Judgment P.S. Asopa, J.-This writ petition directed against the Judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short CAT) dated 210.2001 whereby the original application filed by the respondent applicant Naman Singh Shekhawat against the dismissal order dated 02.02.1993 and appellate Court order dated 17.04.2004 has been allowed and the aforesaid orders have been quashed and set aside with a direction to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits. 2. Briefly stated the relevant facts are that the respondent while working on the post of Assistant Central Vigilance Officer was served with a charge-sheet dated 01.05.1992 after his acquittal from the criminal case vide -Judgment dated 11.07.1991. The said charge-sheet contained two charges, which are reproduced hereunder:- Article -I Shri N.S. Shekhawat, ACIO-II (under suspension) during his posting at Barmer undertook a tour of the area falling under P.S. Ramsar, district Barmer during the night of August 5, 1983. As per record available, no operation was going on or planned in this area during the above period which necessitated the ACIO-II to undertake the tour in odd hours in mid-night. The record further shows that the ACIO-II or the unit did not have any source or contact in the said area whom he was required to contact at mid-night near the international border. Further, plan of the ACIO-II to undertake this tour during odd hours was not in the knowledge of ACIO-IIs superior officers nor did he feel it necessary to take any of his superior into confidence before undertaking this tour/operation. Even after the tour, no follow-up report has been sent by the ACIO-II in furtherance of his selfish interest in which he also used Government vehicle and revolver. He thus not only acted in defiance of normal set official practice but also used Government machinery in pursuit of his private personal interest in which no public interest was involved. Article - II During the unauthorised tour, Shri N.S. Shekhawat on the night of 5th August, 1983 unauthorisedly collected and carried smuggled articles in the Government jeep beyond any conceivable call of his legitimate duties. Thus, act on his part brought avoidable embarrassment to the Department and put the whole organisation in disrepute. The act of Shri Shekhawat was highly unbecoming of an Intelligence Officer and constitutes gross professional mis-conduct. 3. Thus, act on his part brought avoidable embarrassment to the Department and put the whole organisation in disrepute. The act of Shri Shekhawat was highly unbecoming of an Intelligence Officer and constitutes gross professional mis-conduct. 3. Thereafter, the enquiry officer was appointed, enquiry was conducted and concluded by him, on conclusion of the enquiry a copy of the enquiry report was given to the respondent and the respondent submitted his objection to the finding of the enquiry officer, which were considered by the disciplinary authority. Ultimately, the respondent applicant was dismissed from service. Against the said dismissal order an appeal was filed and the same was dismissed on 17.04.2000. Against the dismissal order dated 02.02.1993 and rejection of the appeal vide order dated 17.04.2000, the respondent applicant filed an original application before the CAT. 4. The short question involved in this case is whether even after acquittal a departmental enquiry can be instituted? 5. The said question has been answered by the CAT that after clear cut acquittal of the respondent applicant by the criminal Court, there was nothing against the applicant which warrants the departmental authorities to initiate an enquiry against the applicant. .6. Apart from that, after going through the record of the enquiry as well as dismissal order the CAT observed that no preliminary enquiry was conducted, there was no evidence and the evidence of departmental witness Mool Chand does not support the case of the department. The relevant Paragraphs No. 10, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24 & 25 of the CAT Judgment are reproduced hereunder:- 10. In the instant case, the applicant was acquitted alongwith others. There was no evidence of criminal misappropriation against the applicant and other accused. No preliminary inquiry has been conducted by the department in this case before initiation of the departmental inquiry. Therefore, after clear cut acquittal of the applicant by the criminal Court, there was nothing against the applicant which warranted the departmental authorities to initiate an inquiry against the applicant. 16. The learned Counsel for the applicant has also argued that the conduct of the Inquiry Officer in this case has been through out based and based on his pre-determined notions. He has refered:- .(i) Shri Mool Singh was examined without his name was mentioned in the list of witnesses. .(ii) Shri Jamma was not called as defence witness. 16. The learned Counsel for the applicant has also argued that the conduct of the Inquiry Officer in this case has been through out based and based on his pre-determined notions. He has refered:- .(i) Shri Mool Singh was examined without his name was mentioned in the list of witnesses. .(ii) Shri Jamma was not called as defence witness. (iii) Theapplicant was not given proper opportunity to take the assistance of his defence assistant Shri Madhukar Sharma. .(iv) No opportunity to cross-examine Shri Mool Singh was given to applicant inspite of the fact that the controlling department did not relieve Shri Madhukar Sharma on that date. .(v) The delinquent was cross-examined by the Inquiry Officer himself and not by the departmental representative. 17. It isundisputed fact that Shri Mool Singh was examined although his name was not in the list of witnesses. The applicants request to call Shri Jammua as defence witness was not allowed. Not only this but in the absence of the departmental representative Shri Madhukar Sharma, the applicant was complled to cross-examine Shri Mool Singh who was cited as main witness in this case. It is also not disputed that the inquiry officer himself has cross-examined the applicant which was the duty of the departmental representatives. It appears that the conduct of the Inquiry Officer in this case has been throughout baissed and it appears that he has acted with predetermined notions which should have caused prejudice to the applicant. 18. The learned Counsel for the applicant argued that in spite of the fact that principles of natural justice have not been followed by the Inquiry Officer while conducting the enquiry in this case, there is no evidence on record to corroborate the charges against the applicant. The learned Counsel for the respondents has objected to this argument and submitted that the Tribunal or the High Court should not act as appellate authority, therefore, they are not allowed to appreciate or reappreciate the evidence. 23. In the instant case, there is no evidence to corroborate the charge against the applicant. The case of the applicant solely or mainly depends on the statement of Shri Mool Chand, who does not support the charges at all. Criminal Court has already acquitted the accused on the basis of no evidence. In support of the allegations against the applicant no preliminary enquiry was conducted in this case. The case of the applicant solely or mainly depends on the statement of Shri Mool Chand, who does not support the charges at all. Criminal Court has already acquitted the accused on the basis of no evidence. In support of the allegations against the applicant no preliminary enquiry was conducted in this case. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that there is no evidence on record to sustain the charges against the applicant and it is a case of no evidence. Therefore, the finding of the Inquiry Officer can be characterised as perverse. 24. The learned Counsel for the applicant has argued that the order of the appellate authority is a non speaking order and was passed without application of mind as the impugned order of termination has been not sustainable in law as the same was passed upon the perverse findings of the Inquiry Officer. 25. We, therefore, allow this OA and quash and set aside the impugned order of termination dated 02.02.1993 and appellate order dated 17.04.2000 and direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant forthwith in service. Applicant is also entitled for all consequential benefits thereof . 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the CAT committed an error in reassessing and re-appreciating the evidence as appellate Court, which is not function of the CAT and in support of the aforesaid argument the learned Counsel placed reliance on 1996 SC 1669, 1998 (2) SC 394, 1998 (1) SC 700, AIR 1996 SC 2474 , AIR 1996 SC 1232 . The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the acquittal was on technical ground and cannot be construed as clear exoneration on this point. He has placed reliance on 1997 (4) Supreme Court Cases 385, Union of India & Anr. vs. Bihari Lal Sidhana, 2000 (10) Supreme Court Cases 177, State of A.P vs. K. Allabakash. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the CAT has committed an error in considering the fact that no preliminary enquiry was conducted in this case. The further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the preliminary enquiry is not a mandatory requirement for conducting the departmental enquiry. The same is a fact finding enquiry and even the departmental enquiry can be initiated directly without there being preliminary enquiry. 9. The further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the preliminary enquiry is not a mandatory requirement for conducting the departmental enquiry. The same is a fact finding enquiry and even the departmental enquiry can be initiated directly without there being preliminary enquiry. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that after acquittal the departmental authorities could not have initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Hence, entire exercises of taking disciplinary action is void-ab-initio and in support of the said argument the learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the Judgment AIR 1964 (SC) 786 and 1999 (3) Supreme Court Cases 679, Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the CAT has rightly given finding on the aforesaid issues in accordance with the law. Merely making a reference of some witness does not amount to re-appreciation and the conclusion of the CAT that the present case is of no evidence is based on record of the enquiry. He further placed reliance on other Judgment s which has been relied upon by the CAT on the issue of no evidence and others. 11. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order, considered the rival submissions and the Judgment s, cited by the Counsel. 12. Law on the point that reappreciation or reassessment of evidence is not permitted under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India is well settled. Here in the instant case neither the evidence was reappreciated nor the same was reassessed by the CAT and mere reference of statement of prosecution witness does not amount to reappreciation or reassessment, therefore, there is no need to discuss the aforesaid Judgment s on this point. 13. As regard the issue of no evidence, it is submitted that since the said departmental witness Mool Chand does not support the case of the Department and there was a report of the Department on record of Additional Collector Custom, Jaipur (Annexure-26) wherein the petitioner was exonerated of charge of unauthorisied seizure and use of vehicle, therefore, there was no need of initiating the enquiry after the acquittal. 14. The further submission of petitioner that the criminal Court has not exonerated him clearly, we are of the opinion that the petitioners are misconstruing the Judgment of the acquittal. 14. The further submission of petitioner that the criminal Court has not exonerated him clearly, we are of the opinion that the petitioners are misconstruing the Judgment of the acquittal. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charges of Sections 409, 120-B, IPC, as well as 13(2) Foreigners Act & 27 of Arms Act, therefore, the petitioner has been acquitted, which is a clear acquittal on merit. Therefore, the Judgment s cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard are not applicable. 15. The contents of the FIR mentioned in the Judgment of the criminal case dated 11.07.1991 (Annexure-27), the issues under consideration framed by the criminal Court and the final finding of the criminal case are reproduced hereunder for ready reference. Therefore, the Judgment s cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard are not applicable. 15. The contents of the FIR mentioned in the Judgment of the criminal case dated 11.07.1991 (Annexure-27), the issues under consideration framed by the criminal Court and the final finding of the criminal case are reproduced hereunder for ready reference. 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Last submission made by the Counsel for the petitioner is that prelinary enquiry is not a bar to conduct regular enquiry. It is true that a departmental enquiry straightway can be conducted without there being any preliminary enquiry. The Constitution Bench made distinction between preliminary enquiry and departmental enquiry and it was held that the preliminary enquiry is fact collection enquiry by Government to decide whether departmental enquiry is to be conducted or not. The preliminary enquiry can be held ex parte. Constitution Bench of Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1854, Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs. The Union of India held so in Para 12, which is reproduced hereunder:- (12) Generally, therefore, a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. Even where Government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy Government that there is reason to dispense with the service of a temporary employee or to revert him to his substantive post, for as we have said already Government does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore, when a preliminary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a Government servant holding a higher rank temporarily it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry made (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry) when the Government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the three major punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the Government servant. Therefore, so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of its being Government by Article 311 (2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of Government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary Government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a Government servant in which he may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte, for its merely for the satisfaction of Government, though usually for the same of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry. But at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government and it is only when the Government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purposes of inflicting one of the three major punishments that the Government servant gets the protection of Article 311 and all the rights that that protection implies as already indicated above. There must, therefore, be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the Government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that article. That is why this Court emphasized in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case, 1958 SCR 828 : ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) and in Shyam Lal vs State of Uttar Pradesh, 1955 (1) SCR 26 : ( AIR 1954 SC 369 ) that the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule is irrelevant. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Although there is no reference of the said Judgment in the latest Judgment of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioner reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2148, Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., but still the law on the point is the same. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Although there is no reference of the said Judgment in the latest Judgment of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioner reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2148, Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., but still the law on the point is the same. Here we would like to add that CAT has not based its decision merely, on the preliminary enquiry but the circumstances referred by it with a view had the same been conducted and acquittal and report of the seizure and ownership of goods by Additional Collector Custom had been considered there would not have been the charge-sheet. We are also of the view that had the same been conducted and report of the Additional Collector Custom on seizure and ownership of goods (Annexure-26) whereby it was held that seized goods do not belong to Naman Singh Shekhawat (Respondent) as well as acquittal been considered, then authorities might have come to the conclusion that there is no need of any departmental enquiry. 18. The word "misconduct" has not been defined under the Central Civil Services (CC & A) Rules 1965 or in any other para materia Government conduct rules. The Honble Supreme Court in such a circumstances has taken the dictionary meaning of misconduct in the case reported in 1992 (4) Supreme Court Cases 54, State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Ram Singh Ex-constable. The relevant Paras 5 and 6 reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 5. Misconduct has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus:-"A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness." "Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the fact of on affirmative duty to act." P. Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821 defines misconduct thus:-"The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of Judgment . Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskillfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected." 6. Thus, it could be seen that the word misconduct though not capable of precise definition, or reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of Judgment , carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order. In Service Jurisprudence it has also been stated that any violation of the conduct rules is misconduct. At the same time, it has also been stated that illustrations of misconduct given in conduct rules are not exhaustive. 19. On the contrary the offence is defined in Section 40 of the Indian Penal Code. It seldom consists of a single act. In Service Jurisprudence it has also been stated that any violation of the conduct rules is misconduct. At the same time, it has also been stated that illustrations of misconduct given in conduct rules are not exhaustive. 19. On the contrary the offence is defined in Section 40 of the Indian Penal Code. It seldom consists of a single act. Usually it is composed of several elements and, as a rule, the whole series of acts must be proved before the offence can be said to have been committed. "Offence" as was pointed out by the Court in Maqbool Hussains case 1953 SCR 730 , where Article 20(2) of the Constitution came up for consideration has not been defined in the Constitution. So under Article 367, which provides that the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply for the interpretation of the Constitution of word "offence: in the several clauses of Article 20 must be understood to convey the meaning given to it in Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act. That section defines an offence to mean an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. Thus, it can be said that every offence is a misconduct and reverse of it, is not correct. It can also be said that misconduct is short of offence. 20. The Judgment cited by the Counsel for the respondent, reported in, AIR 1965 Mad. 502 , 1973 (2) SLR 238 and the Judgment 1999 (3) Supreme Court Cases 679 Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., have relevant bearing on issues. The paras 34 and 35 of the Judgment of M. Paul Anthony (Supra), is reproduced hereunder:- 34. Thereis yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, "the raid conducted at the appellants residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom". The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery", at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 2.35. Since, the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof , would not be applicable to the instant case. 21. However, there are some other Judgment s on the issue which we would like to refer in order to strengthen the point in issue. 22. The Honble Supreme Court in, AIR 1984 SC 636 , in Para 6 has discussed the law on issue of acquittal in criminal case and continuation of enquiry. The Hon