NEPAL SINGH v. U. P. HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
2005-02-17
JAGDISH BHALLA, P.K.CHATTERJI
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
JAGDISH BHALLA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order of reversion-dated 20. 11. 1985 passed by the Housing Commissioner and consequential order dated 24. 01. 2004, contained in annexure no. 29 to the writ petition. ( 2 ) PETITIONER is said to be a product of I. I. T. Kanpur 1963 batch and was appointed as Assistant Engineer by an order dated 08. 07. 1970 in U. P. Housing Development Board. Thereafter in 1982 he was confirmed. . On 30. 11. 1978 petitioner was promoted on adhoc basis on the post of Executive Engineer for a period of six months. According to petitioner his promotion on the post of Executive engineer was regularized. ( 3 ) ON 29. 11. 1983, the Superintending Engineer, Meerut submitted a report to the Housing Commissioner indicating therein the alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner. The superintending Engineer also recommended the suspension of the petitioner but the same was not accepted. However, a departmental inquiry was ordered by an order dated 19. 12. 1983 with respect to the various charges against the petitioner and one Sri v. S. Vasudevan, Superintending Engineer Ist Circle was appointed as Enquiry officer. The petitioner submitted reply to the charges levelled against him and requested for personal hearing. According to petitioner the impugned order is illegal, unjustified and unwarranted as by this punishment order dated 20. 11. 1985 the petitioner was inflicted with major and minor punishment both by the Housing Commissioner, which is not permissible under law. The petitioner was not only reverted to his substantive post of assistant Engineer but his two increments were permanently withheld and an adverse entry was also made in his character roll. According to petitioners Counsel, the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet on 19. 12. 1984 denying the charges levelled against him with specific request that he be heard in person. It has been submitted that the Inquiry Officer who had framed as many as 13 charges against the petitioner failed to afford an opportunity to the petitioner during inquiry. Neither any date was fixed by the Inquiry Officer nor the petitioners specific request for being given oral hearing as laid down in Regulation 27 (2) of the regulations was afforded.
It has been submitted that the Inquiry Officer who had framed as many as 13 charges against the petitioner failed to afford an opportunity to the petitioner during inquiry. Neither any date was fixed by the Inquiry Officer nor the petitioners specific request for being given oral hearing as laid down in Regulation 27 (2) of the regulations was afforded. The decision of disciplinary authority against the petitioner was in gross violation of the provisions of regulation and the entire disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were void ab-initio. ( 4 ) SRI Devendra Kumar Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner stated with vehemence that Regulation-27 lays down the procedure for imposing major punishment and Regulation-28 prescribes procedure for imposing minor punishment. Regulation 27 (2) lays down that it is to be stated whether the charged Officer desires to be heard in person and the petitioner specifically conveyed by means of written statement of defence dated 19. 12. 1984 that he desire to be heard in person but the disciplinary authority did not heed to afford any adequate and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself, and therefore, the inquiry proceedings and the impugned order is vitiated being in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. It has been further contended that in true sensethere was no charge with regard to the financial embezzlement against the petitioner and the petitioner followed the same procedure for purchasing material which was being followed by his predecessor as such the petitioner was subjected to unnecessary hostile discrimination which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India. ( 5 ) ELABORATING further, it has emphatically been contended that the relevant documents referred to in the charge sheet and in para-15 to the writ petition were not furnished to the petitioner inspite of repeated request and the petitioner was not allowed to inspect the relevant document. Specific violation of Regulation 27 (4) of the regulations has also been alleged as the disciplinary authority failed to apply his mind to the question as to whether he himself would inquire into the charge sheet or entrust the inquiry to the board of Inquiry or an Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority appointed the Inquiry Officer in the beginning against the provision of Regulation 27 (4), which rendered the disciplinary proceeding manifestly illegal, and without jurisdiction.
The Disciplinary Authority appointed the Inquiry Officer in the beginning against the provision of Regulation 27 (4), which rendered the disciplinary proceeding manifestly illegal, and without jurisdiction. Further the disciplinary authority in violation of Regulation 27 (5) of the Regulations did not nominate any person to present the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority and similarly the petitioner was not given any opportunity to avail the help of any officer or servant to defend himself in the departmental proceedings. The petitioner was also not allowed to cross-examine the witness, which is against the provision of Regulation 27 (6) of the Regulations. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner next argued that the disciplinary authority failed to take into consideration the normal working of the department i. e. the work without administrative sanction and technical sanction used to be carried on in the Board and it is still being carried on and the Housing Commissioner had admitted this fact in the Boards meeting held on 10th, 11th and 20th august 1983 as contained in annexure no. 20 to the writ petition. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that even the Inquiry officer while working in the department had himself followed the same procedure in purchasing the material as was followed by the petitioner. ( 7 ) IT was further contended that the petitioner was the General secretary of the Engineers Association and the petitioner and other directly recruited Engineers were opposing the merger of the deputationists. The Superintending Engineer, who forwarded the adverse report against the petitioner and the Enquiry Officer were working in the Housing Board on deputation and as such both being annoyed were bent upon to ruin the career of the petitioner. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer had conducted fair and impartial enquiry against the petitioner. Further, for this reason aforesaid, he was disqualified from holding any enquiry against the petitioner. ( 8 ) IT may be stated at this juncture that at admission stage an ad-interim order was passed. However, on 14. 07. 1999 the writ petition was dismissed in default and the interim order was discharged. Subsequently, the writ petition was restored on 03. 02. 2004 and the order dated 14. 7.
( 8 ) IT may be stated at this juncture that at admission stage an ad-interim order was passed. However, on 14. 07. 1999 the writ petition was dismissed in default and the interim order was discharged. Subsequently, the writ petition was restored on 03. 02. 2004 and the order dated 14. 7. 99 was recalled because the name of Sri H. S. Jain, the counsel who was conducting the matter at that stage was not printed in the cause list of 14. 07. 1999. However, by the time when the matter was restored, in the absence of the interim order the impugned order dated 24. 01. 2004 was passed reviving the reversion order dated 20. 11. 1985. The petitioner accordingly amended the writ petition and has also assailed the order dated 24. 1. 2004. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the respondents it has been submitted that the punishment order dated 20. 11. 1985 was passed after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and the order of reversion has already been implemented and affected. It was further pointed out that the petitioner was promoted in stop-gap arrangement in the year 1978 purely in officiating capacity on the post of Executive engineer from the post of Assistant Engineer and because of the unsatisfactory record of service, he could not be regularized nor could he be confirmed on the post of Executive Engineer in view of various adverse entries. It was further submitted that the Housing commissioner was competent enough to take decision and by order dated 29. 12. 1983 he instituted the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and appointed Shri V. S. Vasudevan as an Inquiry officer because of he being technically qualified as also well versed with the matter in question. It is in this backdrop that he was directed to prepare the charge sheet. It was further indicated that no statement of witness on behalf of the Parishad was recorded by the Inquiry Officer and as such there was no occasion to afford any opportunity whatsoever to the petitioner to cross-examine any witness on behalf of the Parishad. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respondents further argued that the explanation submitted by the petitioner indicated that there was no need for calling the witnesses but opportunity of hearing be afforded for putting his version.
( 10 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respondents further argued that the explanation submitted by the petitioner indicated that there was no need for calling the witnesses but opportunity of hearing be afforded for putting his version. The report of the inquiry Officer would reveal that the petitioner neither wanted to call upon the witnesses nor wanted to see the cash book and finally on the basis of oral discussion, clarification was sought from him in march, 1994 and thereafter Inquiry Officer had submitted his report in 1985. ( 11 ) RELYING upon the decision of the Apex Court in Debotosh Pal choudhury Versus Punjab National Bank and others (2002) 8 SCC 68 , learned counsel appearing for the Housing Board contended that when the petitioner participated in the enquiry and has not demanded to examine any witness but wanted only oral discussions before the Enquiry officer as such the petitioner is now debarred from contending that the petitioner was not afforded adequate opportunity in the enquiry. ( 12 ) BEFORE proceeding further, we deem it proper to refer certain provisions of the Regulation, which deals with the procedure to be adopted in the enquiry, supply of documents etc. Regulation 27 lays down the procedure for imposing penalties as specified in clause (e)to (g) of Regulation 25 shall be passed except after an enquiry. Regulation 27 (2) laid emphasis that the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations and such charges together with the statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be communicated to the charged employee. . Clause (3) of Regulation 27 provides that the officer or servant of the Board shall for the purpose of preparing his defence shall be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as the charged employee may specify. Regulation 27 (5) provides that the disciplinary authority may also nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority inquiring into the charges. It further provides that the Officer or servant of the Board may present his case with the assistance of any other officer or servant of the Board approved by the disciplinary authority.
It further provides that the Officer or servant of the Board may present his case with the assistance of any other officer or servant of the Board approved by the disciplinary authority. Clause (6) of the Regulation 27 provides in clear words that inquiring authority, shall in the course of the enquiry, consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence as may be relevant. Further the charged officer or servant shall be entitled to cross-examine witnesses and to give evidence in person. ( 13 ) RELYING upon the decision of the Apex Court in Kashinath dikshita versus Union of India and others; (1986) 3 SCC 229 managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others versus B. Karunakar and others; (1993)4 SCC 727 , State of U. P. Shatrughan Lal and another (1998) 6 SCC 651 Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited versus Girja shanker Pant and others; (2001) 1 SCC 182 Bhupinder Pal Singh versus director General of Civil Aviation and others (2003)3 SCC 633 , learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has a right to be given copy of the preliminary enquiry report and shall also be allowed to inspect the relevant documents which were demanded by the petitioner, in the event their copies could not be supplied. Since the petitioner was neither given copy of the preliminary enquiry report nor he was given the desired documents, which were being relied upon by the department against the petitioner, were never supplied to the petitioner inspite of repeated request. ( 14 ) IN State of U. P. versus Shatrughan Lal and another; (1998)6 SCC 651 the Honble Supreme Court held that the Preliminary enquiry which is conducted invariably on the back of the delinquent employee often constitute the foundation of the charge sheet, it must be supplied to a person who is called upon to submit his reply to the charge sheet. In Kashinath Dikshita versus Union of India and others; (1986)3 SCC 229 the Honble Supreme Court emphasized that no one facing a departmental enquiry can effectively meet the charges unless the copies of the relevant statements and documents to be used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such copies the concerned employee cannot prepare his defence, cross examine the witnesses and point out the inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible.
In the absence of such copies the concerned employee cannot prepare his defence, cross examine the witnesses and point out the inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible. Observance of natural justice and due opportunity has been held to be an essential ingredient in disciplinary proceedings and following this principle, the Honble Supreme Court set-aside the order of removal of the petitioner Bhupinder Pal Singh reported in (2003)3 SCC 633 . ( 15 ) IN Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shanka Pant and others (2001)1 SCC 182 , the Honble Supreme Court emphasized that fundamental requirement of law is that the doctrine of natural justice should be complied with and has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence. It was also held in this case that at an enquiry facts have to be proved and the person proceeded against must have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to give his own version or explanation about the evidence on which he is charged and to lead his defence. We would also like to mention that the petitioner being the general Secretary of the Engineers Association and other directly recruited Engineers have been opposing the merger of the deputationists. The Superintending Engineer, who forwarded the adverse report against the petitioner and the Enquiry Officer were working in the Housing Board on deputation and as such it is difficult to believe that the Enquiry Officer, whose merger was being opposed by the petitioner, would have conducted the enquiry in a detached and unbiased manner. ( 16 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and have also examined the material on record including the record produced by the Counsel for the respondents relating to the enquiry. There is no document on record from which it emerges out that time, place and date of enquiry was ever fixed by the Enquiry Officer and the same was communicated to the petitioner. Counsel for the respondent has also failed to show that the documents, which were demanded by the petitioner, were supplied to him during the course of enquiry. Such lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence.
Such lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence. ( 17 ) FURTHERMORE, this Court in the case of Om Pal Singh v. District development Officer, Ghaziabad and others [2000 (18) LCD 1239] has held that even if the delinquent employee has not appeared, the charges could be held proved only after examination of witnesses and production of record to support the allegations. The letter dated 26. 11. 1984 clearly reveals that the petitioner apart from oral hearing has demanded relevant papers such as comparative details of tender, cash book and vouchers referred to in the charge-sheet. Similarly, in the letter dated 14. 12. 1984 the petitioner has mentioned that the cash book of 1982-83 may be allowed to be inspected. Further the petitioner has also demanded for examination of certain witnesses. The respondents have failed to show that the documents demanded by the petitioner were ever supplied. As regard examination of witnesses, in paragraph 1 (x) of the counter affidavit it has been stated that no statement on behalf of the Parishad was recorded by the Enquiry Officer and as such there was no occasion to afford any opportunity to the petitioner to cross examine any witnesses. ( 18 ) AFTER having carefully examined the record pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner produced by the respondents and the decisions, referred to above cited on behalf of the petitioner, we are fully satisfied that enquiry proceedings were conducted in utter disregard of the Regulation 27 (2) to Regulation 27 (5) and the Principles of natural justice as such the impugned punishment dated 20. 11. 1985 suffers from serious infirmities and is liable to be quashed. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 20. 11. 1985 [annexure-10] to the writ petition including the order dated 24. 01. 2004 [which was passed consequent to dismissal of the writ petition in default] reverting the petitioner from the post of superintending Engineer to the post of Assistant Engineer, passed by the Housing Commissioner are hereby quashed. The petitioner would be entitled for all consequential reliefs. .