JUDGMENT Prakash Krishna, J. - The revision is directed against the order dated August 15, 1995 passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, Bench I, Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 624 of 1993 whereby it dismissed the appeal filed before it by the dealer - applicant. The dealer - applicant is carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of tyres and tubes and the dispute in the present revision pertains to the assessment year 1985-86 under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Sales Tax, Allahabad by his order dated April 10, 1989 accepted the account books as well as the disclosed turnover. But it in respect of certain items rejected the claim of exemption. This order was challenged by the applicant by way of appeal under section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act"). The first appellate authority namely Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) by the order dated February 6, 1990 allowed the appeal in part. He set aside the assessment order under appeal and restored the case to the file of the assessing officer with certain directions, against this order second appeal filed by the applicant before the Tribunal was rejected by the order dated July 11, 1991. The Tribunal rejected the appeal on the finding that undoubtedly the dealer - applicant has given different explanation from time to time at different stages of proceedings and as such it is desirable that the account books of the applicant be examined in detail and assessment order be framed in the light of the detailed examination of the account books. In this view of the matter the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the first appellate authority on the ground that there is no legal infirmity in the directions given by the first appellate authority. The applicant in spite of the several opportunities afforded by the assessing authority before reframing the fresh assessment order after remand did not produce the account books for its examination, in spite of sufficient notice of the fresh assessment proceedings. The assessing authority consequently this time rejected the account books and framed best judgment assessment order. The applicant in spite of the several opportunities afforded by the assessing authority before reframing the fresh assessment order after remand did not produce the account books for its examination, in spite of sufficient notice of the fresh assessment proceedings. The assessing authority consequently this time rejected the account books and framed best judgment assessment order. The applicant challenged the assessment order by way of appeal which came up for consideration before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Appeal), Sales Tax, Allahabad, who by the order dated August 20, 1993 has set aside the assessment order on the short ground that no basis has been given for fixing the turnover and an opportunity be afforded to the applicant to produce the account books. This order has been confirmed in the second appeal filed by the applicant by the Tribunal by the order under revision. Heard Shri Bharatji Agrawal, the Senior Advocate, on behalf of the applicant and perused the record. The only submission made by the applicant's learned counsel is that instead of passing an assessment order the matter should have been examined either by the first appellate authority or by the Tribunal. Strong reliance has been placed by him on a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Munni Lal Vinod Kumar v. Sales Tax Officer [1987] 65 STC 13. He further submitted that once the account books of the applicant were accepted by the assessing authority while framing the assessment order before remand, the said portion of the assessment order has become final and it was no longer open to the assessing authority to re-examine the account books. I have given careful consideration to the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant. A Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Ram Dayal Harbilas v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1979] 44 STC 84; [1979] UPTC 999 has examined the jurisdiction and powers of assessing authority to deal with the case on remand. It has been held that where an order of assessment is set aside by the first appellate authority which remands to the assessing authority with certain directions for making fresh assessment the assessing authority has subject to carrying out such directions, the same power as it originally had in making the assessment under section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. But where the order of the assessment is set aside by a revising authority under section 10 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to make assessment can be circumscribed by specific direction given by the revising authority in that regard. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Full Bench judgment would show that power of the assessing authority after remand when the remand order was passed by the first appellate authority with certain directions for making fresh assessment is very wide. The assessing authority subject to carrying out the directions given by the first appellate authority possesses the same power as it originally had. The learned counsel for the applicant could not dispute the above proposition of law as laid down by the Full Bench. Nor he could point out anything either with reference to section 9 of the Act or otherwise to persuade me to take a different view of the matter. However, he has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Munni Lal Vinod Kumar [1987] 65 STC 13. In the case of Munni Lal Vinod Kumar [1987] 65 STC 13 the controversy involved therein was entirely different. The assessing authority granted exemption on mahua flowers in assessment proceedings but disallowed certain claims of the assessee against which an appeal was filed before the first appellate authority, who remanded the matter and directed the assessing authority to decide the matter in appeal afresh keeping in view the observations made in the appellate order. The assessing authority after remand issued a show-cause notice to the dealer as to why sales tax be not imposed on the applicant in respect of sale of mahua flowers for the assessment year involved therein. The validity of the said notice was impugned by the dealer by way of filing a writ petition before this court. This court took the view, having held that the sale of mahua flowers was not liable to tax, it was not open to the Sales Tax Officer to issue a show-cause notice to the dealer unless reference could be made to the setting aside of the above order allowing the exemption. This court took the view, having held that the sale of mahua flowers was not liable to tax, it was not open to the Sales Tax Officer to issue a show-cause notice to the dealer unless reference could be made to the setting aside of the above order allowing the exemption. The decision by the Commissioner in revision of some other dealer could not be relevant for the purposes of the case in view of the sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Act which specifically states that no decision of the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 35 shall affect the validity or operation of any order passed earlier by any assessing, appellate or revising authority or the Tribunal. In this view of the matter the Division Bench held that issue of show-cause notice was without jurisdiction. The law laid down therein is with respect to the fact situation existed in that case. The facts of the case in hand are distinguishable and are not parallel to the facts of the case of Munni Lal Vinod Kumar [1987] 65 STC 13 (All). In the case in hand application of section 35(3) of the Act is not involved even remotely. The facts of the case in hand are nearer to the facts as were involved in the Full Bench judgment of this court in the case of Ram Dayal Harbilas [1979] 44 STC 84; [1979] UPTC 999. The Full Bench interpreted sections 9 and 10 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time and held as follows : "Where an order of assessment is set aside by the appellate authority which remands the case to the assessing authority with certain directions for making a fresh assessment, the assessing authority has subject to the carrying out such directions, the same power as it originally had in making the assessment under section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. But where the order of assessment is set aside by a revisional authority under section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment can be circumscribed by the specific directions given by the revisional authority in that regard. But where the order of assessment is set aside by a revisional authority under section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment can be circumscribed by the specific directions given by the revisional authority in that regard. If under the remand order made by the revising authority, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment has been limited, the Sales Tax Officer will have the jurisdiction to make the assessment only to the extent to which he has been permitted to do so under the orders of the revising authority." In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Full Bench which is nearer to the controversy involved in the present case the judgment given in the case of Munni Lal Vinod Kumar [1987] 65 STC 13 is distinguishable and has presently no application. Moreover the decision of the Full Bench was neither referred nor was considered by the Division Bench. In this view of the matter the argument of the applicant's counsel that assessing authority did not possess power to reject the account books after remand is meritless and is hereby rejected. It is not in dispute that the dealer - applicant was given opportunities by the department to produce the account books after passing of the remand order but the applicant failed to avail opportunity. It is clear that the dealer - applicant was asked to produce the account books and to enable it, the assessment proceedings were adjourned from time to time. The assessing authority refrained the assessment order under compelling circumstances as the applicant failed to produce the account books in spite of notice. It is not the case of the applicant that no opportunity was afforded to it by the assessing authority before reframing the fresh assessment order after remand. Even then the first appellate authority, in interest of justice by setting aside the ex parte assessment order has granted further opportunity to the applicant to produce the account books. The order of the first appellate authority is totally in favour of the applicant and it cannot be said that it is in any way prejudicial to the applicant. Even then the first appellate authority, in interest of justice by setting aside the ex parte assessment order has granted further opportunity to the applicant to produce the account books. The order of the first appellate authority is totally in favour of the applicant and it cannot be said that it is in any way prejudicial to the applicant. It appears that the applicant for the reasons best known to it does not want to produce the account books on one pretext or the other and challenged the favourable order dated August 20, 1993 passed by the first appellate authority by way of filing second appeal before the Tribunal and thereafter the present revision, and thus allowed more than 12 years to pass on. The subsequent assessment order dated August 20, 1993 could not be given effect to as the applicant obtained stay order from this court, staying the further proceedings in pursuance of the order of remand dated April 15, 1995 passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, Allahabad. The learned counsel could not place any thing to justify his submission that the first appellate authority or the Tribunal was duty bound to examine the account books of the applicant and not to pass a remand order. The order passed by the first appellate authority was discretionary one and was most appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case. It goes without saying that when detailed examination of the account books is required, the assessing authority is the most appropriate authority to examine the account books. The appellate authorities are not expected to examine the veracity of the account books in depth. I find absolutely no merit in the submission that the account books should have been examined by the Tribunal being the last fact-finding authority. It may be noted here that on the earlier occasion the Tribunal by its order dated July 11, 1991 which has become final between the parties had directed that in view of the shifting stand taken by the applicant at different stages of the proceedings the examination of the account books in detail is required and as such the order of remand passed by the Deputy Commissioner is perfectly just and legal. In view of this direction of the Tribunal in the order dated July 11, 1991 which has become final between the parties it is no longer open to the applicant to insist that his account books should be examined either by the first appellate authority or by the Tribunal. In view of the above discussion there is no merit in the revision. The revision is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000.