ORDER 1. Application for substitution is allowed and the persons whose names have been given in para 3 of the affidavit of Nirmal Chaudhary affirmed on 7-11-2004 be taken on record. It is recorded that the learned counsel appearing for the respondents represents the substituted parties also. 2. Leave granted. 3. The subject-matter of dispute in this appeal relates to joint family property. The property was originally owned by one Kashi Chaudhary. Kashi b married Gulaichi Kaur. They had three sons, namely, Ram Lakhan, Sarjug and Ram Swamp. Kashi died in 1944 leaving behind him his widow Gulaichi and his three sons. Gulaichi executed two deeds of gift in respect of certain portions of the joint family property in favour of the wife and children of Ram Lakhan. Challenging the gifts a suit was filed by the heirs of the other two sons of Gulaichi for a declaration that the deeds of gift were invalid and c illegal and not binding upon them. It was inter alia contended by the plaintiffs that Gulaichi did not have any right in the joint family property. Ram Lakhan and Gulaichi contested the suit. They claimed that there had in fact been a partition of the joint family property in 1953 and that the property which was the subject-matter of the two gift deeds had fallen in Gulaichis share. The trial court held in favour of Ram Lakhan and Gulaichi on both d counts, namely, that Gulaichi had an interest in the joint family property and that there had in fact been a partition of the joint family properties in 1953. The suit was, accordingly, dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved, a first appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs who are now the respondents before us. The appellate court recorded that the parties had compromised the appeal: "On the terms that the plaintiffs should get a decree for partition and the share in the lands covered by two deeds of gift would remain subject to the allotment of it to the donor." It was ordered: "That the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower court be set aside on agreement but without cost. The case is f remanded back to the lower court who will permit amendment of the plaint for insertion of prayer for partition also and payment of court fee. The case is f remanded back to the lower court who will permit amendment of the plaint for insertion of prayer for partition also and payment of court fee. Thereafter, as agreed between the parties, the lower court would rewrite a fresh judgment giving decree for partition between the parties. All the lands including the lands covered by the two deeds of gift would be put in the hotchpot and thereafter the parties may privately partition the lands in accordance with the share or wishes or by the process of the court by metes and bounds. The lands falling in the share of Mst Gulaichi Devi would be liable to go to the donees as per two deeds of gift." 5. On remand, the trial court construed the order quoted by us earlier and held that upon partition the lands covered by the deeds of gift would be allotted to Defendants 1-4 (who are the appellants before us). According to the trial court, that was evidently the intention behind the order and it was so decreed. 6. The respondents preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge was of the view that the trial court had misconstrued the compromise decree. It was held that all the lands had been directed to be put into the "hotchpot" and on a harmonious and equitable interpretation the order meant that there would be a partition of the lands according to the shares of the property. 7. The appellants preferred a second appeal to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the second appeal by holding that there was no question of Gulaichi inheriting any share in the joint family property. It was also held that the observations and direction of the first appellate court in the previous round of litigation indicated unambiguously that the land covered under the deeds of gift would be thrown in the common "hotchpot" and all co-sharers would get allotment as per shares available over these lands also. 8. The appellants have challenged this decision of the High Court and have contended that the High Court had wrongly affirmed the decision of the first appellate court. It is submitted that the High Court had erred in deciding that Gulaichi was not entitled to any share in the joint family property. 8. The appellants have challenged this decision of the High Court and have contended that the High Court had wrongly affirmed the decision of the first appellate court. It is submitted that the High Court had erred in deciding that Gulaichi was not entitled to any share in the joint family property. It was contended that the right of Gulaichi under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 had, by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 been transformed into an absolute interest and that Gulaichi was fully entitled to a share in the joint family property along with her three sons. The further contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the compromise decree had been misconstrued and that it was never the intention of the parties that the subject-matter of the gift in the two gift deeds would not be allotted to the appellants but to all the parties. It is the appellants case that those properties were directed to be put into the common "hotchpot" only for the purpose of calculating the shares available to the various parties. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has, on the other hand, contended that the compromise decree had clearly provided that the respondents gave up their challenge to the right of Gulaichi as a shareholder in the joint family property. According to the counsel for the respondents, the compromise was to the effect that the share of Gulaichi to the extent covered by the deeds of gift would be given to the appellants and that the respondents would make no claim in respect thereof. 10. At the outset, we hold that the High Court was wrong in going behind the compromise decree. The only question before the High Court was whether the particular land covered by the two deeds of gift were to be made available to the appellants in specie. 11. It appears to us that the clauses of the compromise decree will have to be construed in the background of the fact that the parties were effecting a compromise. From the point of view of the respondents, they gave up their challenge to the right of Gulaichi as a co-sharer in the joint family property. In return, they wanted that all the properties of the joint family should be put into "hotchpot" for the purpose of partition. From the point of view of the respondents, they gave up their challenge to the right of Gulaichi as a co-sharer in the joint family property. In return, they wanted that all the properties of the joint family should be put into "hotchpot" for the purpose of partition. The division of the property would be made between the three branches of the sons of Gulaichi and Kashi a equally except to the extent of the share in the lands covered by the two deeds of gift. If we accept the appellants submission that the specific land covered by the two deeds of gift would be given to them that would mean that they would not only get what they had been claiming all along but would in addition get further shares in the joint family property. 12. In other words, there would have been no element of compromise on the part of the appellants and the first appeal would have not only been decided in the appellants favour but would have also conferred additional benefits in the form of a share in the balance of the joint family property. We do not think that this could have been the intention of the parties to the compromise. A compromise between the parties means that there is some element of give and take on both sides. If one were to accept the appellants construction of the compromise decree, there would be no giving on their part at all. 13. Besides, the words in the ordering portion of the compromise decree clearly show that what was being spoken of was "the lands falling in the share" of Gulaichi Devi in generic terms. The further phrase "as per two deeds of gift" referred to this share and not to the lands in specie. The paragraph which preceded the operative portion of the decree also speaks of "the share in the lands covered by two deeds of gift" and not "lands covered by the two deeds of gift". 14. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was correct in the conclusion it reached. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal without e any order as to costs.