Per S.K. Gupta, J. 1. All these Letters Patent Appeals involving identical questions of law and facts are being decided by a common judgment. Facts giving rise to these appeals may be noticed. 2. The Jammu Development Authority (for short JDA hereinafter) had developed commercial plots for allotment. The object was to decongest the Warehouse by shifting some of the establishments to new site. On the applications of respondents (1) Ajit Sharma (2) Raj Kumar (3) Ashim Raina (4) Suresh Soni and (5) S.K. Kochhar, five plots of different sizes for commercial purpose (Service Station) were allotted to them in 1988-89 respectively. 3. Appellant, Arun Parkash, filed OWP No. 20/1990 challenging the legality of the allotment orders issued in favour of the respondents. His writ petition was dismissed by the writ Court vide judgment and order dated 11-12-1998. He has challenged the dismissal of his petition in LPA (OW) No. 659/1999. 4. All these allotment orders were also challenged in OWP No. 1008/1992 filed by Sat Pal Saini (respondent herein). Writ Court vide judgment dated 9-9-1999 allowed the writ petition, but while quashing allotment order, directed the appellant-JDA to reconsider his case for allotment of plot in Transport Nagar, Jammu. This judgment has been challenged by the JDA in LPA (OW) No. 623/1999, and LPA (OW) No. 553/1999 filed by Ajit Kumar. 5. Two other writ petitions, OWP No. 151/1992 and OWP No. 823/1992, challenging the same allotment orders were filed by Mehta Prem Kumar Kapoor and Sudesh Kumar respectively. Both these writ petitions were also allowed by the writ Court by a common judgment dated 7-10-1999, which is impugned in LPA Nos.704 and 705 of 1999 filed by the JDA. 6. One Swarn Dass had also filed OWP No. 376/1990, but instead of challenging the allotment order, he prayed for a direction to the appellant-JDA to allot the plot in his favour as a handicapped person. This petition was also allowed by the writ Court vide judgment dated 21-09-1999, which is impugned in LPA(OW) No. 697/1999 filed by the JDA. 7. Even though these appeals involved common questions of law and facts yet the grounds challenged in the some of the writ petitions require to be considered before dealing with the appeals. LPA (OW) No. 659/1999. 8. 7. Even though these appeals involved common questions of law and facts yet the grounds challenged in the some of the writ petitions require to be considered before dealing with the appeals. LPA (OW) No. 659/1999. 8. The main grievance of the appellant-Arun Parkash before the writ Court was that he was interested in establishing a Service Station for which his unit was registered by the Industries Department in the year 1985. After the unit was registered, he applied for allotment of land to the JDA. While his application was not considered, JDA allotted plots to private respondents. The orders of allotment, according to him, were arbitrary, unjust and liable to be quashed. He not only sought quashing of the allotments made in favour of the private respondents, but also prayed for allotment in his favour. 9. The writ petition was dismissed by the writ Court holding that allotments having been made at the behest and on the directions of the Government given under Sections 17 and 18 of the Development Act, 1960, these cannot be called in question. The prayer for allotment was declined relying on the law laid down in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others, (1997) 1 SCC 35. 10. This judgment is challenged on the ground that Government has no power to direct allotment under Sections 17 and 18 of the Development Act, 1960 and, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Mr. Sethi, learned appearing for the appellants, has vehemently argued that all the allotment orders are invalid because these have been made arbitrarily offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India because the appellant was not considered for allotment, even though his application was also pending with the JDA at the time these allotments were made. The contention of Mr. Raina, learned counsel for the respondent-Ajit Sharma, on the other hand, is that the allotment having been made in compliance to the government directive, the same cannot be challenged in the absence of allegations of mala fides. He further argued that delay in filing the petition is fatal because pursuant to allotment order dated 24th August, 1987, lease deed was executed and registered by the Sub-Registrar, Jammu, on 17th November, 1987 whereafter the allottee has made huge investment in setting up of Service Station, which became operational in 1988. He further argued that delay in filing the petition is fatal because pursuant to allotment order dated 24th August, 1987, lease deed was executed and registered by the Sub-Registrar, Jammu, on 17th November, 1987 whereafter the allottee has made huge investment in setting up of Service Station, which became operational in 1988. The petition was filed in 1990 by which time the allottee had altered his position to his disadvantage, the allotment cannot be cancelled at this stage as he had been conducting business for well over decade and a half. Mr. Raina has drawn our attention to para 8 of the counter filed by Ajit Sharma in March 1990 stating therein that he by then had invested more than Rs. four lacs by establishing Automobile Workshop-cum-Service Station and this aspect of the case, argued the learned counsel, though fatal, escaped notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition. Mr. Raina also pointed out that the appellant has deliberately mentioned date of allotment order as 24-08-1988 instead of 24-08-1987 to avoid the charge of delay and laches in filing the writ petition. 11. The admitted facts emerging from the record are that a formal letter of allotment of site measuring 50 x 100 for Workshop-cum-Service Station in Transport Nagar, Jammu, was issued vide No. JDA/M-233/298 dated 24-08-1987. The lease deed was executed on 17-10-1987 and registered on the same day by the Sub Registrar, Jammu. Possession of the site 50 x 100 (Plot No. 13) was handed over to the allottee, Ajit Kumar, on 26-11-1987 as per letter No. 3782-84 dated 26-11-1987, addressed to Vice-Chairman, JDA, by its Executive Engineer. The plot was then mortgaged to the State Financial Corporation vide mortgage deed dated 23-03-1989 registered by the Sub Registrar, Jammu on 25-03-1989 for raising loan amounting to Rs. 3.31 lakhs. This was done after obtaining proper permission from the JDA, the lessor, as is revealed from the record pertaining to the allotment maintained by the JDA. So not only lease deed was executed and possession handed over to the allottee in November 1987, but even third party rights were created in March 1989 by mortgaging the plot for obtaining Rs. 3.31 lakhs as loan. So the plea set up in para 8 of the counter affidavit filed in March 1990 that he has already invested more than Rs. 3.31 lakhs as loan. So the plea set up in para 8 of the counter affidavit filed in March 1990 that he has already invested more than Rs. four lakhs in establishing Service Station-cum-Workshop, which was not controverted, has to be appreciated in the background of the above facts. Thus the question for consideration is whether the writ petition filed by the appellant could be entertained and quashed in exercise of powers of judicial review without considering the ground reality and the delay in filing the petition. Mr. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that since the order of allotment is not based on any policy decision, it is arbitrary and, thus, liable to be quashed as delay cannot be a ground to uphold illegal order. In support of this argument, Mr. Sethi relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Sriniketan Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. etc. etc. v. Vikas Vihar Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and others, etc. etc. AIR 1989 SC 1673. However, in that case, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development had issued general order of allotment dated 31-03-1986 allotting 27 acres of nazul land in favour of nine co-operative group housing societies followed by individual order dated 2-4-1986 in favour of the nine societies. This order was challenged in civil writ petition No. 806 of 1986 by Vikas Vihar Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court quashed the orders dated 31-03-1986 and 02-04-1986 and their Lordships of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the allottees. So, from the facts of the case, it is clear that writ petition challenging the allotment order was filed immediately after the allotment orders dated 31-03-1986 and 02-04-1986 were issued and before the allottees were put in possession, which is not the position in this case as noticed above because there is an inordinate delay in approaching the Court by which time the allottees had made huge investment. The facts of this case are squarely covered by the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja and others, (2003) 8 SCC 567, wherein a three member Bench held that: "........The High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that delay in this case had defeated equity. The allotment was made in the year 1995. The writ applicant was filed after one year. By that time, the Company had taken not only taken possession of the land, but also had made sufficient investment. Delay of this nature, should have been considered by the High Court to be of vital importance." 12. As noticed above, the writ petition was filed more than two years after the lease deed was executed, possession handed over to the lessee who had invested more than Rs. four lakhs in establishing the Workshop-cum-Service Station after obtaining loan from the State Financial Corporation. 13. Similarly, in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and others, (2004) 4 SCC 460, wherein validity of a sale deed dated 19-06-1985 executed by The Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority) in favour of the appellant herein was questioned by way of Public Interest Litigation which the High Court had allowed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while allowing the appeal observed as under: "25. Furthermore, the writ petition should not have been entertained keeping in view the fact that it was filed about three years after making of the allotment and execution of the deed of sale. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the first respondent......" 14. Not only this, in State of M.P. and others, etc. etc. v. Nand Lal Jaiswal and others, etc. etc., AIR 1987 SC 251, it has been laid down that even if the order/decision of the State is unconstitutional and offends Article 14, the Courts will refuse to interfere when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by holding that: "23. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasized time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : (AIR 1979 SC 1628) and the other in Ashok Kumar v. Collector, Raipur, (1980) 1 SCR 491 : (AIR 1980 SC 112). We may point out that in R.D. Shettys case (supra), even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." "24. Here, obviously, there was considerable delay on the part of the petitioners in filing the writ petitions and in the intervening period, respondents Nos.5 to 11 acquired land, constructed distillery buildings, purchased plant and machinery and spent considerable time, money and energy towards setting up the distilleries. These circumstances would, in our opinion, be sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15. This being exactly the position in the instant case, the ratio of these decisions is applicable and the writ petition ought to have been dismissed by the writ Court on the grounds of laches and delay without going into the question of legality or otherwise of the allotment. 16. All this apart, in State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi and others, (1996) 6 SCC 445, their Lordships held that "The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances." 17. In view of the above, allotment order in favour of Ajit Sharma could not be interfered because of the laches and delay in filing the writ petition. 18. Next comes the allotment order No. JDA/L 315-1715-16 dated 22-12-1989 in favour of Raj Kumar respondent No. 5. His allotment was challenged by filing the amended writ petition on 30-03-1990. But he was not served for want of deposit of process fee and on 17-09-1990 the Court passed a peremptory order that, "If registered letters are not furnished within the time specified respondents-5 and 6 shall be deemed deleted from the array of respondents and consequences shall follow. It was only thereafter that registered notice was issued to the allottee Raj Kumar on 05-10-1990 and he appeared through his counsel on 07-11-1990. He filed objections on 12-12-1990 pleading inter alia that he started tyre retrading and Service Station in Warehouse, Nehru Market, Jammu in 1972 and was, thus, entitled to allotment. He has also pleaded of having taken possession in November, 1989 and made investment in setting up the business. In respect of respondents-6 and 7, namely, Ashim Raina and Suresh Soni, allotment orders are dated 31-10-1989 while allotment order in favour of respondent-8, S.K. Kochhar, is dated 21-11-1989. However, even after service was complete, the writ petition was admitted to hearing only by order dated 29-08-1991. However, there is no order directing the respondents to maintain status quo on spot. An application, CMP(W) No. 442/1990, was filed to direct respondents-4 to 8 not to raise construction, but it was never pressed perhaps for the reasons that in CMP No. 40/1990 the writ Court vide order dated 18-01-1990 had directed the official respondents to consider his case for allotment of land for Service Station with which he appeared to be satisfied. As a result of this, the writ petition remained pending until it was decided on 11-12-1998. As a result of this, the writ petition remained pending until it was decided on 11-12-1998. So there was no restraint order or embargo on the respondents to go ahead with the construction to establish their business and equity is, thus, in their favour as they cannot be thrown out after such a long time, as they cannot be compensated. But assuming that petitioners allotment was arbitrary, this by itself is not a ground to allot the plot in favour of the appellant in view of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others, (1997) 1 SCC 35 holding that: "A wrong decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle another party to claim the benefit on the basis of a wrong decision." Their Lordships further held that, "If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order could not be made the basis for issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality to cause another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be exercised for such a purpose." 19. Since the equity is in favour of the respondents-allottees, their allotments cannot be cancelled for the reasons set out here to fore and this appeal must fail and are dismissed accordingly. LPA (W) No. 553/1999 and LPA (W) No. 623/1999 20. Both these appeals are against the judgment of the writ Court dated 09-09-1999. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition No. 1008/1992 directed as under: "As a result of aforesaid discussion, writ petition is allowed and consequently allotments made in favour of respondents-4 to 7 (vide communication No. JDA/M-233/298 dated 24-08-1988 in favour of respondent No. 4, Ajit Sharma, vide communication No. JDA/L-295/1025 dated 31-10-1989 in favour of respondent No. 5, Ashim Raina vide communication No. JDA/L-303/1026 dated 31-10-1989 in favour of respondent No. 6 Suresh Soni and vide communication No. JDA/L-303/1120 dated 21-11-1989 in favour of respondent No. 7 S.K. Kochhar) are hereby quashed and set aside. It is further directed that respondents 1 and 2 shall reconsider and re-examine the case of the petitioner for allotment of plot of land as applied for by him like other similarly situate persons and if he is found entitled would allot the land at the rates at which land has been allotted to respondent No. 8 in Transport Nagar, Jammu." 21. This judgment has been assailed by the appellant-Ajit Sharma, on the grounds (1) that the petition was filed on 06-10-1992 almost five years after the date of allotment and execution of lease deed and handing over of possession in November 1992. He had even mortgaged the plot with the State Financial Corporation and obtained loan of Rs. 3.31 lakhs for establishing the Service Station-cum-Workshop; (2) that he was not served in the petition which was decided without hearing; and (3) that OWP No. 20/1990 having been decided by this Court on 11-12-1998 upholding his allotment, it was against judicial discipline to take a view contrary to the earlier judgment of the Court before the appeal filed against that (LPA (W) No. 623/1999) was decided. 22. Be that as it may, we have already dismissed the LPA (W) No. 659/1999 filed by Arun Parkash against the dismissal of his OWP No. 20/1990 by the learned Single Judge of the Court vide judgment dated 11-12-1998 on the grounds of delay and laches. As a matter of fact, this petition against allotment orders followed by execution of lease deeds in favour of the allottees and handing over possession to them way back in 1987 to Ajit Sharma and in November 1989 to others should not have been entertained because of inordinate delay. It is dismissed accordingly. 23. So far as LPA (W) No. 623/1999 is concerned, it has been filed by the JDA which is aggrieved of the direction to re-consider the case of the writ petitioner, Sat Pal Saini and if found eligible allot him on the rates at which it was allotted to Ajit Sharma in August 1987. The appellant is aggrieved of the judgment because while quashing the allotments of respondents, the Court directed it (JDA) to reconsider the case of Sat Pal Saini for allotment on the same terms and conditions as in the case of Ajit Sharma. The appellant is aggrieved of the judgment because while quashing the allotments of respondents, the Court directed it (JDA) to reconsider the case of Sat Pal Saini for allotment on the same terms and conditions as in the case of Ajit Sharma. This direction, it is argued, is against the law laid down by the Apex Court in Daulat Mal Jains case (supra), the relevant portion of which has already been extracted above. Moreover, it is a paradox that while quashing the allotments in favour of allottees on the charge of arbitrary actions, the appellant is being asked to favour the writ petitioner who had not even applied at the time impugned allotments were made and was not even similarly placed with them. This is because annexures P-5, P-6 and P-7 about which reference has been made by the learned Single Judge, are applications dated 21-07-1975, 26-07-1975 and 21-10-197, while in P-5 and P-6, he wanted a plot at Rakh Raipur, in P-7 he wanted allotment at B.C. Road, Jammu. However, in 1975 Transport Nagar was not even conceived. The next application P-10 is dated 25-02-1990 in which he wanted a plot at Transport Nagar on the ground that he was having a Shop No. 128-B at Warehouse, Jammu. This application is followed by reminder dated 15-12-1990 and notice dated 17-05-1992 through Sh. Abdul Hamid Qazi, Advocate. However, the allotments challenged by him were made in 1987 and 1989. So, there is no parity much less any similarity between his claim and those of the allottees because he appeared on the scene only in February 1990 and there is allotment made after 1989 and before he approached this Court. This is the first infirmity, which the writ Court failed to take notice. 24. Besides, since no allotment is shown to have been made after he applied in 1990 and before Government Order No. 192-HUD/GR of 1991 dated 12-09-1991 was issued, in terms of which all such plots were to be auctioned by public auction. The learned writ Court thus fell in grave error in giving the aforesaid direction because JDA was not in a position to allot any plot after September, 1991 against the policy laid down by the government. So, the petitioner, Sat Pal Saini, not being similarly placed could not claim parity with the allottees and was not discriminated either. 25. The learned writ Court thus fell in grave error in giving the aforesaid direction because JDA was not in a position to allot any plot after September, 1991 against the policy laid down by the government. So, the petitioner, Sat Pal Saini, not being similarly placed could not claim parity with the allottees and was not discriminated either. 25. In view of the above discussion, both these appeals are allowed and the judgment impugned is set aside and the writ petition No. 1008/1992 dismissed. LPA (OW) No. 697/1999 26. This appeal is against the judgment dated 21-09-1999 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in OWP No. 376/1990. The main grievance of the writ petitioner was that he is a handicapped and wanted to start a Service Station for which he applied to the then Chief Minister for allotment, who forwarded his request to the appellant. But despite this no plot has been allotted to him. The only relief claimed by him in the writ petition is that respondent/appellant be directed to allot him the plot reserved for him. He has not challenged any allotment in favour of any person. 27. The writ petition was decided by the judgment under challenge in terms of the following direction: "As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is allowed and it is ordered that respondent No. 2 will process the case of the petitioner for allotment of plot of land at Transport Nagar for establishing a service station as has been done in the cases of above mentioned beneficiaries viz S/Shri Suresh Soni, S.K. Kochhar and Raj Kumar etc. within a period of eight weeks from today and thereafter issue necessary allotment letter in his favour. In the circumstances of the case require respondent No. 2 shall carve out such plot at appropriate place in the Transport Nagar in the vicinity where other service Stations are located." 28. Mrs. Sindhu Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that even though the writ petitioner had questioned the allotment in favour of Suresh Soni, S.K. Kochhar and Raj Kumar on the plea of discrimination but without impleading them as respondents. Mrs. Sindhu Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that even though the writ petitioner had questioned the allotment in favour of Suresh Soni, S.K. Kochhar and Raj Kumar on the plea of discrimination but without impleading them as respondents. The learned Single Judge without making a reference to his own judgment dated 09-09-1999 in OWP No. 1008/1992 in which allotments in favour of Suresh Soni, S.K. Kochhar, Raj Kumar besides Ajit Sharma was quashed, has unwittingly given this direction for allotment which contradicts his earlier decision (supra). The ground for allowing the writ petition is a paradox which is impossible to be reconciled. Moreover, we have already held that an illegal or bad order could not be the basis for giving relief to the other person on the same ground because such a course would perpetuate illegality, which the law abhors. A bare reading of the writ petition which is very very sketchy was sufficient to dismiss it in limine, as it is based on no ground. Neither any right is claimed on the basis of statutory provision nor a case of discrimination is spelt out. How such a petition could be allowed is beyond our comprehension. It is a case about which it can be said that right hand should not know to what the left hand does; otherwise a judgment dated 09-09-1999 rendered in OWP No. 1008/1999 could not have been ignored by taking a diametrically opposite view regarding allotments in favour of Suresh Soni, S.K. Kochhar and Raj Kumar. The appeal, therefore, has to be allowed and the judgment set aside. It is allowed accordingly. 29. This takes us to LPA (OW) No. 704/1999 and LPA (OW) No. 705/1999. These appeals are against the judgment dated 07-10-1999 by which OWP No. 151/1992 and OWP No. 823/1992 have been decided. The operative portion of the judgment impugned herein reads as follows: "In almost exactly identically circumstances, I had the occasion to deal with the matter in OWP No. 376/90. It may be observed here that similar pleas as in the present cases were raised on behalf of the respondents. After having considered the respective contentions of the parties, it is felt that writ petitions deserve to be allowed and it is ordered accordingly. It may be observed here that similar pleas as in the present cases were raised on behalf of the respondents. After having considered the respective contentions of the parties, it is felt that writ petitions deserve to be allowed and it is ordered accordingly. It is further directed that JDA will locate the files of the petitioners and deal with their applications within a period of four weeks from today, failing which on the basis of copies of the applications attached with the writ petitions of the petitioners concerned, their cases will be processed for allotment of the land at Transport Nagar, Jammu, as has been done in the case of private respondents within a period of eight weeks thereafter." 30. The Court further directed the Registry to place on record a copy of the judgment in the case of Swarn Dass v. State and another, OWP No. 376/1990. 31. Since we have set aside the judgment in Swarn Dasss case by allowing LPA (OW) No. 697/1999, these appeals must also succeed for the same reason. Moreover, these petitions having been filed in 1992 by which time new policy had been declared by the Government vide Govt. Order No. 192-HUD/GR of 1991 dated 12-09-1991 were not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed because under the new policy, all plots were to be auctioned by public auction. 32. The net result of the above discussion is that while LPA (OW) No. 659/1999 stands dismissed, all other appeals, viz., LPA (OW) No. 553/1999, LPA (OW) No. 623/1999, LPA (OW) No. 697/1999, LPA (OW) No. 704/1999 and LPA (OW) No. 705/1999, are allowed and the impugned judgments dated 09-09-1999, 21-09-1999 and 07-10-1999 passed in OWP No. 1008/1992, OWP No. 376/1990, OWP No. 151/1992 and OWP No. 823/1992 respectively are set aside. We make the order accordingly. No order as to costs.