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2005 DIGILAW 2099 (RAJ)

Manbhari Devi v. The State of Rajasthan

2005-08-09

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.R.GOYAL

body2005
Judgment 1. The petitioner is aggrieved of the order passed by the Competent Authority, Zonal B-3, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur dated 17.01.2002 where she came up with the case that although she is holding the land for agricultural purposes, she is sought to be evicted from the same by the Jaipur Development Authority by virtue of the amendment introduced in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 by inserting Section 90-B vide Rajasthan Act No. 15 of 1956, which lays down as follows:- “90-B Termination of rights and resumption of land in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act and the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955) where before the commencement of the Rajasthan Laws (Amendment) Act, 1999 (Rajasthan Act No. 21 of 1999) any person, holding any land for agricultural purposes in such urbanisable limits, of an urban area, as may be notified from time to time by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette, has used or has allowed to be used such land or part thereof , as the case may be, for non-agricultural purposes or, has parted with possession of such land or part thereof , as the case may be, for consideration by way of sale or agreement to sell and/or be executing power of attorney and/or Will or in any other manner, for purported non-agricultural use, the rights and interest of such a person in the said land or holding or part thereof , as the case may be, shall be liable to be terminated and such land shall be liable to be resumed. (2) Where any land has become liable to be resumed under the provisions of Sub-section (1), the Collector or the officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf , shall serve a notice, calling upon such person to show cause why the said land may not be resumed summarily, and among other things, such notice may contain the particulars of the land, cause of proposed action, the place, time and date, where and when the matter shall be heard.......” The thrust of argument of the petitioner before the Competent Authority was that she was using the land in question for agricultural purposes and, therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid amendment she could not be evicted from the land. The Competent Authority after hearing the petitioners advocate, vide its order dated 17.01.2002, was pleased to record a finding that the petitioner in fact has not been using the land in question for agricultural purposes but she has transferred the land to a co-operative society, which is converting the agricultural use of the land into residential and since the same was barred by virtue of the amendment referred to herein above, the petitioner was entitled to be evicted from the land in question and the land should be restored to the Jaipur Development Authority. 2. The petitioner instead of moving the Jaipur Development Authority Tribunal, straightaway filed the writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the insertion of Section 90-B in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, which is now listed before us. 3. It was initially difficult to understand the intention of the petitioner as to how she is affected by the amendment if it is asserted by her that she is using the land for agricultural purposes. If in fact she had been using the land for agricultural purposes, the amendment essentially is introduced in her favour as it clearly protects the right of a person using the land for agricultural purposes and envisages resumption of only those lands which are used for non-agricultural purposes. The order of the Competent Authority indicates that the petitioner is not using the land for agricultural purposes and has transferred the land to a co-operative society. This was refuted by the Counsel for petitioner, who submitted that this was a wrong finding recorded by the Competent Authority in the order dated 17.01.2002. 4. If that is so, the petitioner in all fairness should have moved the JDA Tribunal for rectification of this question of fact in order to establish that she in fact has not transferred the land to anyone including a co-operative society, so as to give a cause to the Jaipur Development Authority to evict her on the ground of use of the land for non agricultural purposes. It is thus obvious that the petitioner in fact is aggrieved of the amendment as she has an ulterior motive, but we are not expressing one way or the other on this aspect as the petitioners right of appeal before the JDA Tribunal as also her chance to challenge the order of the Competent Authority before the Single Bench of the High Court, will get affected. This Court, therefore, has permitted the Counsel to confine his arguments and address the Court only in regard to the constitutional validity of the amendment introduced in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. On this aspect the Counsel for petitioner urged that the Governor of the State of Rajasthan has no legal authority to give assent to the amendment as it is the President of India which alone has the authority to accord sanction to a State Legislation as also its amendments. In support of his submission he relied upon Article 213 of the Constitution in order to reinforce his submission that it is the President of India which alone is competent to grant assent to a particular State Legislation 5. But a reading of Article 213 of the Constitution clearly indicates that the Counsel is not even remotely correct in what he is submitting as the provisions under Article 213 is altogether different, which elaborates the circumstances under which the Governor of a State can accord sanction to a particular legislation and does not incorporate any provision in regard to the question as to whether an Act passed by the State Legislature, which is clearly within the State List, requires sanction by the President of India. He also relied on Article 254 of the Constitution of emphasize that sanction of the President of India is essential even though it may be an amendment introduced in a State Act. The Counsel, in our view, is again seriously mistaken in asserting this as Article 254 clearly lays down only to the extent that if there is repugnance between the State and the Central Act, the Governor shall seek assent of the President of India on the same. But in the case at hand, it is not even the case of the petitioner that the amendment introduced in the Act is in any manner repugnant to any Central Legislation and, therefore, reliance placed on this Article also has absolutely no basis. But in the case at hand, it is not even the case of the petitioner that the amendment introduced in the Act is in any manner repugnant to any Central Legislation and, therefore, reliance placed on this Article also has absolutely no basis. Thus, the argument advanced by the Counsel is clearly fallacious and is, therefore, outright rejected. No other argument was advanced besides this. Hence, this writ petition stands dismissed. 6. However, we consider it appropriate in the interest of justice that the petitioner be left with the liberty to file an appeal before the JDA Tribunal, if not preferred earlier, in order to determine the question of fact as to whether the land in question in fact has been put to non-agricultural use or not as that is a question of fact and cannot be determined straightaway by the Division Bench at the appellate stage without the petitioner having exhausted the alternative remedy available to her before the forum below.