JUDGMENT PC : By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 8-10-2004 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Srinagar (Garhwal) in Execution Case No. 2 of 2004, Jagdish Chandra and others Vs. Smt. Komal and others, whereby the learned Prescribed Authority dismissed the application 32-C of the Judgment debtor/petitioner. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the respondent no. 2 J.C. Dhaundiyal (since deceased) filed an application for release of the premises in suit under Section 21(1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (for short the Act) against Ansh Prasad Shah the father of the petitioner. During the pendency of the release application said Ansh Prasad Shah died and his legal heirs were substituted in his place. Ultimately the release application of the landlord was allowed vide order dated 12-9-2002. Aggreived by the said order the tenant went up in appeal, which too was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 26-2-2004 passed by the Appellate Court (Additional District Judge/FTC, Pauri Garhwal). Again the tenant challenged the impugned judgment and orders by way of writ petition before the High Court, which was registered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 153 (M/S) of 2004 Smt. Komal and others Vs. Addl. District Judge and others. The writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 07-4-2004 passed by this Court. The landlord in order to get the decree executed filed Misc. Execution Case No. 2 of 2004 before the Prescribed Authority, wherein the impugned order was passed by the Prescribed Authority. In the execution case the petitioner filed objection on 23-6-2004 alleging therein that the applicant no. 3 Sri Krishan Daundiyal died on 12-4-2004 and the Execution Case was filed on 14-4-2004 by putting fictitious signature of the deceased-applicant. 3. In the present writ petition, the petitioner's case is that he purchased 1/4th share of the disputed property from Satish Chandra, who was allegedly the co-owner of the premises of the suit through registered sale deed dated 17-3-2005. According to the petitioner the Patwari concerned issued a certificate on 29-7-2004 in respect of the said land under purchase and after the execution of the sale deed, the petitioner has become co-owner of this suit premises and his status in the property is that of co-owner Instead of co-tenant. According to the petitioner the Patwari concerned issued a certificate on 29-7-2004 in respect of the said land under purchase and after the execution of the sale deed, the petitioner has become co-owner of this suit premises and his status in the property is that of co-owner Instead of co-tenant. The petitioner raised ail these pleas in his objection before the Executing Court. Against the objection of the petitioner, the respondent no.2 filed Counter Affidavit stating therein that under the alleged sale deed there was no building or trees standing thereon. It was also stated that there was no family partition therefore Satish Chandra had no right to sell his share. The said sale deed having been executed without the consent of other co-sharers is void and illegal. The learned Prescribed Authority after hearing both the parties found that the affidavit flied by the petitioner was not legally admissible because the contents of the affidavit were not signed by the deponent nor his signature was identified. Ultimately the objection of the petitioner was dismissed by the Court below. 4. In the writ petition it has been contended that the leaned Prescribed Authority without considering the point of co-ownership of the petitioner passed the impugned order ignoring the registered sale deed dated 17-3-2005. 5. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and have perused the material on record including the impugned order. 6. It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner being a co-owner cannot be evicted from the suit property, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority is not maintainable in the eye of law. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the sale deed relied upon by the petitioner is dated 17-3-2005. It was pointed out that the sale deed allegedly executed in favour of the petitioner clearly shows that there existed no house and tree thereon. It was further submitted that till the decision of the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act there was no such sale deed and any event which took place subsequent to filing of an eviction proceedings under the Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until by any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. It was also submitted that the finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the Executing Court. The learned counsel also submitted that the writ petition preferred by the petitioner and others before the High Court was dismissed on 7-4-2004 but even then the ground of co-ownership was not pleaded by the petitioners before the High Court. The learned counsel also pointed out that the description of the suit property as mentioned by the decree holders in the Execution Case does not tally with the description of the property purchased by the petitioner through registered sale deed dated 17-3-2005 relied upon by the petitioner, which has been filed for the first time before this Court and that there is no mention in the sale-deed that the premises under the tenancy of the purchaser was included in the sale property. 8. At the outset it may be mentioned that in a writ jurisdiction this Court cannot sit as a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate the evidence recorded on the finding of fact. 9. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Prescribed Authority failed to consider the change in the status of the tenant after execution of sale deed dated 17-3-2005 therefore the impugned order is liable to be set-aside. The learned counsel has relied upon the case Abdul Alim Vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari and others reported in [(1998) 9 Supreme Court Cases, page 683]. I have gone through the judgment of the Apex Court. In that case the release application was filed by the land lords who were real brothers in respect of the disputed shop. Later on one of the brothers sold his share in the shop to the appellant who became co-owner of the premises in question to the extent of half share. The respondent no.1 who continued to be the co-owner of the other half share filed an application for release of the shop under Section 21 (l)(a) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority in 1987. The application was dismissed on 29-3-1989 by the Prescribed Authority mainly on the ground that since the appellant had become a co-owner of the premises, the application for release was not maintainable. The appeal filed by the respondent no.1 was dismissed on 24-1-1990 by the Addl. District Judge. The application was dismissed on 29-3-1989 by the Prescribed Authority mainly on the ground that since the appellant had become a co-owner of the premises, the application for release was not maintainable. The appeal filed by the respondent no.1 was dismissed on 24-1-1990 by the Addl. District Judge. The respondent no.1 came up before the High Court in a writ petition. The High Court confirmed the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below, but held that the application for the release was maintainable as the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant on 12-4-1988 could not change his status of being a tenant of the premises. The Apex Court while up holding the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court as well as the appellate court observed that "Both the trial court and the appellate court were fully justified in holding that the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was not maintainable because the appellant-tenant had, in the meanwhile, acquired co-ownership rights in the demised shop. The change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal co-owner of the unpartitioned property, would, therefore, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not maintainable. It is not disputed that there has been no partition of the suit premises till date. The High Court was, under the circumstances, not justified in upsetting the findings of the trial court and the appellate court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction." The case law is not applicable in the instant case because, in the case before the Apex Court the rights of the parties had not become final till the execution of the sale deed dated 12-4-1988. Here In the case before this court the alleged sale deeds relied upon by the petitioner were executed on 17-3-2005 and subsequently on 17-3-2005. The release application moved by the land lord before the Prescribed Authority was allowed on 12-9-2002. The appeal preferred against the order of the Prescribed Authority was dismissed as back as on 26-2-2004. Even the writ petition preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on 7-4-2004 by this Court. Moreover, the application for' execution of the eviction decree was filed on 14-4-2004 before the Prescribed Authority. It is thus clear that at the time of execution of sale deed dated 17-32-005, the Writ Petition was pending, which was decided on 7-4-2004. Even the writ petition preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on 7-4-2004 by this Court. Moreover, the application for' execution of the eviction decree was filed on 14-4-2004 before the Prescribed Authority. It is thus clear that at the time of execution of sale deed dated 17-32-005, the Writ Petition was pending, which was decided on 7-4-2004. It is relevant to mention here that the sale deed in question dated 17-3-2005, as has been mentioned above, is in respect of an open land and not of tenements in question. Moreover, the rights of both the parties including the relation of landlord and tenant were already adjudicated and the proceedings have already attained the finality to the dispute culminating in the decree as far back as on 14-4-2004. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the case of Imambi Vs. Azeeza Bee (JT-2000(9) Supreme Court page 562). In that case the provisions of Section 47 of the CPC along with the provision of Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act, 1882 were considered. The Apex Court observed that "Tenant purchasing from wife/co-owner-Husband obtaining eviction decree-Execution by seller/wife- High Court upholding right of tenant to get sale-deed in respect of half-share-Execution by both parties-Tenant admittedly put in possession- Yet, execution of seller/wife allowed-High Court on revision holding that tenant continues to be tenant irrespective of sale-deed-Status of tenant- If that of owner, he can not be evicted. Held that after sale deed, she became co-owner with landlord. Hence High Court order set aside." 11. The aforesaid case law is also of no avail to the petitioner. In that case the husband of the respondent executed an agreement of sale in favour of the appellant in respect of the disputed building. When the sale deed was not executed, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance before the Trial Court, which was dismissed. On the other hand, the husband of the said respondent earlier filed eviction petition on the ground of bona fide need. This petition was decreed. The appeal against the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent entered into an agreement with the appellant on 22-11-1981 representing herself as full owner of the property. The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance. The matter went up to the High Court. This petition was decreed. The appeal against the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent entered into an agreement with the appellant on 22-11-1981 representing herself as full owner of the property. The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance. The matter went up to the High Court. In the meanwhile on the strength of eviction order passed earlier, execution was filed by the respondent. The execution application was dismissed on the ground that the appellants-predecessor obtained an agreement for sale with the respondent-decree holder. This order was challenged before the High Court in revision. Respondent's husband died and she was impleaded in the case. All these matters were clubbed together and were disposed of by a common order by the High Court. The High Court up held the right of the appellant to get her sale deed executed to the extent of half share only and order to proceed with the execution in respect of other half share was also passed. Pursuant to the order of the High Court, the appellant filed execution petition for the execution of sale-deed, which was allowed on 30-3-1998 and the sale deed was executed on 17-4-1998 for undivided half share. The suit for partition and injunction was also filed by the appellant. The appellant was admittedly put in possession of the same. The Apex Court considered the question whether status of a tenant would continue to be so even after an agreement of sale is executed by such tenant with the landlord in respect of the same tenanted premises. Referring to the decision in the case of Abdul Alim Vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari and others (Supra), the Apex Court held that "The status of such tenant, after execution of the said agreement of sale ceases to be such which is changed to that of a purchaser and when a sale deed is executed, as in this case of the half share of the said property, such tenant becomes co-owner with the landlord." In the instant case, the matter for consideration is under the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Moreover, even if it may be presumed for the sake of argument that by virtue of the alleged subsequent sale-deed 17-3-2005, the status of the petitioner stood changed. Moreover, even if it may be presumed for the sake of argument that by virtue of the alleged subsequent sale-deed 17-3-2005, the status of the petitioner stood changed. Even then it is apparent on the face of the said sale deed that the premises in possession of the sellers as described in the deed was sold. It was not shown at any stage of the proceedings that the property under the sale-deed included the disputed premises. It is pertinent to mention here that in the alleged sale-deed dated 17-3-2005, which has been filed by the petitioner for the first time before this Court by way of supplementary Affidavit, there is no mention at all that the property sold under the sale deed was under the tenancy of the petitioner from before the execution of sale-deed, rather it has been mentioned in the sale deed that the possession was delivered to the purchaser on the date of execution itself, i.e. 17-3-2005. Therefore, the facts of the present case are quite distinct from that of the case before the Apex Court. 12. In a case before the Apex Court Syed Asadullah Kazmi Vs. A.D.J. Allahabad and others (Allahabad Rent Cases, 1981 Supreme Court page 543) the provisions of Section 23 of the Act were considered including the ambit of jurisdiction there under. The Apex Court in that case observed as under : "The order releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the son of the landlord and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant-tenant acquired finality when the proceedings taken against that order by the appellant-tenant failed. The order having become final, the Prescribed Authority was bound to give effect to it. In doing so, the Prescribed Authority was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law. The application moved by the appellant-tenant before the Prescribed Authority requesting it to take into account the death of the landlord which took place during the proceedings for giving effect to the release order, was misconceived because it did not lie with the Prescribed Authority to reopen proceedings which had been taken to the highest court and had become final. The application moved by the appellant-tenant before the Prescribed Authority requesting it to take into account the death of the landlord which took place during the proceedings for giving effect to the release order, was misconceived because it did not lie with the Prescribed Authority to reopen proceedings which had been taken to the highest court and had become final. It is true that subsequent events must be taken into account by the statutory authority or court when considering proceedings arising out of a landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need but where the order of release of a portion of the accommodation acquired finality before the death of the landlord and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened." Thus it is clear from the aforesaid case law that once the proceedings become final, as in the present case consideration of an event which takes place subsequent to acquisition of finality of lease order would be beyond jurisdiction because it amounts to reopening of controversy finally set at rest. In a subsequent case of Shakuntala Bai and others Vs. Narayan Dass and others ([2004 SCFBRC 338] Supreme Court page 338) .the Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 12(1)(b) and 12(1)(f) of Madhya Pradesh. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, observed that- Suit for eviction of tenant Magan Lal in March 1962 for the bonafide need of carrying on business by the owner landlord Girdhari Lal- Suit was decreed- Appeal by tenant- During the pendency Girdhari Lal died- L.Rs. were substituted- Appellants sought an amendment which was allowed- Magan Lal also sought amendment in W.S.- Allowed- Lower Appellate Court allowed the amendment and remanded the case for fresh consideration- Trial Court dismissed the suit- Appellants preferred appeal- During pendency of appeal Magan Lal died and his L.Rs. were substituted- Appellants sought an amendment which was allowed- Magan Lal also sought amendment in W.S.- Allowed- Lower Appellate Court allowed the amendment and remanded the case for fresh consideration- Trial Court dismissed the suit- Appellants preferred appeal- During pendency of appeal Magan Lal died and his L.Rs. were substituted- Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit- However second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the suit was dismissed- Present special appeal filed- It is well settled law that when amendment is allowed, the proceedings have to be decided on the basis of such amended pleadings- The view of the High Court is wholly illegal- A suit validly filed can not be settled or held no longer maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect- Need must exist when the suit was filed and not till the decree is granted 4 months time to vacate granted Appeal allowed." In that case, the Apex Court referred to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. V. Papanna Vs. K. Padmanabhaiah, 1994 (2) SCC page 316, paragraph 18 whereof reads as under: "18. For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that events which take place subsequent to the fifing of an eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final Court determining the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the executing Court for readjudication on the ground that some event or the other has altered the situation. As a corollary thereto it must also be held that once the decree becomes final it became a part of the estate of the landlord and therefore, the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled to execute the same". 13. The ratio of the aforesaid case laws of the Apex Court are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. The ratio of the aforesaid case laws of the Apex Court are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. From a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the order of release of accommodation vide order dated 12-9-2002 passed by the Prescribed Authority had already attained finality, as the appeal preferred against that order was also dismissed in appeal vide order dated 26-2-2004 passed by the Additional District Judge, F.T.C. Pauri Garhwal. Even the Writ Petition preferred by the petitioner before the High Court too was dismissed vide order dated 07-4-2004. The ground of alleged subsequent event raised by the petitioner had seen the light of the day on 17-3-2005 when the execution proceedings were already on progress before the Prescribed Authority. Moreover at no stage of proceedings, it could be shown on record that the petitioner had become co-owner of half share of the total property of the respondents including the premises in suit. On the other hand the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the description of the property sought to be evicted is different from that of the property purchased by the petitioner through sale deed dated 17-3-2005 finds support from a bare perusal of the record. It is significant to mention here that the scope of interference under Article-227 of the Constitution is limited, which bars re-appraisal of evidence. For the reasons and discussion aforesaid I find no force in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed. 14. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Interim order dated 14-10-2004 passed by this Court is vacated.