G. BIKSHAPATHY, J. ( 1 ) THE Civil Revision Petition is filed under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code calling in question the Order of the learned Senior civil Judge, Amalapuram in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 in I. P. No. 4 of 1959, dated: 16-4-2002. ( 2 ) PETITIONER is the respondent in the interlocutory Application. It is necessary to refer to certain past events so as to appreciate the matter in proper perspective. One Rayapudi Jwala Narasimham was judged as insolvent by an Order passed by the Court in I. P. No. 4 of 1959, dated 5-11-1960. In pursuance of the Order in the insolvency proceedings, the estate of said narasimham became vested in the Official receiver. Consequently, some of the assets of the insolvent were brought to sale and one such property was sold having an extent of ac. 2-12 cents in S. No. 100/1 -B in Mungaga village in the auction conducted by the official receiver on 21-6-1979 for a sum of rs. 4,000/ -. The respondent purchased the said property. Thereafter, official receiver executed a registered sale deed on 26-9-1979 in favour of the respondent- prchaser. However, the petitioner made a claim to the property on the ground that he was the tenant of the insolvent s son and later also he purchased from the insolvant s son under purported agreement of sale dated 25-8-1977. Thereupon, the petitioner filed an application in I. A. No. 30 of 1979 against the official receiver to set aside the sale made by the official receiver on 26-9-1979. The respondent-purchaser filed a petition in I. A. No. 33 of 1979 in I. P. No. 4 of 1959 for injunction against the petitioner and the insolvent s son and for delivery of the petition Schedule property with standing crop thereon. I. A. No. 39 of 1979 was also filed by the respondent-purchaser for appointment of official receiver pending disposal of I. A. No. 33 of 1979. However, the insolvency Court dismissed the I. A. No. 33 of 1979 and I. A. No. 39 of 1979 by an Order dated 6-10-1980. I. A. No. 39 of 1979 was also filed by the respondent-purchaser for appointment of official receiver pending disposal of I. A. No. 33 of 1979. However, the insolvency Court dismissed the I. A. No. 33 of 1979 and I. A. No. 39 of 1979 by an Order dated 6-10-1980. But, I. A. No. 30 of 1979 filed by the petitioner for setting aside the sale was not disposed of Against the Order passed in I. A. No. 33 of 1979, the respondent filed an appeal in A. S. No. 168 of 1980 and against the Order in I. A. No. 39 of 1979, another appeal in A. S. No. 165 of 1980 was filed before the II Additional District Judge, rajahmundry. The appellate Court, however, allowed the A. S. No. 168 of 1980 and held that the respondent-purchaser was entitled for taking delivery of the schedule property. However, the relief relating to injunction was dismissed. The petitioner herein, who is the respondent in I. A. filed c. R. P. No. 2528 of 1984 before this Court against the judgment in A. S. No. 168 of 1980. This Court by an Order dated 10-12-1986 allowed the Revision in part and modified the decree in A. S. No. 168 of 1980 and directed that the petitioner shall be allowed to continue in possession of the schedule land until I. A. No. 30 of 1979 to set aside the sale was disposed of and after disposal of I. A. No. 30 of 1979, the trial Court has to pass on order in I. A. No. 33 of 1979 subject to the result in I. A. No. 30 of 1979. But, however, it is to be noted that I. A. No. 30 of 1979 filed by the petitioner was already dismissed for default on 27-6-1985. This fact was not brought to the notice of this Court for the reasons best known to the parties. Incidentally, I. A. No. 33 of 1979 was also dismissed for default on 16-10-1988. I. A. No. 3 of 1983 (sic. 1988) was filed by the petitioner to set aside the default Order dated 27-6-1985 and the said petition was also dismissed as infructuous on 16-10-1988. The situation thus created was that both the applications filed by the petitioner in I. A. No. 30 of 1979 and I. A. No. 3 of 1983 stood dismissed. 1988) was filed by the petitioner to set aside the default Order dated 27-6-1985 and the said petition was also dismissed as infructuous on 16-10-1988. The situation thus created was that both the applications filed by the petitioner in I. A. No. 30 of 1979 and I. A. No. 3 of 1983 stood dismissed. ( 3 ) THEREFORE, the respondent-purchaser filed a fresh application in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 in I. P. No. 4 of 1959 for delivery of petition schedule property in pursuance of the Order and directions of the learned II Additional district Judge, Rajahmundry in A. S. No. 168 of 1980 as affirmed by the High Court in c. R. P. No. 2528 of 1984. An objection was taken by the petitioner herein to the effect that the application is not maintainable as earlier application filed by the respondent- purchaser in LA. No. 33 of 1979 was dismissed for default and therefore, it is a bar for filing a fresh application without taking steps for getting the Order of default set aside. However, the learned Senior Civil judge in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 sustained the objection and dismissed the I. A. by Orders dated 25-7-1996. Against the said Orders, the respondent-purchaser filed appeal in a. S. No. 117 of 1996 and the learned District judge by judgment dated 9-10-2000 set. aside the Orders and allowed the appeal holding that fresh application in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 was maintainable and the matter was remitted to the lower Court for decision on merits. The lower Court after hearing the parties passed Order in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 dated 16-4-2002 allowing the application with a direction to deliver the petition schedule property to the respondent- purchaser after evicting the petitioner herein. Against the said Order, the petitioner filed a. S. No. 88 of 2002 before the VIII Additional district Judge, Amalapuram. The learned judge dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed in I. A. No. 7 of 1990. Against the said Order, the present Civil Revision petition has been filed. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. V. L. N. G. K. Murthy vehemently submits that the Order of the Court below is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and without jurisdiction. Against the said Order, the present Civil Revision petition has been filed. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. V. L. N. G. K. Murthy vehemently submits that the Order of the Court below is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and without jurisdiction. He submits that when once the application in I. A. No. 33 of 1979 filed by the respondent was dismissed for default, it does not entitle the petitioner to file fresh application giving a go-by to the earlier proceedings and therefore, the second application is not maintainable and consequently the impugned Order is wholly without jurisdiction. The learned counsel would also submit that it is also open for him to urge the ground that the Order passed by the II Additional Judge, Rajahmundry in A. S. No. 117 of 1996 holding that the second application is maintainable can be challenged in the Civil Revision Petition. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi. While the learned counsel for the respondent mr. K. Chidambaram submits that the maintainability of the application was dicided in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 and confirmed by the appellate Court in A. S. No. 117 of 1996 dated 9-10-2000 wherein the appellate court while affirming the maintainability of I. A. No. 7 of 1990 remanded the matter to the lower court for disposal of I. A. No. 7 of 1990 on merits. Therefore, the Order passed by the district Judge in A. S. No. 117 of 1996 became final and it constitutes res judicata to the extent of the maintainability of I. A. No. 7 of 1990. Therefore, it cannot be allowed to be re-agitated in the Civil Revision Petition, he relies on the decision of the Supreme court reported in C. V. Rajendran v. N. M. Muhammed Kunhi. ( 5 ) AS already noticed by us, the matter had been lingering in the Courts for several years. Rayapudi Jwala Narsimham was adjudged as insolvent as early as in 1960. That became final and the official receiver brought to sale an extent of Ac. 2-12 cents ot land which is the subject matter in the present litigation and it was sold for rs. 4,000/- and consequently a Sale Deed was also executed in favour of the respondent herein on 20-6-1977. That became final and the official receiver brought to sale an extent of Ac. 2-12 cents ot land which is the subject matter in the present litigation and it was sold for rs. 4,000/- and consequently a Sale Deed was also executed in favour of the respondent herein on 20-6-1977. However, the petitioner herein alleged to be a tenant of the insolvent s son initiated proceedings in i. A. No. 30 of 1979 claiming right in the property and sought for setting aside the sale and continued to remain in possession. Thereupon, the respondent-purchaser filed i. A. No. 33 of 1979 for injunction and for delivery of the Petition Schedule property. I. A. No. 39 of 1979 was filed for appointment of receiver. However, I. A. No. 33 of 1979 was dismissed against which appeal was filed in A. S. No. 168 of 1980 and the same was allowed against which the petitioner carried the mater in Civil Revision Petition referred to above. In the revision, this Court passed an Order to continue the petitioner herein till the disposal of the I. A. No. 30 of 1979 filed by him for setting aside the sale and thereafter pass appropriate Orders in i. A. No. 33 of 1979. However, I. A. No. 33 of 1979 was dismissed for default. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, the issue that arises for consideration is whether the dismissal of I. A. No. 33 of 1979 for default would debar the fresh application I. A. No. 7 of 1990? and whether the petitioner can be allowed to still urge that I. A. No. 7 of 1990 is not maintainable? ( 7 ) AS could be seen from various events that took place for the last several years, the petitioner herein has been dragging on the proceedings for nearly more than 2 decades. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above will not be of any assistance to them. That decision was rendered with reference to the Second appeal. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above will not be of any assistance to them. That decision was rendered with reference to the Second appeal. The Supreme Court observed that where the High Court in the Second Appeal though not having jurisdiction illegally reversed the concurrent finding of fact and ordered remand and aggrieved party in an appeal to the Supreme Court from the final order of the High Court after remand can challenge even the first Order of the High court making remand and all the proceedings taken thereafter as a result of illegal Order of remand. In the said case, the high Court illegally exercised the jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code and the Supreme Court found that such exercise of power was contrary to law and therefore, even when the matter was remanded and thereafter when the matter again came to the High Court in the Second appeal stage, it is open for the aggrieved party to challenge such a later Order, as also the earlier Order as the earlier Order itself suffers from reconcilable infirmity i. e. it suffers with a total lack of jurisdiction. But, in the instant case, the facts are different. As already observed, the Order passed by the insolvency Court in I. A. No. 33 of 1979 was set aside in appeal in A. S. No. 168 of 1980 and delivery of possession was ordered against which the petitioner herein filed Civil revision Petition and except to the modification that the petitioner herein shall continue in possession until I. A. No. 30 of 1979 was disposed of. The following is the extract of the Order of High Court in C. R. P. No. 2528 of 1984, dated 10-12-1986: "it is now admittedly found as a fact by both the Courts that the petitioner is in possession of the land and interim stay was granted by this Court on 21 -09-1984 and the petitioner has been continuing in possession. His application to set aside the same in i. A. No. 30/79 is still pending adjudication in the insolvency Court. His application to set aside the same in i. A. No. 30/79 is still pending adjudication in the insolvency Court. Therefore, interests of justice would be best served to continue the petitioner in possession till the I. A. No. 30/79 is disposed of and thereafter Order is to be passed in I. A. No. 33/79 depending upon the result in I. A. No. 30/79, directing delivery of possession to the respondent if the petitioner becomes unsuccessful. Under the circumstances, the C. R. P. is allowed with the above modifications. " in fact, as on the date when the Order passed in Civil Revision Petition on 10-12-1996, the petition filed by the petitioner in I. A. No. 30 of 1979 was already stood dismissed for default on 27-6-1985 and no steps were taken. It is only after the order of this Court in the Civil Revision petition after a lapse of two years, I. A. No. 3 of 1988 was filed to set aside the default order. But, however, the said I. A. was also dismissed. When a fresh application was made in I. A. No. 7 of 1990, the same was challenged by the petitioner herein and it was dismissed by the insolvency Court. But, in the appeal in A. S. No. 117 of 1996, it was set aside and it was held that I. A. No. 7 of 1990 was maintainable and that there was no bar for filing a fresh application. Thereafter, the matter was remitted back to the insolvency Court for fresh consideration and ultimately I. A. No. 7 of 1990 was allowed and it was also confirmed in the appeal. Under those circumstances, the petitioner is estopped from contending that I. A. No. 7 of 1990 is still not maintainable and that he can reagitate the same in the Civil Revision petition. When the appellate court had clearly held that the I. A. was maintainable and remitted back to the lower Court on merits, the matter was not carried in revision and thus the Order became final. Under such circumstances, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajendran s case (2nd cited supra) clearly governs the situation. When the appellate court had clearly held that the I. A. was maintainable and remitted back to the lower Court on merits, the matter was not carried in revision and thus the Order became final. Under such circumstances, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajendran s case (2nd cited supra) clearly governs the situation. The Supreme Court clearly observed that the principle of res judicata applies as between two stages in the same litigation, so that if any issue has been decided in the earlier stage against the party, it cannot be allowed to re-agitate at a subsequent stage in the same suit or proceedings. Thus, I hold that the petitioner is estopped from re-agitating the issue already decided by virtue of the Order of the appellate court as early as A. S. No. 117 of 1996. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The Order passed by the insolvency Court in I. A. No. 7 of 1990 in i. P. No. 4 of 1959, dt. 16-4-2002 as confirmed by the appellate court VIII Additional District judge, Rajahmundry in A. S. No. 88 of 2002, dt. 20-12-2004 shall be enforced forth with.