JUDGMENT 1. The Shillong Municipal Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") issued Notice Inviting Tender (in short "NIT") dated 20.02.2003, for collection of toll gates/parking fees in respect of Mawiong Toll Gate and 3rd Mile Toll Gate for a period of one year from the date of issue of the work order(s). The minimum tender in respect of Mawiong Toll Gate being Rupees 65 lakhs and in respect of 3rd Mile Toll Gate being Rupees 10 lakhs. The respondent nos. 2 and 4, namely, Shri Latiplang Kharkongor and Shri Manbha Rani submitted their tenders along with four others for the 3rd Mile Toll Gate. The remaining respondents were tenderers in respect of Mawiong Toll Gate. In the NIT dated 20.02.2003, aforementioned, one of the conditions was that the earnest money of 10% of 65 lakhs and 10% of 10 lakhs for Mawiong Toll Gate and 3rd Mile Toll Gate respectively must be deposited by the tenderer. The respondents herein submitted the requisite earnest money along with their respective tender papers. The NIT aforementioned also specified that withdrawal of the tender shall cause forfeiture of earnest money. Before the tenders of the respondents herein could be accepted by the Board, all the respondents herein withdrew their offers on different dates. However, in terms of the condition specified in the NIT that withdrawal of tender shall cause forfeiture of the earnest money, the Board refused to refund the earnest money, when the petitioners, as tenderers, claimed return of their earnest money. Aggrieved by the Board's decision not to refund the earnest money, respondents filed independent writ petitions, which were registered as WP (C) Nos. 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 and 186 (SH) of 2003. 2. The appellants resisted the writ petitions aforementioned by filing their affidavit-in-opposition, the case of the appellants being, in brief, thus: The request made by the petitioners for withdrawal of the earnest money was kept in abeyance by the Board pending settlement and award of the work order pursuant to the tenders received. On completion of all the formalities, the Board decided to accept the offer of respondent no. 1, herein, who was the highest bidder; but before the work order could be issued to the respondent no. 1, the Board received a letter from the said tenderer expressing his inability to carry out the work and withdrew his tender. On completion of all the formalities, the Board decided to accept the offer of respondent no. 1, herein, who was the highest bidder; but before the work order could be issued to the respondent no. 1, the Board received a letter from the said tenderer expressing his inability to carry out the work and withdrew his tender. The Board, thereafter, decided to issue work orders to the remaining petitioners; but all of them withdrew their tenders on different dates before the acceptance of their tenders could be communicated to them by the Board. As the tenders were withdrawn en masse, though on different dates, the Board had to settle the tender in favour of the lowest bidder. The writ petitioners had, thus, formed a cartel to kill the competitiveness from the tender process and thereby caused financial wrong to the Board. In terms of the condition of the NIT that withdrawal of tender shall cause forfeiture of the earnest money, the Board is not liable to refund the earnest money. 3. We have heard Mr. K.S. Kynjing, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. K. Sunar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. G. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 4. While considering the present appeal, what is of utmost importance to note is that before the tenders submitted by the writ petitioners were accepted by the Board and acceptance could be communicated by the Board, the petitioners had, admittedly, withdrawn their offers. 5. In the above backdrop, a careful perusal of Section 5 of Indian Contract Act is imperative, which reads as follows: 5. Revocation of proposals and acceptance--A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards. An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not afterwards. 6. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 5 shows that a proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of acceptance is complete as against the proposer. Similarly, the acceptance may also be revoked before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor. 6. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 5 shows that a proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of acceptance is complete as against the proposer. Similarly, the acceptance may also be revoked before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor. Thus, a proposal or an offer can be revoked by the person making the offer or giving a proposal at any time before it is accepter': In other words, a proposal or an offer cannot be revoked or withdrawn after the same has been accepted. 7. In the case at hand, since the proposals or offers were revoked and withdrawn by the petitioners, admittedly, before the acceptance of their offers by the Board, it logically follows that the petitioners were within the ambit of their rights to withdraw their offers, unless there exist some provisions of law making it possible for the parties to agree otherwise. While considering this aspect of the matter, it needs to be noted that in terms of Section 25 of the Contract Act, any agreement without consideration is void, unless the agreement is in writing and registered or is in consequence of a promise to compensate for something done or is in consequence of a promise to pay a debt barred by the law of limitation. In the case at hand, it is conceded by Mr. Kynjing that there was no consideration for the condition incorporated in the NIT that withdrawal of earnest money would lead to forfeiture of earnest money. Viewed from this angle, the condition incorporated in the NIT, in question, that withdrawal of earnest money would lead to forfeiture of earnest money is contrary to law and the same, being void, was not enforceable. 8. It needs to be remembered that NIT is nothing, but an offer and a person, who submits tender, does nothing, but makes an offer and it is for the person or the authority, who floats the NIT, to accept or not to accept the offer made by the tenderer. Before the acceptance is communicated to the tenderer, the tenderer has the freedom to withdraw his tender or offer. 9. Before the acceptance is communicated to the tenderer, the tenderer has the freedom to withdraw his tender or offer. 9. If a tender is submitted in pursuance of an NIT, the tenderer shall be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions mentioned in the tender unless the terms and conditions are contrary to law, for no agreement contrary to law is valid or enforceable. 10. In the present case, for the condition included in the NIT that earnest money deposited will stand forfeited if the tender is withdrawn, there was, admittedly, no consideration and, hence, such a condition is, if we may reiterate, void and cannot be enforceable under the law. 11. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that a condition mentioned in an NIT, such as the present one, that an offer once made cannot be revoked or if revoked, it would lead to forfeiture of earnest money would be statutorily impermissible, for such a promise is not supported by any consideration and, hence, if such a condition in an NIT has to survive, it has to be read into such a condition that the offer can be revoked or withdrawn before the acceptance of the offer is communicated. In other words, the condition in the NIT, in question, that the withdrawal of the tender shall cause forfeiture of earnest money, cannot legally stop the offerer from revoking his offer or tender before the same is accepted, for the promise not to revoke the offer would be against the law, for such a promise was made without consideration. We find support for the view that we have taken from the decision in Krishnaveni Constructions v. Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj, Darsi and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 AP 362 , wherein the court observed as follows: From the above observations, I can deduce that an offer made containing a promise not to revoke it and keep it open does not prevent the offerer from revoking the offer, for normally such a promise is unsupported by any consideration. But if a promise to keep the offer open is supported by consideration, the offerer is bound by the promise and cannot revoke the offer [See : Chitty on Contracts, Vol. 1, 24th Edition, Para 209]. But if a promise to keep the offer open is supported by consideration, the offerer is bound by the promise and cannot revoke the offer [See : Chitty on Contracts, Vol. 1, 24th Edition, Para 209]. It is on this principle that a condition in the tender that the tender cannot be withdrawn before it is accepted is invalid and does not prevent a tenderer to withdrawn his bid before its acceptance. 12. In the case at hand, since the writ petitioners had withdrawn their tenders/offers before the same could be accepted by the Board, they had the right, notwithstanding the embargo placed by the conditions of NIT, to withdraw their offers before the same were accepted. Having withdrawn the offers before the same could be accepted, the petitioners did not forfeit their rights to claim refund of their respective amounts of earnest money and the Board acted against the law in refusing to refund the earnest money. 13. It has been submitted by Mr. Kynjing that the petitioners had formed a cartel and all of them, having withdrawn from the tender, made the Board suffer huge financial loss. Apart from the fact that there is no clear evidence of the petitioners having formed a group or cartel to eliminate competitiveness from bidding, what is imperative to note is that the Board had the freedom to cancel the NIT. Having not done so, it cannot, when petitioners approached the court, justify now, refusal to refund the amount by complaining of unfair trade practice allegedly adopted by the writ petitioners. 14. A feeble attempt has been made by Mr. Kynjing by submitting that the writ petitions were not maintainable and the power of judicial review should not be exercised in contractual matters. To this, we can react by doing nothing more than quote from Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 : 1995 (1) ALR 193 (SC), wherein the Apex Court has observed thus: ...it cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. 15. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we find no substance in this appeal. 15. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we find no substance in this appeal. However, we give the liberty to the appellants to refund the earnest money to the writ petitioners within a period of two months from today, failing which interest at the rate of 9% per annum, as already directed by the learned Single Judge, shall accrue on the earnest money till the date of final payment thereof. 16. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed