ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2. The issue in this appeal is whether the respondent school is entitled to grant-in-aid under the Junior High School Salary Disbursement Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). According to the appellants the respondent having been granted recognition as a high school for the d academic year 1994-95, it stood outside the ambit and was not entitled to grant-in-aid under the Act. The problem, however, arose from an order which was passed by the appellants on 12-3-1996. The order states that it was an approval for inclusion of 157 boys and 43 girls private unaided permanent recognised basic schools and that the approval would not be applicable to those schools to whom recognition had been granted up to high school level. In the list annexed to the order, the respondents name was mentioned against Serial No. 73. Based on this list the respondent approached the High Court complaining that it had not been paid the grant-in-aid as approved. Before the High Court no counter-affidavit had been filed. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that the claim of the respondent was uncontroverted that it was entitled to the token grant of Rs 1000 under the government order dated 12-3-1996. The grant was accordingly directed to be paid within a f period of two months. The appellants impugned this order by way of an appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal being largely influenced by the fact that the impugned claim was a mere Rs 1000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs 5000. 3. Before us learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has reiterated the stand that the government order dated 12-3-1996 had not been g properly construed and that the question was not of the quantum of the grant but of the entitlement to it. . 4. It appears that the appellants are justified in their submission. The government order dated 12-3-1996 did not speak of a grant to all those mentioned in the list. On the other hand it said that the approval would not be applicable to such schools outside the schools mentioned in the list to whichrecognition up to high school had been granted. Therefore, the mere appearance of the respondents name in the list would not entitle it to grant-in-aid if it fell within the exception. On the other hand it said that the approval would not be applicable to such schools outside the schools mentioned in the list to whichrecognition up to high school had been granted. Therefore, the mere appearance of the respondents name in the list would not entitle it to grant-in-aid if it fell within the exception. This position was further clarified in a subsequent government order dated 23-3-1996 passed in response to a representation by the respondent school where it was again clarified that the sanction would not be applicable to those schools to whom the competent authority had granted recognition as a high school. The order which was passed pursuant to an interim order in the writ proceedings initiated by the respondent also reiterates that statement that the government order dated 12-3-1996 expressly provided that within the schools listed, those which had been granted recognition for high school would not be entitled to get salary or grant-in-aid under the Junior High School Salary Disbursement Act, 1978. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has drawn our attention to the fact that there has been a subsequent amendment to the 1978 Act by V.P. Act 34 of 2000 by which the provisions of the 1978 Act have been made applicable mutatis mutandis to institutions up to high school/ intermediate standard. We express no opinion on the scope or effect of this amendment. We are only concerned with the construction of the order dated 12-3-1996. For the reasons stated, we are of the view that the High Court erred in allowing the respondents writ petition. The decision of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside. This, however, will not prejudice the respondents from claiming any relief that they may be entitled to in law by virtue of the amendment effected by U.P. Act 34 of 2000. 6. The civil appeal is, accordingly, allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.