Judgment K.K. Acharya, J.-This criminal misc. petition under Section 482, CrPC, has been filed by the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 126/2004, Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali, 2. On 08.04.2005, notice was issued to Public Prosecutor and further proceedings in FIR No. 126/2004 Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali was stayed by this Court. Mr. Ashok Upadhyay, learned Public Prosecutor has given appearance on behalf of the State However, complainant was not made party in this case but Mr. Rakesh Arora, learned Counsel has given appearance on behalf of the complainant. 3. Brief facts of the case are that Smt. Neha lodged a report to the SHO, Police Station, Mahila Thana on 12.2004 alleging therein that she was married to Nitin Nahar of Hospet, District Balari (Karnataka) on 01.05.2004 at Jodhpur and certain dowry articles referred to in the complaint were given in marriage. It was further alleged that she stayed with her husband till 14.05.2004. Thereafter, the complainant alleged that her husband went back to Hospet and she stayed at Jodhpur with her father-in-law, mother-in-law, Jeth and Jethani. Their behaviour was absolutely normal. The complainant alleged that on 28.05.2004 she went alongwith her father-in-law and mother-in-law to Hospet and there she saw change in their behaviour. She was harassed on account of bringing less dowry and she was also beaten. She was locked inside a room. She was given achar and roti. On her resistance, her husband used to slap her. She further alleged that her mother-in-law twisted her hand and father-in-law slapped her. Her husband did not consummate the marriage with her. It was further alleged that her mother-in-law Gulab, father-in-law Krishanlal, Husband-Nitin, Jeth-Manish Nahar, Devar Ratan and Nanad-Rajiya all demanded dowry and treated her with cruelty. She further alleged that her father-in-law tried to kiss her hand. She has also alleged in the FIR that they have also tried to kill her by opening the valve of gas-cylinder. She informed her father and thereafter, her father alongwith relatives and one Gautam Chand Singhvi came Hospet on 11.07.2004 from Pali. They were not allowed to enter into the house and they stayed in a hotel. As there was no known person in Hospet, therefore, they could not proceed to file any FIR in Hospet.
She informed her father and thereafter, her father alongwith relatives and one Gautam Chand Singhvi came Hospet on 11.07.2004 from Pali. They were not allowed to enter into the house and they stayed in a hotel. As there was no known person in Hospet, therefore, they could not proceed to file any FIR in Hospet. Then she alleged that on 16.07.2004, she came to Pali alongwith her father and thereafter, her father talked with her inlaws on phone and then they said that send Neha to Hospet and they have also given assurance that they will keep her happy and no further torture will be given and on this plea, she was again sent to Hospet on 26.09.2004. She has also alleged that her inlaws did not allow her as well as her brother and Gautam to enter in to the house and started assaulting them and given abuses on the road. Then in Hospet, they assembled some reputed persons of society and they asked that their father and mother may be called and since her father was sick, her mother alongwith her brother reached to Hostel. They stayed there for six days but they were not agreeable to them and asked her mother that they do not want to keep her daughter. Then they came to Pali and at the time of departure dowry articles were also demanded, which they have refused to give and after coming to Pali on the basis of the aforesaid allegations, an FIR being No. 126/2004 was registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali for the offence under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323 IPC on 12.2004. 4. The accused-petitioners have filed the present misc. petition for quashing of the said FIR on the ground that FIR was lodged at Mahila Thana, Pali and there is no whisper in the FIR that any offence has been committed in District Pali. Learned Counsel for the petitioners states that Mahila Thana, Pali has no jurisdiction to investigate the matter nor the trial Court at Pali has jurisdiction to try such as case. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments has read over the FIR in toto before this Court and argued that marriage took place in Jodhpur on 01.05.2004 and all the dowry articles were given at Jodhpur. They lived in Jodhpur till 14.05.2004 and thereafter her husband went to Hospet.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments has read over the FIR in toto before this Court and argued that marriage took place in Jodhpur on 01.05.2004 and all the dowry articles were given at Jodhpur. They lived in Jodhpur till 14.05.2004 and thereafter her husband went to Hospet. Their behavior was also normal in Jodhpur. On 28.05.2004, she alongwith his father-in-law and mother-in-law went to Hospet. He further argued that all the allegation of cruelty has been committed in Hospet, District Balari (Karnataka) and dowry articles were also handed over at Jodhpur. On 11.07.2004, her father and uncle came to Hospet but they were not allowed to enter into the house and as they had no acquaintances, therefore, they could not file any report in the Police Station at Hospet. They left Hospet on 16.07.2004 and came to Pali. After coming to Pali, her father talked to her in-laws and they said that send Neha to Hospet and they will keep her happy. Then again they reached to Hospet on 26.09.2004. Thereafter, further occurrence took place at Hospet then they returned to Pali. He further argued that even dowry articles were demanded at Hospet and not at Pali. Therefore, he stated that from the perusal of the complete FIR, no cause of action has arisen in Pali District for the offence under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323, IPC. Thus, neither Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali has jurisdiction to investigate the matter nor any Court in Pali can take cognizance against the petitioners. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention towards Section 177 (2) CrPC and cited before me the Judgment of Honble Supreme Court in case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr., reported in 2004 SCC (Cri.) 2134 and argued that since no offence has been committed in the ordinary jurisdiction of Pali District, therefore, FIR being No. 126/2004 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali may be quashed. 7.
vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr., reported in 2004 SCC (Cri.) 2134 and argued that since no offence has been committed in the ordinary jurisdiction of Pali District, therefore, FIR being No. 126/2004 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali may be quashed. 7. In reply, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned Counsel for the complainant tried to satisfy the Court that telephonic talk was done from Pali and complainant is living in Pali and offence under Sectiond 498-A and 406, IPC, are of continuing nature and complainant is still in stress and all the dowry articles are with the accused-petitioners, therefore, merely on the point of jurisdiction, FIR may not be quashed and the matter be allowed to be investigated properly. 8. Learned Counsel for the complainant has cited before me the Judgment of this Court in case of Ramesh Chand vs. State of Raj. & Ors., reported in 1998 (3) WLC 636 (Raj). 9. I have considered the rival arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the FIR as well as the Judgment s cited by both the learned Counsel for the parties. 10. The Apex Court in Paras 8 and 9 of the Judgment rendered in case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. (Supra) has held as under:- “8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common-law rule referred to in Halsburys Laws of England (Vol. 9 Para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which are alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which reads as follows:- “178.
There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which reads as follows:- “178. Place of inquiry or trial.-( a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offences was committed, or .(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or .(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas then one, or .(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local area, it may, be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 9. "All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed", as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is "ordinarily". Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia vs. State of W.B., L. N. Mukherjee vs. State of Madras, Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India and Mohan Baitha vs. State of Bihar, exception implied by the word "ordinarily need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, a continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule of its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323, IPC.
11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323, IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier, the husband of the complainant went to the place where the complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that Clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.04.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offence cannot be applied." 11. The facts in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors., (Supra) as cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were that accused respondent No. 2 (wife of one of the appellants) filed a complaint in the Court of the Magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Magistrate directed the police to investigate the case. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet. When the matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482, CrPC, before the High Court alleging that the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if the allegations contained therein were accepted in toto as no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent left the place N (where she was residing with her appellant husband) and came to the City C. Since, all the alleged acts as per the complainant took place at N, the Courts at C did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the other hand, respondent No. 2 submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178 (c), CrPC, and, therefore, the Court at C had jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
On the other hand, respondent No. 2 submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178 (c), CrPC, and, therefore, the Court at C had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The Honble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held as stated hereinabove. 12. The facts in the case of Ramesh Chand (Supra), as cited by the learned Counsel for the complainant were that wife of the accused was given beating and was turned out from the house and the accused and his family members treated her with cruelty for demand of dowry. The offence was committed at Faridabad, Haryana and wife of the accused was medically examined at Dholpur and since, consequences of offences was not ended at Faridabad and continued at Dholpur, therefore, the learned Magistrate at Dholpur had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Since, consequences of offence being continued, in this situation, it was held that there was no question of any limitation and the Court remanded the matter for further enquiry to the lower Court. The question of limitation under Section 468, CrPC, was considered by the Court and since consequences of cruelty continued upto Dholpur and on these facts, the Judgment was given. Thus, the facts of the present case are altogether different from the case cited by the learned Counsel for the complainant. 13. Looking to the facts of the present case, it is abundantly clear that the Marriage of the complainant took place in Jodhpur on 01.05.2004 and some dowry articles were also given in Jodhpur and she stayed with her husband till 15.05.2004 and lived with her in-law at Jodhpur and no cruelty was committed in Jodhpur. On 28.05.2004 she went to Hospet alongwith her mother-in-law and father-in-law where she has complained the act of cruelty against her and demand of dowry. On 11.07.2004, her Mausa and one Gautam Chand came Hospet from Pali where they stayed in hotel. They were not allowed by in-laws of complainant to enter in the house. Therefore, her mother alongwith her son-in-law Rajeev Bhandari went to Hospet and they stayed there for six days but petitioners were not agreeable to their asking and they said them to leave Hospet immediately and they do not want to keep their daughter also. Then, they came to Pali. The complainant demanded her ornaments and other articles but they refused to give in Hospet.
Then, they came to Pali. The complainant demanded her ornaments and other articles but they refused to give in Hospet. From perusal of the entire FIR, it is clear that no offence has been committed in Pali District. It has also not been said that in Pali District they have committed any cruelty or demanded dowry. The facts of the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (Supra) are similar to the facts of the present case. In that case, the petitioner alone came from city "N" to city "C". In this case, he has came alongwith her mother and his other relations to Hospet. The Honble Apex Court has held that since, all the alleged acts as per the complainant took place at N, and thereafter, complainant left the house of the husband on 15.04.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at place C. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c), CrPC, relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied. On this legal principle, the Honble Apex Court held that the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai, therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and the proceedings were quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent No. 2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. 14. The facts of the present case are also similar. In this case, no cause of action arose in Pali District no date has been given when she left Hospet and came Pali but it is clear that the act of cruelty and demand of dowry has been committed in Hospet, Karnataka. Marriage took place at Jodhpur and some dowry articles were also given at Jodhpur. When it was demanded and was refused, it was at Hospet, therefore, no cause of action arose in Pali District. Marriage also did not take place in Pali District and no dowry articles were given in Pali District and no act of cruelty has been shown to have been committed in Pali District.
When it was demanded and was refused, it was at Hospet, therefore, no cause of action arose in Pali District. Marriage also did not take place in Pali District and no dowry articles were given in Pali District and no act of cruelty has been shown to have been committed in Pali District. Therefore, looking to the above Judgment of Honble Apex Court, it cannot be said that in such case provisions of Section 178 (c), CrPC, will be attracted. In the light of the above Apex Court Judgment , the Police Station at Pali has no jurisdiction to investigate the matter since no offence has been committed in Pali District. It has not been shown that the petitioners have come to Pali and committed any act of cruelty and demanded dowry in Pali District even no injury has been caused in Pali District, therefore, no offence under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323, IPC, has been committed in Pali District. Thus, in view of the Judgment of Honble Apex Court in case of Y. Abraham Ajith (Supra), the provisions of logic of Section 178 (c), CrPC, relating to continuance of offences shall not be applied in the present case. 15. With the above observations, this misc. petition is allowed. Consequently, FIR being No. 126/2004 of Police Station Mahila Thana, Pali is hereby quashed. However, SHO, Police Station Pali may send the FIR for investigation to the Police Station having jurisdiction.