Honble BALIA, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties. (2). To find the real issue between the parties, it shall be necessary to go through the various orders passed at different stages by the authorities under the Rajasthan Ceiling On Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1973) and to appreciate the preliminary objection raised by the respondents as well as the right claimed by the petitioners. (3). The ceiling proceedings in respect of agricultural holdings held by one Chandan Singh, since deceased, whose legal representatives are respondents No. 4/1 to 4/5 under the Act of 1973 took place and by order dated 26.7.75, the competent officer under the Act of 1973 found that said Chandan Singh held 790 bighas and one biswa of land, consisting of many parcels of land of varying measurement and of varying nature. He further arrived at a finding that the lands held by said Chandan Singh had been converted into 70.06 standard acres of land. The further findings after considering the transfers made by him to members of his family was that he is entitled to hold 30 standard acres of land and he held 35.62 standard acres of surplus land, to be resumable by the Government. With these findings, he invited option of the holder of the land which he wants to surrender. (4). This order records that since he has not submitted his option within the time allowed, 361 bighas and 4 biswa of land converted into 35.88 standards acres pf land on the basis of conversion of the lands in different categories from bighas to standard acres was to be resumed. As per this order since no single piece of land ad-measuring 0.54 standards it is left from acquisition. (5) However, it has further been found on record that said Chandan Singh submitted his option for surrendering the various lands which include 177 bighas and 50 biswas of Chahi land and 188 bighas 10 biswas other lands, both had 7 parcels of land. It was further stated that aftersurrender of the aforesaid 34 standard acres of land if some land is still required to be surrendered, the same may be taken from the North East side of Khasra No. 473, ad-measuring 146 bighas 2 biswa. (6). The aforesaid option was accepted by the Competent Officer vide order dated 4.10.75 except to the extent it related to Khasra Nos. (6). The aforesaid option was accepted by the Competent Officer vide order dated 4.10.75 except to the extent it related to Khasra Nos. 351, 99, 100 and 414, which were found to be encumbered and instead other lands were acquired. (7). The order dated 4.10.75, making variance in the acceptance of the option submitted by the holder Chandan Singh for surrendering the surplus land was subjected to appeal by the said Chandan Singh. The appeal was filed somewhere in 1979 with an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. (8). The said appeal was decided by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide his order dated 20.9.1979, by which he partly accepted the appeal and the matter was remanded to competent officer to reconsider the acquisition of land falling in Khasra Nos. 351, 468/545, 99 and 14 in accordance with law after affording opportunity to holder, which was not offered to Chandan Singh. It was further directed that until the aforesaid matter is decided, no part of land situated in Khasra No. 473 be acquired. (9). This order was further subjected to revision by the State before the Board of Revenue. The Revision was rejected by the Board as not maintainable by order dated 21.1.88. (10). The proceedings up to that stage reveals that there was no dispute about the determination of holdings in the hands of Chandan Singh, the determination of land within the ceiling area which Chandan Singh could hold and the determination of surplus land which was required to be surrendered by said Chandan Singh. The only dispute which survived after determination of ceiling area and the surplus area was relating to the surrender of surplus land vis-a-vis option submitted by the holder in the context of encumbrances, if any, on the lands opted to be surrendered by the assessee. (11). It may be apposite to notice here that while land records enters the land measured in bighas and biswas, the Ceiling Act provides the intention limit in measure standard acres. The determination of holding held by any person is primarily determined in measure bighas and biswas. (11). It may be apposite to notice here that while land records enters the land measured in bighas and biswas, the Ceiling Act provides the intention limit in measure standard acres. The determination of holding held by any person is primarily determined in measure bighas and biswas. Since the land in different part of the State is of not quality and not with same standard of irrigation facilities and its fertility depends on variable factors, Ceiling land provided for conversion of land measured from bighas to standard acres by laying down the formula of equating bighas into acres of different types of land. This appeal is a matter of mathematical calculation on the basis of type of land emerging from land records. This is normally done by the competent officer. (12). When the matter was remanded as aforesaid for considering the acquisition of the lands comprising the aforesaid Khasras, the assessee submitted a detailed reply in which he pointed out that classification of total area held by the assessee between different types of land has not been correctly made while converting his total holdingsmeasured in bighas into standard acres for the purpose of determination of ceiling which needed to be recomputed by carrying out these calculations as per the Rules correctly. This was objected to by contending that submissions may be confined to the issue about the encumbrances of the aforesaid lands which was specifically made the subject matter of remand by the Revenue Appellate Authority in its order dated 20th Sept. 1979 and revision against which was dismissed by Board of Revenue vide its order dated 21.1.1988. (13). By its order dated 16.4.80 (Annex.8), the Sub Divisional Officer, Bhinmal-cum-competent officer recorded two important findings. Firstly, relating to the conversion of measurement of the lands of the petitioners holding from bighas to standard acre on the basis of the nature of the land, it was found by; the competent Officer that from the record, it is 387 bighas 2 biswa of lands which were converted into assuming it to be Chahi land was in fact not Chahi land but was of different variety of inferior land. It was found that out of 397 bighas 2 biswas of land, 144 bighas 6 biswas of land was irrigated land, 117 bighas and 15 biswas were barani, atwal and 65 biswa land of Thada qualities. It was found that out of 397 bighas 2 biswas of land, 144 bighas 6 biswas of land was irrigated land, 117 bighas and 15 biswas were barani, atwal and 65 biswa land of Thada qualities. With this finding, the final holdings of the assessee in bighas and biswas remained the same but by conversion into standard acre; the same was computed at 59.28 standard acre instead of 70.08 Standard Acres as per conversion exercise undertaken earlier. However, the total holdings in bighas remained the same i.e., to say 790 bighas and 1 biswa. It was found that amongst the assessees account 31 standard acre lands is gair-mumkin and which cannot be included for the purpose of ceiling determination. The land which was effectively held by Chandan Singh was found to be 58.97 standard acres. Another important finding reached in favour of the assessee was that it recognised certain transfers in respect of the Ian is which were made subject matter of order of remand ad measured 14,44 standard acres. With this corrected conversion computation, the Competent Officer found that the assessee holds 44.53 standard acres of land on the relevant date. He was held entitled to hold 30 standard acres of land as earlier found in his favour and found remaining 14 standard acres of land to be resumable. (14). Thus, the order dated 16.4.80 not only gave effect to the order of remand, but corrected a mistake apparent on the face of record in making conversion of area from Bighas to standard acres. The mistake was arithmetical in nature. Rectification of conversion computation resulted in alteration of the determination of surplus area in the hands of Chandan Singh. Having come to this conclusion, the competent Officer realised that in accordance with the finality attached to the earlier order, determining the total area held by the assessee and the surplus area to be surrendered by him, certain lands which have been acquired earlier in excess of surplus area, in accordance with the findings reached by him, will be required to be returned to the assessee. He therefore, taking into consideration that the lands which were acquired earlier has been allotted to other person in accordance with law as per rules of allotments and considering the report of the Nayab Tehsildar that most part of the lands so allotted is) not Occupied by the allottees, and in respect of some of the Khasra No. premium has also not been paid and some of the allottees have surrendered their lands, directed that it will not be advisable to call an option again for the purpose of surrender of the reduced surplus area, and to acquire Khasra No. 350, 440, 220, 297, 402 {Mee} and 341/543 totaling 182 bighas 1 biswa in village Rawata. It was also directed that the allottees in these lands which were in occupation were not to be discontinued. It also specified the lands measuring 180 bighas, 1 biswa to be returned to the assessee and to make necessary change in the land records. (15). This order was not appealed against by the holder or his legal representatives. However, the State Government did file appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority challenging the reduction of the surplus area by the competent Officer, contending that while considering the issue remanded to it by the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority vide order dated 20.9.79, it had no jurisdiction to consider any other matter and reduce the surplus area. It was common ground that by correcting the calculation mistake in conversion measure, the land area quantified in the lands of holder in such converted measure of Standard acre stood reduced from 70.08 Standard Acres to 58.97 Standard Acres. Ceiling area applicable to the holder remained the same i.e., 30 Standard Acres. Transfers in respect of 14.04 Standard Acres, which was not earlier recognised, stood recognised as a result of releasing on remand, hence, such holding were to be excluded from computation of land holdings of the holder. After excluding 14.04 Standard Acres of land from 58.97 Standard Acres, the holder was allowed to retain 30 Standard Acres of land. The remainder was to remain surplus. After excluding 14.04 Standard Acres of land from 58.97 Standard Acres, the holder was allowed to retain 30 Standard Acres of land. The remainder was to remain surplus. Thus, on simple arithmetical language, the findings could be expunged so far as determination of total holding, recognisable transfers only applicable and surplus as under— Total holdings of Chander Singh as on relevant date 790 Bighas 1 Biswa (No change in this area) Converted into Standard Acres as per nature of land recorded in land records, after excluding 31 Standard Acres of Gair Mumkin land. 58.97 Standard acres Less : Transfer recognised 14.04 Standard acres 44.93 Standard acres Less : Ceiling area 30.00 Standard acres Balance land held as surplus : 14.93 Standard acres Difference in computation of Standard Acres as a result of correction is noticed as under— 790.01 bighas originally converted into 70.08 St. acres 790.01 bighas converted on the basis of land records 59.28 St. acres 10.80 St. acres Less : 0.31 St. acres Gair Mumkin 10.49 St. acres (16). No challenge was raised to the recognition of 14.44 standard acres of land, subject matter of transfers. The challenge of the State Government was that to the extent measurement in standard acres of land which has been reduced and consequential correction in computation in terms of standard acres, which has resulted in reduction of surplus land to that extent on the ground that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the competent officer while proceeding in pursuance of the order of remand, it cannot be held justified. (17). This plea of the State Government was not accepted by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide its order dated 30.12.92 (Annex.9). It found that the mistake which has been corrected by the competent officer was obviously a clerical/arithmetical error which could be corrected by the concerned authority at any time. It also reached to the clear finding that from the earlier declaration of surplus land, 10 standard acres of land has been found to be additional land acquired under the order of competent officer after remand and it has been released from acquisition. However, while making the conclusive excerpts in the orders, 10 standard acres of land was again in addition to the 14.44 standard acres of land which was the area found to be part of the recognisable transfers. However, while making the conclusive excerpts in the orders, 10 standard acres of land was again in addition to the 14.44 standard acres of land which was the area found to be part of the recognisable transfers. The exact order to the extent, it is relevant will be reproduced at the appropriate stage later. (18). This order was again subjected to revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue by its order dated 15.10.93 (Annex. 10) dismissed the revision petition by finding that it has a case of correcting calculation mistakes and there was no legal issue in the case which needed interference in the revisional jurisdiction. The Board of Revenue too noticed that vide order dated 4.10.75, 35.08 standard acres were found to be eligible for acquisition but vide order dated 16.4.80 only 25.88 was found to be fit for acquisition and it also noticed that 14.44 standard acres land which was subject matter of recognisable transfers as a result of consideration given on remand. This computation also brought to the same conclusion to which the learned competent officer has reached and finding it to be an order validity passed, the revision was dismissed. (19). It may be noticed that before the Board of Revenue also, the State Governments contention was that the order of declaration of surplus land passed in the first instance become final, could not have been amended, modified or varied while considering the case of remand and the consideration ought to have been found only to the extent, the order of remand requiring the enquiry to be made by the competent officer: (20). However, there being no issue about the correctness of the calculation of standard acres on the basis of the nature of land as per the land records and the recognition of certain transfers which were not earlier recognised, and there being no directions by the Revenue Appellate Authority or the Board of Revenue to return any land in addition to what has been directed to be returned by the competent officer vide its order dated 16.4.80, the matter rested at that. (21). The review petition against order Annex. 10 preferred by the State Government was also dismissed inter alia on the ground that the contention raised in the review petition was not raised at the time of hearing of the revision, and therefore, the review petition is not maintainable. (22). (21). The review petition against order Annex. 10 preferred by the State Government was also dismissed inter alia on the ground that the contention raised in the review petition was not raised at the time of hearing of the revision, and therefore, the review petition is not maintainable. (22). Having reached this stage, the third stage commenced with the making of an application by LRs. of deceased Chandan Singh for return of 10 standards acres of land on the basis of the order passed by the Revenue appellate Authority on 30.12.92, Revision against which was preferred by the State Government and which has been dismissed stating that since only 14.4 standard acres of land is required to be acquired, the remaining 10 standard acres land which has been ordered to be retained by competent officer vide its order dated 16.4.80 may be restored to them. This application was allowed by the Competent Officer vide his order dated 1.8.94 by which the SDM, Bhinmal was directed to take possession from the occupants of the land which had been allotted to various persons after the land was acquired way back in 1975, in pursuance of the first determination of the ceiling and surplus area adjudicated by the competent officer and which stood allotted somewhere in 1977 to various persons under the relevant provisions of Rules. (23). It appears that this petition was filed by the present petitioners before they could know about the order dated 1.8.94 but after they came to know about the application filed by LRs. of deceased Chandan Singh seeking possession of 10 standard acres of land on the basis of order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 30.12.1992 as affirmed by the Board of Revenue vide its order dated 15.10.93. The order dated 1.8.94 has been produced by the respondents along with their return. (24). The petition was filed apprehending that they are likely to be dispossessed if the contention of the applicant is accepted on the basis of import of the order dated 15.10.1993. (25). Be that as it may, the petitioner prayed for quashing of the order dated 15.10.1993 and 7.5.1994 passed by the Board of Revenue and the order passed by Revenue Appellate Authority on 30th December, 1992. (26). (25). Be that as it may, the petitioner prayed for quashing of the order dated 15.10.1993 and 7.5.1994 passed by the Board of Revenue and the order passed by Revenue Appellate Authority on 30th December, 1992. (26). The respondents in the return raised preliminary objection and it has been pressed into service that the petitioners being strangers to the proceedings of determination of ceiling have no locus stand to maintain this petition for setting aside or modifying the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority or the Board of Revenue Appellate Authority or the Board of Revenue which related to determination of ceiling area and the surplus land to be acquired from the respondents holders of land. They placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kesa vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 RLW 1 and further contends that if as a result of final determination of ceiling, the assessee is entitled to return of certain land which has been taken possession by the State at the earlier stage of the proceedings, the rights created in between, in favour of allottees are governed by doctrine of lis pendense. No right or equity exists in their favour which can be litigated for the purpose of examining correctness of the order passed under the Ceiling Law. (27). The substance of the contentions raised by the respondents is that since right of hearing of the transferors or the holder of the land has been excluded by necessary implication from the provisions of the Ceiling Law as interpreted by this Court, it must necessarily follow that the transferee of the land from the State Government after it was acquired by the State Government, do not acquire any right of hearing in case as a result of final determination, the land acquired by the State Government and allotted to other landless arson under the Rule, is required to be returned back to the original holder or his legal representatives. (28). Mr. Mridul, learned senior counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, contends that the possession of petitioner is not under a transfer from the holder nor they claim recognition or non recognition of any transfer under the provisions relating to determination of ceiling area. (28). Mr. Mridul, learned senior counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, contends that the possession of petitioner is not under a transfer from the holder nor they claim recognition or non recognition of any transfer under the provisions relating to determination of ceiling area. It was contended by the learned counsel that peculiar facts and circumstances of the case are that so far as determination of ceiling case is concerned, it has attained finality vide orders passed in 1975 in which the petitioner was held to be entitled to hold 30 standard acres of land from his holdings and the balance land was to be acquired by the State. That position was not challenged in appeal and was not liable to be altered. The said position was also not altered even after order dated 16.4.80, that is to say, the lands which the petitioner is entitled to hold within the ceiling limit remain to be 30 standard acres. In fact, the assessee himself has given option of the land to be surrendered by him. He has opted for the lands acquired by the State Govt. In pursuance of option and out of those surrendered lands, the State Government has allotted same lands to the petitioners or their predecessor in interest through whom they have claim to derive title in 1977 much before the respondent assessee has even appealed against the order making variation in his option relating to certain lands. It was only after the remand was made accepting the assessees contention in respect of certain khasra that the matter came before the competent officer with specific directions to consider the question whether the lands required to be surrendered by the respondents assessee were encumbered or land in respect of which he could exercise his option to surrender as a surplus land. In the circumstances, the ceiling determination having become final for all practical purposes, the allotment which was made to the petitioners in 1977 after the surrendered lands were acquired by the State Government and vested in it, no lis was pending so far as status of land as such was concerned. In the circumstances, the ceiling determination having become final for all practical purposes, the allotment which was made to the petitioners in 1977 after the surrendered lands were acquired by the State Government and vested in it, no lis was pending so far as status of land as such was concerned. Therefore, the respondents are not right in replying on the principle of lis pendense because for invoking doctrine of lis pendense as on the day, the allotment by State took place any lis relating to the matter touching that land must be pending somewhere, or if any orders are passed limitation for filing appeal must not have expired. If by subsequent events, certain rights are affected then such transfers, if they have been made in accordance with fact situation existing as on the date allotments were made cannot be considered to be hit by the doctrine of lis pendense whereunder the rights acquired by transfer during pendency of litigation could have been taken away without informing them on the basis of final result of such pending proceedings. If such rights are affected by any such subsequent event, they certainly have the locus to raise questions to safeguard the interest created in them by such allotments. It was also urged by the learned counsel that there is a distinction between the question about exclusion of principles of natural justice qua certain persons and right of holding or seek remedy against the orders affecting their rights in any manner adversely. He contends that allotment having been made in favour of the petitioners by the State Government of the land possession of which was taken by the State government as a result of option about surrender of land given by Chandan Singh, and no lis was pending, then the petitioner had acquired an interest in such land in respect of which they resort to any legal proceedings. If by the impugned orders, the rights of the petitioners qua the allotted land are affected, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not persons who are aggrieved with the impugned orders so as to be considered having no locus standi to challenge the orders. (29). If by the impugned orders, the rights of the petitioners qua the allotted land are affected, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not persons who are aggrieved with the impugned orders so as to be considered having no locus standi to challenge the orders. (29). So far as maintainability of the petition is concerned, another contention raised in alternative is that even if it can be said that after allotments were made, the order computing surplus land in the case of Chandan Singh has been rightly corrected by removing apparent error in the order and even if the petitioners are held to have no right against the respondents/legal representatives of Chandan Singh, their right to remedy against the State Government to seek a mandamus that if for any reason the land in question is returned to the original assessee, the allottees are entitled for allotment of alternative lands or for compensation in lieu of such land which has been allotted on payment of price and which have been improved by the allottees, when they are deprived of their allotted land for no fault of theirs. Thus, the petitioner cannot be none suited on the ground of locus stand. (30). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions. It would be apposite to address to the question as to what is the determining factor for deciding the locus standi of a person to maintain the petition. Since the contention has been raised primarily assuming that the petition is writ of certiorari, the principle is well settled that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari an applicant may ordinarily fall in three categories (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or inter polar or meddlesome. (31). Apparently, the petitioners do not fall within the third category, who in any circumstances do not have any locus standi to challenge the proceedings by applying for the writ of certiorari. So far as the person aggrieved is concerned, he always have a right to apply for a writ of certiorari. So far as a stranger is concerned, he stands on grey area of border line. So far as the person aggrieved is concerned, he always have a right to apply for a writ of certiorari. So far as a stranger is concerned, he stands on grey area of border line. The settled principle in this connection for invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction is that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has an individual right in the subject matter of the application. The expression "aggrieved person" is not an expression which can be covered in strait- jacket, but it denotes an elastic, and to an extent an elusive, concept. The expression "aggrieved person" cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its features can be described in a particular attentive manner and in a broad tentative manner. Who can be an aggrieved person vis-a-vis a particular application depends on diverse and variable factors such as the content and intent of the Statute of which contravention is alleged; the specific circumstance of the case; the nature and extent of petitioners interest and the nature of prejudice or injury suffered by him. (32). The matter was comprehensively considered by the Apex Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671 . It was a case in which the appellant before the Supreme Court was proprietor of a cinema theatre for exhibiting cinema films. Being aggrieved of grant of no objection certificate to a rival proprietor of another cinema theatre, the question arose whether a business rival is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a "No objection certificate" granted under Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 in favour of a rival in trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction. (33). While considering this question, this court enunciated the broad principles of determining the question of locus standi. The Court summarized the principles enunciated in this decision that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction the applicant should an aggrieved person. (33). While considering this question, this court enunciated the broad principles of determining the question of locus standi. The Court summarized the principles enunciated in this decision that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction the applicant should an aggrieved person. The Court then said- "In order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. So as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. This position is not inconsistent with the principles enunciated in the English cases already referred to. In the United States of America, also, the law on the point is substantially the same." (34). The aforesaid principle clearly indicates that even where a person is not a party to the proceedings in respect of which an application for writ of certiorari has been made is not altogether excluded from the province of a person having locus standi. If he has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings, he will be covered by the rule where a stranger is permitted to apply for a writ of certiorari in correcting the apparent error in the proceedings of subordinate Tribunals. In this connection, the Court said further:- "In the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. In this connection, the Court said further:- "In the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold." (35). The distinction between the person aggrieved and stranger was stated thus :- "To distinguish such applicants from strangers, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests area not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the cases, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure, designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?" (36). Significantly, the Court emphasized the reach and content of power to issue writs under Article 226 comprehensively to deal with injustice wherever it is found. Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?" (36). Significantly, the Court emphasized the reach and content of power to issue writs under Article 226 comprehensively to deal with injustice wherever it is found. It said that by referring to courts earlier decision in Dwarkanath vs. ITO Kanpur, A.I.R. 1966 SC 81 that the founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched the Article 226 in a comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. (37). If we examine the facts of the present case and the respective position of the parties in the light of ceiling statute which is a legislation of social welfare for equitable distribution of the land resources of the country by laying restrictions on the maximum holdings which an individual or family can hold, and that land in excess of ceiling so fixed held by any person may be available to State for distribution amongst the landless persons. It is not a statute which is meant to deal with private rights of particular users only, but was to bring agrarian reform by providing a broader land distribution basis for the common good of the people. Therefore, in determining what the statute of the petitioner in the context of question of locus standi is, it becomes relevant to consider whether the orders complained of have the effect of fulfilling the object of the statute or does impugned order results in conferring an advantage contrary to the object of the statute by allowing a person to retain land more than lands permissible under law to the detriment of the common interest in securing surplus land to go to the public pool, and whether the petitioners have some legal rights which have been affected or likely to be affected adversely by impugned orders? (38). So far as the injury caused to the petitioners is concerned, it cannot be denied and disputed that the impugned orders have direct nexus, if they are to be read in the manner in which the assessee has persuaded authorities under Ceiling Act to read and implement it. The same has direct affect on the rights acquired by the petitioners in accordance with law relating to the distribution of the surplus lands, acquired by the State. The same has direct affect on the rights acquired by the petitioners in accordance with law relating to the distribution of the surplus lands, acquired by the State. If such persons after allotment are to be deprived of their lands by subsequent orders passed, whether suo moto by authorities, or on application moved by the holder, it does affect them adversely. It cannot be said that by the impugned orders, no legal right of the petitioners are being affected for which they cannot complain of their grievances by pointing out an apparent error in the proceedings by which their rights are being affected. (39). In my opinion, the petitioners fall in the first category that they are the persons aggrieved by the orders impugned as the orders impugned directly result in depriving them of their right to hold the property which they are otherwise eligible to hold in accordance with law in execution of the provisions of the ceiling law itself. (40). Even assuming that they are not person aggrieved and they fall in the category of the strangers to the proceedings, their locus has to be determined in accordance with the incidence of injury cause to them. The subject matter of the statute under which the orders have been made and the extent of rights of interest of these persons which is affected by such orders. If we examine from such angle, it is not possible to reach the conclusion to deny the petitioners locus standi to maintain this petition simply on the ground that the transferees from the land holder, whose transfers are not recognised, are not required to be heard before determined ceiling applicable to any person and determination of surplus land held by them. It may be noticed that this right was denied primarily on the ground that ceiling proceeding is determination of ceiling up to which the holder of the land can hold the lands and while not recognising the transfers for the purpose of determining the holdings of the assessee, it does safeguard their rights by providing that the land holder is not entitled to surrender such lands which he himself transferred but he has in the first instance, to surrender unencumbered lands. The land transferred by the holder is treated to be encumbered land. The land transferred by the holder is treated to be encumbered land. Thus, in the totality of the scheme and the provisions of the ceiling laws, enough safeguards have been provided to protect the rights of the transferees and keeping in view the various decisions on the ceiling matters, the principles of exclusion of natural justice vis-a-vis such transferees during the determination of ceiling was accepted by the Full Bench of this Court in Keshas case (supra). (41). However, it may be noticed that the Keshas case does not dwell on the question of locus standi of those persons challenging the order passed in ceiling proceedings, which suffers from any mistake apparent on the face of record or defect in jurisdiction and might be affecting their rights otherwise. (42). It is relevant to notice in this connection that though such transferees have no right of the notice and opportunity of hearing during determination of ceiling area, right of such person to challenge the surrender of such transferred land in contravention of provision of Ceiling Act has been accepted by this Court in number of cases. (43). Moreover, the judgment relied on by the respondents does not deal with the rights of the allottees from the surplus land which was taken possession of by the State and had become part of the State holdings under the ceiling laws, which is meant to be distributed amongst landless persons through allotment under the Rules framed for that purpose. After such land is distributed, if subsequently by modification of any orders relating to determination of surplus land, less land is ultimately found to be surplus which could be acquired, and the holder become entitled to return of excess land acquired, whether such allottees, whose interests are adversely affected, are rendered remedy-less notwithstanding that they may have spent a huge amount for the development of the land and made it suitable for agricultural purposes, and deprivation of such land results in depriving the tiller of their livelihood, was not the issue under consideration in Keshas case. The present case beings out new situation which is required to be dealt with on its own merit. (44). Therefore, the decision in Kesas case (supra) is of little assistance to the respondents to support the preliminary objection. The present case beings out new situation which is required to be dealt with on its own merit. (44). Therefore, the decision in Kesas case (supra) is of little assistance to the respondents to support the preliminary objection. What is required for a locus standi to maintain a writ petition is that persons must have a live interest which they are entitled to protect. Whether on merit they are able to protect the same is a different issue. The petitioners have said that they have acquired right to the land in question in lawful manner after the assessee Chandan Singh had given option for surrendering the land in question and that was acquired by the State Government, it cannot be said that any inherent illegality was appended to such allotment. In law it cannot be said that the petitioners have no interest in challenging the orders which affected their rights, if the orders are allowed to stand, they will be deprived of their lands. The petitioners must be held to have locus standi on the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai case (supra). (45). In this connection, it will not be out of place to mention the principle enunciated by the Denning, J. in R. vs. Thames Magistrates Court ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129, and is approved by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai case (supra), which is close to the controversy in hand. (46). It was a case in which there were two traders in Goulston and Stepney. One of them was Gritzman who held a license to trade on pitch No. 4 for five days in the week and pitch No. 8 for the other two days. The other was Greenbaum, who held a licence to sell on pitch No. 8 for two days of the week and pitch No. 10 for the other days of the week. A much better pitch, pitch No. 2, in Goulston St. became vacant. Thereupon, both Gritzman and Greenbaum applied for the grant of a licence, each wanted to give up his own existing licence and get a new licence for pitch No. 2. The Borough Council considered and decided in favour of Greenbaum and refused application of Gritzman, who was left with his right to sell on pitches Nos. 4 and 8. (47). Gritzman appealed to the Magistrate. The Borough Council considered and decided in favour of Greenbaum and refused application of Gritzman, who was left with his right to sell on pitches Nos. 4 and 8. (47). Gritzman appealed to the Magistrate. He could not appeal against the grant of a licence to Greenbaum, but only against the refusal to grant licence to himself. Before the Magistrate, the borough Council opposed him. The Magistrate held that the council was wrong to refuse the licence of pitch No. 2 to Gritzman. The council thereupon made out a licence for Gritzman for pitch No. 2 and wrote to Greenbaum saying that his licence had been wrongly issued. (48). Greenbaum deprived of his licence as a result of order in Grittzmans case made an application for certiorari to court. The court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. An objection was taken that Greenbaum had no locus standi. Rejecting the contention, Lord Denning observed:- "I should have thought that in this case Greenbaum was certainly a person aggrieved, and not a stranger. He was affected by the Magistrates orders because the Magistrate ordered another person to be put on his pitch. It is a proper case for the intervention of the court by means of certiorari." (49). Here, also is a case in which if we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent holder of the land, the Revenue Appellate Authority has ordered to place the assessee on the land which stood allotted to the petitioners resulting in affecting their rights directly. The principle in R. vs. Thames Magistrates Court ex parte Greenbaum was approved by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai case (supra). (50). Accordingly the preliminary objection as to lack of locus standi is rejected. (51). Before parting with the discussion it will not be out of place to mention here that according to material placed on record, the petitioners or their predecessors in interest were allotted land, out of the land surrendered by the assessee Chandan Singh on 3.10.77. (50). Accordingly the preliminary objection as to lack of locus standi is rejected. (51). Before parting with the discussion it will not be out of place to mention here that according to material placed on record, the petitioners or their predecessors in interest were allotted land, out of the land surrendered by the assessee Chandan Singh on 3.10.77. It has been noticed above that by the order dated 26.7.75, by which Chandan Singhs ceiling case was determined, he was found to be holding 361 bighas 4 biswas of land in express of the area upto which he could hold i.e., 30, standards acres and remaining 35.62 standard acres (as per conversion) were held to be surplus out of the acquired lands. Aggrieved of this order, determining ceiling area of Chandan Singh, no appeal at any time was preferred and the said order had become final. In implementing the order, the respondent assessee Chandan Singh had given his option on 4.10.75 which included the lands out of which the allotment has to be made in favour of the petitioners and the said option was accepted on 4.10.75. Appeal against acceptance of the option with certain variation was filed only on 2.4.79 (Annex. 4) i.e., to say much after the date, the allotments were made, out of the land acquired in pursuance of the order dated 26.6.75 and 4.10.75. No proceedings were pending when allotment was made, so as to be hit by doctrine of lis pendense. Subsequently, bringing into existence any lis cannot invite the invocation of doctrine of lis pendense, to impinge the allotment to be subject to the future litigation that may be taken up by the party or the State, as the case may be. Therefore, the contention of the respondents to the extent that the allotment made in favour of the petitioners were subject to lis pendency and the lis having been culminated in favour of the assessee Chandan Singh, they are not entitled to challenge the impugned orders also cannot be sustained. (52). The brings us to the merit of the case. (53). Therefore, the contention of the respondents to the extent that the allotment made in favour of the petitioners were subject to lis pendency and the lis having been culminated in favour of the assessee Chandan Singh, they are not entitled to challenge the impugned orders also cannot be sustained. (52). The brings us to the merit of the case. (53). To recount the facts which we have noticed earlier, the competent officer in his order dated 16.4.80 in a proceeding which came to be instituted as a result of the order of remand made by the Revenue Appellate Authority on 20.9.79 which was confined to a specific area of inquiry to be conducted by him, on an application made by the assessee, pointing out certain mistake in conversion of measurement of land held by him from bighas of Standard Acres, undertook the arithmetical calculation of conversation of bighas in to standard acres as per rules of conversion on the basis of nature of land stated in land records, correctness of which has not been disputed, and found the apparent error in converting a measure part of land as Chahi which was Benami or of different character. (54). In the application submitted by the assessee and after giving details of the nature of land and its conversion, he made a clear assertion that: ^^;g gSa fd mijksDr rF;ksa ij xkSj Qjekdj xSj lk;y dh tehu dk iqu% dsydqysku fd;k tkrk gSa rks xSj lk;y dh tehu flfyax esa vokIr Hkwfe 35-08 LVs- ,dM+ djus ;ksX; ugha jgrh gSa] vr% tks xSj lk;y izkFkhZ dh iwoZ esa tehu flfyax esa tks vokIr dh xbZ gS] mls iqu% xSj lk;y dks ykSVkbZ tk;s] ,oa ftu lk{;ksa dks ,yksV dh xbZ gSa] mudh ,yksVesaV [kkfjt fd;k tkos ,oa izkFkhZ xSj lk;y dks tehu [kljk uEcj 473 jdck 106½ ch?kk] [kljk uEcj 341@543 jdck 2311½ ch?kk] [kljk uEcj 311 jdck 29½ ch?kk [kljk uEcj 402 jdck 22½ ch?kk] [kljk uEcj 306 jdck 24½ ch?kk] [kljk uEcj 312 jdck 711½ ch?kk] [kljk uEcj 97 jdck 24111½ ch?kk ekStk jkÅrk dks izkFkhZ xSj lk;y dks ykSVk;s tkosa ,oa bu uEcjku dks fd;s x;s ,YkksVht dk ,yksVesaV [kkfjt QjekosaA blls flfyax dk eqdnek esa izkFkhZ xSj lk;y dks U;k; fey ldsxk ,oa ljdkj dks fdlh rjg dh tehu vokIr djus esa dksbZ uqdlku ugha gksxk ,oa ,YkksVesaV [kkfjt djus esa dksbZ vkifRr ugha vk;sxhA** (55). The objection was raised by the State Government that re-computation of the ceiling area cannot be done, as remand was only for inquiry into specific issue and not a general order of remand. The finding that there was an obvious mistake in conversion of total holdings of holder from bighas to standard acres, the SDO made a proper conversion of land from bighas to standard acres on the basis of the nature of the land as per the land records correction of which was made and still not in dispute and also recognising some of the transfers after examining the material and affording opportunity to legal representatives of Chandan Singh as per the direction contained in the order of remand resulted in reduction of total holdings of Chandan Singh as a result of exclusion of finding some of the transfers recognisable, which were earlier held to be not recognisable. His findings were recorded as under— ^^vr% xSj lk;y ds odhyksa ds le{k fnukad 24-2-58 dh fLFkfr dh ifjx.kuk iqu% dh tkrh gSA dza la- uke xzke fdLe Hkwfe jdck LVs- ,dM+ 1- jkÅrk okgh 1441½2 16-18 2- jkÅrk ok-v- 32611½2 24-39 3- jkÅrk ok-fn- 12611½2 8-24 4- jkÅrk ok-r`- 189111½2 10-16 5- jkÅrk eS-eq- 211½2 0-31 ;ksx 790½1 59-28 xSj lk;y ds [kkrs esa 031 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe xSjeqefdu gS] ftudks ljdkj }kjk flfyax esa ugha tksM+us ,oa ugha vf/kxzg.k djus ds vknsk gSA vr% 0-31 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe de djus ds ipkr~ mlds [kkrs esa 58-97 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe jgrh gSA xSj lk;y ds odhy }kjk fuEu vkjkth dk cspku gksuk crk;k gSA ¼1½ tfj;s fyf[kr fnukad 6-10-68 :i;s 3000½ :- rhu gtkj Jh xtsUnz flagg oYn j.kthrflagg jktiwr lkfdu >kc rg- lkapkSj uka- la- 99 fnukad 116-71 [k-ua- jdck fdLe LVs- ,dM+ 33936111½3 okgh 3-38 ¼2½ tfj;s fyf[kr fnukad 6-10-68 :i;s 500½ v{kjs ikap lkS Jh Hkksikyflag oYn cyoUrflag dkSe jktiwr lk- jkÅrk uka- la- 161 fnukad 13-8-72 [k-ua- jdck fdLe LVs- ,dM+ 468@54522½ okgh 1-56 ¼3½ tfj;s fyf[kr fnukad 8-11-69 :i;s 11000½ X;kjg gtkj 1½ ukFk oYn jktk dyoh lkfdu & jkÅrk rg- HkhuekyA uka-la- 1381 fnukad 16-4-75 [k-ua- jdck fdLe LVs- ,dM+ 351 41½4 okgh 0-50 99 25½3 ch- 111 100 2011½ ¼4½ tfj;s QSlys fnukad-------½ ykok oYn gsek dyoh lk- jkÅrk rg- HkhuekyA uka-la- fnukad [k-ua- jdck fdLe LVs- ,dM+ 414 37½4 ch- 111 2-00 gLrkUrj.k la[;k 1 ls 3 rd dk cspku 31-2-69 ds iwoZ dk gSa] lHkh [kjhnnkj jktLFkku ds fuoklh gSA muds ikl flfyax lhek ls Hkwfe de gSA dkr ls d`"kd gSa rFkk rhuksa [kjhnnkjksa ds uke jktLo fjdkMZ esa vey njken gks pqdk gS] rFkk bdjkjukek ds vuqlkj Hkwfe/kkjh }kjk muds cgd esa jftLVªh Hkh djkbZ tk pqdh gSa] mDr gLrkarj.k 30 Mh-Mh- ds varxZr gksus ls ekU; djkj fn;s tkrs gSA gLrkUrj.k la[;k 4 tfj;s vnkyr dh fMdzh ds Hkwfe xSj lk;y ds [kkrs ls xbZ gSa] tks laor~ 2012 ls 2015 rd dh tekcanhg ds voyksdu ls ;g lkQ Li"V gks tkrk gSa fd [kljk uEcj 414 jdck 37½4 ch?kk fdLe ch- 111 dh Hkwfe mlds [kkrs esa ugha Fkh ,oa rglhynkj Hkhueky }kjk fjiksVZ isk dh xbZ gSa] ml fjiksVZ esa fnukad 1-4-66 dks mDr Hkwfe xSj lk;y ds [kkrs esa vafdr ugha dh xbZ gS] vr% rglhynkj dh fjiksVZ ds vuqlkj mDr Hkwfe xSj lk;y ds [kkrs esa fnukad 1-4-66 o 31-12-69 dks ugha gksus ls mls ekU; djkj fn;k tkrk gSA xSj lk;y dk blh ekeys dk iwoZ QSlyk fnukad 26-7-75 esa gLrkUrj.k la[;k 1 o 2 dks ekU; djkj fn;k x;k Fkk ftldh dqy Hkwfe 4-44 LVs- ,dM+ gS rFkk bl vknsk ds gLrkUrj.k dh dqy Hkwfe 14-44 LVs- ,dM+ de djus ds ipkr~ xsj lk;y ds [kkrs esa 44-53 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe jgrh gSA rglhynkj us fjiksVZ esa xSj lk;y ds ifjokj esa ikap lnL; rLnhd fd;s x;s gSaA ftlds vuqlkj xSj lk;y 30 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe j[kus dk vf/kdkjh gSA vr% 30 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe [kksM+h tkdj ks"k 14-53 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe jkT; ljdkj esa vf/kxzg.k djus ds vknsk fn;s tkrs gSA** (56). This determination was in the presence of the State and with the aid of the calculation of the respondent holder and was not subject matter of challenge by the assessee. (57). It is apparent that the entire land held by the assessee was taken to be the same i.e., 790 bighas 1 biswa and its conversion to standard acres was made according to the classification of land as per the land records which resulted in reducing the measurement of total land held by Late Chandan Singh from 70.06 standard acres to 59.28 standard acres. From this computation 0.31 standard acres of land found to be gairmumkin Govt. Land, was further reduced leaving total holdings of Chandan Singh at 58.97 standard acres, out of which transfers of 14.4 standard acres were held to be recognisable transfers made by the holder. On that premise, the re-computation of the surplus area was made. After allowing retaining 30 standard acres with the holder as eligible ceiling limit, and excluding the transfers recognized as per aforesaid findings, the S.D.O. directed that in view of its findings no additional land is required to be surrendered. It also directed with details the land ad measuring 182 bighas 1 bigha to be acquired as surplus land. The land, transfers in respect of which were recognized and excluded from the final computation of holdings of Chandan Singh and surplus holdings were with transferees hence it return or retention was not required. Hence, it directed that land which was in possession of allottees after taking possession only was retained as part of surplus land required to be acquired. Since the assessee was not required to surrender any land, the land which had been acquired additionally and was not in possession of allottees was not to be retained. Details of which were also given in the claim. (58). This order was not challenged by the assessee. The correction of computation was not challenged in the writ petition or the further proceedings by the State Government also. The State Government was aggrieved with the reduction of surplus area from 35.28 standard acres to 25.08 standard acres as a result of conversion of measurement from bighas to standard acres only. It was not even aggrieved with recognition of certain transfers made by the assessee to the extent of 14.44 standard acres of land. (59). The State Government was aggrieved with the reduction of surplus area from 35.28 standard acres to 25.08 standard acres as a result of conversion of measurement from bighas to standard acres only. It was not even aggrieved with recognition of certain transfers made by the assessee to the extent of 14.44 standard acres of land. (59). Thus, the orders of the authorities below must be construed and read in the light of aforesaid facts and cannot be read in isolation. If we read in the back-drop, the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, it clearly found that earlier surplus land ad measuring 35.01 standard acres on conversion from bighas was altered as a result of arithmetical correction in the conversion computation. The land in standard acres had earlier been calculated in excess than what it ought to have been. The order was clearly made in the following terms— ^^nksuksa i{kksa dh cgl ij euu fd;k x;k ,oa fjdkMZ dk voyksdu fd;k x;k ftlls ;g Li"V gS fd fnukad 16-4-80 ds fu.kZ; esa ;g ekuk x;k gS fd iwoZ ds fu.kZ; esa ifjx.kuk laca/kh =qfV gqbZ gSA ifjx.kuk dh =qfV ,d fyfidh; =qfV gS rFkk U;k; dh n`f"V ls blesa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us fopkj djus esa vihy kfDr;ksa dks ,DlhM ¼Exceed½ ugha fd;k gS] ,oa ifjx.kuk dh =qfV fdlh Hkh Lrj ij lq/kkjh tk ldrh gSA fnukad 4-10-75 ds fu.kZ; esa 35-08 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe vf/kxzfgr djus ds vknsk fn;s x;s rFkk fnukad 16-4-80 ds fu.kZ; }kjk iw.kZ fu.kZ; esa ifjx.kuk dh =qfV ds dkj.k 25-08 ,dM+ Hkwfe vf/kxzfgr djus ds vknsk fn;s x;s gSA** (60). It is clearly indicated that earlier 35.06 standard acres of land has been held to be surplus land and was acquired but as a result of re computation, 10 standard acres have been found to be excess land acquired which could have been ordered to be returned. While accepting this position, the court found that no interference is called for in the order passed by the SDO even if in this context the last sentence in the order has any ambiguity. The earlier acquired land was 35.08 standard acres. It is nobodys case that the land earlier acquired was 14.44 standard acres out of which 10 standard acres was to be reduced. The earlier acquired land was 35.08 standard acres. It is nobodys case that the land earlier acquired was 14.44 standard acres out of which 10 standard acres was to be reduced. Having affirmed the finding that the 10 standard acres of land has been acquired in excess, it can only relate to what has been acquired earlier and if by some mistake, reference having been made to 14.44 standard acres which was referable to the land subject matter of recognized transfers, it could only relate to what has been earlier included in the lands held by the assessee as a result of non-recognition of transfers. Reference having been made to 14.44 standard acres which was referable to the land, subject matter of recognised transfers as per orders of S.D.O. Dated 16.4.1980 and about which deduction was made, while finally determining the surplus area, the order of Revenue Appellate Authority cannot in any way be read as allowing further reduction of 10 standard acres than what has been allowed by the SDO. It was while confirming the order of SDO determining the re computation as a result of proper conversion of the lands from bighas to standard acres that a clarification has been sought to be made by assuming that 14.44 standard acres was acquired earlier and 10 standard acres has to be reduced from that part which was a mistake apparent on the face of record and was required to be corrected on the reasoning recorded by the Revenue Appellate authority himself for affirming the order passed by the competent officer and rejecting the contention by the state that such mistake cannot be corrected while deciding the matter on remand and order should have been confined to the directions that a clerical error can be corrected by any authority when it is brought to its notice or superior authority. There cannot be any quarrel with this principle. (61). There cannot be any quarrel with this principle. (61). As a matter of fact, the SDO when considered the ceiling case on remand to reconsider the question about recognition of certain transfers made by the erstwhile holder of the land passed a composite order, one in pursuance of direction of remand and another in exercise of his inherent power to correct and apparent clerical or arithmetical mistake in his earlier order on undisputed facts about nature of land emerging from record of State which had been erroneously considered otherwise on earlier occasion. (62). Having confirmed the finding about the determination of ceiling area and surplus area, reference to the figures a clarification was made that retention of land by the assessee was in excess of 30 standard acres. It is not the assessee respondents case even now that more than 30 standard acres were allowed to be retained by him by the Assessing Officer. It is significant to notice that while computation of surplus land leaving out ceiling area was re-adjusted by rectifying the conversion figures of standard acres, there was no scope available for returning the assessee any land to make his retained holdings more than 30 standard acres of land. This aspect of the matter has not at all been noticed while the petitioners application for return of the land was allowed. Subsequently also, the apparent error on the face of record in conversion of standard acres from bighas was not the subject matter of contention before the Board. The only contention was the same, which was made before the Revenue Appellate Authority by the State, that the surplus area could not have been reduced from 35.6 to lesser land by the competent officer which was not countenanced by the Board of Revenue. When the mistake was pointed out by the State, the contention was rejected without examining this aspect. One fails to understand why the clerical mistakes in conversion of land from bighas to standard acres could not be corrected when there is no factual dispute about correctness of conversion figures arrived at by SDO in his order dated 16.4.1980 in accordance with land records is raised. (63). One fails to understand why the clerical mistakes in conversion of land from bighas to standard acres could not be corrected when there is no factual dispute about correctness of conversion figures arrived at by SDO in his order dated 16.4.1980 in accordance with land records is raised. (63). As a result of aforesaid discussion, I hold that the orders Annexures 8, 9 and 10 read as a whole do not give any additional measure of land to the respondent assessee than he was allowed to retain by order dated 16.4.80, that is to say 30 standard acres nor there was any direction to return any part of the excess land which was retained by the Assessing Officer with him to make the holding of Chandan Singh exceeding 30 standard acres. The Assessing Officer being alive to the issue of the allotments having been made meanwhile, his passed a very just and reasonable order after calling report from the Nayab Tehsildar that the lands which are not in occupation of the allottees and which should have been surrendered by the Assessee in excess be returned to the assessee, which ad measured 181 bighas 1 biswa, to which he was entitled and the remaining land, equal to the surplus land have been retained which was in possession of the allottees, their allotments are also not disturbed. (64). It was also with a view to take advantage of the clerical error in the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority that the assessee moved an application for returning of 10 standard acres of land which has been allowed by the competent officer. Afresh adjudication of the ceiling limit and the surplus area by the Revenue Appellate Authority, which admittedly was not permissible, the retention of any land in addition to 30 standard acres in violation of ceiling law cannot be permitted to stand. (65). Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 30.12.1992 to the extent it makes the observations ^^ iwoZ esa 10 LVs- ,dM+ vf/kd vf/kxzfgr Hkwfe dks ?kVkrs gq, vc ek= 4-44 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe vf/kxzfgr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA** In the last but second paragraph of the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly deleted from the order. The order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 30.12.1992 to the extent it makes the observations ^^ iwoZ esa 10 LVs- ,dM+ vf/kd vf/kxzfgr Hkwfe dks ?kVkrs gq, vc ek= 4-44 LVs- ,dM+ Hkwfe vf/kxzfgr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA** In the last but second paragraph of the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly deleted from the order. Likewise reference to the surplus land only to the extent of 4.44 standard acres in subsequent orders must, beheld to be clerical error and the surplus land declared as per the competent officer must be held to be 14.53 standard acres as per the order dated 16.4.80. No other land has been given independently by any authorities nor it was option of the assessee at any time that he has to be returned any further land than what has been determined by the Assessing Officer except to the extent that he may not be required to surrender additional land as appears to have been given out by the Revenue Appellate Authority that he is required to surrender land in addition to the land he has already surrendered under the proceedings which culminated in 1975. (66). As a result of this order, the later order passed by the competent officer for return of the land which is part of the allotments made to the petitioners or their predecessors, as a consequence of the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide Annex.9 also cannot be sustained and cannot be given effect to. Consequently, the order dated 30.12.92 to the extent stated above is also quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.