JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Sole question involved in this case is, whether in a suit under Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), when appeal is not provided from any decree or order passed in any suit instituted under it, whether appeal against the order of the trial Court, on an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be maintainable under Order XLIII of the Code. 2. Before referring to the facts of this case, order passed by Court on 5.10.2004 when this petition came up for consideration which in my view is relevant for deciding it needs to be noted:- ABCD in the plan attached with the plaint. He was tenant under Mr. Sushil Chand Puri defendant. 5. Plaintiff alleges that defendant No. 1 on 15.4.2004 came to the spot and tried to dispossess the plaintiff from this lawn/garden and in this process, he damaged the plants as well as retaining wall of the house. But, the plaintiff successfully retained his possession over this lawn/garden. 6. On 24.4.2004, defendant No. 1 filed suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and under the garb of the status quo order, passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No. 1, Shimla fenced this land on 28.4.2004 by putting barbed wires and also by dispossessing the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 had no right to dispossess him, (the plaintiff). It was in this background that the suit under Section 6 of the Act was filed along with an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff. His application was dismissed by the trial Court on 14.7.2004. In appeal under Order XLIII Rule l(r), CPC, learned Appellate Court below allowed the same after setting aside the order of trial Court, restrained defendant No. 1 from changing the nature of the land depicted by letters ABCD in the plan supra, arid also from raising construction till the disposal of the suit. It is against this appellate order, present petition has been filed by the defendant No. 1 wherein on 5.10.2004, the above extracted order was passed. 7. For ready reference, the extract of Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, is given herein below:— "6. It is against this appellate order, present petition has been filed by the defendant No. 1 wherein on 5.10.2004, the above extracted order was passed. 7. For ready reference, the extract of Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, is given herein below:— "6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property (1).—If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this Section shall be brought— (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this Section shall bar any persom from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." 8. A bare reading of this Section clearly suggests that no appeal is maintainable against any decree or order passed under this Section. Learned Counsel for the parties on a pure question of law were not at variance that suit under Section 6 is in the nature of urgent and summary remedy available to a litigant. Party aggrieved from an order/decree passed in the suit is entitled to maintain a regular suit on the basis of its right/title to the property qua the subject matter of the suit. Aggrieved party can also maintain revision against the decree/order, passed in proceedings under Section 6 of the Act. 9. However, while opposing the petition being not maintainable, Mr. Yadupatti Sood, learned Counsel for the plaintiff forcefully urged that appeal filed by his client was not from an order under Section 6 supra, but was against an interim order passed on an application in such proceedings under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC therefore, such an appeal would be governed only by Order XLIII CPC and thus according to him impugned order passed by the first Appellate Court below calls for no interference. He also urged that the applicability of CPC is not excluded to the proceedings under Section 6 of the Act. This position was controverted by Mr. K.D. Sood. He also urged that the applicability of CPC is not excluded to the proceedings under Section 6 of the Act. This position was controverted by Mr. K.D. Sood. Per him, if an appeal is not envisaged against the final decree/order, that may be passed in a suit under 6, there is no question of an appeal being maintainable against interlocutory order passed in such proceedings. Per him if the plea urged on behalf of the plaintiff is accepted, it will result in creating a right, not envisaged by law. 10. Admittedly, legislature did not intend to create right of appeal against the final decree/order in proceedings under Section 6 of the Act. Only right of revision is available to the party aggrieved, besides filing a regular suit. If the argument urged on behalf of the plaintiff is taken to its logical end, the consequence would be that though appeal is not maintainable against the final order, but would be maintainable against an interim order, thereby creating something which was not intended by law. Providing of appeal if permissible under law in a given case will further result in allowing challenge to such an appellate order in proceedings like the present one or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will be reading down something which was not intended by law, in Section 6 supra. 11. This matter had been attending the attention of different Courts. Reference to some decisions is being made hereinafter— 12. In Prasanna Kumar Singh v. Golak Chandra Madhnal and another, 1996 All India High Court Cases 531, this question was directly involved. After having examining case and while rejecting the plea (as was urged by Mr. Y.P Sood, on behalf of the plaintiff), it was held as under:— "The question involved in the present case is whether the order refusing to accept the prayer in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, of the Code is encompassed by the expression order appearing in sub-section (3) of Section 6. The terms judgment, decree, decision, and order are more or less cognate as applied in general proceedings, and closely allied in meaning. The term order is not inpregnantly used in a more restricted sense urban the word judgment. The terms judgment, decree, decision, and order are more or less cognate as applied in general proceedings, and closely allied in meaning. The term order is not inpregnantly used in a more restricted sense urban the word judgment. The expression order as has been defined in the Code in Section 2(14) reads as follows: "(14) order means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree." It is generally understood to be command, direction of decision of the Court or Judge on some intermediate point of issue in the case but without finally disposing of the main issue or issued in the cause. Then it is merely interlocutory. But the term is sometimes given a more extensive signification, even in legal controversies, and is occasionally used as a synonym of judgment or decree. In the practice of Courts the term order means a decision made during the progress of the case, either prior or subsequent to final judgment, settling some point of practice, or some question collateral to the main issue presented by the pleadings and necessary to be disposed of before such issue can be tried in the Court, or necessary to be determined in carrying into execution the final judgment. Andersons Law Dictionary defines it to be any direction of a Court, other than a judgment or decree, made in a cause. According to Surril, it is any direction in writing, granted by a Court or judge, requiring or authorizing some act to be done. It means in terms of Section 2(14) of the Code the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree. Every direction of a Court or judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment or decree, is denominated an order. The word order has been given a special meaning in order to distinguish it from a decision under the Code. Order as a noun can be said to be equivalent to or synonymous with decision. It is not a term of art. It has no fixed legal meeting, but generally is termed to be comprehensive enough to include every decision or order made under any statute. As indicated above, the prohibition of an appeal against any order or decree in the suit is absolute. It is not a term of art. It has no fixed legal meeting, but generally is termed to be comprehensive enough to include every decision or order made under any statute. As indicated above, the prohibition of an appeal against any order or decree in the suit is absolute. There can be no quarrel over the proposition that the order to which the prohibition applies must have nexus with the subject matter of dispute. In the case at hand, undisputedly the decision which was assailed in appeal was passed in adjudicating an application in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. Whether the order is wrong or not is not the question, what is relevant and what has to be considered is whether it is an order passed in the suit instituted under Section 6 of the Act. The plain, simple and emphatic answer to the question is yes. However, the situation may be different where an order or decree is passed in a suit under Section 6; which has additional directions or prohibitions for example, a decree for possession and damages. Obviously the decree does not have only nexus with the suit itself, which has restricted operation in terms of Section 6. In such case the whole decree may be appealed against. But that is not the case here. The dispute relates to correctness of the order passed in respect of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the appeal was not maintainable and it has been rightly held to be so by the learned District Judge." 13. In Smt. Purnamasi Devi v. Dangi Dei and others, 69 (1990) Cuttack Law Times, 296, it was held:— "Plaintiff obtained a decree in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Defendant preferred an appeal against the said decree. Appellate Court having entertained and allowed the appeal setting aside the decree on the ground that the suit is not maintainable, this Civil Revision has been filed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raises the only question that appeal is not maintainable and appellate Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decree even if the same is assumed to be wrong. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raises the only question that appeal is not maintainable and appellate Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decree even if the same is assumed to be wrong. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner, Section 6 of the Act is to be perused which reads as follows:— "Section 6 : (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this Section shall be brought— (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this Section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." Sub-section (3) thereof makes it clear that no appeal lies from any decree passed in any suit instituted under Section 6. Appeal is a right created under the Statute. If there would have been no specific provision for an appeal, no appeal could have been preferred. Where there is a clear provision as in Section 6(3) that an appeal shall not lie, appellate Court could not have entertained the same. A party not raising the question or even giving consent for entertaining the appeal will not clothe the appellate Court to exercise jurisdiction since acquiescence or consent does not confer jurisdiction which is prohibited by Statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate Court is liable to be set aside. Appellate Court should now consider whether the appeal is maintainable." 14. A Division Bench of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Pt. Govind Ram v. Ram Saroop, AIR 1999 Jammu and Kashmir 63, in a Letters Patent Appeal while considering its maintainability against an interlocutory order in Election Petition, held that when against the final judgment in an Election Petition, Intra Court appeal is not provided under the Election Law, LPA was held to be not maintainable. Govind Ram v. Ram Saroop, AIR 1999 Jammu and Kashmir 63, in a Letters Patent Appeal while considering its maintainability against an interlocutory order in Election Petition, held that when against the final judgment in an Election Petition, Intra Court appeal is not provided under the Election Law, LPA was held to be not maintainable. Reason given was that if this plea is accepted, it will result in there being two forums to a litigant in case of an interim order, one under the Letters Patent and another under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court. Whereas, under law, only one appeal is maintainable, that too against the final order, before the Supreme Court. 15. In Ramesh Devchand Pala v. Jayantkumar Gordhandas Madani and others, AIR 1998 Gujrat 120, Gujarat High Court in suit under Section 6 of the Act, wherein interim order for restoration of possession was passed, specifically held that appeal was not maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC. 16. It may be appropriate to notice here that Shri Y.P. Sood laid great emphasis on the observations made in this judgment. He urged that the defendant No. 1 should not be allowed to take law into his own hand and thus derive benefit after breaking the law. He further pointed out that if plea regarding non-maintainability of appeal is upheld by this Court, then it will be helping the person who has broken the law and leaving the other party totally helpless. Therefore, he urged that this Court, even after coming to the conclusion that appeal was not maintainable should not interfere, as was the case before Gujarat High Court. 17. A Division Bench in Jamaluddin and others v. Asimullah and others AIR 1974 Allahabad 69, held that even in execution of decree under Section 6 of the Act because of bar of sub Section (3) thereof, appeal against the order of executing Court was thus held to be incompetent. To similar effect is in the decision of Lahore High Court in Gurdial Singh v. Central Board and Local Committee, Sri Darbar Saheb, Amritsar, AIR 1928 Lahore 337. 18. On behalf of plaintiff, reliance was placed on a decision of Rajasthan High Court in Hari Shankar and others v. Satya Prakash and another, AIR 1982 Rajasthan 183. To similar effect is in the decision of Lahore High Court in Gurdial Singh v. Central Board and Local Committee, Sri Darbar Saheb, Amritsar, AIR 1928 Lahore 337. 18. On behalf of plaintiff, reliance was placed on a decision of Rajasthan High Court in Hari Shankar and others v. Satya Prakash and another, AIR 1982 Rajasthan 183. After going through the judgment of the trial Court passed while rejecting the plaintiffs application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is felt that this decision does not in 19. In Meghji Jetha Shah v. Kalyanji Nanji Shah AIR 1987 Bombay 273 Bombay High Court while dismissing the revision, against appointment of receiver under Order XL CPC held that Court had jurisdiction to have appointed a Receiver. This judgment has no relevance so far as the question regarding maintainability of the appeal filed against the rejection of the application under Order XXXIX CPC is concerned 20. Reliance is also placed by Mr. YP. Sood on behalf of the plaintiff on a decision of Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad Jail v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1999 S.C. 3873. A perusal of this judgment again, in my considered view does not in any manner advance the case of the plaintiff. 21. As noted above, reliance placed on behalf of the plaintiff on the observations made in the case supra by the Gujarat High Court, in my considered view does not advance his case in any manner whatsoever, particularly, when it has been held as a question of fact that appeal was not maintainable against the order passed on application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. On the facts of that case, Gujarat High Court did not think it fit to remand the case, and in fact disposed of the same. With respect, I have not been able to persuade myself to follow such a course of action. Reason being that after holding the appeal being not maintainable, it will not be as per law to further deal the mattear. 22. Another important fact that needs to be noted here that another suit has been filed by the plaintiff for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant No. 1 in respect of the lawn/garden, (which is subject-matter of the suit out of which the present revision has arisen). 22. Another important fact that needs to be noted here that another suit has been filed by the plaintiff for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant No. 1 in respect of the lawn/garden, (which is subject-matter of the suit out of which the present revision has arisen). His application is for the grant of interim injunction was dismissed on 22.5.2004. Admittedly, against this order, an appeal was pending when the impugned order was passed. This is an additional reason given by the trial Court while dismissing the plaintiffs application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 CPC. 23. While dealing with this matter, Court is alive to another situation, that every illegality, a wrong order or an order contrary to law is not always to be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Still the fact remains that this Court cannot remain a mute spectator in a situation where it concludes purely on a question of law that the order challenged before it was without, jurisdiction, as in the present case. In such a situation, this Court will not hesitate to interfere with such an order with a view to keep the Court below within the bounds of its limits. As such, it was felt necessary to interfere with the impugned order of the appellate Court while dealing with this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Non-interference would have resulted, firstly in conferring jurisdiction on a Court when it was not intended by the legislature, and secondly would have approved an order of such Court which in law it was not competent to have passed. 24. No other point is urged. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussion and without having touched the merits of the respective contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the parties present, this appeal has been disposed of, against rejection of his application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC before the Appellate Court under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable in a case under Section 6 of the Act. Once this conclusion arrived at, this Court has no option but for setting aside the appellate order passed by the Additional District Judge, Shimla in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 47-S/14 of 2004 on 28.9.2004, in case titled Roshan Lal Bhardwaj v. Sanjay Sood, being without jurisdiction. Ordered accordingly. 26. Once this conclusion arrived at, this Court has no option but for setting aside the appellate order passed by the Additional District Judge, Shimla in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 47-S/14 of 2004 on 28.9.2004, in case titled Roshan Lal Bhardwaj v. Sanjay Sood, being without jurisdiction. Ordered accordingly. 26. In view of the above, plaintiff, if so advised, may have recourse to such proceedings as is permissible in law against the order of the trial Court dated 14.7.2004. This petition was finally heard at the joint request of the learned Counsel for the parties, as well as keeping in view the limited legal question involved in it after it was formally admitted. Parties are left to bear their own costs. CMP No. 531/2004 27. No orders in view of the order passed in the main matter and is disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of.