JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This petition is directed against the order of the Family Court, Kota passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. rejecting the claim of the petitioner for maintenance against her husband inter alia on the ground that earlier application too has been rejected on 20.4.1993 and since then there is no alteration in the situation. 3. The undisputed facts are that parties to the petition married on 16.4.1984. On 7.2.1987, the "Gauna" ceremony was performed and the wife came to the matrimonial home. As a result of this alliance, a son was born on 22.11.1989, who is petitioner No. 2. 4. The wife has stated that she has gone to live with her husband in her matrimonial house but she was denied entry in the house by her husband and he refused to accept her. She claimed that she is unable to maintain herself. Her father has been out of job, where he was earlier working. She claimed that her husband is running a Pan shop from, which he earns Rs. 200/- per day and he also has a land ad-measuring 12-13 bigha out of which he earns Rs. 25,000/- per year. She also alleged that earlier application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was rejected on 20.4.1993. Thereafter, on 1.4.1996 she has gone voluntarily to the house of her husband but she was not allowed entry, and therefore, maintenance may be awarded for herself and her child at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. 5. Shorn of details, other admitted facts are that there is no love lost between the parties and thereupon spate of litigations between the parties ensued. Some of which were initiated by wife and some by the husband. 6. After filing of this application, the husband has obtained a decree of divorce against the wife somewhere in 1999 is the fact not in dispute and has been brought to the notice of the Court during the course of hearing by learned counsel for the husband. Prior thereto he has moved an application under Section 107 I.P.C. against the present petitioner, as well as an application for custody of his son. Prior thereto he has moved an application under Section 107 I.P.C. against the present petitioner, as well as an application for custody of his son. However, the result of those proceedings have not been placed on record though it has been stated that the criminal complaint under Section 498-A filed by wife has resulted in F.I.R. being filed by the Investigating Agency. 7. The principal defence to the maintenance petition has been that it was wife who was responsible for deserting the husband. She has indulged in frivolous criminal litigation including the complaint under Section 498-A I.P.C. against her husband and that she had not come to matrimonial home at all on 1.4.1996 as alleged. Reliance was placed on earlier order of the Court under Section 125 rejecting her petition inter alia on the ground that she is living separate from her husband without reasonable cause. 8. With this background, the petition was dismissed by the learned Family Court. However, in the record which has been made available one thing which is obvious is that whatever may be the dispute between the husband and wife, no reason has been shown for not granting claim of maintenance to the child. The application to provide maintenance for a minor child cannot depend upon the responsibility of strained relationship between husband and wife. No material has been placed on record whether the application for custody of child filed by husband has resulted in favour of the husband, but it is admitted that child is with mother. Nor anything has been stated whether wife herself able to maintain reasonably her minor child aged 7. 9. It is incomprehensible on any ground whatsoever that maintenance has been denied to the son on the application moved by the wife. 10. This is apart from the fact that the judgment under appeal appears to be too scratchy, overlooking the material on record which includes the statement of father of the applicant stating that respondent petitioner has remarried somewhere in 1995-1996. This is now the admitted case of respondent that he has moved an application somewhere in 1995-1996 for seeking divorce which has culminated in a decree in 1999. 11. If that were so, change in the circumstances which needed an enquiry are writ large in the record of the learned Judge, Family Court which has been overlooked by disposing of the application in most casual manner. 11. If that were so, change in the circumstances which needed an enquiry are writ large in the record of the learned Judge, Family Court which has been overlooked by disposing of the application in most casual manner. Even he did not care to refer to various disputes to which he indicated by making a vague "observation that the litigations are pending between the parties. If the litigations are pending, between the parties for passage of time, no definite conclusion can be drawn for the summary disposal of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. that who was right or wrong. Existence of disputes and pending litigations between husband and wife only indicates existence of strained relationship between the husband and wife. 12. The learned Judge, Family Court has also overlooked that the proceedings under Section 125 are summary in nature and does not result in determination of rights of parties, finally. The conclusions drawn in such summary proceedings are not conclusive and binding on civil Court, nor it affects other remedies open to a wife to claim maintenance against her husband or to pursue other matrimonial remedies nor it affects the subsequent application if case is made out on merits. 13. Unlike civil proceedings adjudicating rights of parties attain finality and operate as res judicata for subsequent trial of same issues between the parties, as a matter of law successive petitions for grant of maintenance against husband are not barred. As a matter of judicial discipline and judicious discretion it is not-proper to allow the parties to agitate the questions which have been earlier decided between the parties on merits and allow them to take a chance when no new substantial facts are alleged or proved. 14. But where after dismissal of first application for maintenance on the ground that wife was living separate from the husband without reasonable cause, the wife makes a second application alleging that after dismissal of her earlier application, she desired to return to her matrimonial home, but husband did not allow her to return, which amounts to his disinterest in resumption of marital ties, the issue between the parties does not remain the same as has been decided earlier but is substantially a new ground. In such case, the petition cannot be rejected on cryptic observations that because earlier applications for maintenance were dismissed because wife was living separate without sufficient cause, hence, second application is not maintainable. 15. Bombay High Court in Sunanda v. Chandrakant, 1989 Cr LJ 398 (Bom.) took somewhat similar view when it held that when first application for maintenance of wife and husband's petition for divorce was dismissed and husband is not interested in resumption of marital life, second application by wife for maintenance is maintainable. 16. Therefore, to not consider the application on merit merely on the basis of earlier application and particular observations about the numerous litigations pending between the parties is an ill-suited mode for dealing with the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which is a measure of social welfare for benefit of women and child who are the weaker sections of the society. 17. It hardly needs to emphasise that provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. are primarily a measure of social justice and substantially a special enactment to protect the interest of women and children falling within the sweep of Article 15 (3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution. The Section 125 Cr.P.C. is beneficial piece of legislation as noticed by the Supreme Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1807 . This cursory dealing with the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent mechanically urged that since husband has been granted divorce on account of desertion by his wife, the wife has forfeited her right to maintenance. He contends that in such event, when because of desertion by wife marriage stands dissolved, the claim to maintenance automatically comes to an end. Though the proceedings for dissolution of marriage have not been placed on-record, but that is the fact which has been stated by the learned counsel for the respondent and his contention is founded on this fact. 19. Suffice it to say that an Explanation has been added to Cr.P.C. in 1973. The wife has been defined to include a woman who has been divorced by her husband. 19. Suffice it to say that an Explanation has been added to Cr.P.C. in 1973. The wife has been defined to include a woman who has been divorced by her husband. If the submission made on behalf of husband is accepted that after a husband is granted divorce on the ground that the defaulting party was wife, she forfeits her right to claim maintenance would render the Explanation to Section 125 Cr.P.C. a dead letter. The provisions of any statute cannot be read in such a manner as to render it otiose. In fact, in view of the admitted fact that applicant is a divorced wife, itself suggests that circumstances have altered. Husband by taking recourse to divorce proceedings has shown his disinterest in resuming marital relationship even if wife desires such resumption. A decree for dissolution of marriage brings an end to obligation of wife to reside with her husband. In the face of such obligation having been brought to an end by the dissolution of marriage, the plea that wife is residing separate from her husband ceases to be defence to claim for maintenances. 20. Kerala, Gujarat, Bombay and Orrisa High Courts have expressed the similar view in such circumstances, when wife has been divorced. 21. Kerala High court had held in Velkutty v. Prasan Kumar, 1985 Cr LJ 1558 (Ker.) that the words "refusing to live with the husband without a sufficient cause" or "living separately by mutual consent" in sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. are applicable to a wife where marriage is subsisting and not in the case of wife as defined in Explanation (b) of Section 125 (1) Cr.P.C. 22. In Gauri Ali Nalya v. Hawabai Gauri, 1991 (3) Crimes 589 Gujarat High Court opined that where wife is divorced by her husband, a Magistrate is not required to hold an enquiry under Section 125(3) to ascertain whether she is ready and willing to go her husband's house or she is residing separately without sufficient cause. 23. The Bombay High Court took the view in Sugnabai v. Vasant Copal Deobhat, 1992 Cr LJ 1838 (Bom.) that a decree in favour of husband for desertion by wife does not affect the right of wife to claim maintenance. 24. In Rajagopalan v. Kamalamal, AIR 1982 (Mad.) 183 , Madras High Court expressed the same view. 23. The Bombay High Court took the view in Sugnabai v. Vasant Copal Deobhat, 1992 Cr LJ 1838 (Bom.) that a decree in favour of husband for desertion by wife does not affect the right of wife to claim maintenance. 24. In Rajagopalan v. Kamalamal, AIR 1982 (Mad.) 183 , Madras High Court expressed the same view. The Kerala High Court in Yampeklattu Nains v. Mampekkat Vasanthe, 1986 Cr LJ 652 (Ker.) held, that a divorced woman's application is maintainable even if an earlier application prior to divorce was disallowed. 25. Rajasthan High Court too had taken the same view in Ramawvatar Sharma v. Santosh, 2001 Cr LJ 2650 (Raj.) . 26. The aforesaid view by various High Courts is in consonance with the Supreme Court view in Bai Tagore v. Ali Hussain Fissali Chhotic, AIR 1979 SC 362 , the Court said that a decree in favour of husband for desertion by wife does not affect wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court negatived the contention of husband that because of divorce the wife ceased to have any claim to maintenance nor did the Court sustained the refusal to grant maintenance on the basis of consented separate living in 1952 much prior to creation of statutory right to maintenance in favour of divorced wife. About the social welfare object of Section 125 as enacted in the Code of 1973, the Court said:- "Welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of the salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature and when the beneficiaries are the weaker sections, like destitute women, the spirit of Article 15(3) of the Constitution must belight the meaning of the section. The Constitution is a pervasive omnipresence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure. So, Section 125 and sister clauses must receive a compassionate expansion of sense that the words used permits." 27. The view was reiterated in Rahtasab Singh v. Ramnarain, AIR 2000 SC 952 . In Rahtasab Singh's case the Court was directly concerned with a case of wife divorced by her husband on the ground of desertion by her. The plea that she has left matrimonial home without reasonable cause being adjudicated against wife, she is not entitled to maintenance was repelled. The Court said:- "9. In Rahtasab Singh's case the Court was directly concerned with a case of wife divorced by her husband on the ground of desertion by her. The plea that she has left matrimonial home without reasonable cause being adjudicated against wife, she is not entitled to maintenance was repelled. The Court said:- "9. On account of the Explanation quoted above, a woman who has been divorced by her husband on account of a decree passed by the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, continues to enjoy the status of a wife for the limited purpose of claiming Maintenance Allowance from her ex-husband. 9A. Claim for maintenance under the first part of Section 125, Cr.P.C. is based on the subsistence of marriage while claim for maintenance of a divorced wife is based on the foundation provided by Explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 125, Cr.P.C. If the divorced wife is unable to maintain herself and if she has not remarried, she will be entitled to Maintenance Allowance. The Calcutta High Court has an occasion to consider an identical situation where the husband had obtained divorce on the ground of desertion by wife but she was held entitled to Maintenance Allowance as a divorced wife under Section 125, Cr.P.C. and the fact that she had deserted her husband and on that basis a decree for divorce was passed against her was not treated as a bar to her claim for maintenance as a divorced wife. The Allahabad High Court also, in the instant case, has taken as similar view. We approve these decisions as they represent the correct legal position." 28. In coming to this conclusion, the Court reiterated the social welfare concept for benefit of weaker sections as a Constitutional goal as stated in Ramesh Chandra Kaushal v. Mrs. Veere Kaushal, AIR 1978 SC 1807 . "This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15 (3) reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advances the cause - the cause of the derelicts." 29. Thus, the learned Judge Family Court has seriously erred in not entertaining the application of the petitioner for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. 30. There is no reason to deny maintenance claim for the minor child who admittedly is living with the petitioner. All the grounds which have been stated and urged before me relate to the claim of maintenance by the wife but nothing to deny the right to claim of maintenance of minor child. The cursory dealing with the claim of wife to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and in not considering the claim of minor son to maintenance, the learned Judge, Family Court, the order under revision cannot be sustained and deserve to be set at naught for that reason alone. 31. In reply to the petition, no averment has been made to deny the fact about the income of the husband stated by wife in her petition. 32. In these circumstances, the judgment under revision is set aside. The application of petitioner wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance of herself and her minor child is sent back to Judge, Family Court for considering afresh keeping in view the altered circumstances to which reference has been made above, some of which are admitted before the Court and for some of which material is available on record. To what extent, those changed circumstances affect the claim of maintenance has to be examined in the light of the parity to itself of which the provision exceeds. Meanwhile, until disposal of the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by the Family Court, the respondent is directed to pay Rs. 500/- each as maintenance for his wife-petitioner and his son Lalit by the 15th of every ensuing month. Meanwhile, until disposal of the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by the Family Court, the respondent is directed to pay Rs. 500/- each as maintenance for his wife-petitioner and his son Lalit by the 15th of every ensuing month. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any arrears of maintenance and if so from what date, shall be a matter to be decided by the Judge, Family Court at the time of finally deciding the application. This is without prejudice to the wife's other remedies which are available to her under the Hindu Marriage Act or under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. 33. The petition is accordingly allowed.Petition allowed. *******