SABHAJEET YADAV, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved against the order dated 26. 7. 1990 passed by General Manager, Uttar pradesh Parivahan Nigam/u. P. Transport Corporation, Meerut, whereby the petitioner was held guilty of negligence constituting misconduct resulting which the Nigam has suffered a loss of Rs. 95,000/- and half of the amount of loss Rs. 47500/- suffered by the Nigam has been directed to be recovered from the salary of the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month, the petitioner has filed above noted writ petition. ( 2 ) THE petitioners has come forward with the case, while he was posted as Junior Foreman (Elect) at Garh Depot, Garh Mukteshwar, Ghaziabad, an incident took place in the night of 31. 8. 89/1-9-89 at Garh Depot. The petitioners duty on that day was from 5 P. M. in the evening till 2 A. M. in the next morning i. e. 2 A. M. of 1. 9. 1989. A bus U. G. L. 841 coining from Delhi going to Bareilly reached at Garh Depot about 10. 30 P. M. on 31. 8. 1989. The Driver of the vehicle namely Shahamt Khan submitted a report on the out depot defect register. Thereafter the petitioner inspected the bus and he made a note on the same register that bus in question is layland bus and there were no spare tyres or tools available for Layland bus in the depot in question. However the petitioners duty was till 2 A. M. in the morning, which was over and the petitioner left out the depot at 2 A. M. immediately after his duty was over. It appears that when the petitioner left out depot after his duty hours, bus caught fire and burnt out. On expiry of few days on 7. 9. 1989 the petitioner was placed under suspension and on same day a charge sheet was issued and served upon him on 9. 9. 1989. A departmental disciplinary inquiry was held against him wherein in support of the charges certain witnesses besides the documents had also been examined by the inquiry officer. The petitioner has asked copy of statement of witnesses but same was denied to him but he was permitted to adduce his defence evidence. The petitioner has examined his defence witnesses before inquiry officer. The petitioner has asked copy of statement of witnesses but same was denied to him but he was permitted to adduce his defence evidence. The petitioner has examined his defence witnesses before inquiry officer. After holding disciplinary inquiry, the inquiry officer submitted report to the disciplinary authority holding the petitioner partly guilty of charges levelled in the charge sheet but Disciplinary Authority disagreed with it and a show cause notice was issued and served upon the petitioner. The petitioner replied the aforesaid show cause notice. After going through the inquiry report and reply submitted by the petitioner the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order referred herein above. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri V. K. Barman for the petitioner and Sri Samir Sharma on behalf of the respondents. ( 4 ) ON the basis of aforesaid allegations made in the writ petition learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri V. K. Barman has vehemently urged that in given facts and circumstances of the case since the inquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner from a portion of the charge that fire caught to the Bus due to any negligence of the petitioner, to which Disciplinary Authority disagree, therefore, it was obligatory upon him to record his disagreement with cogent reasons to be communicated to the petitioner and further opportunity of hearing was required to be given to him. The Disciplinary Authority did neither give any cogent reason for his disagreement nor give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He urged that on merits too there is no cogent material to support the allegation levelled against the petitioner. Secondly on the basis of available material on record, there is nothing to show that fire caught to the Bus could be directly attributable to the alleged negligence of petitioner whereas no action has been taken against driver of the bus who has admittedly driven the bus in defective condition and chaukidar of workshop/depot who was to watch the depot, who was also spared from any disciplinary action in this regard. ( 5 ) A detail counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein action taken against the petitioner has been justified by refuting the allegations made in the writ petition. ( 5 ) A detail counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein action taken against the petitioner has been justified by refuting the allegations made in the writ petition. However, learned Counsel for respondents has submitted at the strength of law laid down by honble Apex Court in High Court of Judicature At Bombay through Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 316, wherein Honble Apex Court has held that if there is some legal evidence on which findings can be based then adequacy and/or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter to be canvassed before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in judicial review of disciplinary inquiry in the departmental actions. Although there is no quarrel to the proposition laid down by Honble Apex court but the facts of the instant case are quite distinct and distinguishable. Therefore submission of learned Counsel of respondents is wholly misconceived and misplaced, accordingly cannot be accepted. ( 6 ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and perusal of record it appears that there is no dispute that the petitioner was posted in the Depot in question in which a bus has come of which two tires of right back wheel were found burst and the bus was taken in the Depot at 10. 30 p. m. on 31. 8. 1989 and fire was caught to the bus after 2. 20 a. m. in the next morning after 4-5 hours, while same was parked in the Depot. ( 7 ) FROM the perusal of records and charge sheet issued to the petitioner it appears that a charge of negligence failing to check the defects in back wheel of the bus in question was levelled against the petitioner and it was further alleged that bus was driven by driver in defective condition resulting which tyres and Rim of wheel became hot which ultimately generated the fire caught to the bus. As a consequence of the aforesaid fire bus was burnt and caused loss to the Nigam. As a consequence of the aforesaid fire bus was burnt and caused loss to the Nigam. From the perusal of the show cause notice issued to the petitioner it indicates that inquiry officer has found the petitioner guilty of negligence only for not checking the bus and held that the petitioner is not responsible for catching of fire to bus but disciplinary authority disagreed with finding of inquiry officer with regard to the liability of petitioner for catching of fire and tentatively found the petitioner liable for the aforesaid part of the charge also, without recording any reason for his disagreement while issuing show cause notice to the petitioner. From the perusal of finding of inquiry officer, recorded in the inquiry report dated 19. 5. 1990 it appears that he has recorded the aforesaid finding on the basis of material evidence on record i. e. statements of witnesses examined in support of charge and defence witness during inquiry and has come to the conclusion that petitioner can not be held responsible for catching of fire in the bus. The allegations against the petitioner is based on imagination and there is no evidence to support such allegation. Accordingly inquiry officer exonerated the petitioner from the aforesaid portion of the charge. However the inquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of negligence only in not checking the bus alone. ( 8 ) FROM a perusal of impugned order dated 26. 7. 1990 passed by Disciplinary Authority it appears that no cogent reasons has been recorded for disagreement with the aforesaid findings of inquiry officer. Besides this, it is also no where mentioned that on the basis of statement of any witness or statement of any expert witness it was found that fire caught to the bus only on account of its driving in defective condition of bursting of tyres and due to which after 4-5 hours when the bus was parked in Depot, the fire caught to bus. In absence of such concluded opinion based on statement of expert witness in this regard it cannot be authoritatively held that fire caught to the bus only on account of its driving in the defective condition and petitioner can be held responsible for the negligence in not checking the bus otherwise the incident causing loss/damage to the Nigam would have been avoided. ( 9 ) THUS in view of the aforesaid discussion I am of the considered opinion that in absence of cogent material on record, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority in this regard is based on irrelevant considerations and based on imaginations, inasmuch as surmises and conjectures not on relevant materials on record hence perverse and cannot be accepted. Further unless it is found that loss caused to Nigam can be directly attributable to the alleged negligence as a natural consequence of it, the petitioner cannot be held guilty of such negligence amounting misconduct levelled against him. In other words unless it is found that fire caught to the bus as a natural consequences of driving of Bus in defective condition of bursting of tires of the bus the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the same. In absence of such material it cannot be said at all that it is on account of negligence of the petitioner only the Nigam has suffered such a loss. In this regard it is necessary to point out that every negligence is not misconduct unless it has material and direct bearing with damage/loss caused to the Nigam as its natural consequence as held by Honble Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed AIR1979 SC 1022 , [1979 (38 )FLR344 ], (1979 )II LLJ14 SC , (1979)2 SCC286 , [1979 ]3 SCR504 , 1979 (1 )SLJ308 (SC ), wherein in para 11 of the decision honble Apex Court held as under: 11. Code of conduct as set out In the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that thai conduct which is blameworthy for the (Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pearce v. Foster) (1886) 17 QBD 536 (at p. 542 ). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct (see Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers)) (1959) 1 WLR 698. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Supdt. , Central Railway, Nagpur Divn. , Nagpur, AIR1961 Bom 150 , (1959 )61 BOMLR1596 , ILR1960 Bom 545 and satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza (1969) 10 Guj LR 23. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Supdt. , Central Railway, Nagpur Divn. , Nagpur, AIR1961 Bom 150 , (1959 )61 BOMLR1596 , ILR1960 Bom 545 and satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza (1969) 10 Guj LR 23. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Strouds Judicial Dictionary which runs as under: misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive, acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct. In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct hut in Management, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik, AIR1966 SC 1051 , [1966 (12 )FLR45 ], (1966 )I LLJ398 SC , [1966 ]2 scr434 , in the absence of standing orders governing the employees undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India AIR1967 SC 1274 , 1967 (0 )KLT336 (SC ), (1967 )II LLJ219 SC , (1967 )II LLJ249 SC , [1967 ]2 SCR566 , the manner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P. H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta AIR1963 SC 1756 , (1963 )I LLJ679 SC , [1964 ]2 SCR104 , wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duly or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable of the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through there are other more familiar (examples) instances of which (are) a railway cabinman signaling in a train on the same track where there is a stationary train causing headlong collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashing causing heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil (see Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Coop. Department Stores Ltd. (1978) 19 Guj LR 108 at p. 120 ). But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duly permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion in duty. ( 10 ) THUS from a close analysis of law laid down by Honble Apex Court in J. Ahmads case (supra) it is clear that Honble Apex Court has categorically held that there may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to the negligence would be such as to be irreparable of the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of the culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. An error can be indicative of negligence and degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Thus in view of the settled legal position, what is necessary to examine in such a situation is as to whether the alleged negligence attributed to the employee is cause of damage or loss suffered or not? or the alleged negligence has any direct nexus with the damage or loss caused to employer or any affected body or person or not? In other words as to whether such loss or damage suffered is result of directly attributable negligence of concern employee in discharge of his duties or not? If the answer would come that loss/damage caused is directly attributable to the negligent discharge of duty of the delinquent employee the same would be held as misconduct and not otherwise. ( 11 ) NOW applying the aforesaid principle of law on facts of the case it is to be seen as held earlier that the petitioners negligence in discharge of his duties in not checking the bus in question can not be held to be direct cause of catching of fire to the bus in question, therefore, loss or damage caused to the Nigam cannot be attributable as direct consequence of aforesaid negligence of petitioner in discharge of his duties, accordingly same cannot be regarded as such a misconduct causing loss or damage suffered by the Nigam. The Nigam has utterly failed by placing any material evidence on record to establish that the fire caught to the bus was on account of bursting of tires alone and not because of any other possible reason as discussed herein before, therefore, it cannot be said that it is only on account of negligence of the petitioner in not checking the bus the Nigam has suffered the aforesaid loss on account of aforesaid negligence act of the petitioner otherwise the incident could have been avoided. Thus the negligence attributed to the petitioner cannot be regarded as such a nature which has direct link or nexus with the damage caused to the nigam constituting misconduct of such a nature imputed against the petitioner. The fact that the driver of the bus and chaukidar of Depot were not subjected to any disciplinary action in connection of the incident in question also assumes significance in the matter. The fact that the driver of the bus and chaukidar of Depot were not subjected to any disciplinary action in connection of the incident in question also assumes significance in the matter. ( 12 ) THUS the findings recorded by Disciplinary Authority in this regard based on no cogent materials rather perverse and based on conjectures and surmises inasmuch as imaginations, therefore, in view of aforesaid discussion, I am of considered opinion that the decision taken by the authority is contrary to law and not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is liable to be quashed. Accordingly the impugned order dated 26. 7. 1990 is hereby quashed. In given facts and circumstances, I do not find any justification to leave it open to the Nigam to pass any order with regard to remaining part of negligence of petitioner in not checking the bus in question in view of discussion made herein before. Thus in view of the aforesaid discussion and observation, the writ petition succeeds and allowed. ( 13 ) THERE shall be no order as to cost. . .