Pratap Kumar Ray ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. ( 2 ) IN the instant case the petitioners being a Beedi manufacturing company and running the business of selling such manufactured Beedi by engaging Home-workers through Contractors, have assailed the determination of the liability under Section 7a of the Employees Provident funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the interest, being a statutory interest, as fixed under Section 7q of the said Act by mainly contending, inter alia, that there was on final determination by identifying the Home-workers engaged by different Contractors save and except identification of few Home-workers engaged by some Contractors, that by the impugned decision the identification of the other Home-workers since has been kept open which vitiated the order impugned as the order has taken the shape of interim direction, not a final determination of the liability of the petitioners in terms of Section 7a of the said Act so far as contribution of the Provident Fund amount, that the petitioners Company never engaged any Home-workers who are practically rolling the Beedi leaves and those beedi workers were engaged by the Contractor with whom the petitioners company had relationship only and accordingly the Company is not liable to pay the Provident Fund amount in respect of the employees share as well as the employer's share. The last point is argued that since the impugned decision is a combined order under Section 7a read with Section 7q of the aid Act directing imposition of interest on the assessed amount under Section 7a of the said Act, there is no alternative remedy of preferring an appeal to a Tribunal under Section 7-I of the said Act in relation to any fixation of interest under Section 7q of the said Act. ( 3 ) THIS writ application has been opposed by the respondents by filing Affidavit-in-opposition and contending, inter alia, that the Home-workers who are practically rolling the Beedi leaves by putting tobacco materials inside such leaves, though are engaged by the Contractors but the writ petitioners Company is the principal employer in terms of the provisions of the statute and the petitioners Company cannot wash out the responsibility to pay the Provident Fund money, which is out come of deep rooted social justice concept, to benefit the workers concerned. It has been further contended that on the basis of identification of the Home-workers by the contractor who deposed in the proceeding and the names of those Home-workers who were accepted by the present writ petitioners Company the liability of payment of Provident Fund money was identified and accordingly the amount was assessed and there is no scope of the argument of the writ petitioners Company that unidentified Home-workers also have been tagged in the impugned decisions. So far as the nature of the impugned order is concerned as canvassed by the writ petitioners Company by contending, inter alia, that the order was a composite order under Section 7a read with section 7q of the said Act, it has been contended by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the order under Section 7q of the said Act has no determining factor as it is a statutory determination fixing the fixed liability of payment of interest under statute and there is no question of any person being aggrieved by such interest fixing if the principal amount as liable to be paid under Section 7a of the said Act is finally determined and assessed. In that view of the matter, in the statute no provision has been made for preferring an appeal under Section 7-I of the said Act with reference to the amount of interest as determined under Section 7q of the said Act. It has been further urged that there is alternative forum of preferring the statutory appeal under Section 7-I of the said Act and the writ petition is not maintainable. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to the respective submission of the parties, the only point emerge for decision in the writ application is whether any ground has been set up for judicial review of the impugned decision as reached by the competent authority in determining the liability of the writ petitioners company under Section 7a of the said Act and fixing the interest amount on the said amount following the statutory regulation of fixing of the interest under Section 7q of the said Act. It is a settled law that the writ Court is not a Court of appeal to determine in depth with reference to the materials and in making roving query of the issues involved save and except verification and scrutinising of the decision making process as was followed to reach the impugned decision, being the subject matter of the writ petition. Having regard to such settled position, the writ petition is to be disposed of and determined. The contention as raised that the Home-workers, namely, the beedi workers who are rolling beedi leaves by putting tobacco materials inside it are not the workers employed by the writ petitioners Company, can be instantly decided on the reflection of the law, namely, Beedi and Cigar workers (Condition and Employment) Act, 1966. Under Section 2 (f) of the said Act, employee has been defined as a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not, in any establishment or godown to do any work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical and also includes any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or Contractor for being made to Beedi or Cigar or both (hereinafter referred to as Home-workers ). An employee has been defined under Section 2 (g) of the said Act to this effect that it means in relation to contract labour, principal employer and in relation to other labour, the person who has ultimate control over the affairs to any establishment, or who has by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the Managing Agent, Manager, Super-intendent or by any other name. The principal employer has been defined under Section 2 (m) of the said Act which speaks that a person for whom or whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in a establishment. However, in this case, from the writ application and the pleading itself it appears that the writ petitioners company have admitted that the Contractors were engaged by them and had entrusted them the duties to engage Home-workers for manufacturing beedi by performing the job of rolling of the Beedi leaves and putting the tobacco mixtures into such rolled leaves. However, in this case, from the writ application and the pleading itself it appears that the writ petitioners company have admitted that the Contractors were engaged by them and had entrusted them the duties to engage Home-workers for manufacturing beedi by performing the job of rolling of the Beedi leaves and putting the tobacco mixtures into such rolled leaves. There is no denial that the contractors had deposed before the appropriate authority that the Home-workers as engaged were engaged by the Contractors but they worked for the petitioners Company who is running the business of manufacturing the beedi and selling of the products thereafter. Hence in view of the statutory provision of Beedi and Cigar Workers (Condition and Employment) Act, 1966, it is established that the Home-workers are the workers working for the petitioners Company and the petitioners Company is the principal employer in terms of the said statutory provision. Under Para 30 of the Employees provident Fund Scheme, 1952 the employer has been saddled with the responsibility to deposit the employer's contribution as well as the member's contribution irrespective of the fact whether such member workers were employed direct or through Contractor. Para 30 of the said Scheme reads to this effect. "30. Payment of contribution.- (1) The employer shall, in the first instance, pay both the contributions payable by himself (in this Scheme referred to as the employer's contribution) and also, on behalf of the member employed by him directly or by or through a contractor, the contribution payable by such member (in the Scheme referred to as the member's contribution.) (2) In respect of employees employed by or through a contractor, the contractor shall recover the contribution payable by such employee (in this Scheme referred to as the member's contribution) and shall pay to the principal employer the amount of member's contribution so deducted together with an equal amount of contribution (in this Scheme referred to as the employer's contribution) and also administrative charges. (3) It shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the employees employed by or through a contractor and also administrative charges. (3) It shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the employees employed by or through a contractor and also administrative charges. " ( 5 ) HAVING regard to the payment of contribution as above accordingly the writ petitioners cannot contend that as the Home-workers were engaged by Contractors, there is no scope for them to pay the member's contribution. Since statute is clear to this effect that employer's contribution and member's contribution both to be deposited by the employer at the first instance subject to realisation of the same from the Contractor, if any, the petitioners Company cannot shirk their responsibility in terms of Para 30 of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 so far as payment of their contribution as well as the contribution of the member workers, namely, the home-workers though engaged by the Contractors as the Company is the principal employer in terms of the statutory provision of Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditions and Employment), Act, 1966. From the impugned decision it appears that though there were as many as 39 Contractors employed by the writ petitioners Company in his business of Beedi manufacturing, but only 16 Contractors were identified. Such identification was accepted by the writ petitioners Company. The liability under Section 7a for determination of the amount so as to be paid accordingly was determined with reference to the Home-workers engaged by those 16 identified Contractors by fixing the figure to the tune of Rs. 1,32,000/- and odd as the principal amount for the period May, 1995 to January, 1999. So far as other unidentified Contractors are concerned, some of whom already left the job as it appears from the impugned order that the Department was directed to findout them and to place the relevant records subsequently for quantifying the payable amount by the principal employer so far as the provident Fund dues under the Provident Fund Scheme and the concerned act are concerned. In view of the positive finding by the concerned authority by determining the quantum under Section 7a of the said Act so far the home-workers as engaged by those identified Contractors, the contention of the petitioners Company that Home-workers are not duly identified has no legal basis. In view of the positive finding by the concerned authority by determining the quantum under Section 7a of the said Act so far the home-workers as engaged by those identified Contractors, the contention of the petitioners Company that Home-workers are not duly identified has no legal basis. Furthermore, the contention of the petitioners Company that the impugned decision was not a final as other unidentified Contractors and the Home-workers were left out for identification in subsequent stage also cannot be a ground to assail the impugned decision, since the writ petitioners company is not saddled with liability to pay the Provident Fund dues under section 7a of the said Act in respect of the Home-workers who were not identified through the unidentified Contractors concerned and they have been left out from the proceedings itself. In that view of the matter the argument of the petitioners Company is not legally sustainable about the nature and character of the impugned decision by terming the same as interim order. In fact, the impunged order is final and absolute in view of the positive findings as it appears from page 133 of the writ application which reads to this effect. "now, therefore, I Samir Kumar Bhattacharya, Assistant Provident fund Commissioner, West Bengal, The A and N Islands and Sikkim in exercise of the powers vested upon me under Section 7a of the Act hereby determine the said amount of Rs. 1,32,760. 10 towards principal amount and Rs. 52,785. 95 towards interest payable under Section 7q of the Act for the relevant period in respect of eligible home workers so far identified on the grounds that the employer himself has accepted the principal amount as assessed and agreed with the amount of dues payable by the employer so deposed by the area E. O. in his report dated 23. 10. 2000. The estt has also prayed for waiver of the interest to the tune of Rs. 52,785. 95 payable under Section 7q as this will tell upon the health of the business and may cause severe irreparable injury to the business of the estt. 10. 2000. The estt has also prayed for waiver of the interest to the tune of Rs. 52,785. 95 payable under Section 7q as this will tell upon the health of the business and may cause severe irreparable injury to the business of the estt. I cannot accept this plea of the estt on the grounds that it is the statutory provision and hence in the proceedings under Section 7a of the Act this cannot be waived and hence I reject the plea of the estt and held it as assessed under section 7a of the Act. " ( 6 ) ANOTHER point has been urged that the impugned decision is a composite order under Section 7a read with Section 7q of the said Act and since there is no appeal provision with reference to any decision under section 7q of the said Act, only remedy is the writ application now to be considered for decision. Under Section 7q of the said Act, no appeal provision has been provided in the statute because of the sole reason that the concerned authority was not given any discretionary power to determine the interest as the amount of interest has been fixed by the statute fixing the rate 12% per annum or any higher rate under the Scheme. Section 7q of the said Act reads to this effect. "7-Q. Interest payable by the Employer.- The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment : provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. " ( 7 ) HENCE the determination of the interest amount applying the mathematical formula as laid down in the said provision cannot be said as any disturbing material as would cause any person aggrieved to prefer an appeal since the statute has quantified and specified the amount of interest. " ( 7 ) HENCE the determination of the interest amount applying the mathematical formula as laid down in the said provision cannot be said as any disturbing material as would cause any person aggrieved to prefer an appeal since the statute has quantified and specified the amount of interest. Hence irrespective of the fact that there is no separate provision under section 7q of the said Act, this Court is of the view that the appeal was maintainable against the impugned decision even though the decision was a composite decision quantifying the amount under Section 7a read with section 7q of the said Act, in terms of the appeal provision under Section 7-I of the said Act. Once before the Tribunal in the statutory appeal, the amount as determined under Section 7a of the said Act is reduced or enhanced, whatever it may be, naturally the quantum of interest as fixed under Section 7q of the said Act applying the mathematical formula of 12% interest as stipulated would follow by increasing or decreasing the amount. Hence there is no question of determination by the Appellate Authority so far as interest amount is concerned. Despite alternative remedy, however, this writ Court is not referring the matter back to the Appellate Authority for determination for the two reasons, namely, that the writ application is pending for considerable period since 2000 and the writ application was admitted by passing necessary orders by this Court from time to time. Alternative remedy issue cannot be pleaded at the final hearing of the matter. Furthermore, alternative remedy is no absolute bar to entertain the writ application. The writ application is a constitutional remedy and it is the absolute discretionary jurisdiction of the writ Court to entertain any matter. It is not saddled with any statutory provision otherwise the constitutional provision would be infructuous. It is settled law by the judgment of the Apex Court that the exercise of power in the writ jurisdiction despite alternative remedy is absolutely within the discretionary power of the writ Court to consider and if the writ Court considers the case as entertainable despite having other alternative remedy, the writ is maintainable. Reliance is made to the judgment passed in the case Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, reported in air 1965 SC 1321 and State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Reliance is made to the judgment passed in the case Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, reported in air 1965 SC 1321 and State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. , reported in air 1977 SC 1132 . In that view of the matter, I hold that this writ petition is maintainable. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate for the petitioners Company, however, has referred to the judgment of a Single Bench passed by Calcutta High Court in the case of M/s. Allied Electricals and Switch Fuses and Ors. v. Assistant provident Fund Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund Organization, durgapur and Ors. , reported in (2003)3 Cal LT (HC) 25 to contend that the composite order passed under Section 7a and 7q of the said Act is not appealable. I have already held that the order passed under Section 7q of the said Act cannot be assailed in any appeal in view of the statutory fixation of interest quantifying the amount, as done, in terms of the mathematical formula as specified in the said provision and as no remedy could be available in the appeal, which is the reason that no appeal provision has been made in the statute under Section 7a read with Section 7q of the said Act. However the same is appealable under Section 7-I of the said Act so far as the quantum of amount as determined under Section 7a of the said Act and in the event of any consequential relief granted by the Tribunal hearing the appeal by reducing the principal amount, surely the interest amount would come down by applying Section 7q of the said Act and the appellate Tribunal also has the jurisdiction to determine that interest amount. In that view, the judgment as referred to by the learned Advocate for the petitioners Company cannot be considered as a ratio decidendi on this point as the relevant statutory provisions were not placed and argued before His Lordship for effective adjudication of the matter. Furthermore, it appears from the said judgment that this point has not been squarely answered by the Court as his Lordship determined the issue on going into another root question for issuance of notice which is reflected from the relevant paragraph in the said judgment, which reads to this effect : "5. Furthermore, it appears from the said judgment that this point has not been squarely answered by the Court as his Lordship determined the issue on going into another root question for issuance of notice which is reflected from the relevant paragraph in the said judgment, which reads to this effect : "5. Although neither of the parties agitated any question in respect of the alternative remedy but it is my responsibility to discuss on that score. Section 7-I of the Act gives provision of appeal to the tribunal. I find that Section 14b is appealable but there is no provision of appeal in respect of 7q. Good, bad or indifferent both are merged here. A sum can be said to be due when it is determined against a notice. Question of appeal arising therefrom. But when the root of the notice is under challenge, the Court cannot shut out the eyes. Whenever element of violation of principle of natural justice is available on the ratio of the Whirlpool Corporation case reported in (1998)8 SCC 1 will be applicable even having alternative remedy. " ( 9 ) HAVING regard to the discussion already made and having considered all the materials and observations as aforesaid, it appears that in the impugned decision making process, no illegality or irregularity was committed by the concerned authority. The petitioners were heard and their cases were considered. They themselves identified the Home-workers and accepted such identification and liability in respect of Home-workers engaged by 16 Contractors who identified them and in terms of Para 30 of the said scheme the entire liability since rest upon the writ petitioners Company to deposit the Provident Fund and other contribution, the writ petitioners have failed to make out a case of judicial review by identifying the grounds to that effect. ( 10 ) IN that view of the matter, the writ application accordingly stands dismissed as there is no merit which will accelerate this Court to proceed for judicial review or which will be considered by this Court as a ground of arbitrary action taken by the appropriate authority for determining the amount under Section 7a of the said Act. However, the writ petitioners have not assailed the quantum of the amount as fixed as well as the assessment proceeding. However, the writ petitioners have not assailed the quantum of the amount as fixed as well as the assessment proceeding. ( 11 ) IN that view of the matter, the writ application stands dismissed, as already held, with a cost of Rs. 1,000/- to be paid by the writ petitioners company to the respondent contesting Provident Fund Commissioner. ( 12 ) THE writ petitioners are directed to deposit the aforesaid money within three weeks from date. ( 13 ) AS the money is of the poor Home-workers for whom social welfare legislation was enacted to uplift their financial conditions, applying social justice concept along with the amount as fixed for interest, the writ petitioners are liable to pay further interest amount in terms of Section 7q of the said Act till the date of payment, as per direction of this Court, on the principal amount.