements given by the deceased, it is not safe to base the conviction on the basis of those dying declarations alone. The Supreme Court recorded acquittals in the cases covered by the above decisions by keeping in view the circumstances mentioned therein. The Supreme Court recorded acquittals in the cases covered by the above decisions by keeping in view the circumstances mentioned therein. ( 22 ) IN the case on hand, the factual position is different. There is consistent version from the prosecution witnesses and the dying declarations given by the deceased regarding the offence proper, and the person who was responsible forthe commission of the offence. When there is consistent version from all corners pointing out the guilt of the accused, it is not desirable to throw away the case on the ground of minor omissions or contradictions. After carefully going through the contents of the dying declarations, we are convinced that the deceased was definite about the person who was responsible for the commission of the offence, and we have no hesitation to accept the dying declarations of the deceased and we do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the court below. ( 23 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed by confirming the conviction and the sentences imposed by the court below in all respects.