P. N. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application under Section 401 of Cr. P. C. is directed against order dated 16. 2. 04 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Alipore in Sessions Trial No. 2 (10) 2001 thereby allowing the prayer of the accused opposite parties (O. P.) under Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. and deferring the cross examination of P. W. 2 till the examination in chief of charge-sheet witness Nos. 10, 11, 13, 15 and another Siddhartha Mukherjee are completed. ( 2 ) MR. Biplab Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the de facto complainant and on the dasis of complaint/fir lodged by her Regent Park Police Station Case No. 196 of 1998 under Sections 498a/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short i. P. C.) was started against the accused O. Ps. 2 to 8. After completing investigation the police submitted charge-sheet under Sections 498a/302/34 of I. P. C. and in the charge-sheet 18 witnesses have been cited by the investigating Officer (I. O.) After commitment of the said case to the Court of sessions, it was transferred to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions judge, 5th Court, Alipore. RW. 1 was examined and cross examined, and thereafter P. W. 2 namely Belarani Mukherjee, the de facto complainant was exammed-in-chief by the prosecution. At that stage, the accused O. Ps. filed an application under Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. praying for deferring cross examination of P. W. 2 till some of the witnesses, namely, Sunil Kanti bhattacharya, Smt. Sonali Bhattacharya, Subrata Bhattacharya, Nirmal bhattacharya and Siddhartha Mukherjee are examined in chief. It was alleged that all the said witnesses belong to the same family and, therefore, the cross examination of P. W. 2 should be deferred till the examination in chief of the aforesaid 5 witnesses are completed, and they want to cross examine P. W. 2 and these witnesses one after another. The learned Judge by the impugned order dated 16. 2. 04 allowed the prayer of accused O. Ps. in spite of objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the case. ( 3 ) MR. Mitra contended that the learned Judge could not follow the true spirit of provisions of Section 231 (2) of Cr. The learned Judge by the impugned order dated 16. 2. 04 allowed the prayer of accused O. Ps. in spite of objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the case. ( 3 ) MR. Mitra contended that the learned Judge could not follow the true spirit of provisions of Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. Plain reading of Sections 230 and 231 of Cr. P. C. would indicate that, it is the discretion of the prosecution to examine witnesses according to their choice and examination in chief and cross examination are to be continued simultaneously without any break. Under Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. , the learned Judge has discretion to defer cross examination of any witness but, the learned Judge has no discretion to defer cross examination till whole set of witnesses are examined in chief. Generally in such matter the High Court should not interfere but, if the learned trial Judge exercises his discretion illegally without following provisions of law the High Court must interfere into the order of the learned Judge. The learned judge also did not consider the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence act. The order of the learned Judge being not in accordance with law should be set aside and the learned Judge may be directed to proceed with the trial and to complete the cross examination of P. W. 2 and to proceed with the trial in the order the prosecution produces its witnesses. In support of his contention mr. Mitra cited the decision in Md. Sanjay v. State of West Bengal, 2000 C cr LR (Cal) 53. ( 4 ) MR. Joymalya Bagchi appearing for the accused O. Ps. submitted that the persons whose cross examination has been prayed for to be deferred belong to the same family. Even if they do not attend Court on same day they may discuss the nature of cross examination in their residence and would try to fill in lacuna or defect and may try to remove advantage of defence cross examination. There is difference between the factual aspects of the case of md. San/ay and the present case. In Md. Sanjay (supra) the witnesses did not belong to same family but they were eye witness. There is difference between the factual aspects of the case of md. San/ay and the present case. In Md. Sanjay (supra) the witnesses did not belong to same family but they were eye witness. In the instant case the witnesses whose examination has been prayed to be deferred belong to the asame family, and by discussing the nature of evidence in their residence they would try to fill the lacuna of the prosecution case and the defects that may transpire during cross examination of P. W. 2 and other witnesses. Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C gives the discretion to the learned Judge and the factual aspect of the case of Md. Sanjay (supra) is distinguishable from facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 5 ) MR. Bagchi further submitted that there is no legal embargo to exercise the discretion vested with the learned Trial Judge in view of provisions of Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. In Md. Sanjay (supra) the learned Judge rejected the prayer of accused persons to defer cross examination and thereafter, the accused persons approached the High Court. In the instant case, the learned judge has exercised his discretion vested on him and such discretion was exercised by him applying his mind. When a Trial Court exercises discretion vested on him, the High Court should not interfere into the matter. As power of discretion was exercised by the learned trial Judge reasonably and applying his mind considering all aspects the High Court should not interfere. The word "any" appearing in Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. cannot be confined to only one witness and. cross examination of few witnesses may be deferred for the ends of justice, if the factual aspects and circumstances so require. In support of his contention Mr. Bagchi referred to the decisions in The Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay v. L. R. Melwani, reported in 1970 Cr LJ 885, State of onssa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647 , Charan singh v State of U. P. , reported in (2004)4 SCC 205 : 2004 C Cr LR (SC) 565 and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N. R. Vairamani, reported in (2004)8 SCC 579 . ( 6 ) MR Ranjit Ghosal appearing for the State of West Bengal submitted that the order of the learned Judge was bad in law. ( 6 ) MR Ranjit Ghosal appearing for the State of West Bengal submitted that the order of the learned Judge was bad in law. It is not permissible to defer wholesale cross examination of prosecution witnesses till all of them are examined in chief. This is in violation of provisions of recording evidence as laid down in Section 138 of the Evidence Act. The order of the learned Trial judge being bad in law should be set aside. ( 7 ) I have perused the revisional application, materials on record and considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates of the parties. It is evident that the petitioner as de facto complainant lodged the complaint/ fir on the basis of which Regent Park P. S. Case No. 196/98 under Sections 438a/302/34 of I. PC. was started against accused O. Ps. , and it ended in submission of charge-sheet against them It appears that in the charge-sheet the I O cited as many as 18 witnesses for prosecution After commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions, the learned Sessions Judge, 24-Parganas, alipore transferred the case to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions judge, 5th Court at Alipore. After the charge was framed the trial commenced under Sections 498a/302/201/34 of I. PC. and P. W. 1 was examined in full. Thereafter, the petitioner was examined as P. W. 2 and her examination in chief was complete, when the accused O. Ps. filed the application praying for deferring cross-examination of P. W. 2 till examination of charge-sheet witness numbers 10 Sunil Bhattacharya, 11 Smt. Sonali Bhattacharya, 13 Subrata bhattacharya, 15 Nirmal Bhattacharya and another witness Siddhartha mukherjee, son of the deceased. The learned Judge by impugned order dated 16. 2. 04 allowed the prayer of the defence under Section 231 (2) of crpc and deferred cross examination of P. W. 2 till the examination in chief of the other five witnesses are completed. ( 8 ) THE crux for consideration is whether by exercising the jurisdiction vested on him under Section 231 (2) of the Cr. PC. the learned Trial Judge properly applied his mind which would tantamount to an order where no interference is required by this Court. The submission of Mr. Bagchi for the 0 Ps indicates that, if the learned Judge failed to exercise the discretion, interference by th,s Court was permissible in law. PC. the learned Trial Judge properly applied his mind which would tantamount to an order where no interference is required by this Court. The submission of Mr. Bagchi for the 0 Ps indicates that, if the learned Judge failed to exercise the discretion, interference by th,s Court was permissible in law. In the instant case the learned Judge has exercised the discretion after applying proper judicial mind and the said order requires no interference The decision cited on behalf of the prosecution in the case of Md. Sanjay (supra) is clearly distinguishable in this case After carefully considering the submissions of the both parties as well as the submission of Mr. Bagchi and going through the provisions of section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. read with provisions of Section 138 of the Evidence act I am of opinion that the submission made by Mr. Bagchi for the O. Ps. are not acceptable. ( 9 ) IN Charan Singh (supra) the Supreme Court indicated that, "there is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases (See. Padma Sundara Raov. State of T. N. , (2002)3 scc 533 . It is more so in case where conclusions relate to appreciation of evidence in a criminal trial. "in State of Onssa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (supra) the Supreme Court observed that," A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides, What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. . . . . . . . It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. " ( 10 ) IN Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay (supra) the Supreme court held that, "whether a particular document should be summoned or not is essentially in the discretion of the trial Court. . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IN Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay (supra) the Supreme court held that, "whether a particular document should be summoned or not is essentially in the discretion of the trial Court. . . . . . . . . Except for very good reasons the High Court should not interfere with the discretion conferred on the trial Courts in the matter summoning documents. " In my opinion this decision is clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case and this decision is of no help to the accused O. Ps. Discretion relating to summon of some documents is clearly different and distinguishable from the discretion of the Court under Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. to defer cross examination of a witness till some other witnesses are examined which is against the normal procedure of trial of examination and cross examination as laid down in Section 138 of the Evidence Act. The earlier two decisions namely Charan Singh (supra) and State of Onssa (supra) are also not properly applicable in the facts circumstances of the present case. ( 11 ) IN Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) it was held by the supreme Court that, "courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgements of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. " ( 12 ) THIS decision is also of no help to the accused O. Ps in the present case considering facts and circumstances. Before proceeding into the merit of the revisional application it would be fruitful to mention the true meaning of Sections 226, 227, 228, 230 and 231 of Cr. PC. " ( 12 ) THIS decision is also of no help to the accused O. Ps in the present case considering facts and circumstances. Before proceeding into the merit of the revisional application it would be fruitful to mention the true meaning of Sections 226, 227, 228, 230 and 231 of Cr. PC. Section 226 prescribes that when the accused appears or is brought before the Court the learned Public Prosecutor shall open his case by describing the charge against the accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Section 227 prescribes that, if upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the learned judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. ( 13 ) IN the instant case as it appears the provisions of Section 227 were not followed and provisions of Section 228 were followed and charges were framed against the accused persons. Section 229 deals with conviction on plea of guilty and this section does not require our discussion as the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Section 230 of crpc prescribes that if the accused does not plead guilty and claim to be tried the Judge shall fix a date for the examination of witnesses, and may, on the application of the prosecution, issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or other thing. The provisions of Sections 230 and 231 (1) makes it clear that the Judge on the application of prosecution issue process or summons for compelling attendance of any witness. The provisions of Sections 230 and 231 (1) makes it clear that the Judge on the application of prosecution issue process or summons for compelling attendance of any witness. Section 231 (1) makes it clear that on the date so fixed for the trial the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution It is settled principle of law that it is the choice of prosecution or the Public Prosecutor that to whom or which witness the Public Prosecutor or the prosecution will examine as witness and in which order The accused or defence has no right at all to interfere in the manner of examination of witness as well as order of examination of witness or other person whom the prosecution may examine as a witness. Question of application of provisions of Section 231 (2) does not arise at all unless the prosecution starts examination of its witnesses The learned Judge without following the provisions of law cannot allow the application of defence and cannot direct the learned Public Prosecutor or the prosecution to examine some of the witnesses first according to choice of defence The accused cannot have any right of choice of examination of prosecution witnesses It is the choice of prosecution to examine witnesses according to seriality of charge-sheet or according to the choice of order as the learned P. P. in charge of the sessions case thinks it fit for establishing the case for prosecution. Unless recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses are started, question of deferring cross examination under Section 231 (2) of Cr P. C. does not arise at all Moreover, mere asking to defer cross examination cannot be a ground for allowing an application under Section 231 (2) of Cr. P. C. ( 14 ) I am fortified in my view which gets support form the judgment of the Supreme Court in Banti @ Gudduv. State of M. P. , reported in 2004 SCC (Cr) 294 2004 C Cr LR (SC) 230. The Supreme Court has observed that, "when the case reaches the stage as envisaged in Section 231 of the Code the Sessions Judge is obliged "to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution". State of M. P. , reported in 2004 SCC (Cr) 294 2004 C Cr LR (SC) 230. The Supreme Court has observed that, "when the case reaches the stage as envisaged in Section 231 of the Code the Sessions Judge is obliged "to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution". It is clear from the said section that the Public prosecutor is expected to produce evidence "in support of the prosecution" and not in derogation of the prosecution case. At the said stage the Public prosecutor would be in a position to take a decision as to which among the persons cited are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on the same point the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited, if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prcsecut'on in relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the Court considerably in lessening the workload the time has come to make every possible effort to lessen the workload, particularly of those Courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A four-Judge Bench of this Court had stated the above legal position thirty five years ago in Masaltiv State of U. P. , AIR 1965 sc 202 (1965)1 Cr LJ 226 It contextually apposite to extract the following observation of the Bench : (AIR p 209, para 12) "it is not unknown that where serious offences like the present are committed and a large number of accused persons are tried, attempts are made either to terrorist or win over prosecution witnesses and if the prosecutor honestly and bona fide believes that some of his witnesses have been won over, it would be unreasonable to insist that he must tender such witnesses before the Court. " The said decision was followed in Bava Hajee Hamsa v State of Kerala, 1974 SCC (Cr) 479 1974 SCC (Cr) 515 In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v State of Maharashtra, (1973)2 SCC 793 1973 SCC (Cr) 1033, Krishna Iyer, J, speaking for a three-Judge Bench had struck a note of caution that while a Public Prosecutor has the freedom "to pick and choose" witnesses, he should be fair to the court and to the truth. This Court reiterated the same position in Dalbir Kaur v State of Punjab, (1976)4 SCC 158 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 527 and in Hukam singh v State of Rajasthan, (2000)7 SCC 490 : 2000 SCC (Cr) 1416 : 2000 c Cr LR (SC) 230. " ( 15 ) THE law prescribes that after prosecution witnesses are examined cross examination by the accused and re-examination, if any, shall follow immediately in the order as prescribed in Section 138 of the Evidence Act there is no right to the accused to reserve cross-examination. Generally, or according to procedure examination and cross-examination of witnesses are a continuous process Sub-section (2) of Section 231 vests with the Judge a discretion to permit for sufficient reason, either) cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or n) recall any prosecution witness for further cross-examination. "any other witness or witnesses" definitely reters to prosecution witnesses. "any other witness or witnesses" definitely reters to prosecution witnesses. The defence has no right to claim postponement or deferring cross-examination of a witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, but the discretion to defer cross-examination lies with the Court and it will be exercised in a Special case where in the circumstances it is found necessary to postpone or defer cross examination of a prosecution witness until the examination of any other ptrosecution witness for effective cross examination of the witness concerned. ( 16 ) THE word "any witness" in sub-section (2) has significant meaning and it cannot be interpreted as deferring of cross examination of wholesale set of witnesses the letter part of the words in sub section (2) namely recall any witness tor further cross examination" has also significance ana it has relation to the earlier part of the word "any witness" in the said sub-section. It indicates that if the defence thinks that after examination of any prosecution case or some other prosecution witness there is need of further cross examination relating to certain points they would make a prayer before the learned Judge for further cross examination so that the defence can try to expose veracity of the evidence against them introduced by the prosecution witness or witnesses. ( 17 ) THIS Court earlier in Md. Sanjay (supra) clearly observed that deferring wholesale cross examination of prosecution witness is bad in law and it is not the intention of the legislature and the statute does not permit deferring of wholesale cross examination of prosecution witnesses till particular witness are examined in chief Almost identical view was expressed by this court in another Single Bench judgment in Abarna Mukhopadhyayv. Diptiman mukhcpadhyay, reported in (2005)1 C Cr LR (Cal) 62. ( 18 ) IN a criminal trial the accused has an additional advantage particularly in cases which arose on the basis of police report as in such cases copies of earlier statements of prosecution witnesses recorded under section 161, Cr. PC. Diptiman mukhcpadhyay, reported in (2005)1 C Cr LR (Cal) 62. ( 18 ) IN a criminal trial the accused has an additional advantage particularly in cases which arose on the basis of police report as in such cases copies of earlier statements of prosecution witnesses recorded under section 161, Cr. PC. are supplied to accused well in advance so that the accused can not only know to his advantage what each prosecution witness is expected to depose in Court in the witness box, but has also the advantage of cross examining each and every witness with reference to the earlier statements made by such witness as well as by any other witness during investigation and thereby trying to bring out discrepancies amongst the evidence of the witnesses inter se as given in Court and also discrepancies between the evidence of a witness in Court and the earlier statement made by such witness or witnesses to the police. The defence has the opportunity to take contradiction of the prosecution witnesses from the Investigating Officer who recorded earlier statement of witnesses during investigation under Section 161 of Crp. C. If any prosecution witness or witnesses introduced so many new things in evidence from witness box making partial or complete departure from earlier statement made by him or them to the Investigating Officer which was recorded under Section 161, Crp. C. , the contradictions taken by the defence would expose the veracity of such witness before the learned Court. In view of the aforesaid decisions and considering the true meaning of Section 231 (2) of Cr PC it is not permissible to defer wholesale cross examination of prosecution witnesses or defer cross examination of particular witness till examination of at least few prosecution witness according to choice of defence, when the law is that it is the Public Prosecutor who has the right to examine witness in the order as he likes. ( 19 ) THE language of any section or statute and interpretation of the words used in the section should be in harmony with the words having cognate sense by which it was intended by the Legislature or Parliament and, a different meaning is completely unwarranted Long back in 1955, the Supreme court in M K Ranganathan and Anr v Government of Madras, reported in AIR 1955 SC 604 held that, " (21) It is a well recognized rule of construction that 'when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together 'noscuntura socus' They are understood to be used in their cognate sense They take, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general" (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes-Edn 10, p 332)" ( 20 ) IN the Constitution Bench decision of Willie (William) Slaney v madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 the Supreme Court made the following observation"before we proceed to set out answer and examine the provisions of the Code, we will pause to observe that the Code is a Code of procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well-established and well- understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice". ( 21 ) THE above stated principles of law make it clear that in order to construe words used in any section it is legitimate rule of construction to construe the words with reference to words found in immediate connection with them Section 231 (2) of Crpc thus make it clear that the Court may in its discretion permit cross examination of 'any witness' to be deferred until any otner witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross examination The word "any other witness or witnesses" obviously refers to prosecution witness which the learned Public Prosecutor will produce to establish case of prosecution It is true that according to legal dictionary the word 'any' excludes limitation or qualification and 'any' may mean one as construed with more than one In construing the true sense of the words of section 231 (2) of Crpc the words 'permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred' does not indicate that the Legislature and the Parliament had ever intention to permit deferring of wholesale cross-examination of prosecution witnesses The accused has no right for deferring cross- examination of prosecution witnesses in a wholesale way on the plea that otherwise the prosecution may take the chance of filling up the lacuna in its case that may be disclosed during cross-examination I have already indicated that it is the right of the Public Prosecutor or the prosecution to prove its case and it is the privilege of Public Prosecutor to decide as to in which order he will examine the prosecution witnesses in proving the case of prosecution ( 22 ) IN the instant case as it has been argued on behalf of the accused o Ps that as the witnesses named above belong to same family their cross examination may be deferred till examination in chief of other witnesses are completed and thereafter cross examination of the five witnesses and PW2 may be taken up one after another In my opinion this is not at all permissible pw2 is the mother and she is definitely the aggrieved person and infructuous Learned P. P may submit before the Court that he does not intend to examine remaining persons of same category. The impugned order, if allowed to stand would make provisions of Sections 231 (1), 309 of Cr. The impugned order, if allowed to stand would make provisions of Sections 231 (1), 309 of Cr. P. C. and Section 138 of the Evidence Act nugatory When choice is of learned puolic Prosecutor to examine prosecution witness according to order he likes and when examination of witnesses has once began the same shall be continued from day to day and after examination of prosecution the cross- examination shall follow immediately under Section 138, Evidence Act If cross-examination of P. W 2 is deferred till examination of charge witness Nos. 10,11,13,15 and another it would frustrate the purpose of Sessions trial and would make delay in the trial which is wholly undesirable ( 23 ) NON production of available witnesses cannot in each occasion lead to adverse presumption under Section 114 (g) of Evidence Act against prosecution and such presumption is always optional and one of fact depending upon the whole set of facts, and it is not obligatory (Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Naram, AIR 1975 SC 2229 and also in view of Pal Singh and Ors. v. State of U. P. , AIR 1979 SC 1116 ). ( 24 ) FOR ends of justice in this case cross-examination of PW. 2 may be deferred till the examination of the father of deceased, namely, Sunil Kanti bhattacharya is completed, if prosecution wants to examine him as a witness and, if he is examined by prosecution he should be treated as P. W 3. The prayer of defence for deferring cross examination of P. W 2 till the examination in chief of Sonali Bhattacharya, Subrata Bhattacharya. Nirmal Bhattacharya and Siddhartha Mukherjee cannot be permitted as it is against provisions of law as indicated above The observation made above considering nature of this case permitting cross examination of P. W. 2 to be deferred till examination in chief of her husband cannot be applied as universal rule of application in each and every case. The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge being not in accordance with law is set aside as he failed to exercise discretion properly, or exercised his discretion improperly without considering provisions of law relating to examinations of witnesses in trial. The learned Judge would allow the defence to cross-examine PW. The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge being not in accordance with law is set aside as he failed to exercise discretion properly, or exercised his discretion improperly without considering provisions of law relating to examinations of witnesses in trial. The learned Judge would allow the defence to cross-examine PW. 2 and P. W. 3, and thereafter, will proceed with the trial in accordance with rules as laid down in Section 231 (1) of Crpc read with Section 138 of Evidence Act in order of presentation of witnesses before the learned trial Court by the learned Public Prosecutor in charge of the case. ( 25 ) THE revisional application is accordingly allowed and disposed of in terms of the directions as made above in the body of the order. Since the trial is pending from February, 2004, the learned Trial Judge is directed to proceed with the trial as expeditiously as possible without granting undue adjournment to either of the parties. ( 26 ) CRIMINAL Section is directed to send a copy of this order to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Alipore for information and necessary action.