JUDGEMENT V.K. Gupta, C. J. (Oral).: With the consent of the teamed counsel for the parties, this petition is taken up today for final disposal. 2. A very short point of law is involved for consideration in this case. But brief facts first. 3. Some disputes having arisen between the petitioner and the respondent and undisputedly these being covered within the ambit and scope of Section 72 of Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968, in terms of Section 72 read with Section 73 of the said Act these were referred to arbitration and the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, in delegated exercise of the powers of Registrar passed an award which partially favoured the petitioner but partially went against it. Aggrieved therefrom the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 93(l)(h) of 1968 Act. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 93, the appeal lay to the State Government. The Additional Secretary, Cooperation, Government of Himachal Pradesh exercising the powers of the State Government in terms of Section 93 (supra) disposed of the petitioners appeal vide judgment dated 23rd December, 2003 by allowing the same. What had been refused to the petitioner by the Arbitrator was granted in its favour by the Appellate Authority. 4. The respondent in the aforesaid appeal had filed Cross Objections. Apparently feeling aggrieved that while disposing of and allowing the petitioners aforesaid appeal vide aforesaid judgment 23rd December, 2003 the Appellate Authority had not considered the Cross Objections of the respondent, it filed a review petition purportedly in terms of Section 94 of 1968 Act for recalling and reviewing the Appellate Authoritys judgment dated 23rd December, 2003. The following prayer in the aforesaid review application of the respondent is apposite and I quote:- "It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order i.e. order dated 23.12.2003 calls for review and as such may be reviewed by allowing the present petition. It is further prayed that the cross objections preferred by the Petitioner Federation may be considered and disposed off in accordance with the law and the appeal may also be heard again on merits." 5.Vide order dated 4th January, 2005, the Appellate Authority allowed the aforesaid review application of the respondent and directed that the Cross Objections filed by the respondent would be taken into consideration at the stage of fresh arguments in the case. For facility of reference, I quote herein below the text of the impugned order dated 4th January, 2005 which reads thus:- "4.1.2005. Case called. For the appellate/petitioner federation Sh. Ajit Jaswal vice Sh. Neeraj Gupta present. Sh. Surinder Saklani for the Respondent on behalf of Shri Aman Sood. Review petition entertained and cross petition, as filed by the Himfed Lawyer will be taken into consideration & arguments will be heard afresh. To come upon 11.4.2005. Announced." 6. Two Issues arise for consideration in this case. Firstly, whether the State Government either in terms of Section 94 or under any other provision of 1968 Act had the jurisdiction to review any judgment or order that it had passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 93 of 1968 Act. Second Issue which arises for consideration, going to the very root of the controversy is whether the respondent in an appeal filed under section 93 of 1968 Act had any right of preferring Cross Objections. In other words did any right in her in a respondent in an appeal filed under Section 93 of 1968 Act to file and maintain the Cross Objections. Let us deal with the second Issue first because it goes to the very root of the controversy. 7. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the respondents Cross Objections were maintainable in terms of Rule 145 of The Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Rules, 1971. Rule 145 read thus "145. Code of Civil Procedure to operate in certain matter- Where the Act, or these rules, have not laid down any procedure for any matter arising during the course of proceeding under section 74, 87, 93, 94 and 95 the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for such matter shall be applied in the same manner as if the person conducting the proceeding is a civil court." 8. Relaying upon Rule 145, Mr. Gupta has submitted that because Rule 145 stipulates that the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable mutations mutandis and since under the 1971 Rules there was no specific provision about the filing of Cross Objections, the provision for filing Cross Objections could be mutatis mutandis held applicable to an appeal filed under the 1968 Act because amongst various provisions mentioned in Rule 145, Section 94 also found its place. The argument even though appears attractive at the first impression, when considered in proper perspective is found to be totally devoid of any merit. 9. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and other vs. International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 250 clearly held that the right to file Cross Objections is in the nature of the exercise of a substantive right of appeal conferred by a statute since the right to prefer Cross Objection partakes of the right to prefer an appeal. Since the right of appeal is the creation of a statute and since there is no inherent right of appeal no appeal can be filed, heard or determined on merits unless the statute confers such a right upon a person wanting to file an appeal. The right to file Cross Objections having been held to be a substantive right, partaking of the right to file an appeal, unless the statute by itself created the right of filing the Cross Objections, no one can be said to be possessed of a right to file the Cross Objections. The following observations in paras 14, 15 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and other vs. International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd. (supra) being apposite are reproduced hereunder- "14. Right of appeal is creature of statute. There is no inherent right of appeal. No appeal can be filed, heard or determined on merits unless the statute confers right on the appellant and power on the court to do so. Section 39 of the Act confers right to file appeal, insofar as the orders passed under this Act are concerned, only against such of the orders as fall within one of other of the descriptions given in clauses (I) of (vi) of subsection (1) of Section 39. Parliament has taken care to specifically exclude any other appeal being filed, against any order passed under the Act but not covered by clause (I) to (vi) above said, by inserting the expression "and from so others" in the text of sub-section (1). Clause (a) of Section 41 extends applicability of all the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to (I) all proceedings before the Court under the Act, and (ii) to all the appeals, under the Act. Clause (a) of Section 41 extends applicability of all the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to (I) all proceedings before the Court under the Act, and (ii) to all the appeals, under the Act. However, the applicability of such of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be excluded as may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and/or of rules made there under. A bare reading of these provisions shows that in all the appeals filed under Section 39, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would be applicable. This would include the applicability of Order 41 including the right to take any cross-objection under Rule 22 thereof to appeals under Section 39 of the Act. 15. Right to prefer cross-objection partakes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one partly may rest contended by his partial success with a view to giving a quietus to the litigation. However, he may like to exercise his right of appeal if he finds that the other party was not interested to burying the hatchet and proposed to keep the lis alive by pursuing the same before the appellate forum. He too may in such circumstances exercise his right to file appeal by taking cross-objection. Thus taking any cross-objection to the decree or order impugned is the exercise of right of appeal though such right is exercised in the form of taking cross-objection. The substantive right is the right of appeal; the form of cross-objection is a matter of procedure. 18. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that right to take a cross-objection is the exercise of substantive right of appeal conferred by a statute. Available grounds of challenge against the judgment, decree or order impugned remain the same whether it is an appeal an cross-objection. The difference lies in the form and manner of exercising the right; the terminus a quo (the starting point) of limitation also differs." 10. A Full Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 27th October, 2004 in the case of Miss Lata, vs. United India Insurance Co. The difference lies in the form and manner of exercising the right; the terminus a quo (the starting point) of limitation also differs." 10. A Full Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 27th October, 2004 in the case of Miss Lata, vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (Cross Objections No. 39 of 1996 in FAO No. 267 of 1993) dealing with the issue relating to the right of a respondent in an appeal to file Cross Objections in matters arising out of Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 held as under:- "Whether, therefore, an appeal is filed by an Insurance Company within the confines of Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 or otherwise, or an appeal is filed by any one else, against a judgment and award of the Tribunal, since Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not lay down, provide for, or say that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to appeals field under the Act, even though there is a right of appeal against the judgment and award passed by a Tribunal as prescribed in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in the absence of any stipulation in the Act of the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act, the substantive right of filing Cross Objections cannot be availed of by any one as such a right does not exist in the statute. The right of appeal is a creature of statute and that right has been conferred upon a person aggrieved of an award in Section 173 of the Act. Neither in Section 173 of the Act nor elsewhere in the Act has it been provided that there shall be a right of filing Cross Objections. In other words, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not by itself, under its scheme, in its own body, contain any provision similar or identical to Rule 22 or Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor does the Act anywhere provide that order 41 Rule 22 or Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or the principles flowing therefrom, shall apply to appeals filed under the Act nor does the Act provide that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to appeals filed under the Act" 11. The legal position, therefore, is amply clear that unless the Statute creates or provides for the right of filing the Cross Objections, this being a substantive right, no one has any right to file the Cross Objections in an appeal. In the present case, since 1968 Act admittedly does not create or provide for any right to file Cross Objections by a respondent in an appeal under Section 93 of the Act, in exercise of subordinate legislation or delegated legislation power under the 1971 Rules, such a right could not be created. 12. There is another angle with which we may examine the aforesaid aspect. This relates to the import of Rule 145 itself. Actually when we look carefully to Rule 145 we find that even though the Rule 145 we find that even though the Rule has been loosely worded, in effect and substance it does not create a right of filing Cross Objections because all that it says is that irrespective of whether 1968 Act or 1971 Rules have laid down or not laid down any procedure for any matter arising during the course of proceedings under Sections 74, 87, 93, 94 and 95 of 1968 Act, the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil- Procedure for any such unspecified matter shall apply. At both the places, therefore, Rule 145 talks of laying down and the applicability of the "procedure". "Procedure" is not the same thing as "substantive law". As has been clearly noticed above, the right to file Cross Objections is in the realm of a substantive law. It is not a part of procedure. On such reckoning also, therefore, it can safely be held that it was not open to the respondent even to invoke Rule 145 in support of his argument that it had the right to file Cross Objections under Rule 145. 13.1 have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Cross Objections were not maintainable and, therefore, it was not open to the respondent to have filed the Cross Objections. 14. Coming to the first issue now involved for consideration in this case, viz. Whether the State Government in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 94 read with Section 93 of 1968 Act had any power or jurisdiction to review the judgment/order passed by it while disposing of an appeal filed before it under Section 93 of 1968 Act. 14. Coming to the first issue now involved for consideration in this case, viz. Whether the State Government in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 94 read with Section 93 of 1968 Act had any power or jurisdiction to review the judgment/order passed by it while disposing of an appeal filed before it under Section 93 of 1968 Act. This is particularly so because the review application filed by the respondent before the State Government invoked Section 94 of 1968 Act. Section 94 read thus: "94. Review and Revision;- (1) The State Government except in a case in which an appeal is preferred under Section 93 may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or inspection held or made under this Act or any proceedings of the Registrar or of any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority, and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. (2) The Registrar may at any time:- (a) review any order passed by himself; or (b) call for and examine the record of any inquiry or inspection held or made under this Act of the proceedings of any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority and if it appears to him that any decision, order or award or any proceedings so called or should for any reason be modified, annulled or reversed, may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit; Provided that before any order is made under sub-section (1) and (2), the State Government or the Registrar as the case may be shall afford to any person likely to be affected adversely by such orders an opportunity of being heard. Provided further that every application under sub-section (1) and (2), to the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be shall be made within ninety days from the date of the communication of the order sought to be reviewed or revised." 15. As is clearly seen Section 94 comprises of two sub-sections. Whereas sub-section (1) deals with and relates to the exercise of power and jurisdiction by the State Government, sub-section (2) relates to the exercise of power and jurisdiction by the Registrar. As is clearly seen Section 94 comprises of two sub-sections. Whereas sub-section (1) deals with and relates to the exercise of power and jurisdiction by the State Government, sub-section (2) relates to the exercise of power and jurisdiction by the Registrar. Whereas the Registrar has been conferred the power of review with respect to any order passed by himself, no such power has been conferred upon the State Government in so far as an appeal decided by the State Government under Section 93 is concerned. Actually sub-section (1) relating to the power and jurisdiction of the State Government does not at all talk of any review power with the State Government. It only talk of the power of Revision vested in the State Government and even this Revision jurisdiction is confined to only such matters which are not covered by Section 93 of 1968 Act The expression, "The state Government except in a case in which the appeal is preferred under Section 93" clearly connotes the limited jurisdiction of the State Government even for exercising Revisional jurisdiction with respect to such matters which are not covered by Section 93 of 1968 Act. 16. By now it is well settled principle of law that no one has any inherent jurisdiction or power of review. No one can exercise of power of review unless the Statute creates or confers such power. No provision of 1968 Act was brought to my notice, apart from Section 94 which can be said to be any way conferring the power of review upon the State Government with respect to a judgment that it has passed in an appeal decided by it under Section 93 of 1968 Act. 17. Based on the aforesaid reasoning, therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that both the respondent as well as the Additional Secretary, Cooperation, Government of Himachal Pradesh acted irresponsibly in filing and prosecuting the Cross Objections as well as the review application (as far as the respondent is concerned) and in allowing the review application as well as ordering the consideration of the Cross Objections (as far as the Additional Secretary, Cooperation, Government of Himachal Pradesh is concerned). By their irresponsible act both of them landed the petitioner in avoidable rounds of litigation. 18. This petition accordingly is allowed. By their irresponsible act both of them landed the petitioner in avoidable rounds of litigation. 18. This petition accordingly is allowed. The impugned order dated 4th January, 2005 is set aside with all the consequences and with costs assessed at Rs.10,000/- to be paid to the petitioner by the respondent within four weeks from today. CMP No. 96 of 2005. 19. In view of the disposal of the main petition, this application is also disposed of and the interim order dated 5th April, 2005 shall stand vacated.