Industrial Relations Manager, Madurai Coats Limited,Papavinasam Mills (Post), Ambasamudram, and others . . . v. Jayaraman and another
2005-02-10
PRABHA SRIDEVAN
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER: The management has filed this revision against the order passed in I.A.No.865 of 2004 in O.S.No.116 of 2003. The suit was filed by the first respondent for a declaration that the order of demotion passed by the petitioners on 4.2.2002 is not valid and a direction to the petitioners to restore him in the same post as before. The petitioners filed their written statement and raised a plea inter alia that the matter related to an industrial dispute and must be decided before the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Therefore, the petitioners filed I.A.No.865 of 2004 for raising a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction. The trial Court elaborately considered the matter and came to the conclusion that the preliminary issue with regard to jurisdiction must be answered in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents. Against that this revision is filed. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners would refer to the decisions reported in The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishna Kant, A.I.R.1995 S.C.1715, M/s. Madura Coats Limited, Papanasam Mills Post, Vikramasingapuram, Ambasamudram, Tirunelveli District by its General Manager and another v. Devadoss Sathraj, (2003)3 L.W.419, Tamil Nadu Cement Corporation Limited v. Jabamalai and others, (1996)3 L.L.J.(Supp.) 471 and The Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 to support their case. 3. The learned counsel for the first respondent on the other hand would submit that it is only if the dispute is one under Sec.2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the civil Court remedy is barred, but whereas demotion has not been enumerated as a dispute covered by Sec.2-A and therefore, the first respondent was entitled to file a civil suit for his relief. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Thirupattur Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. S.Sivalingam, (2003)2 L.L.J. 231. 4. Sec.2-A where certain specific industrial disputes are enumerated is really an extension of the definition of “Industrial Dispute” under Sec.2(k). Originally, before the enactment of Sec.2-A, the workers faced a difficulty, since the decisions in this respect were to the effect that a dispute between the employer and an individual workmen does not constitute an Industrial dispute, unless, the cause of the workmen is espoused by a body of workmen.
Originally, before the enactment of Sec.2-A, the workers faced a difficulty, since the decisions in this respect were to the effect that a dispute between the employer and an individual workmen does not constitute an Industrial dispute, unless, the cause of the workmen is espoused by a body of workmen. This aspect has been discussed in detail by the Apex Court in The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishna Kant, A.I.R.1995 S.C.1715: “The expression” Industrial Dispute “ is defined in Sec.2(k) to mean any dispute or difference: (i) between employers and employers;(ii) between employers and workmen; and (iii) between workmen and workmen, provided such dispute is connected with the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that a dispute between the employer and an individual workman does not constitute an industrial dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by a body of workmen [See.Bombay Union of Journalists v.” The Hindu“, (1961)2 L.L.J.436: A.I.R.1963 S.C.318.] Of course, where the dispute concerns the body of the workers as a whole or to a section thereof, it is an industrial dispute. It is precisely for this reason that Sec.2-A was inserted by Amendment Act, 35 of 1965. It says,” where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute“. By virtue of this provision, the scope of the concept of industrial dispute has been widened, which now embraces not only Sec.2(k) but also Sec.2-A.Sec.2-A, however, covers only cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination otherwise of services of an individual workman and no other matters, which means that - to give an example - if a workman is reduced in rank pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the dispute raised by him does not become an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sec.2-A. However, if the Union or body of workmen espouses his cause, it does become an industrial dispute.
We have given only one instance; there may be many disputes which would not fall within Sec.2(k) or Sec.2-A. It is obvious that in all such cases, the remedy is only in a Civil Court or by way of arbitration according to law, if the parties so choose. The machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act for resolution of disputes (in short, Secs.10 or 12) does not apply to such dispute).” It has been held specifically in this case that if a workman is reduced in rank, pursuant to domestic enquiry that dispute raised by him does not become an Industrial Dispute within the meaning of Sec.2-A, but it would become an Industrial Dispute, if the Union or a body of workmen support the case of the individual workman. 5. In this case the first respondent has been reduced in rank. According to him, the Assistant Commissioner by his letter dated 2.4.2003 had advised him to seek the help of the Union and that no Union came forward to help him and the respondent was bound to act in compliance with the standing orders and if he violates the standing orders, the employer was entitled to take action against him. But according to him, the enquiry was in violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, the civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the case. These submissions are recorded in the impugned order. 6. O.14, Rule 2 gives the Court the discretion to dispose of the suit on a preliminary issue, only if the issue relates to jurisdiction of the Court or a bar of suit. It is further necessary that the suit may be disposed of on an issue of law only. Only in those circumstances, the Court may dispose of the suit on a preliminary issue, when both the question of law and of fact are raised in the suit. But otherwise the Court shall pronounce the Judgment on all issues. 7.
It is further necessary that the suit may be disposed of on an issue of law only. Only in those circumstances, the Court may dispose of the suit on a preliminary issue, when both the question of law and of fact are raised in the suit. But otherwise the Court shall pronounce the Judgment on all issues. 7. In fact in the judgment reported in M/s.Madura Coats Limited, Papanasam Mills Post, Vikramasingapuram, Ambasamudram, Tirunelveli District by its General Manager and another v. Devadoss Sathraj, (2003)3 L.W. 419 , the learned Judge makes the following observation: “Had the learned Principal District Munsif decided that the maintainability of the suit can be decided along with other issues at the time of trial, there will be no cause for this C.R.P. being filed by the petitioners. Since the learned Principal District Munsif has Naheld that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction, this revision petition has been filed by the petitioners.” 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the relief of mandatory injunction for restoration of the first respondent in the original post, is not the one that can be given by a civil Court, since it is barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. 9. The observation of the Supreme Court in The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishna Kant, A.I.R.1995 S.C.1715, is clearly to the effect that a dispute, which is not covered by Sec.2-A would become an industrial dispute only if the Union or the body of workmen supports the individual workmen. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the order and the finding given thereon actually deprived the petitioners, an opportunity to disprove the first respondent’s case that his dispute was not supported by Union. But it is the petitioners who filed this application for trying the issue as a preliminary issue. When an issue involves a mixed question of fact and law, it would have been better for the Court to pronounce judgment on all the issues, including the issue relating to maintainability of suit. However, the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that the suit should be dismissed as not maintainable cannot be accepted, since that will depend upon the question whether the Union or the body of workmen supported the first respondent.
However, the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that the suit should be dismissed as not maintainable cannot be accepted, since that will depend upon the question whether the Union or the body of workmen supported the first respondent. Dismissal of the I.A. is not interfered with, since the issue of maintainability could not have been tried as a preliminary issue, but however, the Court below has also given a finding that the suit is maintainable. In the event, if at the time of trial of the suit, the petitioners are able to prove that the dispute raised by the first respondent under Sec.2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act was espoused by the body of workmen, then the trial Court shall give a finding on the same uninfluenced by observation of this Court or the dismissal of this revision. 10. With the above observations, the C.R.P is disposed of. Consequently, connected C.M.P is closed.