Judgment Prem Shanker Asopa, J.-By the instant writ petition, the petitioner-Bank has challenged the award of the Labour Court dated 18.07.2005 whereby the reference has been answered in favour of the workman with a direction to reinstate him without any back wages. 2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the case are that the workman was employed as a clerk against a permanent post vide oral order dated 02.08.1983 and his service were terminated on 23.05.1984 without giving any notice or pay in lieu of the notice. It was submitted in the statement of claim that although he was paid on daily wages basis but the work was of permanent nature at the time of termination of the services no seniority list was prepared and the junior persons were working. After termination also one Shri Arvind Mathur was employed who is still in employment but the petitioner was not given any opportunity of re-employment. It was also stated by the petitioner that he is unemployed and approached the respondents so many times but only assurance was given and he was not taken back in service. Therefore, the termination is in gross violation of Section 25-F, G read with Rules 77 and 78 of Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rule 1958 and Section 25-H and the same is liable to be declared null and void with a further direction to reinstate the petitioner with back wages. 3. In reply to the statement of claim, the respondents have submitted that the petitioner was employed on daily wages Rs. 14/-per day, which was temporary in nature. The petitioner has not reported on duty after 23.05.1984. The objection of delay of 14 years was also taken. 4. The oral evidence as well as documentary evidence was produced by the parties. 5. The Labour Court after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the petitioner has worked for more than 218 days in proceeding last 12 months and on adding the Gazette holidays the said period is more than 240 days. It was also held by the Labour Judge that neither one month notice nor pay in lieu of notice nor any compensation has been paid, therefore, the Section 25-F has been violated. While granting the relief of the reinstatement the Labour Court has considered the fact of unemployment, delay and denied the back wages. It was also held by the Labour Judge that neither one month notice nor pay in lieu of notice nor any compensation has been paid, therefore, the Section 25-F has been violated. While granting the relief of the reinstatement the Labour Court has considered the fact of unemployment, delay and denied the back wages. The relevant Paras No. 7 and 8 of the award of the Labour Court dated 18.07.2005 are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- Þ7- ;gka ij izkFkhZ dh vksvk gS ftlesa mlus fnukad 02-08-1983 ls 23-05-1984 ok easjguk crk;k gSA fnukad 23-05-1984 dks lsFkd dj fn;kA mls ,d ekg rd foi{khx.k ds ;gka lsok ls i`dk uksfVl vFkok uksfVl ds cnys osru o NaVuh eqvkotk ugha fn;k gS] tcfd mlus ,d o"kZ esa 240 fnu ls vf /kd dk;Z fd;k gSA mldh izfrijh{kk ls tkfgj gS fd mls 14@& #i;s jkst ij nSfud osru Hkksxh ij fnukad 02-08-1983 dks lsnkZ ,e 1] iznkZ ,e 5] iznkZ ,e 9] mldh lsok esa j[kk x;k gSiznkZ ,e 3] iznkZ ,e 7 o izgktjh ds ckjs esa vkosnu crk;s gS ,oa iznkZ 2] iznkZ ,e 4] iznkZ ,e 6] iznkZ ,e 8] o iznkZ ,e 10] ij osru vnk;xh o osru okmplZ crk;s x;s gSA iznkZ ,e 11] dk;Z fnol dk fooj.k gS A mldk ;g Hkh dFku gS fd ;g xyr gS fd mlus 218 fnu gh dk;Z fd;k gks vkSj Lor% gh ukSdjh NksM+dj x;k gksA blds [k.Mu esa foi{khx.k dk xokg vafcdsk ikjhd dk kiFk&i= esa tkfgj fd;k gS fd 14@& #i;s izfr dk;Z fnol ds fglkc ls fnukad 02-08-1983 dks iw.krZ% vLFkkbZ :i ls izkFkhZ dks j[kk x;k FkkA ftl dk;Z ds fy, j[kk x;k Fkk og ebZ 1984 esa iw.kZ gks x;kA izkFkhZ us fnukad 02-08-1983 ls ebZ] 1984 ds e/; rd 218 fnu dk;Z fd;k gS A iznkZ ,e 1] ls iznkZ ,e 11] dk;Z fnol o okmplZ crk;s x;s gS mldk izfrijh{k.k esa Lohdkj djuk fd izkFkhZ us 218 fnu dke fd;k gSA Jfed dks vuqca/k ij j[kk x;k Fkk] nSfud osru ij j[kk x;k Fkk A cSad esa lsok j gkftj gks x;kA xSfu;e cus gS tks isk dj ldrk gawA Jfed LosPNk ls Lo;a xSj gkftj jgus ij mls uksfVl ugha fn;kA Jfed dks dksbZ NaVuh eqvkotk ugha fn;k A vr% LI"V gS fd foi{kh dk xokg ;g Lohdkj djrk gS fd izkFkhZ us 218 fnu dke fd;k Fkk vkSj mls NaVuh eqvkotk oxSjk ugha fn;kA iznkZ MCyw 1 foi{kh ds a dke fd;k gSA nLrkost ls tkfgj gS fd izkFkhZ us 02-08-1983 ls 23-05-1984 rd cSad esnkZ ,e 11] foi{kh ds i= ls gh tkfgj gS fd izkFkhZ us vxLr] flrEcj] vDVwcj] uoEcj] fnlEcj] 1983] tuojh] Qjojh] ekpZ] vizSy o 23-05-1984 rd 218 fnu dke fd;k gSA mlesa ;g Hkh tkfgj gS fd fnukad 23-05-1984 ds ckn mifLFkfr ugha nh A vr% mDr foospu ls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ us fnukad 02-08-1983 ls 23-05-1984 rd 218 fnu dke fd;k gS] mlesa lkIrkfgd vodkk jfookj o vU; jktif =d vodkk tksM+us ij fuf pr :i ls ;g vof/k 240 fnu ls vf /kd gksrh gSA izkFkhZ dks dksbZ /kkjk 25&,Q ds vUrxZr ,d ekg dk uksfVl vFkok uksfVl ds cnys osru o NaVuh eqvkotk Hkh ugha fn;k x;k gSA vr% Li"Vr /kkjk 25&,Q dk mYy/kau gqvk gSA vr% izkFkhZ iqu% lsok esa vkus dk vf /kdkjh gSA frfuf /k izkFkhZ dk dFku gS fd izkFkhZ lsokeqfDr dh fnukad ls csjkstxkj gSA blds [k.Mu es 8- iza foIk{kh odhyu dk dFku gS fd izkFkhZ us ;g Dyse 13 lky ckn mBk;k gSA vr% og brus le; rd csjkstxkj ugha jgk gS vkStu esa jgk gSA izkFkhZ dks fnukad 23-05-1984 dks lsokeqQjsUl ykHkiw.kZ fu;ksDr fd;k tkuk tkfgj gS ;g jsfnukad 15-10-1997 dk gS tks dkQh vof /k ckn dk gSA izkFkhZ ds }kjk dkQh nsjh ls fookn mBk;k x;k gSA vr% ,sls rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij eSa izkFkhZ dks fiNyk ifjykHk fnykuk mfpr ugha le>rk gwaA vknsk vr% izklafxd fookn dk mRrj bl izdkj ls fn;k tkrk gS fd foi{khx.k }kjk Jfed Jh vCnqy jgeku iq= Jh Dr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k ugha gSA izkFkhZ dh lssvCnqy ethn dks fnukad 23-05-1984 ls lsokeqok;a fujUrj ekuh tkrh gSA og fiNyk osru o ifjykHk ikus dk vf /kdkjh ugha gSa mls rqjUr izHkko ls lsok esa fy;k tk;AsvokMZ dh ,d izfr jkT; ljdkj dks okLrs izdkkukFkZ Hksth tk;Aßs 6. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner-Bank is that reference ought to have been answered in negative on the ground of delay as the Government has acted illegally in not considering the fact whether an industrial dispute is said to be in existence after the delay of 14 years? The further submission of the Counsel for the petitioner is that the dispute was stale, therefore, the same could be said to be existed at the time of making of the reference and the reference is bad in law. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 839 The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahavankutty & Ors., Para 6 and Division Bench Judgment of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1095/2001 Raghuvar vs. Divisional Forest Officer & Anr., decided on 07.05.2003. Although the aforesaid argument of the delay the management has not substantiate the same before Labour Court. Since, the issue of delay has been raised before this Court and aforesaid two Judgment s have been cited, the same is required to be considered as per the provision of law. 7. Here in the instant case the Government has considered the existence of the dispute while considering the Conciliation Officers failure report. 8. From the facts before the Labour Court it appears that the job of the workman was of permanent in nature and he has made an efforts for taking back him on duty but to no avail. He remain unemployed. Ultimately when he lost all the hopes he raised the industrial dispute wherein the Government has considered the said aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion that their exist industrial dispute which is required to be adjudicated and reference was made. 9. I have considered on the above mentioned submissions, perused the record of the writ petition and considered the Judgment s on this subject. 10. In a case reported in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 839 The Nedungadi Bank Ltd., vs. K.P. Mahavankutty & Ors., Para 6 the Honble Supreme Court considered the issue of delay and held that complaint made after lapse of 7 years give rise to the industrial dispute has been held to be stale on account of the fact that at the time of reference made no Industrial Dispute existed or could be even to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant Para 6 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis no which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 11. In the case before the Supreme Court the respondent-workman served a notice on the Bank containing that he was discriminated as two other employees of the Bank under the similar situation were reinstated in the service of the Bank but under what circumstances they dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Otherwise also in the case before the Supreme Court the matter relates to the disciplinary proceedings on the charge of misappropriation a sum of Rs. Otherwise also in the case before the Supreme Court the matter relates to the disciplinary proceedings on the charge of misappropriation a sum of Rs. 1,185/-and falsifying the books of the Bank that was not a simple case of retrenchment wherein the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F have been violated as in the instant case. 12. The aforesaid case of The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (Supra), has been followed in 2001 (6) Supreme Court Cases 222 reported in Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. wherein it has been held that the real test is the existence of industrial dispute on the date of reference for adjudication. The curx observation made in the Nedugadi Bank Ltd. of the decision was quoted from Para 6 of the said Judgment in Para 13 of the Sapan Kumar Pandit case. The relevant Paras 9 and 13 of the Sapan Kumar Pandit Judgment are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 9. Hence, the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Governments power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. The apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility of what another party would think, whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference, there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government, there existed such a dispute. 13. Learned Counsel for the Board invited our attention to a recent decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahavankutty. No doubt in the said decision it is said that the power of the Government under Section 10 of the ID Act cannot be exercised at any point of time or for reviving the matters which have already been settled although law does not prescribe any time-limit. No doubt in the said decision it is said that the power of the Government under Section 10 of the ID Act cannot be exercised at any point of time or for reviving the matters which have already been settled although law does not prescribe any time-limit. The crux of the observations in the said decision is the following: (SCC p. 460, para 6) “A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the (ID) Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 13. In JT 2003 (3) SC 436 S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka Para 18 issue of the delay has been considered and the Honble Supreme Court held that it is just and reasonable to deny the relief of back wages while considering the issue of delay. Para 18 of the said Judgment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 18. The fact remains that there was delay, though not a fatal one, in initiating proceedings calculating the time between the date of termination and initiation of proceedings before the industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The employee cannot be blamed for the delay. The learned Single Judge has denied the relief of back-wages while directing the appellants to be reinstated. That appears to be a just and reasonable order. Moreover, the Judgment of the learned Single Judge was not put in issue by the appellants by filing an appeal. 14. There is one more Judgment on the issue which has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1351 Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anr. wherein it has been held that the plea of delay raised by the employe is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. Para 10 of Ajaib Singh is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. Para 10 of Ajaib Singh is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- 10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned Counsel for the respondent-management on the full bench Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya vs. State of Haryana, 1999 (1) SCT 141 is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held “neither any limitation has provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases.” However, it went on further to say that “reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to Labour Tribunals will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay.” We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 37-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The Courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The Courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentially left over by the Legislature. The Judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the Courts/Boards and Tribunal under the Act. .15. The Division Bench Judgment in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1095/2001 Raghuvar vs. Divisional Forest Officer & Anr., followed the Judgment of AIR 2000 Supreme Court 839 The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahavankutty & Ors., and further taking into consideration the various aspect considered by the learned Single Judge i.e., the workman was daily wager, worked for a short period, has not made any complaint, he has agricultural land engaged himself in his own work and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge was upheld by the Division Bench. .16. The law on the subject of delay in making the reference can be summarised. .(1) It is for the appropriate Government formed the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. .(2) There is no time limit for making the reference the appropriate Government may make it at any time after forming the opinion as stated above. .(3) The opinion of the Government can be considered by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal with regard to fact of existence of the dispute or apprehension of the dispute. .(4) The objection of the delay should be raised and proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere plea hypothetical defence. .(5) The dispute should not be stale one so as to render the dispute as non-existent by lapse of time. .(4) The objection of the delay should be raised and proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere plea hypothetical defence. .(5) The dispute should not be stale one so as to render the dispute as non-existent by lapse of time. .(6) If the Government and Industrial Tribunal both considered the issue of delay and came to the conclusion that there was a industrial dispute of the date of making the reference then the relief can moulded by non grant of the full back wages or part back wages as the case may be. .(7) The issue of the delay depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. 17. Applying the aforesaid principle of law on the facts and circumstances of this case there exists industrial dispute on the date of reference and the Industrial Tribunal rightly denied the back wages. The other factors considered by the Government and the Labour Court are further analysed in the subsequent para. 18. The Government was convicted for existence of the dispute. The satisfaction of the Government regarding existence of industrial dispute is not arbitrary and subsequently the said fact was also considered by the Labour Judge in Para 13 while denying the back wages. However, the Bank has not been able to prove the real prejudice test as laid down in AIR 1999 Supreme Court page 1351. The Counsel for the petitioner has also not satisfied this Court that the delay has caused real prejudice to them. Thus, the approach of the Tribunal is in accordance with the Judgment of Honble Supreme Court. The present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. In view of the above, the writ petition as well as stay application dismissed.