Judgment Surya Kant, J. 1. The petitioner has come up with a prayer for quashing of the orders dated 2.7.1997 (Annexure P-1) whereby his services were terminated, dated 31.12.2002 (Annexure P-2) denying him payment as a Sanskrit Teacher on the basis of his selection in the year 1998 and dated 2.1.2003 (Annexure P-3) conveying him the decision regarding rejection of his representation by the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana for reinstatement, in service. The petitioner has also sought quashing of a letter dated 11.12.1998 (Annexure P-12) whereby he was intimated about the termination of his services by the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana vide order dated 5.5.1997 and the communication thereof by District Education Officer (DEO) vide his Memo dated 2.7.1997. A direction has also been sought by the petitioner for his reinstatement in service. Alternatively, the petitioner seeks a direction to command the respondents to permit him to join back as the Sanskrit Teacher on the basis of the appointment letter dated 27.4.1998. 2. Briefly, the facts are that vide an order dated 23.2.1996 (Annexure P-4) DEO, Sirsa appointed the petitioner as a Sanskrit Teacher purely on ad hoc basis till the Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana recommended names of candidates for appointment on regular basis. The petitioner joined the afore-mentioned post on 2.3.1996. It appears that before his appointment, the petitioner was named as one of the accused in F.I.R. No. 258 dated 14.8.1990 under section 302, 307, 326, 324, 323, 148 read with section 149 I.P.C., PS Rajound, District Kaithal in which vide judgment dated 24/25 September, 1996, the Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal convicted and sentenced him for life alongwith his co-accused. The petitioner was, accordingly, taken into custody on 24.9.1996. As a result of the afore-mentioned conviction, services of the petitioner were terminated vide one of the impugned orders dated 2.7.1997 (Annexure P-1) with effect from 24.9.1996. The petitioner along with his co-accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. 509-DB of 1996 in this Court which was decided by a Division Bench vide judgment dated 27.9.2001 whereby petitioners appeal was partly allowed and while acquitting him of the charges under Section 302/326 read with Section 149 and 148 I.P.C., he was convicted under Section 324 I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for the period he already had undergone. 3. 3. During this period, it further transpires that posts of Sanskrit teachers were advertised by the Staff Selection Commission, Haryana for appointment on regular basis. The petitioner applied for the same and was selected. The DEO, Ambala issued even an appointment letter dated 27.4.1998 (Annexure P-6) in terms whereof the petitioner was to join in Govt. Middle School at Fatehpur. However, having been brought to the notice of the Department that he was a convict under section 324 I.P.C., his appointment on regular basis, referred to above, was cancelled vide another impugned order dated 31.12.2002 (Annexure P-2). It further appears that after the judgment of the High Court in the Criminal Appeal in which petitioners conviction under Section 324 I.P.C. alone was maintained, he represented for his reinstatement in terms of his previous appointment on ad hoc basis in the year 1996 and alternatively, sought appointment on regular basis pursuant to his selection in the year 1998. His application, however, was turned down vide yet another impugned order dated 2,1.2003 (Annexure P-3). Aggrieved at these orders that the petitioner has approached this Court. 4. Notice of motion was issued and in response thereto two separate written statements have been filed by the DEOs of Sirsa and Ambala respectively. 5. We have heard Shri S.P.Laler, Seamed Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Rajbir Sehrawat, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana and have perused the record. 6. The primary contention of Shri Laler revolves around that Govt. instructions dated 17/26.9.1975 (Annexure P-19) which pertain to rehabilitation of ex-convicts released from jails and regarding their eligibility for appointment under government. In these instructions, the government has also mentioned that the persons convicted for committing any heinous crime involving moral turpitude shall not be eligible for appointment under the government, According to Shri Laler, the offence under section 324 I.P.C. is not included in the list of "heinous crimes involving moral turpitude", therefore, there was no legal embargo in the reinstatement and/or fresh appointment of the petitioner merely on the basis of his conviction and sentence under Section 324 I.P.C. 7. On the other hand, Shri Sehrawat contends that the ad hoc services of the petitioner were terminated due to his absence from duty and concealment of facts, namely, pendency of a criminal case under Section 302 I.P.C. etc. against him. On the other hand, Shri Sehrawat contends that the ad hoc services of the petitioner were terminated due to his absence from duty and concealment of facts, namely, pendency of a criminal case under Section 302 I.P.C. etc. against him. According to him, the first appointment was merely on ad hoc basis and the petitioner having been found guilty of concealing material information, namely, pendency of the afore-mentioned criminal case and after he was taken into judicial custody on 24/2.5 September, 1996, he having absented himself from duty, his services were rightly terminated. So far as the denial of appointment on regular basis pursuant to the 1998 selection is concerned, reference has been made to the averments made in the written statement of respondent No. 4 in which it has been stated, inter-alia, that a convict is not entitled for appointment as a matter of right and the government policy dated 17/26 March, 1975 (Annexure P-19) does not confer any legally vested right upon the petitioner in terms whereof he could claim appointment and/or reinstatement as a matter of right. 8. So far as the claim of the petitioner pertaining to his reinstatement in ad hoc service pursuant to his appointment in the year 1996 is concerned, we are of the view that the petitioner was merely an ad hoc appointee and had no right to hold the post. The appointment was secured by him by concealing material facts, namely, that he was facing trial in a case pertaining to a heinous crime registered under Section 302, 307, 326 I.P.C. etc. Had he disclosed this fact to the authorities, there was no question of him being appointed on ad hoc basis. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongs. His ad hoc services were, thus, rightly terminated and in this regard no fault can be found with the order dated 2.7.1997 (Annexure P-1) and that too at this belated stage. 9. Coming to the claim of the petitioner for appointment on regular basis pursuant to his selection by the Staff Selection Commission, Haryana and/or the appointment letter dated 27.4.1998 (Annexure P-6), we are of the view that the government policy dated 16/26 March, 1975 (Annexure P-19) does not confer an indefeasible right upon an ex-convict to claim appointment in Government service merely because the offence for which he was convicted does not involve "moral turpitude". Para 2(ii) of the policy reads as follows:- "(ii) With regard to the employment of ex-convicts on release from jail, a uniform policy will not be possible and each case should be considered on its own merits. The appointing authority should, in such cases, make detailed inquiries and satisfy himself fully that the ex-convict has reformed himself after release from jail and nothing adverse about his conduct has come to notice after his conviction, and he is thus suitable for Government service....". (emphasis applied). 10 True it is that an offence under Section 324 I.P.C. is not included in the list of heinous crimes involving moral turpitude in the afore-mentioned government policy. We a re, however, of the firm view that parameters in relation to "moral turpitude" would always vary from case to case. The job of a school teacher is not merely a government service. He is the trustee of our future generations. The knowledge he imparts, the conduct he demonstrates, and the values he delivers, are essential to adjudge him as to whether he is a teacher or a mere government employee. The conduct of a teacher has to be above board and worthy of emulation and not like the petitioner who carries the burden of allegations in a murder case over his shoulders and indulged in free fights causing injuries to one of the victims. In our view, there might not be that much aberration of moral turpitude if an ex-convict of Section 324 I.P.C. is to be employed like a Mechanic in a workshop or a Bus Conductor but to install him as a guardian of the youngsters who are in an impressionable age is to deprive them of the impeachable moral values, idealistic philosophies and ethics that they are supposed to be imbibing. 11. That apart, it appears to us that when the "conduct of a person which leads to his conviction on a criminal charge" has a material bearing in relation to his retention in government service in terms of the mandate as contained in Clause (a) of Second Proviso to Article 311(2) of our Constitution, such a consideration cannot be altogether alien for the purpose of his appointment to Government service. 12. 12. We, therefore, do not find it a fit case to invoke our extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Section 226 of the Constitution so as to command the respondents to appoint or reinstate the petitioner as a Sanskrit Teacher and consequently dismiss this writ petition with no order, however, as to costs.