Judgment R.S. Chauhan, J.-Heard learned Counsels for the parties. 2. Vide order dated 210.1996, the Appellant was punished by withholding of five increments with cumulative effect. Vide Order dated 111.1996, the increments and allowances admissible to him during his suspension period were also withheld. Vide Order dated 210.1997, the Appellate Authority confirmed the punishment order dated 210.1996 and dismissed the departmental appeal filed by the appellant. Since the appellant was aggrieved by these three orders, he challenged the same before the Honble High Court. However, vide Judgment dated 13.02.1998, the Learned Single Judge was pleased to uphold the impugned orders and to dismiss the writ petition. Hence, the Special Appeal before us. 3. According to the appellant, the factual matrix of the case is that in the years 1977-78, he was posted as Compounder at Primary Health Center, Bhinai, District Ajmer. Since there was no Medical Officer at the Primary Health Center, therefore, he was In-charge of the Center. While the appellant was there, one Miss Leliacia Hamilton was also posted there as Auxiliary Nurse and Midwife. Both, the appellant and Miss Hamilton lived as neighbours. On 03.09.1978, the appellant went on leave to Chittorgarh. On the same day, Miss Hamilton was discovered in a burnt condition in her bathroom. She was rushed to Beawar for treatment, but unfortunately, she succumbed to her injuries on 05.09.1978. A suicide note was discovered by another nurse, Miss. Nirupama Ganguli, Subsequently, Miss. Ganguli handed over the said suicide note to Mr. Durga Lal, the Upper Division Clerk, working at the Centre. Meanwhile, on 04.09.1998, the appellant came back from Cittorgarh and went to Beawar to collect the staff s pay. On 05.09.1978, when he came back he lodged a FIR with the police about Miss. Hamiltons death. Initially, the local police was of the opinion that appellant may have murdered Miss. Hamilton. Therefore, it registered a criminal case for offences under Sections 302, 376 and 120 B, IPC against the appellant. But eventually, after a through investigation not only by the local police, but also by the C.I.D. and the C.B.I. a final report, exonerating the appellant was submitted before the trial Court. The trial Court was pleased to accept the said Final Report (F.R.). 4. After a lapse of almost six years, on 29.05.1984, the appellant was suspended alongwith Mr. Druga Lal. The trial Court was pleased to accept the said Final Report (F.R.). 4. After a lapse of almost six years, on 29.05.1984, the appellant was suspended alongwith Mr. Druga Lal. Two months later, on 05.07.1984, a charge sheet was served upon the appellant wherein two charges were leveled against him: firstly, the appellant was in possession of the suicide note written by Miss. Hamilton. But, he neither reported about the same to the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Beawar, nor informed the police about it. Secondly, that he forged letter dated 19.05.1977 and made false entries in the Dispatch Register. According to the charge sheet the appellant did these acts in overt to divert the investigation in the direction of suicide so as to save himself from suspicion of complicity in the alleged crime. 5. On 04.09.1989, the appellant replied to the said charge sheet. He contended that Mr. Durga Lal never gave the suicide note to him. In fact, it was recovered by the police from Mr. Durga Lal on 05.09.1978 itself . Therefore, there is no question of his withholding the suicide note from the police. Furthermore, he denied his sending any letter on 19.05.1977. In fact, he claimed that he had sent a letter on 20.05.1977 to the Chief Medical & Health Officer. Beawar. The record of the said letter is absolutely clear, intact and readily available in the office. Therefore, he denied both the charges leveled against him. Interestingly, on 10.07.1989, the respondents reinstated the appellant. 6. Having served the charge sheet and having received the reply, the department went into a deep slumber for eight long years. It was only in 1993 that the inquiry commenced against the appellant and Mr. Durga Lal. After the completion of the inquiry, vide order dated 210.1996, the appellant was punished as stated above. As a follow up action, vide order dated 111.1996 it was also directed that increments and allowances admissible to the appellant during the suspension period would be withheld. 7. The appellant preferred a departmental appeal against the order dated 210.1996 to the Chief Secretary, Medical & Health Services. However vide order dated 210.1997 the Appellate Authority was pleased to confirm the punishment order and to dismiss the departmental appeal. As stated above, he challenged the order dated 210.1996, the order dated 111.1996 and the order dated 210.1997 before the Honble High Court. 8. However vide order dated 210.1997 the Appellate Authority was pleased to confirm the punishment order and to dismiss the departmental appeal. As stated above, he challenged the order dated 210.1996, the order dated 111.1996 and the order dated 210.1997 before the Honble High Court. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. P.P. Chaudhary, vehemently argued that the Charge No. 1 about withholding of the suicide note by the appellant is absolutely baseless. According to him, Mr. Durga Lal never handed over the suicide note to the appellant. Therefore, he could not inform his superior officers when he went to Beawar on 04.09.1978 the police recovered the suicide note on 05.09.1978 from Mr. Durga Lal. Since the suicide note was never in the appellants possession, therefore, there is no question of his withholding the said note from the police. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority is perverse. 9. Concerning the second charge, Mr. Chaudhary contended that there is no expert evidence available on the record to show that the appellant had forged the documents. He further contended that the letters were allegedly sent in the year 1977, yet the suicide was committed in the year 1978. Hence, there in no link between the two. 10. He further stressed on the fact that there is an inordinate delay in commencing and in concluding the inquiry. 11. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate, Mr. Syham Ladrecha, not only supported the impugned orders, but also supported the impugned Judgment of the learned Single Judge. 12. We have critically analyzed the oral submissions and examined the evidence on record. 13. Both in the reply to the charge sheet and in his departmental appeal, the appellant had categorically stated that Mr. Durga Lal refused to give the suicide note. Mr. Durga Lal had told him that he will give the suicide note to the appropriate authority as and when the time comes. According to him, since he had neither seen the suicide note, nor it was in his possession, therefore, he did not mention the said note in the FIR lodged by him. Thus, according to him, the first charge is misplaced. 14. According to the investigating Officer, Mr. Govind A.S.I. Police Station Bhinai, he recovered the suicide note from Mr. Durga Lal at the Primary Health Centre on 05.09.1978. Thus, according to him, the first charge is misplaced. 14. According to the investigating Officer, Mr. Govind A.S.I. Police Station Bhinai, he recovered the suicide note from Mr. Durga Lal at the Primary Health Centre on 05.09.1978. A bare perusal of the suicide note, submitted as (Annexure P-11) clearly reveals that there is an endorsement in the back according to which, the “Prastut Karta” is Mr. Durga Lal. The said note has been signed by I.O., Police Station Bhinai and is dated 05.09.1978. There is also the signature of one Ram Singh as a witness to the said recovery. Thus, it is clear that the said note was not in the appellants possession, but was in Mr. Durga Lals possession. 15. Mr. Durga Lal, certainly, claims that he had given the suicide note to the appellant. However, his claim is belied firstly, by the endorsement on the back of the suicide note. Secondly, by Mr. Govinds statement. Since Mr. Durga Lal was arrayed as a co-delinquent in the inquiry and since the charge of withholding the suicide note from the police was also leveled against him, it was but natural for him to put the entire blame on the appellant in order to save his own skin. Both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority seem to have forgotten that “while men may lie, circumstances do not.” A bare perusal of the suicide note would have revealed that Mr. Durga Lal is making a mis-statement of fact. Hence, the first charge is without any factual foundation. 16. As far as the second charge is concerned, the department has produced an expert, Mr. S.K. Jain, Senior Scientist, CFSL, New Delhi. He testified that there is an interpolation in the Dispatch Register. However the expert has not stated that the said interpolation is done in the handwriting of the appellant. In fact, there is no evidence on record to show that the appellants handwriting was ever compared with the writing in the Dispatch Register. Therefore, mere interpolation in the said register does not lead to the conclusion that the alleged interpolation has been done by the appellant. It is, indeed, trite to state that however strong suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for conclusive proof . Half-baked evidence is unpalatable to judicial taste. Thus, the Enquiry Officer was unjustified in concluding that the appellant was the author of the alleged interpolation. It is, indeed, trite to state that however strong suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for conclusive proof . Half-baked evidence is unpalatable to judicial taste. Thus, the Enquiry Officer was unjustified in concluding that the appellant was the author of the alleged interpolation. Hence even the second charge has not been proved against the appellant. 17. Thus, there is no evidence on record to prove that the appellant had committed the alleged misconduct. Yet, he has been punished. This error is apparent on the face of the record. A person properly instructed in law and acting judiciously could have never drawn the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority, and the Appellate Authority. The conclusions are illogical, hence perverse. 18. Although the rigors of the Evidence Act do not apply to a departmental inquiry, but it is expected that the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority would certainly be aware of the fundamentals of Law of Evidence. It is imperative that the evidence is critically analyzed and logically concluded. 19. Article 21 of the Constitution of India contains not only the right to speedy trial within its ambit, but also contains right to speedy departmental inquiry. A delayed inquiry adversely affects both the delinquent officer and the administration. A prolonged inquiry may weaken the defense of the delinquent officer. For, evidence may disappear or become blurred. It prevents his professional growth. If affects his efficiency. It saps his energy. On the other hand, the administration may find it difficult to prove the charge. Moreover, the punishment, if any, loses its deterrent effect. An ad infinitum inquiry becomes a self -defeating proposition. Therefore, it is imperative that a departmental inquiry is commenced immediately and concluded expeditiously. For, Justice delayed is Justice denied both for the delinquent officer and the administration. 20. In State of Punjab vs. Chaman Lal Goyal 1995 (2) SCC 250, their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court have observed as under: It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bout to give room for allegations of bias, mala fide and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself , the inquiry has to be interdicted. Whenever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the Court has to indulge in a process of balancing. 21. In the present case, the facts were neither disputed nor complicated in nature. Police documents were readily available, suicide note was accessible, the Dispatch Register was in the possession of the department. Yet, the respondents have not offered and explanation for the delay in serving the charge sheet after six years of the alleged misconduct. Moreover, there is no explanation for commencing the inquiry after nine years thereafter. 22. The State has been termed as “a model employer.” The term is not a titular term or an ornamental epitaph. It is a term, which imposes a legal duty to be just, fair and reasonable with ones employees. The act of dangling a sword of departmental inquiry over fifteen long years, certainly, can not be termed as just, fair and reasonable. During this period the appellant has suffered both professional difficulties and has endured the stigma of punishment. It is only at the end of his service career that he is being vindicated. It is unfortunate that the appellant had to suffer agony for twenty-seven years including the period of litigation. 23. The Learned Single Judge had refused to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is only at the end of his service career that he is being vindicated. It is unfortunate that the appellant had to suffer agony for twenty-seven years including the period of litigation. 23. The Learned Single Judge had refused to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Honble Supreme Court has held in Union of India vs. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 that:- “In dealing with a writ petition filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311 (2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. Although, the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order, nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence.” 24. In the case of Board of High School and Intermediate Education vs. Bagleshwar Prasad & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 875 , their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court have observed that. “An order passed by a Tribunal holding a quasi-judicial enquiry which is not supported by any evidence, is an order which is erroneous on the face of it and as such, is liable to be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its high prerogative jurisdiction to issue writ under Article 226.” 25. Similarly in the case of Bhagat Ram vs State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1983 SC 454 the Honble Supreme Court has held that, “In a petition under Article 226, the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of the disciplinary authority. But where the finding is utterly perverse, the High Court can always interfere with the same.” 26. But where the finding is utterly perverse, the High Court can always interfere with the same.” 26. In the present case, there was no evidence to prove that the appellant withheld the suicide note from his superior officers or from the police. Obviously, the conclusion derived by the Department was perverse. Thus, the learned Single Judge should have exercised his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In fact, in the case of Ramesh Kumar Johari vs. State of Rajasthan 1979 RLW 469 this Court had exercised its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and set aside an order of dismissal which was passed even though there was no evidence available against the delinquent officer. 27. Taking a holistic view of the facts, we are of the opinion that the orders dated 210.1996. 111.1996 and 210.1997 are perverse in their conclusions and suffer from errors apparent on the face of record, hence unsustainable. 28. Accordingly, we allow that appeal with cost and set aside the Judgment dated 13.02.1998 passed by the Learned Single Judge. The writ petition is allowed and impugned orders dated 210.1996 (Annexure-4), 111.1996 (Annexure-8) and 210.1997 (Annexure-10) are quashed. As a result of setting aside of punishment order, all consequential benefits to the appellant be made available within a period of two months. Cost is quantified at Rs. 5,000/-.