Judgment S.P. Pathak, J.-The appellant has filed this appeal against the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.06.2002 passed by the learned Special Judge, NDPS Cases, Jodhpur, in Sessions Case No.16/2000, whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted under Sections 8/21, 8/23 and 8/29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and under each of the sections sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1 lac, in default thereof to further undergo one years rigorous imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of present case are that on 312.1999 at about 10:30 PM Rajendra Singh Khangarot, the Regional Director, Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur received secret information from Mukhbir that Baroch Khan s/o Murad Khan, resident of Lunon ki Basti, Sam, District Jaisalmer would cross the border from border pillar No. 743-743/1 ahead of Border outpost in the intervening night of 1st and 2nd January, 2000 with 13 to 14 kgs heroin in two big metal Degs (cooking pot). Acting on the said information received from Mukbir, the Regional Director of Narcotics Control Bureau constituted a team of officers which proceeded in Government vehicle to reach at 58 Battalion, Jaisalmer on 01.01.2000. Shri Jagdish Purohit, one of the officers of the team, went in the mess of 58 Battalion and gave his introduction to Sarva Shri Vijay Singh, Dy. SP and Jaypan Singh, the officers of Border Security Force. Shri Jagdish Purohit informed them that they had secret information that in intervening night of 1st and 2nd January, 2000, one person Baroch Khan would enter into Indian Border from Border Pillar 743-743/1 having with him about 13 to 14 Kgs illegal heroin. He got their written consent for becoming Panch in the proceedings and thereafter, the team reached at the border outpost along with the BSF Officers at about 10.20 and the Officers of BSF and NCB informed the officers posted at the outpost about information received and Nakabandi was staged there. At about 12.30 in the night, three persons entered the Indian Border, who were asked to stop but out of them, two persons fled away and one of the persons was caught by the outpost personnel. Two Degs were lying nearby the person caught. On being asked, he disclosed his name Baroch Khan s/o Murad Khan. Thereafter, he was informed about the information. Two Degs were lying nearby the person caught. On being asked, he disclosed his name Baroch Khan s/o Murad Khan. Thereafter, he was informed about the information. He was asked whether he wanted the search to be taken by a Magistrate or a gazetted officer. He was also asked in writing by Shri Jagdish Purohit about search by a Magistrate or a gazetted officer and in turn he gave his willingness orally as well as in writing to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer. On this, Narendra Singh, the Assistant Director, NCB, Jodhpur, was introduced as Gazetted Officer and in the personal search of Baroch Khan, Rs.240/-were found from the pocket of his shirt but no narcotic drug was recovered from him. However, on seeing the Degs, it was found that the bottoms of “Degs” were soldered in one inch diameter and on cutting that portion with the equipments already with them, in the first Deg, brown powder apparently seemed as heroin was found, the weight of which was 7.200 kg. Out of that material, two samples of 5 grams each were taken out and the samples and the rest of the material were sealed and marked. Likewise, another Deg contained 6.400 kgs material like heroin. samples of 5 grams each were also taken from the material recovered from this pot. The Samples as well as remaining contraband were sealed, seized and marked according to rules. On getting the samples examined chemically, same were found to be of heroin. After completion of proceedings, the Narcotics Control Bureau filed a complaint before the Court. 3. After hearing on charge, charges for the offence under Sections 8/21, 8/23 and 8/29 of the Act were framed, the same were read-over and explained to the accused. Accused denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution produced as many as 9 witnesses in support of its case and got exhibited 67 documents (Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/67). 4. After close of the prosecution evidence, statement of accused under Section 313 CrPC was recorded. Accused denied the prosecution case and claimed himself to be innocent and stated that he has been falsely implicated. He also stated that he is a resident of village Murar, Tehsil Harnau and for earning his livelihood in raining season he stays in Lunon Ki Basti, Tehsil Sam. Accused denied the prosecution case and claimed himself to be innocent and stated that he has been falsely implicated. He also stated that he is a resident of village Murar, Tehsil Harnau and for earning his livelihood in raining season he stays in Lunon Ki Basti, Tehsil Sam. He further stated that in the evening of 01.01.2000 he was grazing the herd of she-goats and at that time some persons took him away and after beating him got some blank papers signed from him. He denied to have any connection with the recovered material. He further stated that he had moved an application in the Court stating that none of the officers had recorded his statement nor he gave any statement. In defence, DW.1 Achar Khan, DW.2 Ajla Khan and DW.3 Maku Khan were examined. 5. The learned trial Court, after hearing both side, has convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant vide his Judgment and order dated 20.06.2002 as indicated hereinabove. 6. Aggrieved by the said Judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant. 7. The learned Counsel for accused-appellant raised various contentions in this case which I propose to deal one by one hereunder. 8. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for accused-appellant that in the instant case the statement Ex.P/12 of accused recorded under Section 67 of the Act cannot be read against the accused because at the time when the statement was recorded the accused was in custody of BSF and was an accused and it has appeared from various documents prepared by the investigating agency that there was accusation against him, therefore, the accused cannot be held guilty on the basis of his statement recorded under Section 67 since an application was moved by the accused was he was protected under the provisions of Constitution of India particularly under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel invited my attention to Ex.P/11, the summon issued to him, wherein accusation was made that he was an accused of an offence. The learned Counsel invited my attention to Ex.P/11, the summon issued to him, wherein accusation was made that he was an accused of an offence. According to the leaned Counsel, when recovery was effected from him then he was not accused of an offence and once it is found that accused was in custody and there was accusation against him in relation to the offence punishable under the Act then statement under Section 67 of the Act would be inadmissible in evidence. The learned Counsel in this connection placed reliance on 1984 CrLJ Madras 134 - Roshan Beevi vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, 1975 CrLJ A.P. 946 -Bhagwan Das vs. Union of India, and 1973 CrLJ (SC) 921 -Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah vs. D.K. & Ors. 9. On the other hand, the leaned Counsel for Narcotics Control Bureau has contended that accused was arrested through Ex.P/13 on 02.01.2000 at 11:30 AM in the morning whereas statement of Baroch Khan was recorded prior to arrest and in view of Ex.P/10 Panchnama (seizure memo) it would appear that entire proceeding of seizure was completed by 7 AM on 02.01.2000. According to the learned Counsel for Narcotics Control Bureau , in the above circumstances, it cannot be said that the accused was in custody. It has also been submitted that in view of Section 67 of the Act and the NCB authorities not being police officials or authorized under the Act were officers, the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act is admissible in evidence. 10. I have considered the submissions made before me. To examine the above contention, Section 67 of the Act is reproduced hereunder: “67. Power to call for information, etc. - Any officer referred to in Section 42 who is authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act,- .(a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; .(b) requireany person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry; .(c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.” 11. Now it appears proper to see the principles laid down in the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 12. In the case of Roshan Beevi, the Full Bench of Madras High Court while considering the provisions of the Customs Act in relation to the protection claimed under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, has observed that in a proceeding under the provisions of the Customs Act, when any person is required or summoned for an enquiry under Section 107 or Section 108, that person is not an accused person and the officer summoning that person is not a police officer. Any confession made by a person summoned under Section 108 before the Customs Officer is admissible in law since it is not hit either by Section 25 or Section 26 of the Evidence Act but if it is shown in a given case that such a confession was obtained by the Customs Officer by exertion or inducement, threat, coercion or duress or extracted by illegally detaining the person in an unauthorized prolonged custody in contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act, or obtained by using third degree mehtods, then the question about the acceptability and reliability of such involuntary confession would arise. The Court further observed that for invoking Article 20 (2), two requirements must be satisfied; namely, (1) the person should have been arrested, and (2) he should have been detained in custody and said that at the stage of inquiry, or investigation or interrogation held under Section 107 or Section 108 of the customs Act, the person required or summoned for such enquiry or examination is not arrested. 13. In the case of Bhagwandas, the Honble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in view of protection available under Article 23 of the Constitution, observed that the person against whom formal accusation relating to commission of an offence has been levelled which in normal course may result in prosecution falls within the expression, and he is entitled to the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. 14. 14. In the case of Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah, the Honble Apex Court while considering the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 examined the aspect of availability of protection to a person under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and observed that a person against whom a FIR is lodged alleging offences inter alia under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, being a person accused of an offence, is entitled to the protection under Article 20(3). Hence, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself . He, however, cannot deny to give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him in proceedings against him under that Act. In para 20 of the Judgment , the Court referred to a decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 940 and quoted the observations of Shah, J. who after reviewing a number of authorities observed:- “Normally a person stands in the character of an accused when a First Information Report is lodged against him in respect of an offence before an officer competent to investigate it, or when a complaint is made relating to the commission of an offence before a Magistrate competent to try or send to another Magistrate for trial of the offence.” 15. In the light of the principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court and the High Courts, I propose to examine the matter regarding admissibility of the statement made by accused under the provisions of the Act. 16. It is suffice to say that validity of Section 67 of the Act is presently not under consideration. A perusal of Section 67 of the Act indicates that if a statement is made by a person who has been called by the authorities mentioned in Section 67 of the Act to furnish information in relation to any contravention of the provisions of the Act or any rule or order made thereunder, he is required to make statement. The statement made should be voluntary and it should not be under pressure or duress. The statement made should be voluntary and it should not be under pressure or duress. In the instant case, a secret information Ex.P/67 was received by PW.8 Rajendra Singh, Director, NCB, who passed an order Ex.P/26 on 312.1999 to the effect that since there was a secret information about the accused crossing Pakistan border during the intervening night of 1st and 2nd of January, 2000, a team was constituted and it was directed that in that team, Narendra Singh, Assistant Director will undertake the preventive works under the Act and Shri Jagdish Purohit, Investigating Officer, will act as Seizing Officer and the team shall leave Jodhpur for Jaisalmer as per the information on 1st January 2000. The provisions of the Act, particularly Secs. 41, 42 & 43 when perused, indicate that when some information is received regarding contravention of the provisions of the Act, then that information is to be reduced in writing and to be sent to superior officials of the concerned department. The secret information was acted upon and accused was apprehended and then after usual procedure, seizure of the contraband heroin was made and samples were taken. Ex.P/10 is Panchnama prepared in presence of accused and witnesses. At Page 6 of Ex.P/10, it is mentioned that the proceedings regarding seizure commenced at about 12:30 in the night and completed at 7 AM on 2nd January 2000. In view of Ex.P/10 and also taking into consideration the Arrest Memo Ex.P/13 of the accused-appellant, it appears that accused was arrested at about 11:30 AM on 02.01.2000. Ex.P/11 is the summon issued to accused Baroch Khan and makes a mention that PW.1 Jagdish Purohit, Seizure Officer summoned the accused at about 7 AM in the morning of 2nd January, 2000. It was mentioned in the summon that some enquiry in relation to a case was being done by PW.1 Jagdish Purohit and therefore he was required to appear before him at the border outpost camp, Jaisalmer. Ex.P/12 is the statement of accused, which indicates that the accused was read over the secret information Ex.P/67 in Hindi and accused stated that he was giving the statement voluntarily. The statement was recorded under the dictation of PW.1 Jagdish Purohit by the Intelligence Officer, Takhat Singh at about 7:05 AM in the morning in pursuance of summon issued to the accused. The statement was recorded under the dictation of PW.1 Jagdish Purohit by the Intelligence Officer, Takhat Singh at about 7:05 AM in the morning in pursuance of summon issued to the accused. It also appears that accused was medically examined on 02.01.2000 at 3.50 PM (Noon) and no injury was found on the person of accused. The medical examination report is Ex.P/14. 17. After carefully examining Exs. P/10, P/11, P/12, P/13 & Ex.P/14, it appears that the entire seizure proceedings were completed at 7 AM in the morning of 2nd January 2000 and the arrest of accused was made at 11:30 AM. It establishes that after completion of seizure proceedings, the accused was given a summon and in response to that the accused gave his statement under Section 67 of the Act and he was arrested at about 11:30 AM on 2nd of January 2000. It shall also be relevant to mention here that no first information report was lodged uptil then. It is correct that the secret information was received by PW.8 Rajendra Singh in relation to contravention of the provisions of the Act but that does not mean that there was accusation against the accused. It also appears that when enquiry was being made in pursuance of secret information, recoveries were made under the provisions of the Act and after completion of enquiry the accused gave statement under Section 67 of the Act in pursuance of summons issued to him. Perusal of Section 67 reveals that if during the course of any enquiry or in connection with the provisions of the Act, the person authorized in the section can call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder can require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry and also can examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The contention of the learned Counsel that since there was formal accusation against the accused, therefore, he should be deemed to be in custody and his statement cannot be read in evidence as the same will not be admissible in evidence because of protection available to accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, is not tenable in view of the discussions made hereinabove i.e. the accused-appellant was arrested much after recording of his statement after completion of the proceedings of Panchnama Ex.P/10 on 02.01.2000. The authorities cited by learned Counsel are also not of any help to him. At this stage, it shall be relevant to notice here Sections 24, 25 & 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 24 of Evidence Act states that confession caused inducement, threat or promise in criminal proceedings will be irrelevant. Section 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in course of any investigation. Section 26 of Evidence Act states that confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. In the instant case, the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act was not recorded by a police officer and at the time when it was recorded, accused was not arrested, therefore, the statement made by the accused if found voluntarily made without any pressure and threat etc. then the same is admissible in evidence. 18. In K.I. Pavunny vs. Assistant Collector, [1997 (3) S.C.C.721], the Honble Supreme Court has held:- "The question then is whether the retracted confessional statement requires corroboration from any other independent evidence. It is seen that the evidence in this case consists of the confessional statement, the recovery panchnama and the testimony of P.Ws.2, 3 and 5. It is true that in a trial and proprio vigore in a criminal trial, Courts are required to marshal the evidence. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence may consist of direct evidence, confession or circumstantial evidence. In a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the I.P.C., it is now well-settled legal position that confession can form the sole basis for conviction. If it is retracted, it must first be tested whether confession is voluntary and truthful inculpating the accused in the commission of the crime. In a criminal trial punishable under the provisions of the I.P.C., it is now well-settled legal position that confession can form the sole basis for conviction. If it is retracted, it must first be tested whether confession is voluntary and truthful inculpating the accused in the commission of the crime. Confession is one of the species of admission dealt with under Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 164 of the Code. It is an admission against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some of those provisions. If a confession is proved by unimpeachable evidence and if it is of voluntary nature, it when retracted, is entitled to high degree of value as its maker is likely to face the consequences of confession by a statement affecting his life, liberty or property. Burden is on the accused to prove that the statement was obtained by threat, duress or promise like any other person. The Court further observed :-“If it is established from the record or circumstances that the confession is shrouded with suspicious features, then it falls in the realm of doubt. The burden of proof on the accused is not as high as on the prosecution. If the accused is able to prove the facts creating reasonable doubt that the confession was not voluntary or it was obtained by threat, coercion or inducement, etc., the burden would be on the prosecution to prove that the confession was made by the accused voluntarily. If the Court believes that the confession was voluntary and believes it to be true, then there is no legal bar on the Court for ordering conviction. However, the rule of prudence and practice does require that the Court seeks corroboration of the retracted confession from other evidence. The confession must be one inculpating the accused in the crime. It is not necessary that each fact or circumstance contained in the confession is separately or independently corroborated. It is enough if it receives general corroboration. The burden is not as high as in the case of an approver or an accomplice in which case corroboration is required on material particulars of the prosecution case. Each case would, therefore, require to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances in which the confession came to be made and whether or not it was voluntary and true. Each case would, therefore, require to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances in which the confession came to be made and whether or not it was voluntary and true. These require to be tested in the light of a given set of facts. The high degree of proof and probative value is insisted in capital offences. 19. In Hem Raj vs. State of Ajmer, ( AIR 1954 SC 462 ), a three-Judges Bench was considering whether retracted confession of an accused could be corroborated from the material already in the possession of the police prior to the recording of the confession. Therein the confession was recorded under Section 164 of the Code during the committal proceedings but at the trial it was retracted. The Court held that the evidence already on record of the police could be used to corroborate the retracted confession. The Court observed:- “It is true that in criminal law, as also in civil suits, the trial Court and the appellate Court should marshal the facts and reach conclusion, on facts. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the guilt beyond doubt. The concept of benefit of doubt is not a charter for acquittal. Doubt of a doubting Thomas or of a weak mind is not the road to reach the result. If a Judge on objective evaluation of evidence and after applying relevant tests reaches a finding that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt for acquittal. The question then is whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court has committed any error of law in reversing the acquittal by the Magistrate. Not every fanciful reason that erupted from flight of imagination but was relevant and germane, requires to be tested. Reasons are the soul of law. The best way to discover truth is through the interplay of viewpoints. Discussion captures the essence of controversy by its appraisal of alternatives, presentation or pros and cons and review on the touchstone of human conduct and all attending relevant circumstances. Truth and falsity are sworn enemies. Man may be prone to speak falsehood but circumstantial evidence will not. Falsity is routed from mans proclivity to faltering but when it is tested on the anvil of circumstantial evidence truth stands. Truth and falsity are sworn enemies. Man may be prone to speak falsehood but circumstantial evidence will not. Falsity is routed from mans proclivity to faltering but when it is tested on the anvil of circumstantial evidence truth stands. On scanning the evidence and going through the reasoning of the learned Single Judge we find that the learned Judge was right in accepting the confessional statement of the appellant Ex.P-4 to be a voluntary one and that it could form the basis for conviction. The Magistrate had dwelt upon the controversy, no doubt on appreciation of the evidence but not in proper or right perspective. Therefore, it is not necessary for the learned Judge of the High Court to wade through every reasoning and give his reasons for his disagreement with the conclusion reached by the Magistrate. On relevant aspects, the learned Judge has dwelt upon in detail and recorded the disagreement with the Magistrate and reached his conclusions. Therefore, there is no illegality in the approach adopted by the learned Judge. We hold that the learned Judge was right in his findings that the prosecution has proved the case based upon the confession of the appellant given in Ex.P-4 under Section 108 of the Evidence Act and the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3 and 5. The prosecution proved the case beyond doubt and the High Court has committed no error of law." 20. In A.K. Mehaboob vs. Intelligence Officer, NCB (2002 SCC (Cri) 1035, it is held:- "The substance of the case against the three accused was this:- On the strength of sleuth information the Intelligence Officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau led by the Superintendent of the Narcotics control Bureau, Cochin (P.W.1 and P.W.2) raided the house of the appellant Naushad on 06.03.1994 at about 10.00 A.M. They found Divakaran (A-1) and appellant Mehaboob (A-3) sitting in one room. On search, 251 grams of brown sugar had been recovered from Divakaran, A-1. It was followed by another search made in the house of the said Divakaran at about 7.00 P.M. And then also a quantity of 251 grams of brown sugar had been recovered from a suitcase kept in that house. All the three accused were arrested. Their statements were recorded under Section 67 of the Act. The case against appellant Naushad depends entirely on E