SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners have filed this writ petition against the order dated 13th February, 2001 (Annexure 9) passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad denying claim of the petitioners for payment of salary from the State Exchequer since the institution wherein the petitioners are employed is not receiving grant-in-aid and the provisions of the U. P. Recognized institution (Payment of Salaries) Act, 1971 are not applicable in the present case. The petitioners have also sought mandamus directing the respondents to bring the college in question under grant-in-aid and pay regular salary to the petitioners in the prescribed pay scale as per governments Rules. ( 2 ) IN brief, the relevant facts, as disclosed in the petition, are that the petitioners were appointed as Class IV employees in the year 1971 at Annie Basent School, Allahabad vide appointment order dated 1. 2. 1971 (Annexures 1 and 2) issued by the Principal of the aforesaid School. The petitioner no. 1 was appointed as Kuli and the petitioner no. 2 was appointed as PARICHARIKA at the fixed salary of Rs. 30/- per month besides dearness allowances. It is stated that Annie besant School was up-graded to Higher Secondary School in the year 1997. Thereafter, the management of the School informed the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Allahabad vide letter dated 30th October, 1993 that the petitioners have been appointed as Class IV employees in the scale of Rs. 750-940/- in High School and their appointments may be approved, since the appointments are being made in anticipation of approval. It is also stated that the aforesaid appointments were approved in respect whereof the letter dated 28. 10. 1993 is claimed to be filed as Annexure 4, but it is actually the minutes of the selection sub committee who selected some candidates as teachers and the petitioners as Class IV employees and not a letter of approval as asserted in the writ petition. ( 3 ) THE petitioners further claimed that after their approval by means of Annexure 5, they were permitted to work in Higher Secondary Classes since the College was upgraded from Junior high School to High School. ( 3 ) THE petitioners further claimed that after their approval by means of Annexure 5, they were permitted to work in Higher Secondary Classes since the College was upgraded from Junior high School to High School. However, Annexure 5 is a letter dated 27th March, 1997 issued by the Regional Deputy Director of Education addressed to the Principal and Manager of the Annie basent School stating that the aforesaid school was Recognized unaided (Vitta Viheen) School, hence liability of payment of salary etc. of teachers and other staff is to be borne by the management and not by the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Allahabad. So far the selection proceedings are concerned, the same were consented and approved. The petitioners claim that although College has now been upgraded to intermediate level but the respondents are not paying salary to the petitioners under the relevant Payment of Salaries Act. The petitioners claim that half of the institution is being treated runders grant-in-aid and the salary is being paid to the teachers under the U. P. Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 but the petitioners are not being paid salary under the said Act from the Government Exchequer. ( 4 ) THE petitioners earlier approached this Court by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4777 of 2000 which was disposed of finally on 2. 11. 2000 directing the petitioners to make representation to the District Inspectors of Schools-II, Allahabad, who was directed to decide the same by a speaking and reasoned order, in case such a representation is made. ( 5 ) THE petitioners in pursuance to the order of this Court dated 2. 11. 2000 approached the District inspector of Schools by filing representations which have now been rejected by the impugned order. ( 6 ) INSPITE of grant of time repeatedly, no counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. However, the learned Counsels for the parties consented for final disposal of this case on the basis of the record of Writ petition. Hence, this writ petition is being disposed of finally under the Rules of the Court. ( 7 ) HEARD Sri Shekhar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned standing Counsel appearing for the respondents no. 1,3,4 and 5. Hence, this writ petition is being disposed of finally under the Rules of the Court. ( 7 ) HEARD Sri Shekhar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned standing Counsel appearing for the respondents no. 1,3,4 and 5. ( 8 ) THE basic contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners are two fold :. 1. The District Inspector of Schools before passing the impugned order did not afford any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are entitled for payment of salary under the Intermediate Payment of Salaries act, 1978 but they are not being paid salary illegally by the Educational Authorities from the state exchequer which is illegal. ( 9 ) I propose to consider the second question first. The petitioners have claimed payment of salary under the provisions of Intermediation Education Payment of Salaries Act, 1978 but when enquired, learned Counsel for the petitioner could not place any such Act before this Court. It was conceded that there is no such Act in existence. Learned Standing Counsel informed that there are two statutes which govern payment of salaries to the teachers of the recognized Primary and Secondary School, namely (1) U. P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 and (2) U. P. High School and Intermediate (Payment of Salaries)Act, 1971. Faced with this situation, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that since the school in question is an intermediate school/college and, therefore, they may be paid salary under 1971 Act, and in case the school in question is being paid salary under 1978 Act then they, may be paid salary under the aforesaid Act. In nut shell, without specifying, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners be paid salary under the appropriate statutes whichever is applicable. The submission is thoroughly misconceived and even otherwise shows total lack of understanding of the statutory provisions on the part of the petitioners. ( 10 ) A perusal of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools shows following facts, which have not been disputed or assailed by the petitioners in the entire writ petition. 1. Annie Besant Krishnaashram Educational Trust was running initially a Nursery School, namely, Annie Besant School. 2. The petitioner no. ( 10 ) A perusal of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools shows following facts, which have not been disputed or assailed by the petitioners in the entire writ petition. 1. Annie Besant Krishnaashram Educational Trust was running initially a Nursery School, namely, Annie Besant School. 2. The petitioner no. 1 was appointed in 1971 and was employed in the aforesaid nursery school run by the aforesaid Trust from its own sources. 3. The petitioner no. 2 was appointed in the year 1978 and worked till - 1993 in the Nursery school which was being managed by the aforesaid Trust from its own financial resources. 4. No grant-in-aid was provided by the Government to the aforesaid nursery school. 5. The school was upgraded up to High School in 1992 and was recognized as unaided (Vitta viheen) school. 6. The management, however, in anticipation of the grant-in-aid, selected and appointed petitioners in the High School but since no grant-in-aid was made available to the High School, therefore, the petitioners were not paid salary by the state Government under the provisions of any of the aforesaid statutes. 7. The claim of the petitioners to get salary at par with one Gulab Chandra, Peon, was wrong since Gulab Chandra, Peon, was working in Junior High School which was recognized and receiving maintenance grant from the State Government and the salary was being paid under 1978 Act but the same is not applicable to the petitioners. ( 11 ) THUS the District Inspector of Schools has categorically held since the institution in question was not receiving any grant-in-aid from the "government and recognition was granted without any financial assistance, hence the responsibility of payment of salary to the petitioners lay on the management. There was no legal or otherwise right vested in the petitioners to claim salary from the State exchequer under the provisions of the any of the aforesaid Acts and, therefore, the respondents no 1, 3, 4 and 5 are no; liable to pay any salary to the petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners could not point out any of the facts stated in the aforesaid order passed by the District Inspector of Schools as incorrect. In fact, none of the findings recorded by the District Inspector of Schools in the impugned order has been assailed by the petitioners in the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners could not point out any of the facts stated in the aforesaid order passed by the District Inspector of Schools as incorrect. In fact, none of the findings recorded by the District Inspector of Schools in the impugned order has been assailed by the petitioners in the writ petition. It has only stated that before passing the aforesaid order, opportunity of personal hearing should have been provided by the respondent no, 4. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any error apparent on the face of record committed by the respondent no, 4 in the impugned order dated 13th February, 2001 and the said order, therefore, does not require any interference from this Court. ( 12 ) THE next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that before passing the aforesaid impugned order, oral and personal hearing ought to have been afforded to the petitioner is clearly misconceived, and, therefore, liable to be rejected. The representation, which the petitioner filed before the respondent no. 4, was not statutory since it was not provided under any statutory provisions. The petitioners earlier approached this Court without showing any legal right. However, this Court permitted them to approach the District Inspector of Schools, allahabad by making a representation and the only direction issued to the respondent no. 4 is to pass a speaking and reasoned order. The order-passed by the respondent no. 4 is sufficiently detailed and contain various reasons for different conclusions, -The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also admitted that the said order cannot be challenged as a non speaking or unreasoned order. ( 13 ) ORAL opportunity of hearing unless provided in the Statutes or otherwise is found necessary in the facts and circumstance of a particular case is not an integral part of the principles of audi alteram paratam. In the case of Union of India and Anr. ( 13 ) ORAL opportunity of hearing unless provided in the Statutes or otherwise is found necessary in the facts and circumstance of a particular case is not an integral part of the principles of audi alteram paratam. In the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus Sales Corporation 1996 III AD (SC)497 , AIR1996 SC 1509 , 1996 (55)ECC51 (SC), 1996 (83)ELT486 (SC), JT1996 (3)SC 597 , 1996 (3)SCALE103 , (1996)4 SCC69 , [1996]3 scr894 , 1996 (2)UJ409 (SC), the Apex Court while considering the question as to whether in all cases wherever principles of natural justice is complied with, personal hearing is must, observed as under : the High Court has primarily considered the question as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of this Court have been referred to. It need not be pointed out that under different situations and conditions the requirement of compliance of the principle of natural justice vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances and under different statutory provisions personal hearings have to be afforded to the persons concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals and applications are disposed of by the competent authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the appellants or applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the quasi-judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such" quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. The requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such" quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special facts and circumstances of the case, they certainly it is always open to such authority to decide the appeal or the application only after affording a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application shall not be held to be valid invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been afforded. ( 14 ) IN the case of State of U. P. and Anr. v. Nand Kumar Agarwal J. T. 2000 (7) SC 302, the apex Court held as under : so far as the question of giving personal hearing is concerned, on the express language of section 48 it must be held that personal hearing is not contemplated in the said provision, though of course, if the authorities think it fit, they may give the opportunity of personal hearing while holding appropriate enquiry. In the present case, however, the impugned order cannot be voided on the ground that personal hearing was not given. ( 15 ) AGAIN in the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and Anr. A. I. R. 2005 SC 314, the Apex Court while dealing with the question of personal hearing has held as under : a reading of the above rule show that the appellate authority shall give a show cause notice to the officer as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass final order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer and that this rule does not provide for a personal hearing or a personal. interview. Mr. Salve is right in his above submissions. ( 16 ) THE Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. interview. Mr. Salve is right in his above submissions. ( 16 ) THE Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. v. Luther Kondhpan (2000)I LLJ 275 SC , (1999)9 SCC 268 held that if the incumbent has not demanded for personal hearing, it cannot challenge the order of the authority concerned on the ground of denial of personal hearing as would be apparent from the followings : learned Counsel appearing for the respondent then urged that the respondent was denied an opportunity of personal hearing before the disciplinary authority. We have perused the reply filed by the respondent to the show cause notice. In the said reply it is nowhere stated that the respondent desires personal hearing. Under such circumstances the order of termination cannot be held to be vitiated on that account. ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, the contention of the petitioners that they were entitled for oral hearing before the District Inspector of Schools could have passed the impugned order is untenable and is, therefore, rejected. ( 18 ) IN view of what has been said above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs. . .