Honble SHARMA, J.—The petitioner (here in after referred to as defendant) in the instant writ petition, seeks to set aside the judgment dated August 28, 1986 of Board of Revenue (for short Board) and other judgments and decree respectively passed on June 27, 1978 and June 3,1974 by the Revenue Appellate Authority Bharatpur and Assistant Collector Dholpur. (2). Contextual facts depict that second appeal under section 224 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short 1955 Act) was preferred by the defendant before the Board with the averments that Smt. Javitri (here in after referred to as plaintiff) filed suit against the defendant in the court of Assistant Collector Dholpur under section 180 of the 1955 Act and pleaded that she was the recorded khatedar tenant of land bearing khasra No. 3969 measuring 1 bigha 4 biswas situated in village Jariha, Tehsil Rajakhera and being widow for over 30 years was not in a position to cultivate the land personally. She therefore in Svt. 2008 let out the land to defendant for one year to cultivate on payment to her annually of the land revenue payable to the Government and two maunds of grain per year. This annual arrangement was continued in subsequent years on a year to year basis on the same terms till Svt. 2022, but the defendant thereafter made default in the delivery of the two maunds of grain as agreed upon leading to the plaintiff demanding of the defendant in Svt. 2023 that either he conform to the terms under which the land was let or stop cultivating the land. The refusal of the defendant to do either, provided the cause for action for the suit under section 180 of the 1955 Act. (3). The defendant filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint. He denied to have taken the land on the terms set out in the plaint in Svt. 2008 and onwards on a year to year basis. The defendant further alleged that an earlier suit filed in 1956 for the same land by the plaintiff under section 180 of the 1955 Act in the court of the Assistant Collector Dholpur was dismissed in default and the plaintiff was therefore debarred from bringing a fresh suit. The plaintiff was not entitled to seek relief in view of the provisions contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. The plaintiff was not entitled to seek relief in view of the provisions contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. It was also alleged that the suit was time barred as for more than 12 years preceding the filing of the suit the plaintiff had remained dispossessed and her interests, if any, in the land in question had been extinguished under section 63 of the Act. (4). The Assistant Collector dismissed the suit vide judgment dated June 3,1974 holding that in the previous suit the plaintiff had alleged that defendant had been admitted as a sub tenant for five years in Svt. 2006 and could not be ejected earlier because of the coming into force of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance (for short RPTO) as against which in the subsequent suit it had been alleged that the sub tenancy commenced in Svt. 2008 and was on a year to year basis, the defendant was a tress passer since Svt. 2006 and the limitation for suits for ejectment of tress passers was twelve years and since no suit for ejectment had been brought within twelve years from Svt. 2006 the plaintiffs interest in the land in question was extinguished as per section 63 of the Act. It was also held that the plaintiff was unable to establish that the defendant was a sub tenant holding from year to year ever since Svt. 2008. It was further held that the suit was barred by Order 9 Rule 9 CPC as well as Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as in the earlier suit relief had been sought under section 180(1) (c) and (d) while in the present suit relief had been sought under section 180(l)(b). (5). Aggrieved by the judgment the plaintiff preferred the appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority Bharatpur who vide judgment dated June 27, 1978 reversed the finding of the court below and decreed the suit holding that Section 63(l)(iv) of the 1955 Act was not applicable to this case as the plaintiff continued to be recorded khatedar of land in question and the defendant admitted his position only to be of a sub tenant later could not be said to have been deprived of possession of plaintiff within the meaning of section 63 (l)(iv) of 1955 Act. It was held that the suit could not be said to be barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC on the ground that relief under section 180(l)(b) was not claimed in the earlier suit where relief only under section 180(l)(d) was claimed as the cause of action was held to be different. It was also held that Order 9 Rule 9 CPC also did not apply. As regards limitation it was observed that the cause of action arose in Svt. 2002 when the defendant defaulted in the delivery of grain and this was not controverted by the defendant the limitation should be reckoned from Svt. 2022 and since the suit was filed within a year it was not time barred. (6). Aggrieved by the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority the defendant preferred second appeal before the Board which was dismissed as indicated herein above. (7). Having heard the submissions, I find that the bar under order 2 Rule 2 and order 9 Rule 9 CPC operated only when the cause of action is the same. In the instant matter the dismissal in default of earlier suit is not hit by Order 9 Rule 9 CPC since the repeated default of sub tenant provided distinct and separate cause of action. It is also seen that the plaintiff claimed relied under section 180(l)(b) of the Act, whereas in the earlier suit the relief had been sought under section 180(l)(c) and (d). In my opinion the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC would not apply as the relief under section 180(l)(b) became available to the plaintiff only by an amendment in the Act subsequent to the filing of the suit. Interpreting the provisions of order 2 Rule 2 CPC their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sidramappa vs. Rajashetty ( AIR 1970 SC 1059 ) indicated thus:— "The requirement of Order 2 Rule 2 is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. Cause of action means the cause of action for which the suit was brought. Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. Cause of action means the cause of action for which the suit was brought. Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings." (8). For these reasons, I do not see any infirmity in the impugned findings of the Board. The writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed without any order as to costs.