JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Admitted facts of this case are that Jagat Ram was working as a work charge Beldar, employed by the appellants. He met with an accident due to flood from left bank of river Satluj on 17th August, 2000, at 8.00 p.m. Factum of accident was reported by Assistant Engineer, B&R, Sub-Division, HP PWD, Nirmand, District Kullu on 18th August, 2000 to the Commissioner under Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). As a result of it, case No. WCA-3 of 2000 came to be registered before the said Commissioner. Finally vide impugned award total compensation payable in the sum of Rs. 4,51,718/ - was assessed by the Commissioner below payable by appellants. This was inclusive of interest at the rate of 12% simple. In case this amount was not deposited within two months of the impugned award i.e. from 16th August, 2001, 50% penalty was also payable. 2. When this case came up for consideration, learned Advocate General urged that admittedly accident took place on 17th August, 2000, whereas Explanation II to Section 4(1) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, was amended with effect from 8th December, 2000 vide Central Act No. 46 of 2000, and by this amendment for words "two thousand rupees" words "four thousand rupees" were substituted. Thus according to him, for the purpose of calculation of the compensation in this case figure of 2000 rupees is to be taken, and its 50% has to be multiplied by the relevant factor, which is 201.66, as per Schedule IV of the Act keeping in view the age of the deceased being 33 years. 3. So far submission of Shri Chandel regarding age and factor is concerned, it was not disputed by Shri Ghosh. He however urged that for calculating compensation under the provisions of the Act relevant date would be the date of award and not the date of accident. With a view to support this submission, Shri Ghosh placed reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in Rathi Menon v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 714. According to him, this decision completely negatives the submission of learned Advocate General. 4. After having examined this decision as well as for reasons to be recorded hereinafter submission urged by Shri Ghosh to uphold the compensation awarded by the Commissioner, cannot be accepted. 5. According to him, this decision completely negatives the submission of learned Advocate General. 4. After having examined this decision as well as for reasons to be recorded hereinafter submission urged by Shri Ghosh to uphold the compensation awarded by the Commissioner, cannot be accepted. 5. It is by now well settled that under the provisions of the Act if an employer, is held liable for payment of compensation, he incurs financial liability. Therefore, rights of the parties are fructified on the date of accident. In case legislature has intended to hold an employer liable on the basis of amended provision and/or had intended to make the amended provision applicable retrospectively, nothing prevented it to have made a provision in that behalf in the amended Act itself. It may also be observed that legislature is presumed to be well aware regarding cases pending for grant of compensation on the date when the amendment came into force; still the amending provision has not been made retrospectively applicable. In addition to this liability for payment of compensation on the basis of amended provision by no stretch of imagination can be said to have been made applicable retrospectively. 6. Reliance placed by Shri Ghosh on the basis of the decision in the case of in Rathi Menons supra, is misplaced. Reason being that the matter in issue, under consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in this case was a claim under the Railways Act, 1989. Payment of compensation under the Act was not the question under consideration nor was the Honble Court called upon to have decided the matter in the context of provisions of the Act. Therefore, observations made in paragraph 33 of this judgment and relied upon by Shri Ghosh are per-incurium. This is an additional ground not to accept his submission. 7. Besides this, as to on what date rights of an employer like the appellants in the present case, are fructified is no more res-integra in view of decision of the Supreme Court to which a brief reference will be made hereinafter. 8. In a three Judge Bench in Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Valsala K. and another, (1999) 8 SCC 254, held as under : "3. 8. In a three Judge Bench in Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Valsala K. and another, (1999) 8 SCC 254, held as under : "3. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289, speaking through Shinghal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. 4. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan, CAs Nos. 16904-09 of 1996, decided on 6.11.1996, however, took the view that the Workmens Compensation Act being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo case the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case is not correct. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi, (1998) 1 KLT 951 (FB), wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above-noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, lays down the correct law and we approve it. 6. Having answered the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment in the negative, we shall take up this batch of special leave petitions for consideration. 7. Insofar as these special leave petitions are concerned, we find that the accident took place a long time back. Compensation became payable to the workmen, as it is not disputed that the accidents occurred during the course of employment, as per the law prior to the amendment made in 1995. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the pettiness of the amounts involved in each of the cases and the time that has since elapsed, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders, decided on the basis of the 1995 amendment, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, dismiss the special leave petitions, but after clarifying the law, as noticed above." 9. Similar view was again taken by the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khajuni Devi and others, (2002) 10 SCC 567, as well as by a four Judge Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and another, 1976 ACJ 141. Two Division Benches of this Court also took this view in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nako alias Naiku Devi and others, 1996(1) SCL 370 and Smt. Satya Devi Sharma and others v. Megh Pal and another, 2002 (2) SLC 311. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that for the purpose of calculating the compensation in the present case, relevant date is 17th August, 2000. Now taking 50% of the maximum monthly wage of Rs. 2,000.-, then total compensation payable in this case comes to Rs. 2,01,660/- and not Rs. 4,51,718/-. On this amount respondents are entitled for interest at the rate of 12% per annum on and with effect from 17th August, 2000 till the date of deposit i.e. 16th July, 2003. In addition to this, appellants are also entitled for payment of penalty which is fixed at 50% on the compensation of Rs. 2,01,660/-. 2,01,660/- and not Rs. 4,51,718/-. On this amount respondents are entitled for interest at the rate of 12% per annum on and with effect from 17th August, 2000 till the date of deposit i.e. 16th July, 2003. In addition to this, appellants are also entitled for payment of penalty which is fixed at 50% on the compensation of Rs. 2,01,660/-. Thus in all the respondents are held entitled to Rs. 3,02,490/- (Rs. 2,01,660/- + Rs. 1,00,830/-) besides interest. 11. No other point is urged. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal is partly allowed and as a result of it, compensation awarded by the Commissioner Workmens Compensation Act, HP PWD Rampur Bushahr at Shimla in WCA-3 of 2000 dated 16th August, 2001, in case titled as Jagat Ram v. Assistant Engineer and another, is modified, holding that compensation payable by the appellants to the respondents will be Rs. 3,02,490/- in all, and only the sum of Rs. 2,01,660/- shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 17th August, 2000 to 16th July, 2003 i.e. the date of deposit of compensation. Respondents shall equally share the compensation awarded in terms of this judgment. Registry after retaining the amount in terms of this judgment with proportionate interest shall remit the surplus amount, if any, also with proportionate interest to the bank account of Executive Engineer, Outer Seraj Division, HP PWD, Nirmand District Kullu, number whereof Shri Chandel submitted will be furnished within four weeks. 13. Appeal was taken up for final hearing at the joint request of the learned Counsel for the parties as also keeping in view the limited controversy involved in it. Accordingly, it has been disposed of finally after it was formally admitted. No costs. CMP No. 383 of 2005. 14. No orders in view of the order passed in the main appeal. Disposed of accordingly. Appeal disposed of.