JUDGMENT : S.U. KHAN, J. Petitioners and contesting respondents are descendants of Chauba in the 4th, 5th and 6th generation (pedigree is annexure 1 to the writ petition) Chauba had some agricultural properties situate in two villages Jamurai and Sahewa. The main dispute in between the parties is as to whether all of them had got share in the property in dispute or some of them have got exclusive share in some of the properties as it was acquired by their ancestor Janki who was one of the four sons of Chauba. Contesting respondents 4 to 8 are descendants of Janki while petitioners and respondent Nos. 9 to 15 are descendants of Pusaiya, Mathura and Judi the other three sons of Chauba. If the entire property in dispute is held and belong to Chauba then all the parties will have share therein. However, if it is held that some property was left behind by Chauba and some property was acquired by his son Janki then the property which was self-acquired property of Janki, would devolve only upon his descendants i.e respondent Nos. 4 to 8. 2. In the year 1960 a suit for declaration and partition among all the descendants of Chauba was filed before S.D.O/Assistant Collector and the suit was decreed on 28.10.1960 through compromise in which share of each and every person was determined. It appears that thereafter a civil suit was filed before Munsif, Banda being O.S. No. 168 of 1964 challenging the compromise decree dated 28.10.1960 passed by Assistant Collector. The civil suit was also got decided in terms of compromise. Through compromise, earlier compromise decree of the revenue Court was set-aside and fresh shares were determined. Civil Court decided the suit in terms of compromise on 8.10.1966. 3. After start of consolidation, objections were filed before Consolidation Officer, Khurhand Banda in the form of case No. 2757/1621 and case No. 1553/4044. The objections were decided by Consolidation officer on 28.12.1978. The Consolidation Officer held that civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the case as it pertained to agricultural land. The Consolidation Officer (C.O in short) held that the compromise of 1960 entered into in the suit before Asst. Collector was binding upon the parties. The objections were decided by C.O in terms of the compromise decree of 1960 by the revenue Court. The Consolidation Officer (C.O in short) held that the compromise of 1960 entered into in the suit before Asst. Collector was binding upon the parties. The objections were decided by C.O in terms of the compromise decree of 1960 by the revenue Court. Against the orders passed by Consideration Officer, two appeals were filed before SOC (Settlement Officer Consolidation) Banda in the form of appeal No. 111/492, Kundru and Anr. v. Gangwa and Ors. and appeal No. 1127 493, Kundru and Anr. v. Gangwa and Ors. S.O.C allowed the appeals in part through judgment and order dated 20.5.1981. Against the said judgment and order, three revisions were filed being revision No. 239 /381, 240/339 and 241/340. First and third revisions were filed by Kundru and others and second revision by Gangwa and another. D.D.C Banda through judgment and order dated 7.10.2003 dismissed all the revisions and approved the judgment and order passed by S.O.C, hence this writ petition. 4. Both the parties asserted and all the three Courts below held that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to set-aside the compromise decree of the revenue Court. In this writ petition also both the parties have taken the same stand. In the writ petition, it has been stated repeatedly that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to set-aside the decree of revenue Court and to partition the agricultural property. In para 11 of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents 4 to 8, it has clearly been stated that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to partition the agricultural holdings. In view of this the Consolidation Officer held that the partition decree passed by the revenue Court in the suit of 1960 was binding upon the parties and shares of all the parties were determined in accordance withi the compromise decree of the revenue Court passed in the suit of 1960. 5. On behalf of the contesting respondents a strange case has been taken. According to them the Civil Court had jurisdiction to set-aside the decree of the revenue Court as the decree of the revenue Court was based upon compromise while one of the parties was a minor and no permission of the Court was sought for compromise. 5. On behalf of the contesting respondents a strange case has been taken. According to them the Civil Court had jurisdiction to set-aside the decree of the revenue Court as the decree of the revenue Court was based upon compromise while one of the parties was a minor and no permission of the Court was sought for compromise. However according to the contesting respondents second part of the decree of the Civil Court through which shares were determined was without jurisdiction as Civil Court had no jurisdiction to partition the agricultural property. This argument may be inferred from para 11 of aforesaid Counter affidavit also. Either the whole decree of the Civil Court is to be ignored on the ground of being without jurisdiction or the whole decree is to be taken as correct. The stand taken by the contesting respondents that Civil Court’s decree to the extent to which it set-aside the earlier decree of file revenue Court is valid however same decree of the civil Court is without jurisdiction to the extent to which it demarcated the shares of the parties through compromise. 6. Settlement Officer Consolidation in its judgment repeatedly held that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the suit hence second agreement entered into before the civil Court could not be given more value than first agreement entered into before the revenue Court, S.O.C also held that as far as question of minority of Bandu was concerned Bandu himself even after becoming major did not challenge the earlier, compromise decree of revenue Court of 1960 and it was only his guardian who challenged the same before the civil Court hence decree of the civil Court is not binding upon the parties and decree of revenue Court of 1960 continues to be binding. It has also been held by the S.O.C that in accordance with the compromise decree of 1960 passed by revenue Court, mutation in the revenue records took place while decree of the civil Court was not given effect to. It was further held that decree of civil Court also became in executable due to passage of time and execution became barred by time. However thereafter S.O.C took a very strange case. It was further held that decree of civil Court also became in executable due to passage of time and execution became barred by time. However thereafter S.O.C took a very strange case. S.O.C held that the first compromise decree of the revenue Court was binding upon the parties in respect of some of the agricultural land in dispute but not in respect of the remaining agricultural land as the same was acquired by Janki one of the four sons of Chauba. S.O.C therefore gave share to all the descendants of Chauba in some of the agricultural land in dispute and some of the agricultural land in dispute was held by the S.O.C to have been acquired by Janki son of Chauba hence only his (Janki’s) heirs and descendants (respondents 4 to 8) were given share in the said land. 7. As both the parries have taken up the case that decree of the civil Court was without jurisdiction hence it is not necessary to decide as to whether civil Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree in the suit of 1964 canceling the earlier partition decree of revenue Court and determining shares of all the parties on the basis of compromise was within jurisdiction or not. As both the parties asserted that civil Court decree did not annul the earlier decree of the revenue Court hence it is taken that the decree of the civil Court has got no effect and has to be ignored. 8. If all the parties asserted that partition decree of the revenue Court in the suit of 1960 on the basis of compromise was not legally set-aside by the subsequent decree of the civil Court then all the parties are bound by the said decree. The said partition decree of 1960 can not be bifurcated. No party can be permitted to that part of the said decree is valid and binding and part of the said decree is invalid and not binding. 9. It is also quite strange that S.O.C in its judgment which is quite detailed one discussed the decree of the revenue Court in detail however on the last page it held that copy of the compromise which was filed in the suit of 1960 before revenue Court was not filed. 9. It is also quite strange that S.O.C in its judgment which is quite detailed one discussed the decree of the revenue Court in detail however on the last page it held that copy of the compromise which was filed in the suit of 1960 before revenue Court was not filed. Both the parties since the proceedings at the stage of C.O till this writ petition are admitting that first compromise was arrived at in the year I960 and then again in the year 1966. It is not understandable as to how S.O.C has mentioned that compromise of revenue Court was not filed. In para 15 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that copy of compromise decree of 1960 was not filed. In para 15 of rejoinder affidavit, it was stated that it was filed but in the year 2004, it was taken back. In any case it was admitted to all the parties that in the compromise decree of 1960 on the entire land shares of all the ‘descendants of Chauba were determined. It is also admitted to all the parties that in accordance with the compromise decree of revenue Court of 1960 mutation was effected and shares of all the parties as determined in, the said compromise decree were mutated. They were repeated uninterruptedly in the subsequent revenue records also. In view of this, even if only decree of, 1960’s suit was filed but not the compromise, which was part of decree, it would not make much difference. 10. Accordingly I find that the judgment and order passed by the S.O.C and revisional Court/ D.D.C are erroneous in law and liabl,e to be set aside (sic). Writ petition is therefore allowed. Judgment-passed by the D.D.C as well as S.O.C are set-aside. Judgment and order passed by the Consolidation Officer is restored.