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2005 DIGILAW 215 (CHH)

DHANANJAY PRASAD SURYAVANSHI v. RAJENDRA SHARMA

2005-06-16

A.K.PATNAIK, SATISH K.AGNIHOTRI

body2005
A. K. PATNAIK, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the order dated 6/1/1996 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, bilaspur in Claim Case No. 10 of 1994. ( 2 ) THE case of the appellant before the tribunal was that on 23/6/1993, appellant was going to village Jokhi and respondent no. 1 driving a Hero Honda motor cycle bearing registration No. MIL 1800 dashed against the appellant near a wine shop and as a result the appellant sustained injuries and fell unconscious and when he regained consciousness he found himself in a hospital. An F. I. R. was lodged on 26/6/1993 at Police Station, Civil Lines, Bilaspur by the appellant. Further case of the appellant was that he suffered injuries on his right hand and as a result he was unable to carry on with his work of carpentry. He suffered medical expenses of Rs. 5,000 and also other losses. He, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 3,88,000 towards compensation for loss and Rs. 5,000 towards medical expenses. But the Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim of the appellant by the impugned award dated 6/1/1996. ( 3 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that pursuant to the F. I. R. lodged on 26. 6. 1993 the police filed a challan against respondent No. 1 in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur and on 3. 9. 1993, respondent No. 1 appeared before the said court admitted his guilt and was convicted for the offence of rash and negligent driving and was punished with fine. He submitted that although the certified copy of the order dated 3. 9. 1993 passed by the court of learned Chief Judicial magistrate, Bilaspur was produced before the Tribunal, the learned Tribunal held that the conviction of respondent No. 1 in the criminal case by the learned Chief Judicial magistrate was not relevant for deciding as to whether respondent No. 1 was guilty of rash and negligent driving. He further submitted that the appellant also examined himself as a witness and also examined two cyclists who were riding on the road when the accident took place to show that aforesaid accident did happen due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1. But the Tribunal has not considered the said evidence. Mr. He further submitted that the appellant also examined himself as a witness and also examined two cyclists who were riding on the road when the accident took place to show that aforesaid accident did happen due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1. But the Tribunal has not considered the said evidence. Mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal cited the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in r. Venkatappa Naidu v. Thammivevi Sugunamma, 1990 ACJ 1080 (AP), in which it has been held that the admission of the driver before the criminal court that he has driven the vehicle rashly and negligently was admissible under section 18 of the indian Evidence Act, 1872 and constitutes substantive evidence in the proceedings under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939. He also cited the decision of lord Denning, M. R. in Nettleship v. Weston, 1972 ACJ 115 (CA, England), to the effect that the conviction in a criminal case is admissible in civil proceedings asprima facie evidence of negligence as has been held in Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. , (1970) 3 All ER 230. He also relied on the decision of Karnataka High Court in Vinobabai v. K. S. R. T. C. , 1979 ACJ 282 (Karnataka), in which relying on the aforesaid decision of Lord Denning, M. R. in nettleship v. Weston (supra), Karnataka high Court has held that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the criminal court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. Mr. N. K. Agarwal, senior Advocate appearing for respondent no. 3 did not dispute the aforesaid position of law but submitted that in the present case the admission has been explained. ( 4 ) WE are unable to accept the submission of Mr. N. K. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for insurance company, respondent no. 3. It appears from the evidence on record and in particular Exh. P4 that the driver of Hero Honda motor cycle bearing registration No. MIL 1800 has admitted before the court of learned Chief Judicial magistrate in C. C. No. 1512 of 1993 that he was driving the aforesaid vehicle rashly and negligently and on the basis of such admission he has been convicted and punished with fine. P4 that the driver of Hero Honda motor cycle bearing registration No. MIL 1800 has admitted before the court of learned Chief Judicial magistrate in C. C. No. 1512 of 1993 that he was driving the aforesaid vehicle rashly and negligently and on the basis of such admission he has been convicted and punished with fine. This is an admission in terms of section 18 of the Indian Evidence act, 1872 and was relevant as against the driver of the vehicle under section 21 of the said Act. That apart, as has been held by lord Denning, M. R. in case of Nettleship v. Weston, 1972 ACJ 115 (CA, England), the conviction in a criminal court is admissible in civil proceedings as prima facie evidence of negligence. On these materials the Claims Tribunal ought to have arrived at a finding that there was an accident on account of rash and negligent driving of the aforesaid vehicle by respondent No. 1. ( 5 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that appellant produced before tribunal a prescription which was marked as Exh. P1 showing that the appellant has suffered fracture in his radius bone of the right hand. He also produced before the tribunal a certificate, Exh. P2, of a doctor to show that the injury amounted temporary disability of 30 per cent on account of which the appellant could not carry out his normal duties of employment as a carpenter. Mr. N. K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3, on the other hand, submitted that the Tribunal has rightly discarded the aforesaid evidence and has rightly held that there is no proof of any injury suffered by the appellant. ( 6 ) ONE of the cyclists who has been examined as a witness on behalf of the appellant, namely, Sagar, AW 3, has clearly deposed that a person had been hit by Hero honda motor cycle bearing registration no. MIL 1800 and as a result of the accident he fell down. The prescription, Exh. P1 and the doctor certificate, Exh. P2, go to show that the appellant had suffered fracture in his right hand. It is not disputed that the appellant was a carpenter. For a carpenter his right hand is very valuable with which he carries on his work as a carpenter. The prescription, Exh. P1 and the doctor certificate, Exh. P2, go to show that the appellant had suffered fracture in his right hand. It is not disputed that the appellant was a carpenter. For a carpenter his right hand is very valuable with which he carries on his work as a carpenter. If the right hand has been damaged, as would be clear from the aforesaid evidence, he must be compensated for such injury. In our view the compensation that would be fair and just for the appellant for medical expenses, pain, suffering, loss of earnings, etc. would be Rs. 30,000. ( 7 ) IN the result, we award a sum of rs. 30,000 (rupees thirty thousand) in favour of the appellant and considering the rate of interest which was the prevailing rate on the date of the application, i. e. , 22/12/1993, the appellant will be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent on the said sum of Rs. 30,000 from 22/12/1993. The aforesaid amount with interest will be deposited with the Tribunal within two months from today and the Tribunal will allow the appellant to withdraw the same on proper identification. ( 8 ) THE appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .